United States v. Charles Ransom, Jr. ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 20 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50306
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:10-cr-01236-R-TJH-2
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES DWIGHT RANSOM, Jr., AKA
CJ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 14, 2021**
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Charles Dwight Ransom, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s orders
denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
and motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we vacate the district court’s orders and remand.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
As Ransom acknowledged in the district court, he did not fully exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing his motion for compassionate release. See
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (a defendant may not file a compassionate release
motion in the district court until “after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion
on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request
by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier”). While the
government does not raise this argument on appeal, it timely raised an exhaustion
objection in the district court. In an opinion issued by this court after the district
court’s decision, we made clear that a district court may not reach the merits of a
compassionate release motion if the government has properly objected in the
district court to the defendant’s failure to exhaust. See United States v. Keller, 2
F.4th 1278, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2021) (a district court may not overlook a timely
exhaustion objection because “§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s administrative exhaustion
requirement is mandatory and must be enforced when properly raised by the
government”).
Unlike in Keller, the error here was not harmless because, in denying
Ransom’s motion on the merits, the district court appears to have impermissibly
treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797,
802 (9th Cir. 2021) (though a district court may treat U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as
2 20-50306
instructive, it may not treat it as binding in assessing a compassionate release
motion filed by a prisoner). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s orders
denying Ransom’s motion for compassionate release and subsequent motion for
reconsideration, and remand for the court to dismiss Ransom’s motions without
prejudice.
This decision is without prejudice to Ransom filing a new, fully exhausted
motion for compassionate release on remand. If Ransom files such a motion, the
district court should follow the guidance provided by this court in Keller and
Aruda, but we express no opinion as to whether it should grant relief.
The government’s motion to supplement the record is denied without
prejudice to any arguments it wishes to make should Ransom file a new motion for
compassionate release in the district court.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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