Robin Allman v. Kevin Smith , 790 F.3d 762 ( 2015 )

Menu:

                                       In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.  14-‐‑1792
ROBIN  ALLMAN,  et  al.,
Plaintiffs-‐‑Appellees,
v.
KEVIN  SMITH  and  CITY  OF  ANDERSON,  INDIANA,
Defendants-‐‑Appellants.
____________________
Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the
Southern  District  of  Indiana,  Indianapolis  Division.
No.  1:12-‐‑cv-‐‑0568-‐‑TWP-‐‑DML  —  Tanya  Walton  Pratt,  Judge.
____________________
ARGUED  MAY  22,  2015  —  DECIDED  JUNE  24,  2015
____________________
Before   EASTERBROOK,   WILLIAMS,   and   HAMILTON,   Circuit
Judges.
EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge.  After  being  elected  Mayor  of
Anderson,   Indiana,   a   city   of   about   56,000   people,   Kevin
Smith   replaced   many   members   of   the   City’s   staff   with   his
political   supporters   or   persons   he   deemed   trustworthy.
Eleven   of   the   fired   workers   filed   this   suit   under

42 U.S.C. §1983

,   contending   that   the   discharges   violated   the   First
Amendment   as   understood   in   Elrod   v.   Burns,

427 U.S. 347

2                                                                 No.  14-‐‑1792
(1976).   The   district   judge   concluded   that   all   plaintiffs   have
enough   evidence   to   require   a   trial   but   that   Mayor   Smith   is
entitled   to   qualified   immunity   with   respect   to   nine   of   the
eleven  plaintiffs’  claims.

6 F. Supp. 3d 889

  (S.D.  Ind.  2014).
The  Mayor  has  appealed  from  the  adverse  portion  of  this
interlocutory  decision,  relying  on  Mitchell  v.  Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511

  (1985),  and  its  successors.  Surprisingly,  the  City  also  has
appealed,  even  though  as  a  municipal  body  it  is  not  entitled
to  any  form  of  immunity  and  is  outside  Mitchell’s  ambit.  The
City   invokes   the   doctrine   of   “pendent   appellate   jurisdic-‐‑
tion,”  which  barely  survived  its  scathing  treatment  in  Swint
v.  Chambers  County  Commission,

514 U.S. 35

  (1995),  and  today
allows   a   court   of   appeals   to   review   an   interlocutory   order
only   when   it   is   “inextricably   intertwined”   with   an   appeala-‐‑
ble  decision.  Clinton  v.  Jones,

520 U.S. 681

,  707  n.41  (1997).
The  City  maintains  that  its  attempt  to  have  the  plaintiffs’
claims  dismissed  on  the  merits  is  “inextricably  intertwined”
with   the   Mayor’s   attempt   to   be   free   of   the   risk   of   damages
liability,  but  the  contentions  are  not  “intertwined”  at  all,  let
alone   “inextricably”   so.   Mitchell   described   an   immunity   ap-‐‑
peal   as   “conceptually   distinct   from   the   merits”   (

472 U.S. at 527

),  which  the  Court  saw  as  an  essential  condition  of  inter-‐‑
locutory  review.  It  is  not  only  possible  but  also  normal  to  re-‐‑
solve   a   defendant’s   request   for   qualified   immunity   without
deciding  the  merits  of  a  plaintiff’s  claim.  See  Pearson  v.  Calla-‐‑
han,

555 U.S. 223

,  231–43  (2009).
The  principal  question  in  an  immunity  appeal  is  whether
uncertainty   in   legal   doctrine   makes   it   inappropriate   to
award   damages   against   a   public   official—that   is,   whether
the   law   was   “clearly   established”   before   the   official   acted.
See,   e.g.,   San   Francisco   v.   Sheehan,

135 S. Ct. 1765

,   1774–78
No.  14-‐‑1792                                                                    3
(2015);   Wilson   v.   Layne,

526 U.S. 603

,   618   (1999).   A   general
principle   does   not   support   personal   liability;   instead   the
law’s   application   to   a   type   of   situation   must   be   developed
enough   to   “place[]   the   statutory   or   constitutional   question
beyond   debate.”   Ashcroft   v.   al-‐‑Kidd,

131 S. Ct. 2074

,   2083
(2011),  quoted  in  Sheehan,

135 S. Ct. at 1774

.  The  question  on
the  merits,  by  contrast,  concerns  who  is  in  the  right,  not  how
much  legal  uncertainty  must  be  cleared  away  to  find  the  an-‐‑
swer.   The   district   judge   held   that   factual   investigation,   per-‐‑
haps  including  a  trial,  is  necessary  to  determine  whether  the
plaintiffs’  rights  under  the  First  Amendment  have  been  vio-‐‑
lated.  We  therefore  limit  the  appeal  to  Mayor  Smith’s  argu-‐‑
ments   about   the   only   two   plaintiffs   with   respect   to   whom
the   district   judge   denied   his   request   for   immunity:   Robin
Allman  and  Margaret  Baugher.
When  Smith  was  elected,  Allman  was  Office  Manager  for
the  Utility  Department.  That  position  includes  planning,  or-‐‑
ganization,  and  other  tasks  that  the  parties  agree  are  vital  to
an   elected   official’s   ability   to   carry   out   his   platform,   and   so
entitle  elected  officials  to  use  political  criteria  to  decide  who
holds  the  job.  See  generally  Branti  v.  Finkel,

445 U.S. 507

,  518
(1980)  (describing  the  sort  of  positions  for  which  “party  affil-‐‑
iation   is   an   appropriate   requirement   for   the   effective   per-‐‑
formance   of   the   public   office”).   Smith   told   Allman   that   he
would   not   retain   her   as   the   Office   Manager;   she   then   exer-‐‑
cised  her  seniority  (she  had  worked  for  the  City  for  20  years)
to   move   to   an   open   position   as   a   cashier   in   the   Utility   De-‐‑
partment.   That   transfer   took   effect   on   December   27,   2011.
When  Mayor  Smith  took  office  on  January  3,  2012,  he  “pro-‐‑
moted”  her  back  to  Office  Manager  and  immediately  sacked
her.
4                                                                No.  14-‐‑1792
The  parties  agree  that  the  position  of  cashier  is  not  politi-‐‑
cally  sensitive  and  that  Elrod  forbids  the  use  of  politics  when
filling   it.   Mayor   Smith   does   not   contend   that   he   would   be
entitled  to  immunity  had  he  cashiered  a  cashier.  But  he  con-‐‑
tends  that  Allman  was  not  properly  a  cashier  because  politi-‐‑
cal  considerations  influenced  both  her  hiring  as  Office  Man-‐‑
ager   and   her   transfer   to   the   cashier’s   position;   according   to
Mayor   Smith,   this   meant   that   Allman   was   still   the   Office
Manager   when   he   took   office   and   could   be   removed   con-‐‑
sistent   with   Elrod   and   Branti.   Allman   maintains,   to   the   con-‐‑
trary,  that  the  cashier’s  position  had  been  properly  posted  as
open  in  November  2011,  that  her  transfer  satisfied  all  of  the
City’s   rules,   and   that   the   reason   she   sought   the   transfer   is
irrelevant.
This   description   of   the   controversy   shows   that   it   has
nothing  to  do  with  uncertainty  in  federal  law,  and  thus  noth-‐‑
ing  to  do  with  qualified  immunity.  The  only  disputed  ques-‐‑
tion  is  one  of  state  or  local  law  (which  may  be  influenced  by
the   resolution   of   factual   disputes   about   how   and   why   the
transfer   occurred):   whether   Allman   properly   occupied   a
cashier’s  position.  It  follows  that  Mayor  Smith  is  not  entitled
to   interlocutory   review   with   respect   to   Allman’s   situation.
Johnson   v.   Jones,

515 U.S. 304

(1995), holds that qualified-‐‑
immunity appeals under Mitchell are limited to determining
whether the legal issue is subject to uncertainty and do not
support review of antecedent questions. The antecedent
question in Johnson was whether the plaintiff or the defend-‐‑
ant had correctly described the facts of the controversy; the
Court held that resolution of factual questions had to await
appeal from a final judgment, even if one possible resolution
would have brought a legal issue to the fore. In Allman’s
situation the antecedent question is whether her appoint-‐‑
No. 14-‐‑1792 5
ment to the cashier’s position was valid. No matter how that
comes out, the court will not need to resolve a disputed
question of federal law. Johnson makes it easy to see that
Mayor Smith is not entitled to interlocutory review of the
question whether Allman was entitled to be a cashier. That’s
the whole case, not (as Mitchell requires) an issue conceptual-‐‑
ly distinct from the merits.
Margaret Baugher, the other ex-‐‑employee involved in
this appeal, “worked as Customer Service Supervisor in the
City’s Utility Department. She reported to the Assistant
Manager for the Utility Department. As Customer Service
Supervisor, Ms. Baugher was responsible for directing per-‐‑
sonnel, assisting customers, and making billing adjustments,
as well as receiving and responding to customer inquiries
and complaints, assisting customers in initiating and termi-‐‑
nating services, and coordinating new sewer and storm wa-‐‑
ter accounts with the appropriate City department.” 6 F.
Supp. 3d at 894. This customer-‐‑service job was not the top of
the Utility Department, or even a deputy, but the third level
on the organization chart. The district judge wrote: “Ms.
Baugher mainly interacted with co-‐‑workers and members of
the general public, not high level city officials. Her main du-‐‑
ties consisted of complying with department policies and
rules, not developing such policies, and the information she
was charged with keeping confidential was not politically
sensitive information. Unless there is additional evidence
provided to the contrary at trial, it appears that Ms. Baugh-‐‑
er’s position falls outside of the exemption for First
Amendment protection, thus summary judgment on her
claim is not warranted.” Id. at 902.
6 No. 14-‐‑1792
This court has urged district judges to use job descrip-‐‑
tions, whenever possible, to apply Elrod and Branti, see Riley
v. Blagojevich,

425 F.3d 357

  (7th  Cir.  2005),  and  Mayor  Smith
observes  that  the  job  description  for  Baugher’s  position  men-‐‑
tions   the   possibility   that   the   Customer   Service   Supervisor
might   have   to   run   the   Department   if   all   higher   positions
should   be   unfilled   or   unable   to   act.   The   record   does   not
show  that  this  has  ever  happened,  however,  and  if  a  remote
possibility  that  a  subordinate  might  need  to  act  as  a  caretak-‐‑
er  were  enough  to  make  politics  a  legitimate  qualification  for
the   post,   then   Elrod   would   be   overthrown—for   if   a   disaster
of   sufficient   proportions   struck,   even   a   garbage   collector
might   find   himself   the   highest   remaining   worker   in   a   city’s
department  of  sanitation.
Branti   holds   that   an   assistant   public   defender   cannot   be
fired   on   political   grounds,   although   the   public   defender,
charged   with   setting   policy   for   the   office,   might   be.   By
Mayor  Smith’s  lights,  Branti  should  have  come  out  the  other
way,   because   it   was   possible   that   an   assistant   might   have   to
perform  the  chief’s  duties  if  that  office  became  vacant  or  the
chief   was   unable   to   act.   But   that’s   not   how   the   Court   ap-‐‑
proached  the  case.  Nor  is  it  how  we  approached  the  question
whether   the   #2   position   in   a   large   bureaucracy   (Chicago’s
Water   Department)   could   be   removed   on   political   grounds.
We  asked  in  Tomczak  v.  Chicago,

765 F.2d 633

  (7th  Cir.  1985),
what   the   First   Deputy   Commissioner   usually   did,   not   what
duties  were  conceivable  under  unlikely  conditions.  The  First
Deputy  Commissioner  of  Chicago’s  Water  Department  regu-‐‑
larly   made   policy   (or   exercised   politically   sensitive   discre-‐‑
tion),   and   it   followed   that   he   could   be   replaced   on   political
grounds.   That   can’t   be   said   about   Baugher’s   job   (the   third
tier  in  a  small  organization)—and  Mayor  Smith  does  not  say
No.  14-‐‑1792                                                                     7
it.   He   does   not   contend   that   she   regularly,   or   indeed   ever,
made  policy  or  exercised  politically  sensitive  discretion,  such
as   which   street’s   potholes   get   filled   or   what   ward’s   snow
gets  plowed.
Now   if   the   job   description   said   that   she   did   do   those
things,   then   Mayor   Smith   would   be   entitled   to   immunity
even   if   it   turned   out   that   the   description   was   inaccurate.   A
newly   elected   mayor   needs   to   rely   on   published   criteria   to
know  which  positions  can  be  filled  on  political  grounds.  For
the   federal   government,   United   States   Government   Policy   and
Supporting  Positions  (the  “Plum  Book”)  identifies  the  7,000  or
so   posts   eligible   for   presidential   selection   or   discretionary
replacement  by  presidential  appointees.  Many  states  and  lo-‐‑
cal  governments  have  similar  rosters,  and  people  whose  jobs
are  in  such  a  catalog  are  not  well  situated  to  complain  when
replaced.   They   certainly   cannot   obtain   damages   from   an
elected  official  who  relies  on  a  published  list.  But  the  City  of
Anderson  does  not  have  a  local  version  of  the  Plum  Book.  A
mayor   who   equates   a   worker’s   possible   duties   (e.g.,   acting
for  the  top  official  if  all  higher  positions  on  the  organization
chart  are  vacant)  with  the  worker’s  normal  duties  (e.g.,  pro-‐‑
cessing   complaints   about   overbilling   or   failure   to   credit
payments)  cannot  claim  immunity,  because  Branti  and  deci-‐‑
sions   such   as   Tomczak   and   Riley   establish   that   it   is   the   posi-‐‑
tion’s  normal  duties  that  matter.
As  a  fallback,  Mayor  Smith  contends  that  anyone  respon-‐‑
sible   for   dealing   with   citizens’   complaints   may   be   hired   or
fired  on  political  grounds,  for  if  such  a  person  insults  people,
or  is  lazy,  or  refuses  to  act  on  legitimate  grievances,  that  re-‐‑
flects  poorly  on  the  administration,  and  a  loss  of  public  con-‐‑
fidence   undermines   its   ability   to   carry   out   its   political   pro-‐‑
8                                                                  No.  14-‐‑1792
gram   (or   be   re-‐‑elected).   For   this,   Mayor   Smith   relies   princi-‐‑
pally   on   Selch   v.   Letts,

5 F.3d 1040

(7th Cir. 1993), which
holds that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the position of subdistrict superintendent at the Indiana
Department of Highways.
Responding to complaints was one aspect of a subdistrict
superintendent’s job, but it mattered to the decision what
those complaints concerned—and how the subdistrict super-‐‑
intendents could deal with them. Each subdistrict could set
an independent agenda about road repairs and maintenance,
including snow removal. Subdistrict superintendents had
“almost unbridled authority to determine where and when
… work was to be done” (id. at 1045). The ability to deliver
public services is vital to the success of any mayor or gover-‐‑
nor, and Selch reported that the quality of public services
had been an issue in the gubernatorial election that led to
Selch’s replacement. It is therefore understandable that a
person with “unbridled authority” to determine where and
when road-‐‑related services are provided must be someone
the Governor can trust. That subdistrict superintendents
sometimes acted in response to complaints was a sidelight;
what mattered was their discretion over matters of high po-‐‑
litical salience.
Mayor Smith does not contend that the Customer Service
Supervisor of the Utility Department has unbridled, or in-‐‑
deed any significant, discretion over matters of high political
value. Customer-‐‑service positions are ubiquitous in the
economy; people who call AT&T to complain about a tele-‐‑
phone bill hope to be well treated, but they do not imagine
that they are speaking to people with policy-‐‑making discre-‐‑
tion. True, if a customer-‐‑service supervisor fouls up, that
No. 14-‐‑1792 9
will redound to the employer’s detriment. But that’s true of
almost every employee. If a road maintenance worker falls
asleep on the job, or a postal letter carrier tramples a flower
bed, citizens may be furious and the government will fall in
public esteem. Yet Elrod holds that politics may not be a
ground of replacing road maintenance workers and similar
positions that do not entail political discretion. That’s equal-‐‑
ly true of customer-‐‑service supervisors.
The district judge recognized that a trial might show that
Baugher has more discretion than her job description im-‐‑
plies, and if so it may turn out in Branti’s words that “party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective per-‐‑
formance of the public office”. All we have to go on now,
however, is the job description. Johnson v. Jones prevents any
deeper inquiry. Selch and other decisions we have men-‐‑
tioned clearly establish that a person whose main duties are
managing a clerical staff that handles customer complaints—
who has limited operational discretion but no significant
policy-‐‑making discretion—cannot be fired on political
grounds.
The appeal is dismissed to the extent it concerns the City
of Anderson or Robin Allman’s claim. The district court’s
decision that Mayor Smith is not entitled to qualified im-‐‑
munity on Margaret Baugher’s claim is affirmed.