Transit Express Inc v. Ettinger, Joel P. , 246 F.3d 1018 ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-1987
    TRANSIT EXPRESS, INCORPORATED,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JOEL P. ETTINGER, Regional Administrator
    of the Federal Transit Administration for
    Region V, U.S. Department of Transportation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 99 C 3415--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
    Argued September 26, 2000--Decided April 12, 2001
    Before COFFEY, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
    COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On May 21, 1999, Transit
    Express, Incorporated, filed a one-count
    complaint in the United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Illinois seeking
    declaratory relief and review of an
    administrative decision issued by the Federal
    Transit Administration. The complaint asserted
    that Transit Express had been improperly excluded
    from receiving monies from a federal program
    designed to provide transportation services to
    the elderly and persons with disabilities. The
    district court dismissed the complaint after
    ruling that the court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction because there was no federal
    question involved in the case. We affirm.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A.   Statutory and Regulatory Background
    The Federal Transit Authority is a grant-making
    agency within the United States Department of
    Transportation authorized under Chapter 53 of
    Title 49 of the United States Code to award
    monetary grants to states in order that they may
    finance the planning, development, construction,
    and improvement of mass transportation
    facilities. 49 U.S.C. sec. 5310(f). The Wisconsin
    Department of Transportation ("WisDOT"), and
    therefore Wisconsin, is one of the participants
    in this program.
    Under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5310, the "Elderly Persons
    and Persons with Disabilities Program," state
    agencies may apply directly to the Federal
    Transit Authority for funding so the agencies can
    meet the special transportation needs of the
    elderly and the disabled in their state.
    According to the FTA, the goal of the program is
    to improve mobility for the elderly and persons
    with disabilities throughout the country. Toward
    this goal, FTA provides financial assistance for
    transportation services planned, designed, and
    carried out to meet the special needs of the
    elderly and persons with disabilities in all
    areas--urbanized, small urban, and rural.
    FTA Circular 9070.1E.
    Furthermore, Section 5310 funds are disbursed to
    the states through a formula that is based upon
    the number of elderly persons and persons with
    disabilities residing in each state as determined
    in the last U.S. census. Id. at Chapter II,
    paragraph 3. Once in receipt of federal funds, a
    state agency, in this case WisDOT, has the option
    of using the funds to either: (1) purchase
    equipment, such as vans and buses; or (2)
    subsidize services that transport elderly persons
    and persons with disabilities. 49 U.S.C. sec.
    5323(a).
    1.   FTA Circulars 4220.1D and 9070.1E
    The United States Secretary of Transportation is
    entrusted with the responsibility of promulgating
    rules and regulations establishing the standards
    for participation in the Section 5310 program. 49
    U.S.C. sec. 5310(f). There are two FTA Circulars
    that are relevant to the disposition of the
    claims in this case: (1) Circular 9070.1E (the
    "Section 5310 Program Circular"); and (2)
    Circular 4220.1D (the "Third Party Procurement
    Circular"). Circular 9070.1E sets forth
    requirements that FTA recipients (state agencies)
    must adhere to when providing sub-grants to
    qualifying entities, such as non-profit
    organizations, under the Section 5310 program.
    Chapter I of the Section 5310 Program Circular
    states that a state agency that receives funds,
    in this case WisDOT, has the principal authority
    and responsibility for administering the Section
    5310 program. WisDOT is responsible for notifying
    eligible local entities of funding availability,
    developing project selection criteria,
    determining applicant eligibility, and selecting
    projects for funding. FTA Circular 9070.1E,
    Chapter I./1
    WisDOT implements the Section 5310 program by
    extending sub-grants to eligible, non-profit
    organizations serving the elderly and persons
    with disabilities needing transportation
    assistance that have made direct application to
    WisDOT for state assistance. The eligible non-
    profit organizations selected and approved by
    WisDOT, in turn, usually contract with private
    companies to provide the transportation services.
    However, it is undisputed that in 1997, WisDOT
    used all of its Section 5310 grant monies to
    purchase vans, rather than fund operating
    expenses for the non-profit organizations.
    B.   Transit Express’s Complaints
    1. Transit Express’s State Administrative
    Complaint
    Transit Express is a Wisconsin based,
    transportation service company that is not
    eligible to apply for or receive sub-grants from
    WisDOT under the Section 5310 program because it
    is a for-profit enterprise. On February 9, 1997,
    Transit Express filed an administrative complaint
    with WisDOT complaining that it had been
    unlawfully excluded from participating as a
    service provider for non-profit organizations
    that had received Section 5310 program funds from
    WisDOT funds during the fiscal 1997 grant cycle
    for a host of reasons./2 In its administrative
    complaint to WisDOT, Transit Express specifically
    claimed that: (1) Goodwill had contracted with
    Elder Care Lines, Inc. ("Elder Care Lines") for
    transportation services under the Federal Section
    5310 program despite the existence of several
    improper conflicts of interest;/3 (2) Goodwill,
    the Center for Independence, Curative Services,
    and the Jewish Center all required what Transit
    Express felt were excessive amounts of insurance
    coverage, which, in turn, barred Transit Express
    from participating in the 5310 Program; (3) the
    Section 5310 fund-recipients neglected to provide
    Transit Express with the selection criteria used
    to evaluate bids; and (4) the Center for
    Independence improperly selected Elder Care Lines
    to provide transportation services. On July 23,
    1997, WisDOT denied the administrative complaint
    filed by Transit Express.
    2.   The Federal Administrative Complaint
    On September 10, 1997, Transit Express filed a
    petition for administrative review with the FTA
    challenging WisDOT’s disposition of its state
    complaint. On November 13, 1998, Joel Ettinger,
    the Regional Administrator of Region V of the
    FTA,/4 issued a decision denying the petition
    for administrative review, stating:
    Before FTA gets to the merits of the allegations
    raised by Transit, a decision must be made as to
    whether FTA has jurisdiction over this dispute
    and, if so, on what legal authority should FTA
    make a decision. Transit has argued that FTA
    should review this issue because it is a matter
    of federal concern. Further, Transit believes
    that FTA Circular 4220.1D is applicable and that
    WisDOT has ". . . failed to either establish its
    own protest procedures or to follow them."
    * * * *
    WisDOT does not fund any contractual or purchase
    of service agreements as part of its Program even
    though these agreements would be eligible for
    federal assistance. The only funds that the
    recipients receive under the program are for the
    purchase of capital assets. FTA’s procurement
    requirements would only apply to the contracts
    solicited to purchase vehicles. Transit is not
    complaining about the purchase of vehicles by the
    five not for profit entities but is instead
    complaining about the notification process
    associated with the private transportation
    provider coordination requirements under the
    Program. Therefore 4220.1D is not applicable to
    this matter.
    Having made this original determination about the
    applicability of the 4220.1D to WisDOT’s Program,
    FTA must turn to what are the implications of
    that decision. A review of the basis of the
    complaint tends to indicate that there are a
    number of substantive issues being raised by
    Transit such as the conflict of interest
    violations as well as the overly restrictive
    insurance requirements. WisDOT has pointed out in
    their brief that they should be the ones to
    interpret their own regulations. FTA agrees with
    WisDOT’s position. FTA Circular 9070.1E clearly
    states that the principal authority and
    responsibility for administering the program
    resides with the designated state agency. To the
    extent that the arguments of Transit are directed
    at WisDot’s interpretation of their own
    regulations, FTA will not intervene. . . . FTA
    believes that the reasonableness or
    unreasonableness of WisDOT’s decision is not for
    FTA to decide. FTA is responsible for determining
    if WisDOT is following FTA’s requirements . . .
    .
    Therefore, based on the above, FTA refers this
    matter back to WisDOT to take whatever additional
    action it deems necessary in accordance with
    their administrative process. To the extent that
    the administrative process has been exhausted,
    Transit should pursue the matter further in the
    appropriate manner as specified under state law.
    No further action was taken by WisDOT.
    3.   Transit Express Files Suit in Federal Court
    On May 21, 1999, Transit Express filed a
    complaint in federal court seeking to compel the
    FTA to review the administrative complaint
    previously filed with WisDOT. Transit Express
    specifically asked the trial judge to find that
    the FTA had a duty to assume jurisdiction over
    its petition for review of WisDOT’s service
    contract practices under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5301 et
    seq. Transit Express’s complaint did not allege
    that WisDOT or any of the non-profit
    organizations that received grants from WisDOT
    had improperly used the vehicles purchased with
    federal funds; instead, the lawsuit focused
    exclusively on the allegation that Transit
    Express was unlawfully excluded from receiving a
    service provider contract based on the alleged
    fact that sub-grantees of the Section 5310
    program had conflicts of interest with Elder Care
    Lines.
    Transit Express asserted that the trial court
    could properly exercise federal question
    jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. sec. 1331 because the action arose under
    the federal transit laws 49 U.S.C. sec. 5301 et
    seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act
    ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. sec. 701, et seq. The defendant
    disputed that federal jurisdiction was proper and
    thus moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
    state a claim. The district judge granted
    defendant’s motion and dismissed the lawsuit with
    prejudice on March 16, 2000, due to the fact that
    federal subject matter jurisdiction was lacking
    because there was no federal question involved in
    the case.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    We review the district court’s decision to
    dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. Long v.
    Shorebank Development Corp., 
    182 F.3d 548
    , 554
    (7th Cir. 1999). In considering a motion to
    dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
    the district court must accept the complaint’s
    well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw
    reasonable inferences from those allegations in
    the plaintiff’s favor. Rueth v. EPA, 
    13 F.3d 227
    ,
    229 (7th Cir. 1993).
    B.   Subject Matter Jurisdiction
    Fundamental to our law is the understanding
    that "[f]ederal courts are not courts of general
    jurisdiction; they have only the power that is
    authorized by Article III of the Constitution and
    the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant
    thereto." Bender v. Williamsport Area School
    District, 
    475 U.S. 534
    , 541 (1986); see also
    Allen v. Wright, 
    468 U.S. 737
    , 750 (1984).
    Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331 provides that
    "[t]he district courts shall have original
    jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
    the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
    States." Also, plaintiff-appellant Transit
    Express bears the burden of proving that
    jurisdiction is proper in this case. Kontos v.
    United States Dept. of Labor, 
    826 F.2d 573
    , 576
    (7th Cir. 1987). Finally, we are cognizant of the
    Supreme Court’s admonition that "federal question
    jurisdiction arises only when the complaint
    standing alone ’establishes either that federal
    law creates the cause of action or that the
    plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends
    on resolution of a substantial question of
    federal law.’" Minor v. Prudential Securities,
    Inc., 
    94 F.3d 1103
    , 1105 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
    Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
    Vacation Trust, 
    463 U.S. 1
    , 27-28 (1983)).
    With these standards in mind, federal
    jurisdiction is appropriate in the present case
    if Transit Express can establish either: (1) that
    a federal statute has granted the court the power
    to create substantive law governing this dispute;
    or (2) that federal common law jurisdiction has
    been implicated due to a "uniquely federal
    interest" as to which "the application of state
    law would frustrate specific objectives of
    federal legislation." Northrop Corp. v. AIL
    Systems, Inc., 
    959 F.2d 1424
    , 1426-27 (7th Cir.
    1992).
    1. Lack of federal statute authorizing
    jurisdiction
    Initially, Transit Express argues that it has
    properly invoked federal question jurisdiction
    because the Federal Transit Authority has a duty
    under federal law to assure that grantees, such
    as WisDOT, are in compliance with the mandates of
    the Section 5310 program. Transit Express
    contends that 49 U.S.C. sec. 5310, as embodied in
    FTA Circular 4220.1D ("the Third Party
    Procurement Circular"), requires WisDOT to
    oversee how organizations that receive sub-grants
    from state agencies distribute the grant monies
    they received from WisDOT. Transit Express
    specifically claims a federal court is authorized
    to compel the FTA to review what Transit Express
    views were violations of the "Competition"
    requirements contained in paragraph 8 of the
    Third Party Procurement Circular. Paragraph 8 of
    that Circular states:
    a. Full and Open Competition. All procurement
    transactions will be conducted in a manner
    providing full and open competition. Some of the
    situations considered to be restrictive of
    competition include, but are not limited to:
    (1) Unreasonable requirements placed on firms in
    order for them to qualify to do business;
    (2) Unnecessary experience and excessive bonding
    requirements;
    * * * *
    (5) Organizational conflicts of interest. An
    organizational conflict of interest means that
    because of other activities, relationships, or
    contracts, a contractor is unable, or potentially
    unable, to render impartial assistance or advice
    to the grantee; a contractor’s objectivity in
    performing the contract work is or might be
    otherwise impaired; or a contractor has an unfair
    competitive advantage.
    Initially, Transit Express is correct in stating
    that Circular 4220.1D mandates WisDOT to comply
    with federal regulations whenever WisDOT
    distributes federal funds to subgrantees.
    However, contrary to Transit Express’s arguments,
    the competition requirements embodied in FTA
    Circular 4220.1D do not apply when state agencies
    such as WisDOT choose to purchase capital assets
    with the funds. The Third Party Procurement
    Circular plainly states:
    This circular applies to all FTA grantees and
    subgrantees that contract with outside sources
    under FTA assistance programs. If a grantee
    accepts operating assistance, the requirements of
    this circular apply to all transit-related third
    party purchase orders and contracts. These
    requirements do not apply to procurements
    undertaken in support of capital projects
    completely accomplished without FTA funds or to
    those operating and planning contracts awarded by
    grantees that do not receive FTA operating and
    planning assistance.
    Under the plain language of the Third Party
    Procurement Circular, the competition
    requirements contained in Paragraph 8 of the
    Circular do not apply to operating service
    contracts that are not assisted with federal
    funds. As WisDOT used all of its federal funds
    for capital expenditures, the competition
    requirements do not apply to the service
    contracts "awarded by grantees that [did] not
    receive FTA operating and planning assistance."
    Furthermore, we have previously held that the
    mere existence of a federal regulatory framework
    does not convey federal jurisdiction over
    contractual disputes between private parties that
    are ancillary to the governmental interest.
    Northrop, 
    959 F.2d at 1424
    . In Northrop, the Air
    Force contracted with AIL Systems, Inc. ("AIL")
    to develop a bomber. 
    Id. at 1425
    . AIL had
    previously contracted with another defense
    contractor, Northrop, and had agreed to
    subcontract part of the work it received under
    the Air Force contract to Northrop. AIL
    subsequently decided to retain all of the defense
    contract work for itself. Northrop, in turn,
    brought suit in federal court against AIL for
    breach of contract alleging that federal question
    jurisdiction existed as a result of the federal
    government’s interest in the production of the
    airplanes. The district court dismissed the case
    for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and we
    affirmed. 
    Id. at 1426
    . We specifically rejected
    Northrop’s argument which claimed that because
    the federal government had a strong interest in
    the production of bombers, it had a similar
    interest in the contract between AIL and
    Northrop. 
    Id.
     We also rejected Northrop’s
    argument that the federal government’s extensive
    statutory and administrative regulation of
    defense contractors resulted in a federal common
    law concern for the adjudication of contract
    disputes between military contractors and
    subcontractors. 
    Id.
    Transit Express’s arguments mirror those
    rejected in Northrop. Initially, Transit Express
    argues that the Federal Transit Authority has a
    strong interest in monitoring the Section 5310
    program requirements. However, just as in
    Northrop, the FTA’s general interest in efficient
    transportation does not extend a concurrent
    interest in the contracts entered into between
    private companies that provide transportation
    services and those non-profit organizations that
    make use of such services. At base, Transit
    Express complains about the failure of a state
    agency to review complaints that sub-grantees
    failed to follow state issued regulations.
    Consequently, whatever legal remedy Transit
    Express might be entitled to would be in state
    court not federal court.
    2. Use of federal funds is not a "unique federal
    interest"
    Transit Express alternatively argues that
    subject matter jurisdiction exists because the
    federal government retains a continuing interest
    in the use of those vehicles that WisDOT
    purchased with federal funds. In support of this
    argument, Transit Express relies primarily on In
    re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency,
    
    847 F.2d 430
     (7th Cir. 1988), a case where state
    and federal agencies disputed the ownership of a
    bankrupt entity’s assets purchased with state and
    federal grant money. Transit Express cites
    Joliet-Will for the proposition that subgrant-
    funded assets (such as the vehicles purchased by
    WisDOT) are "assets of the federal government and
    of the state agencies to which the federal
    government made some of the grant initially, for
    redistribution (along with the state’s own money)
    to operating organizations." 
    Id. at 432
    . Transit
    Express reasons that if the vehicles acquired
    with Section 5310 subgrant assistance are "assets
    of the federal government" then the federal
    government has a continuing interest over the use
    of such vehicles and this interest provides for
    federal jurisdiction over disputes concerning
    such property.
    The argument that federal jurisdiction exists
    over this case because federal funds were
    expended in the purchase of the vehicles fails
    because the subject matter of Transit Express’s
    complaint is unrelated to the vehicles, but
    rather centers on the distribution of service
    operating contracts. For example, the complaint
    filed by Transit Express alleges that Transit
    Express was unlawfully excluded from receiving
    service provider contracts with non-profit
    organizations who received the benefit of Section
    5310 assistance, such as Goodwill. In its
    complaint, Transit Express frames the core of its
    grievance in this manner:
    Plaintiff [Transit Express] has been unlawfully
    excluded from operating contracts funded by
    Section 5310 Program subgrants made by Wis DOT to
    [subgrantees] by and because of the unlawful
    conduct described in this Complaint.
    The fact that federal funds were used to purchase
    the vehicles in compliance with the Section 5310
    program is completely irrelevant to the present
    action and may not be used as a basis for
    bringing this action in federal court. The
    nonprofit organizations that were the recipients
    of the vehicles from the state could either elect
    to operate the vehicles themselves or contract
    independently with a service provider, such as
    Transit Express or Elder Care Lines. As the trial
    court so aptly stated, "the federal funds lurking
    in the background of this case cannot serve as an
    independent basis for establishing jurisdiction."
    We also agree with the judge’s conclusion that:
    If the government retained some legal interest in
    the vehicles, not only would federal courts have
    jurisdiction over every accident involving the
    vehicles, the government could also be held
    liable for any injuries caused by the negligent
    operation of the vehicle. This would result in an
    avalanche of unforeseen liability for the United
    States and Wisconsin; plainly an untenable
    result. We hold that the government does not
    retain any continued legal interest in the
    vehicles. Accordingly, Transit’s complaint does
    not present a federal question, and we have no
    jurisdiction over the suit.
    The district court’s decision is
    AFFIRMED./5
    /1 State agencies also accept complaints about
    disputes concerning their decisions because the
    Federal Transit Authority will not accept such
    feedback. Fed. Reg. 21890-901 (April 26, 1994).
    /2 In 1997, WisDOT awarded Section 5310 funds (in
    the form of vehicles) to the following non-profit
    agencies: Curative Rehabilitation Services, Inc.
    ("Curative Services"); Goodwill Industries of
    Southeastern Wisconsin ("Goodwill"); Jewish
    Community Center of Milwaukee, Inc. ("Jewish
    Center"); and the Milwaukee Center for
    Independence ("the Center for Independence").
    /3 Transit Express asserted that Elder Care Lines’
    relationship with Goodwill was inappropriate for
    the following reasons: (1) a director of
    transportation was on the payroll of both
    Goodwill and Elder Care Lines; (2) that Elder
    Care Lines’ president was married to a Goodwill
    vice-president; and (3) substantial direct
    financial links existed between Goodwill and
    Elder Care Lines.
    /4 Region V includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
    Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
    /5 Because we hold that district court properly
    found that it did not have subject matter
    jurisdiction over this lawsuit, we need not
    address the standing issue.