Frake, Allen v. City of Chicago ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-2367
    ALLEN FRAKE, in his capacity as Special
    Administrator of the Estate of Robert Frake,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 97 C 1221--James B. Zagel, Judge.
    Argued February 16, 2000--Decided April 24, 2000
    Before KANNE, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit
    Judges.
    EVANS, Circuit Judge. A person arrested in
    Chicago is likely to find himself in a detention
    facility at a district police station. Because of
    a potential for suicide, lockup personnel at
    detention facilities (jailers, in ordinary
    English) are required to make observations of
    people as they arrive--observations of signs of
    pain or injury, of infection, of drug or alcohol
    intoxication, despondency, and whether the person
    is carrying medication. In addition, jailers must
    ask the detainee whether he has ever tried to
    commit suicide and whether he has any serious
    medical or mental problems. Regardless of
    observations and the answers given to the
    questions, jailers also take away belts,
    shoelaces, mufflers, ties, and other items which
    could be converted into ligatures. After the
    person is placed in a cell, the jailers check the
    cell every 15 minutes. In addition, the district
    watch commander and the desk sergeant are
    required personally to inspect the lockup at
    least twice during their tour of duty, which
    results in a number of inspections which far
    exceeds the one-inspection-per-hour requirement
    in the State of Illinois "Municipal Jail and
    Lockup Standards." If it seems likely that a
    person is suicidal, other precautions are taken,
    such as placing the person in a cell which can be
    continuously observed and replacing the person’s
    clothing with a paper suit. In addition, the City
    provides jail workers with training in suicide
    awareness.
    Despite these precautions, which no one contends
    were neglected in this case, Robert Frake--who
    was arrested for possession of a small amount of
    cocaine--managed to hang himself in his cell at
    the District 12 Chicago Police Department lockup.
    His father, as administrator of Robert’s estate,
    has brought this lawsuit/1 under 42 U.S.C. sec.
    1983, claiming that the one thing which would
    have prevented Robert’s suicide is the thing
    which was not done. The City had done nothing
    about the horizontal metal bars in the cells. It
    was from a horizontal bar that Robert Frake
    hanged himself with his jacket, which he had been
    allowed to keep. The task of the district court
    (and now us) is to look beyond the obvious and
    regrettable tragedy to determine whether the City
    deprived Robert Frake, a pretrial detainee, of
    his right to life in violation of the Due Process
    Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
    court thought not and granted summary judgment
    for the City, a decision which we review de novo
    under the familiar principle that summary
    judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue
    of material fact and the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law. We construe all
    facts in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party and draw all inferences in his
    favor. Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc.,
    
    185 F.3d 732
     (7th Cir. 1999).
    The only defendant in this case is the City of
    Chicago. For liability to attach against a
    municipality under sec. 1983, a plaintiff must
    show that "deliberate action attributable to the
    municipality directly caused a deprivation of
    federal rights." Board of County Comm’rs v.
    Brown, 
    520 U.S. 397
    , 415 (1997). A plaintiff must
    show that municipal policymakers made a
    "deliberate choice" among various alternatives
    and that the injury was caused by the policy.
    Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 
    475 U.S. 469
    , 483
    (1986).
    In this case it is Robert Frake’s due process
    rights with which we are concerned. He was a
    pretrial detainee, not found guilty of a crime,
    and therefore he could not be "punished." For
    that reason, his treatment in the detention
    facility is analyzed under the Due Process
    Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s
    prohibition against cruel and unusual
    punishments. Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U.S. 520
    (1979). But like the protection afforded a
    convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment, a
    detainee is protected from the "deliberate
    indifference" of officials. County of Sacramento
    v. Lewis, 
    523 U.S. 833
     (1998); Antonelli v.
    Sheahan, 
    81 F.3d 1422
     (7th Cir. 1996).
    Specifically, when the claim is based on a jail
    suicide we have determined that the protection a
    detainee receives is the same as that received by
    an inmate claiming inadequate medical attention
    under the Eighth Amendment. Mathis v. Fairman,
    
    120 F.3d 88
     (7th Cir. 1997); Payne for Hicks v.
    Churchich, 
    161 F.3d 1030
     (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
    denied, 
    119 S. Ct. 2339
     (1999). A finding of
    deliberate indifference requires a showing that
    the officials were aware of a substantial risk of
    serious injury to the detainee but nevertheless
    failed to take appropriate steps to protect him
    from a known danger. 
    Id.
     See also Farmer v.
    Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837 (1994); Salazar v.
    City of Chicago, 
    940 F.2d 233
     (7th Cir. 1991). A
    defendant is not, however, required to guarantee
    the detainee’s safety. The existence or
    possibility of other better policies which might
    have been used does not necessarily mean that the
    defendant was being deliberately indifferent.
    Manarite By and Through Manarite v. City of
    Springfield, 
    957 F.2d 953
     (1st Cir. 1992).
    Frake contends that the history of suicides in
    the Chicago detention facilities coupled with the
    fact that the City continues to put detainees
    alone in cells with horizontal cross-bars
    requires a conclusion that the City is, in fact,
    deliberately indifferent. He claims that from
    December 4, 1990, until November 18, 1997, there
    were 20 other suicides and 163 attempted suicides
    by hanging, a number which he finds convincing
    proof of the City’s liability. The City says the
    figures are suspect and inadmissible, but in any
    case do not add up to deliberate indifference. It
    says that during that period the Chicago Police
    Department made 2,111,640 nontraffic arrests,
    which would mean, at most, that .0087 percent of
    arrests resulted in suicides or attempted
    suicides by hanging. The City does not argue that
    the number of suicides is acceptable, merely that
    it does not give rise to constitutional
    liability.
    We do not think that numbers can tell the whole
    story. It is possible that one or two suicides
    coupled with other evidence could add up to
    deliberate indifference in a proper case. The
    fact of an unfortunate, but not outrageous,
    number of suicides, however, given other
    precautions which may be taken, might not. See
    Manarite.
    Neither can the construction of the jail cells
    be viewed in isolation. As we have noted, many
    precautions are taken to ensure the safety of
    detainees. Given the fact that the City took
    other precautions with detainees, we cannot find
    that the continued use of the cells as
    constructed equals deliberate indifference. See
    also Payne for Hicks.
    Another factor which is instructive, but not
    conclusive, of the issue in this case is that the
    type of cell used in Chicago detention facilities
    is authorized by the State of Illinois Municipal
    Jail and Lockup Standards for new construction.
    The standards allow a steel grille or reinforced
    solid masonry. Frake does not present evidence
    that the City’s cells or the Illinois standards
    fall outside the range of professional judgment
    about cell design.
    The City is entitled to summary judgment. Frake
    has raised no genuine issue of material fact
    which might lead to a conclusion that the City
    maintains a policy which is deliberately
    indifferent to the risks of putting detainees in
    the existing cells. There is no evidence that
    anyone had knowledge that Robert Frake was
    suicidal. The screening process used in the
    detention facility is thorough. The lockup
    personnel receive training. There is no dispute
    that the cells are checked every 15 minutes or
    that obviously dangerous items are removed from
    the detainee’s possession. The death of Robert
    Frake was a tragedy. But the record shows that as
    a matter of law the City of Chicago was not
    deliberately indifferent to his welfare. The
    decision of the district court is, therefore,
    AFFIRMED.
    /1 The case, originally filed in state court in
    Illinois, was removed by the City of Chicago to
    the federal District Court for the Northern
    District of Illinois.