United States v. State of Mich. ( 2023 )

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 23a0108p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Plaintiff-Appellee, │
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BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY; SAULT STE. MARIE │
TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS; GRAND TRAVERSE BAND > No. 22-1946
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OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS; LITTLE RIVER
│
BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS; LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY │
BANDS OF ODAWA INDIANS, │
Intervenors-Appellees, │
│
v. │
│
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STATE OF MICHIGAN, and its agents, │
Defendant-Appellee, │
│
COALITION TO PROTECT MICHIGAN RESOURCES, fka │
Michigan Fisheries Resources Conversation Coalition, │
│
Proposed Intervenor-Appellant. ┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Marquette.
No. 2:73-cv-00026—Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge.
Argued: May 3, 2023
Decided and Filed: May 23, 2023
Before: BOGGS, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Christopher S. Patterson, FAHEY SCHULTZ BURZYCH RHODES PLC, Okemos,
Michigan, for Appellant. Kelly M. Drake, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee State of Michigan. Benjamin Richmond, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee United States.
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 2
ON BRIEF: Christopher S. Patterson, Stephen O. Schultz, David J. Szymanski Jr., FAHEY
SCHULTZ BURZYCH RHODES PLC, Okemos, Michigan, for Appellant. Kelly M. Drake,
Christopher D. Dobyns, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing,
Michigan, for Appellee State of Michigan. Benjamin Richmond, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee United States. Mason D.
Morisset, Thane D. Somerville, MORISSET, SCHLOSSER, JOZWIAK & SOMERVILLE APC,
Seattle, Washington, for Appellee Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians.
_________________
OPINION
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THAPAR, Circuit Judge. For nearly three years, seven sovereigns have been embroiled
in negotiations over who gets to manage the Great Lakes fisheries. The merits of those
negotiations aren’t before us, only an antecedent question of civil procedure: is the Coalition to
Protect Michigan Resources (“the Coalition”) entitled to intervene in those negotiations just as
the parties are approaching a deal? Under our precedent, the answer is no. Because the district
court properly denied the Coalition’s motion to intervene, we affirm.
I.
After extensive litigation beginning in 1973, the United States, the State of Michigan, and
five federally recognized tribes1 entered the Great Lakes Consent Decree of 1985. Among other
things, that decree governed the regulation of Great Lakes fisheries, whose waters the Ottawa
and Chippewa Indian Nations ceded to the United States in the 1836 Treaty of Washington. But
that decree wasn’t permanent. Rather, the decree lasted fifteen years.
When that fifteen-year term expired, the parties entered the Great Lakes Consent Decree
of 2000. Unlike its predecessor, this decree had a twenty-year term. Though that term has since
1
Namely, the Bay Mills Indian Community, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and Little Traverse Bay Bands of
Odawa Indians. These tribes are the successors in interest to the Ottawa and Chippewa Indian Nations, which
signed the 1836 Treaty.
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 3
expired, the district court extended the 2000 Decree indefinitely “until all objections to a
proposed successor decree have been adjudicated.” R. 2027, Pg. ID 12022.2
The latest round of negotiations began about three years ago. At the onset of these
negotiations, the district court presiding over this matter granted the Coalition amicus status.
The Coalition represents numerous private “sport fishing, boating, and conservancy groups”
interested in protecting the Great Lakes. R. 1865, Pg. ID 2070. These groups have long had an
interest in this dispute. In fact, several have “had a longstanding role in this case as amic[i]
curiae dating back to the origins of this dispute in the 1970s.” Coalition Br. 18 (emphasis
omitted). And since its amicus status was confirmed in 2019, the Coalition has been able to
represent its own interests during in-person and virtual negotiation sessions, caucusing with
Michigan during those meetings. It has also been able to meet with the parties and the mediator
outside of these negotiation sessions.
Now, the seven sovereigns are in the process of finalizing a new decree. But just as the
parties were concluding their negotiations, the Coalition moved to intervene. Why? Because it
says that “its relationship with the State deteriorated to the point” that Michigan is no longer
“willing or able to adequately represent the Coalition’s interests.” Id. at 24. The Coalition
alleges—with some force—that Michigan intends to abandon key provisions of the 2000 Decree,
namely those that: (1) promote biological conservation and diversity; (2) allocate fishery
resources between sovereigns; and (3) establish commercial and recreational fishing zones. The
Coalition particularly objects to the Tribes’ use of “non-selective gill nets,”3 which it claims
could decimate fish populations and harm the Great Lakes ecosystem. Coalition Br. 13; see
Reply Br. 20. Unlike the trap nets used under the 2000 Decree, gill nets kill nearly everything
2
“Much has been written about the perniciousness of consent decrees.” Allen v. Louisiana, 14 F.4th 366,
375 (5th Cir. 2021) (Oldham, J., concurring) (collecting authorities). Indeed, consent decrees “provide[] the
legitimacy of a judicial decision without the reality of a judicial decision.” Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees
Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103, 132 (1987). They often
limit the rights of third parties because once the court approves a consent decree, it’s difficult to undo. Id. And they
risk “improperly depriv[ing] future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.” Frew ex. rel.
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004). But here, the parties don’t challenge the legality of consent decrees, so
we save this issue for another day.
3
A “gill net means a wall of webbing held vertically in the water by weights and floats, and designed to
capture fish by means of entanglement.” R. 1458, Pg. ID 3220 (cleaned up).
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 4
that swims into them. See Mich. United Conservations Clubs v. Anthony, 280 N.W.2d 883, 888–
91 (Mich. App. 1979). Indeed, evidence suggests that the overuse of gill nets could “deplete the
fish resources of the Great Lakes to the extent that they would become non-existent.” Id. at 891(cleaned up).
This isn’t the first time that the Coalition has sought party status. Indeed, the Coalition’s
members have made similar arguments in seven other unsuccessful motions to intervene over the
last five decades.
On August 31, 2022, the district court denied the Coalition’s most recent motion to
intervene, which it made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and (b). First, the court
held that while the Coalition failed to prove any of the four elements necessary for intervention
as of right, “the untimeliness of the motion [was] the most compelling reason to deny.” R. 1985,
Pg. ID 11668. Second, and again focusing on the motion’s untimeliness, the court exercised its
discretion to deny the Coalition’s request for permissive intervention. Nevertheless, the court
promised to consider the Coalition’s objections to the parties’ proposed decree. The Coalition
then moved for reconsideration. After that motion was denied, the Coalition appealed.
II.
A.
A party seeking intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must show that: (1) the
motion was timely; (2) the movant possesses “a substantial legal interest” in the case; (3) the
movant’s ability to protect its interest will be impaired without intervention; and (4) the existing
parties inadequately represent the movant’s interest. Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F.3d 278, 283
(6th Cir. 2011). If the movant fails to meet any one of these criteria, the court must deny
intervention as of right. United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2005).
We review most of these criteria de novo. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467,
471 (6th Cir. 2000). But we review the district court’s timeliness decision for abuse of
discretion. Id. Why? Because district courts must consider “all relevant circumstances” of a
case to determine whether a motion is timely, including: (1) the stage of the proceedings;
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 5
(2) the purpose for the intervention; (3) the length of time that the movant knew or should’ve
known of its interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties; and (5) any unusual
circumstances militating for or against intervention. Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336,
340 (6th Cir. 1990). Since district courts are in the best position to evaluate these criteria, we
defer to their timeliness determinations unless “we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that [they] committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Heavrin, 330 F.3d 723, 727
(6th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).
Here, the district court found that the Coalition’s motion to intervene was untimely.
Because the Coalition failed to establish that the court abused its discretion when it made that
finding, it’s not entitled to intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
1.
The stage of the proceedings. This factor weighs against intervention when movants
request party status during the final stages of litigation. United States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d
587, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2001). When is litigation in its “final stages”? As this dispute’s decades-
long history demonstrates, it’s not always easy to tell. So instead of merely considering the sheer
amount of time that a case has been pending, our “more critical” reference point is “the [district]
court’s previously identified ‘finish line.’” Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at 475 (cleaned up). After
all, district courts are more familiar with all the circumstances of their cases and the amount of
time needed to resolve them.
Here, the district court identified that “finish line” when it concluded that negotiations
had already progressed “far beyond the point that any other party should be permitted to
intervene.” R. 1985, Pg. ID 11674. On appeal, the Coalition contends that the parties actually
weren’t close to finalizing a new decree because after the court denied the Coalition’s motion, it
extended the parties’ deadline to submit the new consent decree.
But when the district court denied the motion, it believed that the successor decree was
going to be finalized within a month. That is when the previous decree expired. And neither the
court nor any of the parties had any reason to conclude otherwise. Indeed, the court didn’t
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 6
indefinitely extend the 2000 Decree until several months later, when it realized that the new
consent decree would not be forthcoming.
Regardless, even if the court foresaw the extension—something the Coalition hasn’t
established—this factor would still weigh against intervention. That’s because even after the
court indefinitely extended the 2000 Decree, the parties continued to act as if they were close to
resolution. Indeed, they proposed a successor decree less than four weeks after the court
extended the deadline. And the court is set to adjudicate any remaining objections to that decree
in the coming months. Thus, no matter how you look at it, “the court’s previously identified
‘finish line’ . . . was fast approaching” when the Coalition moved to intervene. Stupak-Thrall,
226 F.3d at 475 (cleaned up).
For these reasons, this prong weighs against timeliness.
2.
The purpose for the intervention. Our cases approach this factor in two “somewhat
inconsistent” ways, either by: (1) “peek[ing] behind the timeliness curtain at the legitimacy of
the intervenors’ purported interest,” or (2) analyzing “whether the would-be intervenors acted
promptly in light of their stated purposes.” In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., End-Payor Actions,
33 F.4th 894, 902 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Because we’ve endorsed both approaches, we
review the purpose inquiry as the district court did: in terms of either legitimacy or promptness.
Below, the district court took the legitimacy approach. First, it identified the Coalition’s
asserted purpose for intervention: to “address matters directly affecting their interests.” R. 1985,
Pg. ID 11671 (quoting the motion to intervene). Specifically, “[t]he predominate areas of
concern for Intervenors’ member organizations are the conservation of fishing, boating and
wildlife resources within the Great Lakes.” R. 1969, Pg. ID 11041. Next, the court considered
whether that purpose was legitimate. After noting the Coalition’s “extensive participation” in
this case as an amicus, the district court concluded that the Coalition’s asserted purpose had
already “sufficiently been met” without intervention. R. 1985, Pg. ID 11671.
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 7
In its appellate briefs and during oral argument, the Coalition identified two purposes for
its intervention motion. But as the following shows, neither purpose weighs in favor of
timeliness.
First, the Coalition argues that it has an interest in conserving the Great Lakes fisheries,
an interest it claims that Michigan no longer seeks to protect. While the Tribes’ overuse of gill
nets or other questionable fishing practices could seriously “deplete the fish resources of the
Great Lakes,” it’s unclear whether Michigan supported these practices when the district court
denied the Coalition’s motion to intervene. Anthony, 280 N.W.2d at 891 (cleaned up).4 Nor
would we expect the State to do so given that such a position would arguably violate Michigan
law.
Indeed, the Michigan Constitution declares that the “conservation and development of the
natural resources of the state” is “of paramount public concern.” Mich. Const. art. IV, § 52. In
other words, Michigan has the “obligation to protect and preserve the waters of the Great Lakes”
and the “public right” to fish them. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64–65 (Mich. 2005)
(cleaned up). Of course, if the successor decree ultimately reflects that Michigan abandoned
these interests, that would be good reason for the district court to allow the Coalition to
intervene—even at the eleventh hour.
At this point, the Coalition hasn’t yet shown that Michigan abandoned its obligation to
protect the Great Lakes fisheries. To be sure, the Coalition cites several affidavits for the
proposition that Michigan no longer seeks to preserve biodiversity. But the district court refused
to consider these affidavits because the Coalition introduced them for the first time in its motion
for reconsideration. We review that refusal for abuse of discretion. Sommer v. Davis, 317 F.3d
686, 691 (6th Cir. 2003); Shah v. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc., 507 F. App’x 483, 495 (6th
Cir. 2012). And here, the Coalition didn’t attempt to show abuse of discretion, much less explain
4
To be sure, the 1836 Treaty reserved fishing rights to the Tribes. But “[t]he right of the Indians to engage
in gill net fishing is not absolute.” United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981). Rather, that right
is subject to Michigan regulations that: (1) reflect “a necessary conservation measure,” (2) use the “least restrictive
alternative method” of preserving Great Lakes fisheries from irreparable harm, and (3) don’t unreasonably
discriminate against tribal fishing interests or favor non-tribal interests. Id. (citing People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d
199 (Mich. 1976)).
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 8
why it failed to produce these affidavits earlier. Therefore, the district court’s decision not to
consider the affidavits was not an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, as Michigan and the United States argue on appeal, these affidavits likely
contain confidential information. When the Coalition joined the most recent round of
negotiations, it signed a confidentiality agreement, which provides that “statements, disclosures,
and representations made by any party . . . or amicus” during negotiations shall not be reported
or disclosed “to anyone not a Party” without “the prior consent of all the other Parties.” R. 1966-
2, Pg. ID 10974. Yet in its initial brief, the Coalition used these affidavits to reveal confidential
statements made during the decree negotiations. Though the Coalition’s potential breach isn’t
before us, it further supports the district court’s decision not to consider these affidavits.
Granted, the Coalition is in a tough position. To intervene, it must show that Michigan
no longer represents its interests. And to make that showing, the Coalition probably needs to
introduce statements made during the negotiations, which would likely violate its confidentiality
agreement. That said, there’s a solution to this predicament, one that the Coalition failed to
pursue below: the Coalition could seek permission from the district court to introduce these
affidavits notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement. But the Coalition didn’t do that.
Instead, it attached them to its motion for reconsideration without obtaining permission from the
district court or explaining why it failed to file them earlier with its motion to intervene. Because
the Coalition failed to preserve these affidavits for review, we can’t consider them.
Thus, the Coalition has failed to show that, as an amicus, it’s been unable to protect its
interests through discussions with the parties and the mediator. Looking to Michigan’s
constitution—and absent any contrary evidence in the record—we presume that the State shares
“the same ultimate objective” as the Coalition: the preservation of the Great Lakes fisheries.
Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). That’s
true even though the Coalition might’ve “voted differently” than the State on some discrete
issues. Id. (quoting United States v. Perry Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir.
1978)); see Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at 476; see Blount-Hill, 636 F.3d at 287–88. After all, the
district court already permits the Coalition to file any objections to the proposed successor decree
as an amicus.
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 9
Second, during oral argument, the Coalition also argued that it should receive party status
to protect its appellate rights. But Rule 24(a)(2) doesn’t permit intervention simply because the
movant wants to “file motions and appeals rather than merely amicus briefs.” Stupak-Thrall, 226
F.3d at 477 (cleaned up). Otherwise, movants could always obtain intervention as of right, even
when—as is the case here—the intervention motion was untimely. So without more, that interest
alone doesn’t weigh in favor of timeliness.
Nevertheless, if the successor decree is ultimately unlawful or shows that the government
failed to represent the Coalition’s interests in biodiversity and conservation, then the Coalition
would have good reason to request intervention “for the limited purpose of appeal.” United
States v. City of Detroit, 712 F.3d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). But at this point,
granting such limited intervention would be premature.5
For all these reasons, the second prong also weighs against timeliness.
3.
The length of time that the Coalition knew or should’ve known of its interest in the case.
Below, the district court concluded that this factor “weigh[ed] against timeliness” because
despite knowing its interests “since the beginning of the negotiations,” the Coalition “waited
three years to raise such interests.” R. 1985, Pg. ID 11672. In fact, the Coalition effectively
conceded as much: “intervenors have long known of their general interest in this case.” See R.
1969, Pg. ID 11037 (cleaned up).
But even if we looked beyond that concession, this factor would still weigh against
intervention. After all, when the Coalition first moved to join the case as an amicus, it described
its interest this way: “[Our] predominate areas of concern . . . are the conservation of fishing,
boating and wildlife resources within the Great Lakes.” R. 1865, Pg. ID 2075. Three years later,
when it moved to intervene, the Coalition stated an almost-identical interest: “[t]he predominate
areas of concern for Intervenors’ member organizations are the conservation of fishing, boating
5
During oral argument, both the United States and Michigan suggested that they might object if the
Coalition ultimately seeks leave to appeal a successor decree. But they don’t have the final say. See City of Detroit,
712 F.3d at 932.
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 10
and wildlife resources within the Great Lakes.” R. 1969, Pg. ID 11041. Thus, the Coalition has
known of its interest in this matter at least since this round of negotiations began three years ago.
To get around this fact, the Coalition claims that we should consider only the amount of
time that has transpired since Michigan allegedly stopped representing the Coalition’s interests.
But that argument fares no better. Indeed, for almost 50 years, the Coalition has repeatedly—yet
unsuccessfully—moved to intervene on the basis that the State no longer represented its interests.
So even if the Coalition’s recent disagreements with Michigan over “micro-level interests” count
as an independent reason to intervene, the Coalition has had similar disagreements for decades.
R. 1985, Pg. ID 11669.
In sum, if parties take a “wait-and-see” approach to intervention, they lose on timeliness.
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep’t, 679 F.2d 579, 584 & n.3 (6th Cir.1982); In re Auto. Parts, 33 F.4th
at 904. Here, instead of moving to intervene when this latest round of negotiations began, the
Coalition moved to affirm its amicus status. Three years later, it changed its mind. Because this
is exactly the kind of “wait-and-see” strategy that our caselaw forbids, the Coalition fails to show
why this prong shouldn’t weigh against timeliness. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 367
(1973); Blount-Hill, 636 F.3d at 285–86. But see City of Detroit, 712 F.3d at 931 (“Where future
progress remains and the intervenor’s interests are relevant, intervention may be the most
effective way to achieve a full and fair resolution of the case.”).
4.
Prejudice to the original parties. Below, the district court found that allowing late
intervention would destabilize the nearly concluded negotiations and therefore prejudice the
parties. Specifically, it concluded that if it granted the Coalition’s motion, “many of the agreed-
upon terms—the product of intense negotiation and compromise—could vanish, causing further
delays.” R. 1985, Pg. ID 11672. By contrast, had the Coalition filed its motion earlier, it
could’ve avoided the prejudice that the timeliness inquiry seeks to prevent: that of “a tardy
intervenor from derailing a lawsuit within sight of the terminal.” United States v. BASF–Inmont
Corp., 52 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (table).
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 11
To challenge this conclusion, the Coalition points to its affidavits, which it claims show
that the parties were unlikely to reach a deal when the district court denied its motion to
intervene. But as already discussed, the Coalition failed to properly preserve these affidavits for
appeal. Moreover, when the district court denied intervention, the parties were in the final stage
of negotiations. Thus, the district court reasonably concluded that allowing the Coalition to
intervene in August 2022 could’ve caused costly delays.
Therefore, the prejudice prong weighs against intervention.
5.
Unusual circumstances. As the district court noted, this case is unusual because “it
involves seven different sovereigns as separate parties.” R. 1985, Pg. ID 11673. The Coalition,
by contrast, consists of nongovernmental recreational fishing organizations. Granted, this
exclusion of private parties further underscores the often-problematic nature of consent decrees:
they bind third parties “without the reality of a judicial decision.” Laycock, supra, at 132. But
the Coalition doesn’t challenge the legality of consent decrees. And so long as Michigan truly
protects the Coalition’s—and the public’s—environmental and biological interests in the Great
Lakes fisheries, it makes some sense to limit participation to the sovereign parties.6
In response, the Coalition claims that the “[u]nusual circumstances—namely COVID-19
and the complexity of the negotiations—support the timeliness of the Coalition’s intervention.”
Coalition Br. 30. But that assertion gains no traction. For one thing, the Coalition never made
that argument before the district court, meaning it forfeited that argument for appeal. Puskas v.
Delaware County, 56 F.4th 1088, 1098 (6th Cir. 2023). For another, as an amicus, the Coalition
participated in months of in-person and virtual negotiations both before and during the pandemic.
In other words, COVID doesn’t appear to have justified the Coalition’s three-year delay before
moving to intervene. Thus, the district court correctly held that the unusual circumstances weigh
against timeliness.
6
Of course, if the successor decree or other admissible evidence ultimately shows that Michigan failed to
conserve the biodiversity of these fisheries, then this factor may cut the other way. But for current purposes, the
Coalition fails to make that showing because it solely relies on affidavits that weren’t properly preserved for
appellate review.
No. 22-1946 United States v. State of Mich. Page 12
For all these reasons, the Coalition failed to prove that the district court’s untimeliness
determination was an abuse of discretion. Because a proposed intervenor can’t succeed without
establishing timeliness, we needn’t address the other factors for intervention as of right under
Rule 24(a)(2). See Michigan, 424 F.3d at 443.
B.
Rule 24(b) provides that, “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene
who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Because the Coalition’s motion wasn’t
timely, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying permissive intervention as well.
* * *
For years, seven sovereigns have fought over how to regulate and conserve Great Lakes
fisheries. And for good reason. The Great Lakes—and the fish they contain—are an invaluable
resource to Michiganders, tribal citizens, and the American people alike.
Thus far, the district court has done a good job managing this difficult and complex case.
The Coalition represents an important segment of the public, and the district court has allowed it
to participate throughout negotiations as an amicus and even to file objections to the proposed
successor decree. In the future, we are confident that the district court will seriously consider
any objections or evidence showing how the proposed decree may endanger the Great Lakes
fisheries.
If the successor decree is ultimately unlawful or otherwise suggests that Michigan failed
to protect this public resource, the proper remedy would be for the district court to give the
Coalition the right to appeal that decree. But the Coalition’s concerns haven’t materialized yet.
And it hasn’t shown that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed its motion to
intervene as untimely. For these reasons, we affirm.