United States v. Jimmy Davis ( 2021 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-1505
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JIMMY DAVIS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 1-18-cr-00015-001)
District Judge: Wilma A. Lewis
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on May 7, 2020
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 14, 2021)
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OPINION*
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
Jimmy Davis appeals from the District Court’s judgment convicting him of
possessing cocaine and assaulting a police officer. His court-appointed counsel has moved
to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because a review of the
briefing and record reveals no nonfrivolous issues, we will grant counsel’s motion and
affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I. Discussion1
We analyze Anders motions under a familiar two-step framework. At step one, we
ask if counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues” and
explained “why the issues are frivolous.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d
Cir. 2001). At step two, we conduct our own “independent review of the record” to identify
any issues counsel overlooked. Id. If neither step surfaces nonfrivolous issues, we grant
the motion and dismiss the appeal.
A straightforward application of these steps establishes that Davis’s appeal fails. To
begin, counsel conscientiously surveys the record and convincingly shows why the three
issues he spotlights lack merit. First, by engaging in “unruly conduct” and by disregarding
the District Court’s commands, Davis waived his Sixth Amendment right to be present
during the trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 345–46 (1970). Second, testimony
from a police officer and a forensic chemist supports Davis’s conviction for simple
possession of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Third, testimony from multiple police
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The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C.
§ 1612(c), and we retain jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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officers likewise supports Davis’s assault conviction. See 14 V.I.C. § 298. Any appeal
based on these issues would be frivolous.
That does not end our inquiry, however, because we must still scour the record
ourselves. Aside from the issues counsel underscores, our review reveals one more. On
the trial’s first day, Davis identified numerous disagreements with counsel and demanded
a replacement. But “disagreement over legal strategy does not constitute good cause for
substitution of counsel.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 207 n.10 (3d Cir.
1999). And, although Davis refused to work with counsel and even threatened him, a
“unilateral decision not to cooperate . . . does not constitute good cause.” Id. So this issue,
too, is frivolous.
The bottom line is that this appeal “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Ct. Of
Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988). We therefore “dispose of [it]
without appointing new counsel,” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a), and confirm that no issues
warrant the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, see id. 109.2(b).
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
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