Sandstrom, Kenneth v. Cultor Food Science ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-2331
    Kenneth Sandstrom,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Cultor Food Science, Incorporated,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
    Division.
    No. 97 C 8216--James F. Holderman, Judge.
    Argued April 25, 2000--Decided May 25, 2000
    Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Easterbrook
    and Evans, Circuit Judges.
    Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. American
    Xyrofin, a manufacturer of food
    additives, was sold, merged, and
    reorganized early in 1996, with
    predictable consequences for some of its
    executives. Cultor U.S. Inc. acquired
    Xyrofin in January 1996 and renamed the
    new subsidiary Cultor Food Science (cfs).
    Soon Cultor Limited (the parent of Cultor
    U.S.) bought another food additives group
    from Pfizer, Inc., and merged this
    business into cfs. As part of the
    acquisition, Cultor promised Pfizer that
    it would give Pfizer employees who joined
    cfs but later lost their jobs benefits
    tracking those of the severance-payment
    plan that Pfizer maintained under the
    Employee Retirement Income Security Act
    (erisa). When in March 1996 cfs ended the
    employment of Violeta Velasco, who came
    from Xyrofin (which lacked a severance-
    benefit plan), it offered her a severance
    package: six weeks’ pay, plus one
    additional week’s pay for each year she
    had been employed by Xyrofin, both
    doubled if she signed a release of any
    legal claims against cfs. Toward the end
    of March cfs decided that the services of
    Kenneth Sandstrom, Velasco’s supervisor,
    also were no longer necessary. Sandstrom,
    unlike Velasco, was not offered a
    severance package. He filed this suit
    under sec.502(a) (1)(B) of erisa, 29
    U.S.C. sec.1132(a)(1)(B), contending that
    the offer to Velasco demonstrated that cfs
    had an "informal plan for severance
    benefits" that applied to him too. The
    district court disagreed and granted
    summary judgment for cfs. 1999 U.S. Dist.
    Lexis 6525 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 1999).
    Briefs filed in this court dwell on two
    questions: whether Sandstrom has produced
    evidence from which a reasonable trier of
    fact could conclude that cfs "intended" to
    establish an "informal" (which is to say,
    unwritten) severance-benefit plan and, if
    so, whether the terms of that plan are
    sufficiently definite to support a
    remedy. They debate, for example, whether
    Barton Finegan, the vice president of
    human resources who approved the offer to
    Velasco, had authority to establish a
    plan on behalf of cfs. They also explore
    whether the Velasco offer sets out the
    terms of the plan or whether, instead,
    these terms may be found elsewhere--
    perhaps in a check sent to Velasco (which
    gave her one week’s pay in addition to
    what the offer promised) or perhaps in
    the (written) plan for employees cfs
    inherited from Pfizer. This plan had a
    13-week base plus triple the week’s-pay-
    per-prior-year if the employee signed a
    release. Nor can the parties agree on
    whether the "informal plan" afforded
    benefits in lieu of notice (so that an
    employee who remained on the payroll
    after notice of termination would have
    severance benefits reduced by the number
    of weeks of employment yet to go) or was
    on top of whatever wages the employee
    earned. If cfs created a plan by making an
    offer to Velasco, did it amend or abolish
    the plan by not making a similar offer to
    Sandstrom? These are enigmas, which
    exemplify a deeper problem that the
    parties have not mentioned: does erisa
    contemplate unwritten plans? None of
    these uncertainties would exist if the
    plan were on paper.
    Several of our cases say that it is
    possible to have an unwritten pension or
    welfare-benefit plan under erisa, if the
    plan is "a ’reality,’ which requires . .
    . that the court be able to determine
    ’whether from the surrounding
    circumstances a reasonable person could
    ascertain the intended benefits,
    beneficiaries, source of financing, and
    procedures for receiving benefits.’"
    James v. National Business Systems, Inc.,
    
    924 F.2d 718
    , 720 (7th Cir. 1991),
    quoting from Donovan v. Dillingham, 
    688 F.2d 1367
    , 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (en
    banc). See also Diak v. Dwyer, Costello &
    Knox, P.C., 
    33 F.3d 809
    , 811-12 (7th Cir.
    1994); Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life
    Insurance Group, Inc., 
    805 F.2d 732
    , 738-
    39 (7th Cir. 1986). It is not clear that
    the approach taken in Dillingham is
    compatible with more recent decisions of
    the Supreme Court, which emphasize
    different considerations when asking
    whether an informal policy or arrangement
    is a "plan." See Massachusetts v. Morash,
    
    490 U.S. 107
     (1989); Fort Halifax Packing
    Co. v. Coyne, 
    482 U.S. 1
     (1987). Both
    Morash and Ft. Halifax evince reluctance
    to find that regular and predictable
    awards of severance or vacation payments
    establish a "plan," given the frequency
    with which these benefits are the subject
    of bilateral negotiations between
    employers and departing employees. But we
    need not pursue this subject, because cfs
    had an express plan, which did not cover
    Sandstrom.
    Written plans may be altered only in
    writing. Statements by plan
    administrators, side agreements and
    understandings, or even special offers
    made to many of a firm’s employees, do
    not change the contents of the plan
    applicable to other employees. See, e.g.,
    Central States Pension Fund v. Gerber
    Truck Service, Inc., 
    870 F.2d 1148
     (7th
    Cir. 1989) (en banc); Frahm v. Equitable
    Life Assurance Society, 
    137 F.3d 955
    , 960
    (7th Cir. 1998); Central States Pension
    Fund v. Joe McClelland, Inc., 
    23 F.3d 1256
     (7th Cir. 1994). Likewise,
    statements or conduct by bureaucrats
    implementing a plan do not estop the
    employer to enforce the plan’s written
    terms, and although we have not barred
    the door we have made it clear that only
    extreme circumstances (not yet seen)
    justify estoppel. See, e.g., Shields v.
    Teamsters Pension Plan, 
    188 F.3d 895
     (7th
    Cir. 1999); Plumb v. Fluid Pump Service,
    Inc., 
    124 F.3d 849
    , 856 (7th Cir. 1997);
    Schoonmaker v. Employee Savings Plan of
    Amoco Corp., 
    987 F.2d 410
     (7th Cir.
    1993).
    These decisions are fatal to Sandstrom’s
    position, for his claim must be that cfs
    amended its formal plan (the one
    applicable only to former Pfizer
    employees) by making the offer to
    Velasco. Yet that is not the means erisa
    contemplates for plan amendments. See
    Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
    
    514 U.S. 73
     (1995). Sandstrom evidently
    believes that erisa forbids bilateral
    deals between an employer and individual
    employees, so that the offer to Velasco
    must be a manifestation of a generally
    applicable "plan." Our opinion in Frahm
    rejects that position, holding that
    bilateral arrangements are compatible
    with erisa and do not modify the plan
    applicable to other employees who did not
    receive the offers or estop the employer
    to enforce the plan’s written terms. 
    137 F.3d at 957-58
    . See also McNab v. General
    Motors Corp., 
    162 F.3d 959
     (7th Cir.
    1998). Accord, Sprague v. General Motors
    Corp., 
    133 F.3d 388
    , 403 (6th Cir. 1998)
    (en banc). Sandstrom was not entitled to
    severance benefits under the terms of the
    Pfizer acquisition, so the judgment of
    the district court is
    affirmed.