Wendell Adrian Brown v. United States ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                                RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 23a0144p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    ┐
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    │
    Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
    >        Nos. 21-6161/22-5030
    │
    v.                                                  │
    │
    GARY T. REED (21-6161); WENDELL ADRIAN BROWN               │
    (22-5030),                                                 │
    Defendants-Appellants.          │
    ┘
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
    No. 3:19-cr-00077—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.
    Decided and Filed: June 30, 2023
    Before: GILMAN, READLER, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ON BRIEF: Thomas W. Jakuc, THOMAS LEGAL CENTERS, St. Clair Shores, Michigan, for
    Appellant in 21-6161. David W. Camp, CAMP & CAMP, PLLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for
    Appellant in 22-5030. Kevin Quencer, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville,
    Tennessee, for Appellee.
    GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MATHIS, J., joined.
    READLER, J. (pp. 23–24), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Defendants Wendell Brown and Gary T. Reed
    were convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute at least
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030               United States v. Reed, et al.                          Page 2
    50 grams of methamphetamine (meth), in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1), and
    841(b)(1)(A). Both defendants appeal their convictions, arguing that the district court erred by
    failing to give a “buyer-seller instruction” to the jury. They also appeal their sentences, arguing
    that the district court committed a procedural error when calculating their Guidelines ranges
    under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). Brown separately contends that
    his conviction should be overturned because the district court erroneously admitted an
    incriminating statement by Reed, his nontestifying codefendant. For the reasons set forth below,
    we AFFIRM Brown’s and Reed’s convictions, but VACATE their sentences and REMAND to
    the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Drug-trafficking investigation
    In October 2018, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Tennessee Highway
    Patrol were alerted to a drug-distribution operation in Cumberland County, Tennessee. After an
    investigation, law-enforcement agents executed a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of
    over 200 grams of pure meth from the home of William Eaton. Further investigation revealed
    that Roy Headrick supplied meth for the area. Headrick would make one or two trips to Atlanta
    each week to obtain, on average, one or two kilograms of meth on each trip.
    As the investigation continued, law-enforcement agents executed additional search
    warrants and intercepted phone calls. In particular, phone calls and text messages that were
    consistent with drug trafficking were intercepted between Headrick and Brown.                Other
    individuals, including Reed, were eventually identified as part of the drug operation. A federal
    grand jury ultimately charged Brown and Reed (as well as ten other individuals) in May 2019
    with conspiring to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of
    meth.
    B. Brown and Reed admit to multiple purchases of meth
    Law-enforcement agents interviewed Reed just prior to the May 2019 indictment and
    Brown just after. According to testimony at trial given by the law-enforcement agents, Brown
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030             United States v. Reed, et al.                          Page 3
    and Reed both admitted to purchasing meth on numerous occasions. More specifically, Reed
    admitted to purchasing one-eighth of an ounce (and sometimes up to one ounce) of meth from
    Willard Norris twice per week “for a period of time.” He also admitted to purchasing one-eighth
    of an ounce from Eaton approximately twenty times, and one ounce from Michael Howard on a
    single occasion. According to the law-enforcement agents, Reed knew that Norris had purchased
    the meth from Headrick, who Reed characterized as a “high-level” meth distributor in the area.
    Reed had previously witnessed Headrick with over two pounds of meth on one occasion and two
    ounces on another.
    Brown admitted to repeatedly purchasing between one-half and one ounce of meth from
    Headrick once or twice per week for four or five months. He also admitted that he purchased
    similar quantities from Charlie White once a week for approximately six weeks.             When
    purchasing from Headrick, Brown would sometimes purchase meth on “credit,” paying Headrick
    back with the proceeds he earned from selling the meth. Brown also admitted to occasionally
    purchasing meth from Headrick on behalf of a woman referred to as Garrett.
    C. Brown and Reed proceed to trial
    The government presented testimony at trial from several law-enforcement agents, three
    coconspirators (Headrick, Eaton, and Norris), and Headrick’s Atlanta-based supplier, Rogelio
    Barajas. Headrick testified that he supplied Brown with up to two ounces of meth per week,
    sometimes allowing Brown to pay him back after Brown had sold the meth. In addition, the
    government introduced text messages and phone calls between Brown and Headrick regarding
    meth transactions. These included communications where Brown asked Headrick to “front” him
    meth (i.e., allow him to purchase it on credit), offers from Brown to trade commodities for meth,
    and various other requests for meth.
    The government also presented testimony from law-enforcement agents that relayed the
    admissions that both Brown and Reed made during their interviews, as described above. During
    the questioning of State Trooper Jeremy Newcome, Newcome testified that Reed admitted to
    knowing that Headrick was a high-level meth distributor. On cross-examination, Reed’s counsel
    questioned whether Newcome meant that Reed personally knew Headrick to be a high-level
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030             United States v. Reed, et al.                         Page 4
    distributor or whether Reed simply knew of Headrick’s reputation as such a distributor.
    Newcome replied that Reed said he “met with [Headrick] and witnessed him in possession of . . .
    two ounces of meth” and that he also “purchased off of [Headrick].”
    Reed’s counsel then asked Newcome whether that meeting occurred at Norris’s
    residence. Before Newcome could answer, however, the prosecutor interjected and called for a
    sidebar “out of an abundance of caution.” The prosecutor feared that Newcome might, when
    testifying about where Reed had met with Headrick, reveal that on one occasion Reed met
    Headrick at Brown’s house, thus potentially incriminating Brown in violation of Bruton v.
    United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    , 126 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
    Clause is violated when the court admits an incriminating out-of-court statement by a
    nontestifying codefendant). In his interview with Newcome, Reed had admitted that he had met
    Headrick at both Norris’s and Brown’s respective houses. The parties agreed, and the judge
    confirmed, that Brown should not be mentioned to avoid the possibility of incriminating him.
    Newcome’s cross-examination then resumed. Reed’s counsel questioned Newcome on
    whether Reed bought meth directly from Headrick. In response, Newcome read directly from his
    report, inadvertently mentioning Brown’s name before stopping midsentence: “‘Reed stated he
    witnessed Headrick at Brown’ – I’m sorry.” The judge then interjected, saying “hold on a
    second,” and clarified whether Reed’s counsel wanted Newcome to read the report or just use it
    to refresh his recollection.   Reed’s counsel continued to request that Newcome read the
    statement, but this time Newcome did not mention Brown, stating: “Reed stated he witnessed
    Headrick in Crossville, Tennessee in possession of two ounces [of meth]. Reed confirmed he
    purchased 1/8 ounce of [meth] at this location the night before his most recent arrest.” Brown’s
    counsel made no objection, and the questioning continued.
    As the government neared completion of its case-in-chief, a joint stipulation was entered
    into evidence regarding the quantity and purity of the meth seized from various codefendants.
    The stipulation noted that 2,665 grams (or 2.665 kilograms) of the meth seized from various
    codefendants was “pure” meth. This included 479 grams of pure meth seized from Headrick,
    1,897 grams of pure meth seized from Barajas, 233 grams of pure meth seized from Eaton, and
    56 grams of pure meth seized from Norris. No meth was seized from either Brown or Reed.
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030               United States v. Reed, et al.                           Page 5
    D. The defendants request a “buyer-seller” jury instruction
    Brown and Reed asked the district court to instruct the jury that “a conspiracy requires
    more than just a buyer-seller relationship.” More specifically, their requested jury instruction
    stated:
    (1) A conspiracy requires more than just a buyer-seller relationship between
    the defendant and another person. Additionally, a buyer and seller of
    methamphetamine do not enter into a conspiracy to distribute such
    methamphetamine simply because the buyer resells/exchanges such
    controlled substance to/with another person[,] even if the seller knows that
    the buyer intends to sell/exchange such drug.
    (2) To establish that a buyer or seller knowingly became a member of a
    conspiracy with another person to distribute methamphetamine, the
    government must prove that the buyer and seller had the joint criminal
    objective of distributing such controlled substance to others.
    (3) Simply showing that a buyer purchased a quantity larger than could be
    used for personal consumption, however, is not enough to show
    conspiracy.
    (4) To determine whether a conspiracy exists between the defendant Wendell
    Brown and Roy Headrick or any other person[,] you must consider the
    length of any relationship between the parties; whether there was an
    established method of payment; the extent to which there was an
    established method of payment; the extent to which the transactions were
    standardized; and the level of mutual trust between the parties.
    (5) Mere repeated purchasing on its own does not establish a conspiracy.
    (6) If you find that the defendant Brown is simply a purchaser[] of
    methamphetamine, then you must find that the Government has failed to
    prove the defendant Brown was part of a drug conspiracy beyond a
    reasonable doubt and you must find him not guilty.
    The government opposed the buyer-seller instruction, arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s
    pattern jury instructions for conspiracy were sufficient and more appropriate. During the charge
    conference just prior to jury deliberations, the district court denied Brown’s and Reed’s request
    for a buyer-seller instruction, noting that it was either “inappropriate” or “not necessary.” The
    court stated that the defendants’ “argument as to [a] buyer-seller relationship can be made within
    the context of the Sixth Circuit pattern conspiracy charge as well as can be presented perhaps in
    the defense theory charge if that’s what the defendants want.”
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                           Page 6
    The court ultimately used, nearly verbatim, the Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction
    14.05 on conspiracy. The relevant portion of this instruction reads as follows.
    Count One charges the defendants with conspiracy to distribute and to
    possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. It is a
    crime for two or more persons to conspire or agree to commit a drug crime even if
    they never actually achieved their goal.
    A conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership. For you to find any one of the
    defendants guilty of the conspiracy charge, the government must prove each and
    every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that two or
    more persons conspired or agreed to distribute and to possess with intent to
    distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and, second, that the
    defendants knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. . . .
    With regard to the first element, a criminal agreement, the government
    must prove that two or more persons conspired or agreed to cooperate with each
    other to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
    methamphetamine. This does not require proof of any formal agreement, written
    or spoken, nor does this require proof that everyone involved agreed to know all
    the details. But proof that people simply met together from time to time and
    talked about common interests or engaged in similar conduct is not enough to
    establish a criminal agreement. These are things you may consider in deciding
    whether the government has proved an agreement, but without more, they are not
    enough.
    What the government must prove is that there was a mutual understanding,
    either spoken or unspoken, between two or more people to cooperate with each
    other to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. This is essential.
    An agreement can be proved indirectly by facts and circumstances which
    lead to a conclusion that an agreement existed. But it is up to the government to
    convince you that such facts and circumstances existed in this particular case. . . .
    With regard to the second element, the defendants’ connection to the
    conspiracy, the government must prove the defendants knowingly and voluntarily
    joined that agreement. The government must prove the defendants knew the
    conspiracy’s main purpose and voluntarily joined the conspiracy intending to help
    advance or achieve its goals. You must consider each defendant separately in this
    regard.
    This does not require proof that the defendant knew everything about the
    conspiracy or everyone else involved or that each defendant was a member of it
    from the very beginning. Nor does it require proof that the defendant played a
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030               United States v. Reed, et al.                           Page 7
    major role in the conspiracy or that [his] connection to it was substantial. A slight
    role or connection may be enough. . . .
    [P]roof that a defendant simply knew about a conspiracy or was present at
    times or associated with members of the group is not enough, even if he approved
    of what was happening or did not object to it.
    Similarly, just because a defendant may have done something that
    happened to help a conspiracy does not necessarily make him a conspirator.
    These are all things you may consider in deciding whether the government has
    proved that the defendant joined the conspiracy. But without more, they are not
    enough.
    A defendant’s knowledge can be proved indirectly by facts and
    circumstances which lead to a conclusion that he knew the conspiracy’s main
    purpose. But it is up to the government to convince you that such facts and
    circumstances existed in this particular case.
    You must be convinced the government has proved all of these elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find any one of these defendants guilty of
    the conspiracy charge.
    A related instruction that the district court provided was the defendants’ requested theory-
    of-the-defense instruction: “Defendants say they did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to
    participate in a drug conspiracy, and, instead, are users of the drugs to feed their addiction, and
    quantity alone should not be considered for conspiracy.” The jury ultimately convicted Brown
    and Reed as charged.
    E. The district court sentences Brown and Reed to 360 months in prison
    A probation officer prepared Presentence Reports for both defendants, determining that
    each was responsible for 4.5 kilograms of actual meth, resulting in an offense level of 38. Brown
    had a criminal-history category of V and Reed had a criminal-history category of VI. The
    corresponding Guidelines ranges for both Brown and Reed were the same, being 360 months to
    life in prison.
    Brown and Reed both objected to the purity of the meth that was used to calculate their
    Guidelines ranges, arguing that the Presentence Reports’ determination that the meth was “actual
    meth” (also known as pure meth), as opposed to a “mixture containing a detectible amount of
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030                United States v. Reed, et al.                           Page 8
    meth,” was in error. After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court overruled the
    defendants’ objections and sentenced both of them based on the Guidelines range for actual
    meth. Both Brown and Reed were sentenced to 360 months in prison. These appeals followed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. The defendants’ request for a buyer-seller jury instruction was appropriately
    denied by the district court
    Brown and Reed argue that the district court’s denial of their request to provide a buyer-
    seller jury instruction is reversible error. The legal accuracy of a jury instruction is a question of
    law that we review de novo. United States v. Blood, 
    435 F.3d 612
    , 623 (6th Cir. 2006). But the
    failure to provide a requested instruction is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. 
    Id.
    District courts have “broad discretion in drafting jury instructions” and, when viewing the
    instructions as a whole, “[w]e will not reverse the trial court unless the jury charge fails to
    accurately reflect the law.” United States v. Prince, 
    214 F.3d 740
    , 761 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal
    citation and quotation marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion in declining to give a
    jury instruction “only if (1) the instructions are correct statements of the law; (2) the instructions
    are not substantially covered by other delivered charges; and (3) the failure to give the
    instruction impairs the defendant’s theory of the case.” United States v. LaVictor, 
    848 F.3d 428
    ,
    454 (6th Cir. 2017). The defendants have not established any, let alone all, of these factors.
    1. The defendants’ buyer-seller instruction is not entirely consistent with Sixth
    Circuit law
    The parties dispute whether the proposed buyer-seller instruction is appropriate under
    Sixth Circuit law. Brown and Reed are certainly correct that there is a buyer-seller exception to
    what constitutes a conspiracy in this circuit. We have “long held that a buyer-seller agreement
    alone does not establish a ‘conspiracy,’” United States v. Wheat, 
    988 F.3d 299
    , 304 (6th Cir.
    2021), and that “mere sales do not prove the existence of the agreement that must exist for there
    to be a conspiracy.” United States v. Anderson, 
    89 F.3d 1306
    , 1310 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
    United States v. Cole, 
    59 F. App’x 696
    , 699 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a buyer-seller
    relationship alone is insufficient to tie a buyer to a conspiracy.”).
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                           Page 9
    And because mere sales are not enough, this court has “identified additional ‘factors’ that
    allow a jury to find an agreement between a buyer and seller to go beyond their own sale.”
    Wheat, 988 F.3d at 308 (citing United States v. Deitz, 
    577 F.3d 672
    , 680-81 (6th Cir. 2009)); see
    also Cole, 59 F. App’x at 700 (noting with approval several factors that the Seventh Circuit has
    used to determine whether a drug conspiracy exists) (citing United States v. Rivera, 
    273 F.3d 751
    , 755 (7th Cir. 2001)). Much of the defendants’ proposed buyer-seller jury instruction
    mentions these “factors,” such as whether there were repeat purchases of drugs, the quantity of
    the drugs, the method of payment, the length of the relationship, etc. See Wheat, 988 F.3d at
    308-09 (collecting cases and analyzing the factors that allow a jury to find the existence of a drug
    conspiracy beyond just a buyer-seller relationship); see also Deitz, 
    577 F.3d at 680-81
     (noting
    the relevant factors).
    The defendants’ proposed instruction, however, contains elements that are not entirely
    consistent with the law in this circuit. In fact, two of the very cases that defendants cite in
    support of their buyer-seller instruction, United States v. Brown, 
    332 F.3d 363
    , 372-73 (6th Cir.
    2003), and Cole, 59 F. App’x at 699, contradict language in their proposed instruction. For
    example, the proposed buyer-seller instruction states that “[m]ere repeated purchasing on its own
    does not establish a conspiracy.” But Cole, in analyzing this court’s precedent, makes clear that
    evidence of repeat purchases has been sufficient for a conspiracy conviction. 59 F. App’x at 700
    (citing Anderson, 
    89 F.3d at 1311
    ); accord United States v. Potter, 
    927 F.3d 446
    , 454 (6th Cir.
    2019) (“[A] buyer/seller relationship alone is not enough to establish participation in the
    conspiracy. As noted, however, [the defendant’s] repeat transactions could lead a jury to find
    more than that insufficient relationship.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); United
    States v. Gunter, 
    551 F.3d 472
    , 482 (6th Cir. 2009) (“While a buyer-seller relationship does not
    establish a conspiracy, evidence of repeat purchases can.”).
    The proposed buyer-seller instruction also states that “[s]imply showing that a buyer
    purchased a quantity larger than could be used for personal consumption . . . is not enough to
    show conspiracy.” But Brown states that “a large volume of narcotics creates an inference of
    conspiracy.” 
    332 F.3d at 373
     (quoting United States v. Bourjaily, 
    781 F.2d 539
    , 545 (6th Cir.
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                           Page 10
    1986)); see also Cole, 59 F. App’x at 700 (“[T]his court found that . . . purchases of a large
    volume . . . were sufficient for a conspiracy conviction (citing Anderson, 
    89 F.3d at 1311
    )).
    In sum, the district court would not have erred in giving a properly crafted buyer-seller
    instruction to the jury. See Wheat, 988 F.3d at 312 (“[W]e cannot ignore this buyer-seller rule
    when we ask whether there was enough evidence for all essential elements of the crime.”). But
    because the proposed instruction contained incorrect statements of Sixth Circuit law, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ request.
    2. The buyer-seller instruction was substantially covered by the pattern
    conspiracy jury instructions
    This court, moreover, has made clear that “when . . . the district court gives complete
    instructions on the elements of conspiracy, failure to give a buyer-seller instruction is not
    reversible error.” United States v. Williams, 
    998 F.3d 716
    , 732 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing, inter alia,
    United States v. Dado, 
    759 F.3d 550
    , 568 (6th Cir. 2014) (declining to provide a buyer-seller
    instruction because it “was substantially covered by the standard jury instructions regarding
    conspiracy and accomplice liability, which were delivered to the jury at Defendant’s trial”)); see
    also Wheat, 988 F.3d at 311-12 (“We generally will not reverse a district court for failing to give
    an instruction on the buyer-seller limitation”); Riggs v. United States, 
    209 F.3d 828
    , 833 (6th Cir.
    2000) (“[A] buyer-seller instruction is unnecessary if the district judge has given a complete
    instruction reciting all the elements of conspiracy and requirements for membership in a
    conspiracy.”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Kumar v. United States, 
    163 F. App’x 361
    , 366 (6th Cir. 2006).
    That is precisely what happened here. The district court provided, nearly verbatim, the
    Sixth Circuit’s pattern jury instructions regarding conspiracy.          Further, the district court
    explicitly gave the defendants the chance to craft a theory-of-the-defense charge that would
    encompass their buyer-seller theory.      And the district court ultimately provided such an
    instruction, telling the jury that that the “Defendants say they did not knowingly and voluntarily
    agree to participate in a drug conspiracy, and, instead, are users of the drugs to feed their
    addiction, and quantity alone should not be considered for conspiracy.” We therefore conclude
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030                 United States v. Reed, et al.                      Page 11
    that the rejected buyer-seller instruction was substantially covered by the jury instructions
    provided.
    3. The rejection of the buyer-seller instruction did not impair Brown’s and
    Reed’s defense theory
    As noted above, the district court provided the defendants’ requested theory-of-the-
    defense instruction, which included several elements of the buyer-seller instruction that they had
    proposed. The defendants thus ultimately received part of their requested instruction. This fact,
    when combined with the defects in the proposed buyer-seller instruction and the overlap with the
    conspiracy instruction as given, leads us to the conclusion that the lack of the requested
    instruction did not impair Brown’s or Reed’s defenses. The district court therefore did not abuse
    its discretion in denying the same.
    As a final point on this issue, we note Reed’s additional argument that the buyer-seller
    instruction was necessary because his defense became “illusory and irretrievably mired when
    shaded by the Government’s case against codefendant [] Brown.” Reed’s argument, however,
    does not cure the defects in the proposed buyer-seller instruction identified above and therefore
    is not a valid basis for finding that the district court abused its discretion by not providing the
    instruction.
    B. Brown’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause were not violated
    Brown makes an additional argument that State Trooper Newcome’s inadvertent mention
    at trial of Brown’s name when reading a statement made by Reed (his nontestifying codefendant)
    violated Brown’s Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    (1968).     The Confrontation Clause protects defendants from the introduction at trial of
    incriminating out-of-court statements made by nontestifying codefendants. 
    Id. at 136-37
    ; see
    also United States v. Ford, 
    761 F.3d 641
    , 652 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In Bruton, the Supreme Court
    held that the Confrontation Clause is violated by the introduction of an incriminating out-of-
    court statement by a non-testifying co-defendant.”).
    At issue in this case is Newcome’s response to a question about how Reed knew
    Headrick. Newcome, reading directly from his police report before stopping midsentence,
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030                United States v. Reed, et al.                            Page 12
    testified that “‘Reed stated he witnessed Headrick at Brown’ – I’m sorry.” The judge then
    stopped Newcome, saying “hold on a second,” and clarified whether Reed’s counsel wanted
    Newcome to read the report out loud or to just use it to refresh his recollection. Reed ultimately
    continued reading from the report, but this time he eliminated all references to Brown. Brown’s
    counsel never objected.
    This court generally reviews Confrontation Clause challenges de novo. Ford, 
    761 F.3d at 652
     (citation omitted). However, if a defendant fails to object on Confrontation Clause grounds,
    we review under the plain-error standard. 
    Id.
     “Plain error requires (1) an ‘error or defect,’
    (2) that is ‘clear or obvious,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the
    ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the district court
    proceedings.”’” 
    Id. at 655-56
     (quoting Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009)). And
    even if each of the first three prongs is satisfied, we will correct the plain error only if (4) the
    error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id.
    (quoting United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 736 (1993)).             “Meeting all four prongs is
    difficult, ‘as it should be.’” Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 135
     (quoting United States v. Dominguez
    Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 n.9 (2004)).
    Even if Brown could establish a clear or obvious error, he plainly fails under
    prong (3) because Newcome’s inadvertent mention of Brown’s name did not affect the outcome
    of the trial. There was ample evidence presented at trial that Brown conspired to distribute meth
    with Headrick.     This included Brown’s own confession about buying meth from Headrick
    multiple times per week, recorded text messages and phone calls between Brown and Headrick,
    and testimony from Headrick himself.              In essence, the evidence presented was “so
    overwhelming” that the admission of “‘Reed stated he witnessed Headrick at Brown’ – I’m
    sorry” did not “contribute[] to [Brown’s] conviction.” See United States v. Macias, 
    387 F.3d 509
    , 520 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Schneble v. Florida, 
    405 U.S. 427
    , 432 (1972)).
    We can therefore say with “fair assurance that the jury’s verdict was not substantially
    swayed by” the admitted statement. See United States v. Warman, 
    578 F.3d 320
    , 341 (6th
    Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Stokes, 
    834 F. App’x 213
    , 217 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding no
    plain error, and that a “curative instruction would have only highlighted” the objectionable
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                        Page 13
    statement where the statement “was fleeting and likely did not have much influence on the jury’s
    verdict, given the other evidence of guilt at trial”). In sum, the Confrontation Clause was not
    violated.
    C. The district court procedurally erred when calculating the defendants’
    Guidelines ranges
    We now turn to Brown’s and Reed’s argument regarding their sentences. The defendants
    challenge the district court’s determination that they were involved in the distribution of 4.5
    kilograms of actual meth, as opposed to 4.5 kilograms of a “mixture containing a detectable
    amount of meth.” We review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness
    under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Battaglia, 
    624 F.3d 348
    , 350 (6th Cir.
    2010). Here, the defendants focus only on the procedural reasonableness of their sentences,
    arguing that the district court improperly calculated their Guidelines ranges. See United States
    v. Stubblefield, 
    682 F.3d 502
    , 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If the district court misinterprets the
    Guidelines or miscalculates the Guidelines range, then the resulting sentence is procedurally
    unreasonable.”). “The court’s legal interpretation of the Guidelines are reviewed de novo, but its
    factual findings are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard.” Battaglia, 
    624 F.3d at
    351
    (citing United States v. Bolds, 
    511 F.3d 568
    , 579 (6th Cir. 2007)).
    The Guidelines treat “methamphetamine,” “methamphetamine (actual),” and “ice” (not at
    issue here) differently. See USSG § 2D1.1(c). Under the Guidelines, “methamphetamine” refers
    to “the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of
    methamphetamine (i.e., a “meth mixture”).           Id., Notes to Drug Quantity Table (A).
    “Methamphetamine (actual)” (i.e., “actual meth”) means the “weight of the controlled substance,
    itself, contained in the mixture or substance.” Id., Notes to Drug Quantity Table (B) (“For
    example, a mixture weighing 10 grams containing [methamphetamine] at 50% purity contains
    5 grams of [methamphetamine] (actual)”). And “ice,” which is treated the same as actual meth,
    means “a mixture or substance containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80%
    purity.” Id., Notes to Drug Quantity Table (C).
    The Drug Quantity Table within the Guidelines employs a 10:1 weight ratio between
    meth mixtures and actual meth. See id at § 2D1.1(c). This results in 4.5 kilograms of actual
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                         Page 14
    meth having an offense level of 38, whereas 4.5 kilograms of a meth mixture has an offense level
    of 32. Id.; see also United States v. Kennedy, 
    65 F.4th 314
    , 326 (6th Cir. 2023) (outlining the
    treatment of meth under the Guidelines); United States v. Johnson, 
    812 F. App’x 329
    , 331-32
    (6th Cir. 2020) (same). So, if the district court had calculated the defendants’ sentences based on
    4.5 kilograms of a meth mixture, both Brown’s and Reed’s offense levels would have decreased
    from 38 to 32, and their corresponding Guidelines ranges would have been 188 to 235 months of
    imprisonment for Brown and 210 to 262 months of imprisonment for Reed. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt.
    A.
    The defendants raise two arguments in support of their claim that their Guidelines ranges
    were improperly calculated. First, they argue that the district court erred in calculating their
    Guidelines ranges based on actual meth because this resulted in an unconstitutional “upward
    departure of a criminal sentence” based on facts not found by a jury. Second, they argue that the
    court’s determination that they were responsible for distributing 4.5 kilograms of actual meth
    was clearly erroneous. We address each argument in turn.
    1. The district court did not unconstitutionally enhance Brown’s and Reed’s
    sentences
    The defendants turn to the language of the jury-verdict form to argue that the jury
    rejected the possibility that the meth at issue was actual meth. That verdict form asked the jury,
    in relevant part, whether the defendants “distribute[d] and possess[ed] with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine” and, if so, how much “methamphetamine . . . was attributable” to each
    defendant. The jury answered “guilty” to the first question, and “50 grams or more” for the
    second. Because the indictment and the verdict form specified “methamphetamine” and not
    “actual methamphetamine,” the defendants contend that the jury specifically found that the meth
    distributed was not actual meth. By nonetheless sentencing the defendants for distributing actual
    meth, the defendants argue, the district court made an unconstitutional “upward departure on a
    criminal sentence” in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
    , 301 (2004) (“Other than
    the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
    prescribed statutory maximum” as determined by the statute of conviction “must be submitted to
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                         Page 15
    a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    ,
    490 (2000))).
    We find no merit in the defendants’ argument. Contrary to their contention, the district
    court’s determination at sentencing that the meth was actual meth did not contradict the jury-
    verdict form. The criminal statute under which Brown and Reed were convicted outlines a single
    offense that can be committed two ways: by distributing either “50 grams or more of
    methamphetamine . . . or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
    amount of methamphetamine.” 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(viii). Brown and Reed were charged
    with a conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and the verdict form
    exactly mirrored the language of the statute by stating “methamphetamine,” and not “a mixture
    or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.” We do note the confusing
    dual treatment of the term “methamphetamine” between the statute (which uses
    “methamphetamine” to refer to actual meth) and the Guidelines (which uses “methamphetamine”
    to refer to a meth mixture). Regardless of this idiosyncrasy, we know that a conviction under
    § 841(b)(1)(A) for distributing only 50 grams of meth cannot mean 50 grams of a meth mixture.
    See Kennedy, 65 F.4th at 326 (“Crimes involving pure [i.e., actual] methamphetamine trigger a
    ten-year mandatory penalty at 50 grams, while crimes involving a methamphetamine mixture
    trigger a ten-year mandatory penalty at 500 grams.”) (citing 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(viii)).
    The defendants’ claim that the jury “determined the purity” of the meth and “did not
    agree” that it was actual meth is therefore not accurate. In fact, the opposite is true because, as
    noted above, a conviction for a meth mixture under § 841(b)(1)(A) is possible only if the
    defendants were found to have distributed at least 500 grams of the substance. The more
    appropriate conclusion is that the jury convicted the defendants of a conspiracy to distribute at
    least 50 grams of actual meth.
    The district court did engage in additional factfinding, however, because the defendants
    were ultimately sentenced for conspiring to distribute 4.5 kilograms of actual meth—well above
    the jury’s verdict of “50 grams or more” of actual meth. This raises the question of whether such
    judicial factfinding resulted in an unconstitutional sentencing increase in violation of Blakely,
    which makes clear that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases a
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030                United States v. Reed, et al.                         Page 16
    sentence beyond the statutory maximum penalty for the statute of conviction must be submitted
    to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301.
    We conclude that the district court did not impose an unconstitutional sentence. This
    court, sitting en banc a few years after Blakely was decided, held that “[s]o long as the defendant
    receives a sentence at or below the statutory ceiling set by the jury’s verdict, the district court
    does not abridge the defendant’s right to a jury trial by looking to other facts, including acquitted
    conduct, when selecting a sentence within that statutory range.” United States v. White, 
    551 F.3d 381
    , 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); accord Apprendi, 
    530 U.S. at 481
     (“[N]othing in this history
    suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration
    various factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the range
    prescribed by statute.” (emphasis in original)). More specifically, “a sentencing judge may find
    (by a preponderance of the evidence) that a defendant is responsible for a greater quantity of
    drugs than determined by the jury.” United States v. Castro, 
    960 F.3d 857
    , 868 (6th Cir. 2020)
    (citing United States v. Watts, 
    519 U.S. 148
    , 157 (1997) (per curiam)).
    Here, a conviction for distributing 50 or more grams of actual meth has a statutory
    minimum ten-year prison sentence and a statutory maximum of life in prison.               
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A). The defendants’ sentences of 360 months in prison did not exceed the statutory
    maximum; thus, the district court’s factfinding at sentencing did not result in an upward
    departure in violation of Blakely.
    Brown and Reed further argue that the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), applied Blakely to the Guidelines such that any fact that alters the Guidelines
    range must also be found by the jury. True enough, Booker concluded that Blakely applies to the
    Guidelines. 
    Id. at 243
    . But the ultimate solution in Booker was to render the Guidelines
    advisory rather than mandatory. 
    Id. at 245
    ; see also United States v. Stone, 
    432 F.3d 651
    , 654
    (6th Cir. 2005) (“Based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are
    no longer mandatory; they are advisory.”).
    “In the post-Booker world, the relevant statutory ceiling is no longer the Guidelines range
    but the maximum penalty authorized by the United States Code.” White, 
    551 F.3d, at 384
    ; see
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                          Page 17
    also 
    id. at 385
     (“So long as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory ceiling set
    by the jury’s verdict, the district court does not abridge the defendant’s right to a jury trial by
    looking to other facts . . . when selecting a sentence within that statutory range.”); Stone, 432
    F.3d at 654-55 (“Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. Instead, the remedial majority
    gave district courts the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a defendant
    outside the resulting Guideline range.”). Because the district court’s factfinding altered only the
    defendants’ Guidelines ranges and not the statutory minimum and maximum penalties identified
    by the U.S. Code, the defendants’ Booker-based argument is without merit.
    2. The district court provided no basis to conclude that at least 4.5 kilograms
    of the meth distributed was actual meth
    Although a sentence based on the distribution of 4.5 kilograms of actual meth would not
    be unconstitutional under Blakely, the government nonetheless bears the burden of proving the
    quantity of actual meth at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States
    v. McReynolds, 
    964 F.3d 555
    , 563 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jeross, 
    521 F.3d 562
    , 570
    (6th Cir. 2008). We review the district court’s factual findings at sentencing under the clear-
    error standard. McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 563. A factual finding is clearly erroneous only where,
    after considering all the evidence, the court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been committed.” United States v. Sands, 
    4 F.4th 417
    , 420 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting
    Heights Cmty. Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 
    774 F.2d 135
    , 140 (6th Cir. 1985)). “Importantly,
    ‘[t]he question is not whether the finding is the best or only conclusion that can be drawn from
    the evidence, or whether it is the one [we] would draw.’ Instead, ‘the test is whether there is
    evidence in the record to support the lower court’s finding, and whether its construction of that
    evidence is a reasonable one.’” 
    Id.
     (alterations in original) (quoting Heights Cmty. Cong., 
    774 F.2d at 140
    ).
    Brown and Reed stipulated at trial that 2.665 kilograms of the meth seized during the
    investigation was tested and determined to be “pure” (i.e., actual meth). The defendants do not
    challenge on appeal that, although no meth was ever found on either of them personally, this
    2.665 kilograms of actual meth was within the scope of their relevant conduct and could be
    attributed to them at sentencing. See McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 563 (noting that defendants can
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030               United States v. Reed, et al.                          Page 18
    be sentenced based on all drug quantities within the scope of their relevant conduct). This leaves
    the question of whether Brown and Reed should be held responsible for 4.5 kilograms of actual
    meth—1.835 kilograms more than was ever tested and determined to be actual meth.
    “Where exact drug quantity cannot be established, a district court may make a reasonable
    quantity estimate if that estimate is supported by the preponderance of the evidence.” United
    States v. Treadway, 
    328 F.3d 878
    , 885 (6th Cir. 2003). A court must “err on the side of caution,”
    however, and hold defendants responsible only “for a specific quantity for which he is more
    likely than not actually responsible.” United States v. Rios, 
    830 F.3d 403
    , 436 (6th Cir. 2016)
    (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
    732 F.3d 577
    , 581 (6th Cir. 2013)).
    The district court overruled Reed’s objection to the purity of the meth, citing the
    stipulation that 2.665 kilograms of the seized meth was actual meth. It also noted that “the co-
    conspirators’ actions as relate to the conspiracy involving actual methamphetamine were within
    . . . the scope of the conspiracy.” Without any further elaboration on the question of the meth’s
    purity, the court concluded that Reed “was responsible . . . for at least 4.5 kilograms of actual
    methamphetamine.”
    The district court reached the same conclusion at Brown’s sentencing, but
    never addressed the question of the meth’s purity when calculating Brown’s Guidelines range. It
    instead focused on whether there were 4.5 kilograms of meth within the scope of the conspiracy,
    not whether those 4.5 kilograms were comprised of actual meth. The court did later touch on the
    question of the drug’s purity when analyzing whether a downward variance in Brown’s sentence
    was appropriate because of the disparate treatment of actual meth and meth mixtures under the
    Guidelines. Although the court analyzed Brown’s objection only as a policy objection to the
    Guidelines, it nonetheless concluded that the meth at issue could appropriately be considered
    actual meth because of the stipulation at trial as to the purity of 2.665 kilograms of meth.
    In order to sentence a defendant for conspiracy-wide drug quantities, the district court
    must make “particularized findings as to why it is doing so.” McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 564. This
    includes determining whether “the acts were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement” and
    whether the acts “were foreseeable to the defendant.”          Id. at 563 (quoting United States
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                        Page 19
    v. Campbell, 
    279 F.3d 392
    , 399-400 (6th Cir. 2002)). The district court diligently and properly
    engaged in this analysis to determine that the defendants could be held responsible for at least
    4.5 kilograms of some type of meth, but, as noted above, provided practically no analysis on the
    question of whether 4.5 kilograms of actual meth were properly attributable to them. See Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 50 (2007) (noting that the district court must “adequately explain the
    chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
    sentencing”); Treadway, 
    328 F.3d at 886
     (noting that “a district court cannot adopt ‘the factual
    findings of the presentence report without making factual determinations of its own’ when the
    facts are in dispute” (quoting United States v. Parrott, 
    148 F.3d 629
    , 633 (6th Cir. 1998))). The
    district court ultimately relied solely on the joint stipulation. But this gets us to only 2.665
    kilograms of actual meth, well below 4.5 kilograms of actual meth.
    Perhaps attempting to bolster the district court’s analysis of the question, the government
    contends, without citation, that the court’s determination was “amply supported by evidence at
    trial, which included each defendant[’s] confession, the testimony of co-conspirators, and their
    stipulation that more than 2 kilograms of methamphetamine recovered from their suppliers was
    ‘pure’ methamphetamine.” But after thoroughly reviewing the record, we cannot agree.
    The only evidence that we can locate as to the purity of any meth is the parties’ joint
    stipulation. No other meth was tested, and the government did not introduce any additional
    testimony or evidence that would support a determination that an additional 1.835 kilograms of
    meth was actual meth. True enough, the defendants both confessed to purchasing meth, but they
    admitted nothing as to the meth’s purity. The government’s own briefing acknowledges as
    much, contending only that the defendants admitted to purchasing “methamphetamine.”
    And the trial testimony from Brown’s and Reed’s coconspirators gets us no closer. Four
    coconspirators testified: Barajas, Eaton, Headrick, and Norris. We can find no mention in their
    testimony that the meth that they handled was actual meth, and the government has pointed us to
    no specific testimony of the coconspirators that establishes otherwise.
    In fact, Norris’s testimony directly contradicts the government’s theory. When asked by
    the government whether the meth he received from Headrick was high or low quality, Norris
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                         Page 20
    replied “[e]verybody’s [meth] is different, so some of it’s good and some of it’s bad.” This
    highlights the flaw in assuming, without further evidence, that there was an additional 1.835
    kilograms of actual meth beyond what was tested because the meth handled by the
    coconspirators was of unknown and varying purity.
    The closest the government came to demonstrating that there was more than 2.665
    kilograms of actual meth being distributed was through the testimony of Nathan Stinnett, an
    investigator for the Oak Ridge Police Department. He testified that the “new norm” for meth is
    “crystal meth,” which he claims is a lot purer than “the old shake-and-bake.” But on its own,
    this is clearly insufficient to support an inference that the meth at issue in this case was actual
    meth. He simply commented on the “new norm” for meth in general.
    Plus, even if the meth at issue was “purer” than the meth of days past, we have no clue if
    that means 100% purity, 70% purity, or just 5% purity. See United States v. Carnell, 
    972 F.3d 932
    , 942 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that meth being referred to as “crystalline” fails to meet the
    burden at sentencing without “evidence from a chemist or other relevant expert that
    methamphetamine cannot form a crystalline structure below 80% purity”). This matters because
    actual meth is determined under the Guidelines by multiplying the percent purity by the total
    grams of the meth mixture. See USSG § 2D1.1(c), Notes to Drug Quantity Table (B) (“For
    example, a mixture weighing 10 grams containing [methamphetamine] at 50% purity contains
    5 grams of [methamphetamine (actual)]”). Stinnett’s testimony therefore provides no support for
    the question of whether an additional 1.835 kilograms of meth in the conspiracy was actual meth.
    The dissent attempts to get around the lack of evidence of actual meth with its own
    “back-of-the-envelope math.” Dissent at 24. But in doing so, the dissent makes its own
    “particularized findings” to surmise that Headrick purchased between 84 and 108 kilograms of
    meth from Barajas during the 7 to 9 months that both defendants were engaged in the conspiracy,
    that the entirety of this amount was both within the scope of the defendants’ agreement and
    foreseeable to each defendant, and that the quantity was at least 2.185% pure meth. Id.; see also
    United States v. McReynolds, 
    964 F.3d 555
    , 564 (6th Cir. 2020).
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                         Page 21
    The district court, however, never made a finding as to the total quantity of meth that
    Headrick handled, noting only that he received “up to 3 kilograms per week for several weeks.”
    (emphasis added). Nor did it determine whether this full amount was both within the scope of
    the defendants’ agreement and foreseeable to each defendant. See McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 563-
    64. The district court should be the entity to engage in the particularized factfinding as to the
    quantity and purity of the meth for which each defendant should be held responsible, not this
    court from our “distant perch.” See Dissent at 24; see also McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 563-64.
    There is simply no evidence in the record about the purity of any meth beyond the 2.665
    kilograms in the stipulation. The dissent nonetheless attempts to extrapolate the amount of pure
    meth based solely on its own estimate of the total volume of meth handled by Headrick. But
    such an extrapolation is inappropriate without “[s]ufficient indicia of reliability.” See United
    States v. Jackson, 
    470 F.3d 299
    , 310-11 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that statistically-based drug-
    quantity calculations are permitted only where the government can demonstrate “an adequate
    basis in fact for the extrapolation and that the quantity was determined in a manner consistent
    with the accepted standards of reasonable reliability” (quoting United States v. Scalia, 
    993 F.2d 984
    , 989 (1st Cir. 1993)). Absent any evidence in the record of the meth’s purity or any indicia
    of reliability for statistical extrapolation, the dissent ultimately relies on a guess, even if an
    educated one, that the purported 84 to 108 kilograms of meth was more than 2.185% pure.
    Although this is certainly plausible, an educated guess is surely not a substitute for the
    “preponderance of the evidence” required for factfinding at sentencing. See McReynolds, 964
    F.3d at 563.    We are therefore unpersuaded by the dissent, and are concerned about the
    unwarranted precedent that it would set if district courts estimated the quantity of actual meth
    based solely on the quantity of unseized, untested meth.
    At bottom, we find that the district court clearly erred in determining that a
    preponderance of the evidence in the record supports the factual determination that Brown and
    Reed conspired to distribute at least 4.5 kilograms of actual meth. This is particularly true given
    the need to “err on the side of caution” when the “precise quantity of drugs involved is
    uncertain.” Rios, 
    830 F.3d at 436
     (quoting Johnson, 
    732 F.3d at 581
    ). The Guidelines ranges
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                        Page 22
    were therefore improperly calculated for both defendants, which is a procedural error. See
    United States v. Stubblefield, 
    682 F.3d 502
    , 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
    We briefly note that, on remand, the offense level under the Guidelines might remain at
    38 for one or both defendants if the district finds that 45 kilograms of a meth mixture was within
    the scope of Brown’s and/or Reed’s relevant conduct. See USSG § 2D1.1(c), Notes to Drug
    Quantity Table (B). But the court must engage in particularized factfinding to make such a
    determination when calculating the Guidelines ranges.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM Brown’s and Reed’s convictions, but
    VACATE their sentences and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030               United States v. Reed, et al.                       Page 23
    ______________________________
    CONCURRENCE / DISSENT
    ______________________________
    CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Like the
    majority opinion, I would affirm defendants’ convictions.           But I would also affirm their
    sentences, as the district court properly attributed 4.5 kilograms of pure methamphetamine to
    Brown and Reed alike.
    Guiding my conclusion is our deferential standard of review of factual findings at
    sentencing. The prosecution must prove the drug quantity attributable to a defendant by a
    preponderance of the evidence. United States v. McReynolds, 
    964 F.3d 555
    , 563 (6th Cir. 2020)
    (quoting United States v. Russell, 
    595 F.3d 633
    , 646 (6th Cir. 2010)). A reasonable estimate,
    based on physical or testimonial evidence, is acceptable. United States v. Tisdale, 
    980 F.3d 1089
    , 1096 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). And in the context of a distribution conspiracy
    like the one these defendants took part in, the quantity may sweep in more drugs than what the
    defendants personally handled. Accord Maj. Op. at 18 (citing McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 563–64);
    see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 & cmt.3(B). When the case comes to us, we ask only whether the
    district court clearly erred in the drug quantity it found, leaving us with the “definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Sands, 
    4 F.4th 417
    , 420 (6th
    Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
    This case does not leave me with that sort of conviction. Far from it, in fact. Trial
    evidence linked Brown and Reed—through Headrick, Eaton, and Norris—to Barajas’s drug-
    dealing organization. Barajas’s testimony established that Headrick bought from Barajas (and
    later redistributed downstream) many kilograms of methamphetamine—typically three per week,
    occasionally up to nine per week—while Brown and Reed participated in the conspiracy. In
    finding that Headrick trafficked “massive” quantities of methamphetamine, the district court
    concluded that Reed and Brown were each responsible for 4.5 kilograms of pure
    methamphetamine.
    Nos. 21-6161/22-5030              United States v. Reed, et al.                        Page 24
    The majority opinion holds that the district court clearly erred in concluding that those
    4.5 kilograms were pure, or “actual,” methamphetamine. But some quick, back-of-the-envelope
    math suggests otherwise. Defendants stipulated that 2.665 kilograms of the methamphetamine
    seized from their coconspirators was pure methamphetamine, leaving only another 1.835
    kilograms of pure methamphetamine to reach the 4.5-kilogram benchmark. The district court
    determined Reed’s participation in the conspiracy to have lasted seven to nine months, seemingly
    less than the period during which Brown took part. If Headrick bought three kilograms of
    methamphetamine weekly from Barajas, a quite conservative estimate, his total haul during the
    shorter period of Reed’s participation in the conspiracy fell somewhere between 84 and 108
    kilograms.
    Was it clear error for the district court to have deduced that 1.835 additional kilograms
    (out of the bottom-end estimate of 84) was pure? No. By my calculations, after all, the district
    court needed to conclude only that Headrick’s supply was more than 2.185% pure, well below
    even the 5% benchmark the majority opinion seemingly suggests would be at the low end of the
    purity scale. Maj. Op. at 20; see also 
    id.
     (noting testimony that “the ‘new norm’ for meth is
    ‘crystal meth,’” which is believed to be more pure than homemade alternatives). This conclusion
    flows directly from the district court proceedings, where the district court recited Headrick’s
    average weekly purchases amid an extended discussion of its obligation to make particularized
    findings. All of this easily satisfies McReynolds. 964 F.3d at 563 (requiring particularized
    findings that “the acts [of others] were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement” and “that
    [those acts] were foreseeable to the defendant”).
    From our distant perch, we afford a sentencing court wide latitude in making
    approximations of drug quantities based on the evidence before it. United States v. Jeross, 
    521 F.3d 562
    , 570 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 
    32 F.4th 607
    , 614 (6th
    Cir. 2022) (explaining that we affirm the district court’s findings even where we might reach the
    opposite conclusion “so long as both stories are plausible on the record as a whole” (citation
    omitted)). I would follow that approach and affirm the district court. In any event, on remand,
    the district court has this analysis at its disposal in estimating Brown’s and Reed’s drug
    quantities anew, as the majority opinion requires.