Jozette Greenfield v. Deutsche Bank , 569 F. App'x 455 ( 2014 )


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  •                          NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted June 27, 2014*
    Decided July 2, 2014
    Before
    DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    Nos. 13-3834 & 13-3840
    Appeals from the
    JOZETTE GREENFIELD,                              United States District Court for the
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                        Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.
    Nos. 13 C 8442
    DEUTSCHE BANK AG,                                     13 C 6773
    GREEN RIVER CAPITAL, LLC,
    and RISING REALTY, LLC,                          James B. Zagel,
    Defendants-Appellees.                      Matthew F. Kennelly,
    Judges.
    *
    The named defendants are not participating in these appeals. After examining
    the appellant’s briefs and the records, we have concluded that these appeals are
    appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).
    Nos. 13-3834 & 13-3840                                                               Page 2
    ORDER
    An action to foreclose a mortgage on Jozette Greenfield’s home was filed in the
    Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in 2007. Greenfield contested the foreclosure as
    improperly filed and also asserted that the loan secured by her mortgage had been paid
    in full. She did not prevail, however, and eventually was evicted from the residence.
    Then in 2009 she brought the first of three federal lawsuits against defendants involved
    in the mortgage foreclosure. Greenfield renewed her objections to the (now completed)
    foreclosure and also claimed that the named defendants had violated the Fair Debt
    Collection Practices Act, see 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1692
    –1692p, throughout the foreclosure
    proceedings. Judge Darrah dismissed that suit for lack of subject-mater jurisdiction,
    relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
     (1923). That doctrine precludes federal courts
    other than the Supreme Court from reviewing state-court judgments in civil cases.
    See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 283–84 (2005); Crawford v.
    Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    647 F.3d 642
    , 645 (7th Cir. 2011); Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg.
    Ass'n, 
    374 F.3d 529
    , 533, 534 (7th Cir. 2004). Greenfield did not appeal that decision,
    which was entered in June 2012.
    Instead, more than a year later she filed the two lawsuits underlying these
    consolidated appeals. Both of Greenfield’s one-paragraph complaints assert that she
    was wrongly evicted from her home, and in the first of those complaints, she asked the
    court to “reverse the eviction.” Judge Kennelly presided over the first of these lawsuits
    and ordered Greenfield to show cause why the action should not be dismissed under
    Rooker-Feldman. Greenfield filed a response that adds to the facts in her complaint and
    implores Judge Kennelly to return her home, but says nothing about subject-matter
    jurisdiction. Judge Kennelly dismissed the complaint in open court on the basis of
    Rooker-Feldman. The next month Judge Zagel entered an order dismissing Greenfield’s
    remaining complaint for the same reason.
    On appeal Greenfield reasserts her disagreement with the outcome of the
    state-court foreclosure action, but she does not question the district court’s Rooker-
    Feldman analysis except to say that the doctrine is inapplicable because she never
    received a jury trial. But the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not turn on
    whether a state-court judgment was entered with or without a jury trial. See, e.g.,
    Abner v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 
    674 F.3d 716
    , 717–19 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal
    under Rooker-Feldman doctrine when plaintiff asked to set aside state-court judgment
    overturning, without a jury trial, an Illinois commission’s decision favorable to
    Nos. 13-3834 & 13-3840                                                             Page 3
    plaintiff); Mehta v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of the Sup. Ct. of Ill.,
    
    681 F.3d 885
    , 886–87 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal under Rooker-Feldman doctrine
    when plaintiff asked to set aside order of Illinois Supreme Court, issued without trial,
    suspending attorney’s license).
    As Greenfield makes no other appellate claim, the judgments are AFFIRMED.