Laura Jennings v. City of Indianapolis , 637 F. App'x 216 ( 2016 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted February 22, 2016*
    Decided February 22, 2016
    Before
    FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    No. 15-2852
    LAURA A. JENNINGS,                              Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                        Court for the Southern District of
    Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    v.
    No. 1:15-cv-00333-LJM-MJD
    CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,
    Defendants-Appellees.                     Larry J. McKinney,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    Laura Jennings filed suit against the City of Indianapolis and the Indianapolis Fire
    Department,1 alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
    * After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
    unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.
    34(a)(2)(C).
    1 The Indianapolis Fire Department is not a legal entity separable from the City
    and thus is not subject to suit. See Peirick v. Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis
    No. 15-2852                                                                             Page 2
    U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, in connection with prior employment-discrimination suits
    she filed against these defendants. In this suit, instead of asserting any adverse action
    related to her employment, she raised confusing allegations about the guardianship of
    her deceased brother, as well as taxes and insurance related to his death. The district
    court dismissed the complaint because these allegations failed to state an
    employment-discrimination claim.
    On appeal Jennings asserts that the district court erroneously dismissed her suit
    without allowing a jury to assess the City’s wrongdoing. But the court properly
    dismissed her complaint because she has not alleged that she suffered an adverse
    employment action, as is required to state a claim under Title VII. See Huri v. Office of the
    Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty., 
    804 F.3d 826
    , 833 (7th Cir. 2015); Luevano v.
    Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    722 F.3d 1014
    , 1029 (7th Cir. 2013). Nor has she specified how the
    City was involved with her brother’s guardianship such that it plausibly could be liable
    for the guardianship’s mishandling. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009);
    McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 
    694 F.3d 873
    , 885 (7th Cir. 2012). To the extent Jennings
    believes that the district court denied her the opportunity to have those responsible for
    mishandling the guardianship criminally prosecuted, she is not entitled to demand
    prosecution. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 
    545 U.S. 748
    (2005); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 
    701 F.3d 193
    , 204 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
    Jennings also asks us to strike documents included in the appellee’s supplemental
    appendix, including complaints and court orders from her prior suits. But we may take
    judicial notice of these documents, see Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 
    644 F.3d 483
    , 494
    (7th Cir. 2011), and thus deny her request. Jennings additionally asks that we appoint
    counsel, but we decline to do so because there is no reasonable likelihood that the
    presence of counsel would alter the outcome of the case. See Pruitt v. Mote, 
    503 F.3d 647
    ,
    659 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
    Finally, Jennings has been a vexatious litigant.2 We now order Jennings to show
    cause within 14 days why the court should not impose sanctions under Federal Rule of
    Athletics Dep't, 
    510 F.3d 681
    , 694 (7th Cir. 2007); City of Peru v. Lewis, 
    950 N.E.2d 1
    , 4 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2011).
    2We already have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction six appeals that Jennings filed
    while her previous employment-discrimination and retaliation suits against the City
    were pending before the district court. See Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, Fire and EMS
    Department, No. 12-3500 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 2013); Jennings v. City of Indianapolis,
    No. 15-2852                                                                            Page 3
    Appellate Procedure 38 for filing a frivolous appeal. Possible sanctions include
    revocation of Jennings’s IFP status, a fine, and an order under Support Sys. Int’l., Inc. v.
    Mack, 
    45 F.3d 185
    (7th Cir. 1995), barring Jennings from filing any other litigation in this
    circuit until she has paid all the fees she owes to the district courts in this circuit and to
    us.
    AFFIRMED.
    No. 12-1546 (7th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012); Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, No. 12-1531 (7th Cir.
    May 16, 2012); Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, No. 12-1548 (7th Cir. May 16, 2012); Jennings
    v. City of Indianapolis, Fire and EMS Department, No. 12-1554 (7th Cir. May 16, 2012);
    Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, Fire and EMS Department, No. 12-1464 (7th Cir.
    Apr. 25, 2012). The district court later dismissed at screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
    another of her complaints in which she asserted largely the same allegations as in this
    suit. See Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:14-cv-1062-WTL-TAB (S.D. Ind. Oct. 16,
    2014). We summarily affirmed. See Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, No. 14-3337 (7th Cir.
    Feb. 12, 2015). We also have either dismissed or summarily affirmed three of her other
    appeals from suits unrelated to her employment with the Indianapolis Fire Department.
    See Jennings v. Vilsack, Nos. 14-2274 & 14-2627 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2014) (summarily
    affirmed); Jennings v. Panetta, No. 12-3922 (7th Cir. May 8, 2013) (dismissed as moot);
    Jennings v. Panetta, No. 12-3522 (7th Cir. Dec. 10, 2012) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).