Morris, Edward v. United States ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 98-3306
    EDWARD L. MORRIS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Illinois.
    No. 97 C 331--William L. Beatty, Judge.
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 28, 2001--Decided September 4, 2001
    Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., KANNE, and
    ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Edward L. Morris
    is a former officer of Germania Bank who
    was convicted of two counts of mail
    fraud, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1341, and one count
    of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1343, in
    connection with Germania’s $10 million
    offering of subordinated capital notes
    ("Schnotes"). We affirmed his conviction
    on direct appeal in United States v.
    Morris, 
    80 F.3d 1151
    (7th Cir. 1996), and
    he now brings a sec. 2255 petition
    alleging ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel. We will not repeat the facts
    which are set out in great detail in our
    prior opinion, but instead turn directly
    to the claim.
    In order to establish ineffective
    assistance of counsel, Morris must
    demonstrate that his counsel’s
    performance was deficient, and that he
    was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984);
    Wright v. Gramley, 
    125 F.3d 1038
    , 1041
    (7th Cir. 1997). In order to demonstrate
    prejudice, the defendant must show that
    there is "a reasonable probability that,
    but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
    the result of the proceeding would have
    been different." 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    ; 
    Wright, 125 F.3d at 1041
    . A
    reasonable probability is one sufficient
    to undermine confidence in the outcome.
    
    Id. at 1041-42.
    The crux of the case at trial was that
    the bank had conducted an in-depth
    quarterly review of the bank’s loan port
    folio in August and September 1987 (the
    "September Analysis" or "SA"), in which
    management (including Morris) recommended
    an additional $9.3 million in loan loss
    reserves. The trial evidence showed that
    Morris was aware of and agreed with that
    SA, that Morris nevertheless failed to
    disclose that information in selling the
    Schnotes in 1987 and 1988, and that the
    offering circular for those Schnotes
    represented that the current reserves
    were "adequate." In February 1988,
    pursuant to recommendations by Peat,
    Marwick based on a year-end audit,
    Germania took an additional $9.4 million
    in reserves, and eventually its financial
    condition deteriorated to the point that
    it was placed in conservatorship by the
    Resolution Trust Corporation and the
    Schnotes became worthless. Morris argues
    that his trial counsel was ineffective in
    failing to reasonably investigate his
    case, specifically in his counsel’s
    failure to recognize the importance of
    two documents provided by the government
    in discovery. The two documents at issue
    are an internal Federal Home Loan Bank
    Board memorandum dated October 19, 1987
    ("Internal Memorandum"), and a September
    30, 1988 letter written by Jimmie New
    (the "New letter"). We begin with the New
    letter.
    As our prior opinion made clear, Jimmie
    New was a critical government witness in
    this case, who himself had pled guilty to
    fraud. He was one of the principle
    authors of the SA, and one of three
    persons in management (Morris and co-
    defendant Gardner were the other two) who
    submitted the SA to the Executive
    Committee of Germania’s Board of
    Directors and recommended increasing the
    reserves in September 1987. Morris
    contends that the New letter would have
    provided "powerful ammunition to impeach
    the critical component of New’s
    testimony--his contention that it was
    necessary to immediately recognize an
    additional nine million dollars of loan
    loss reserves as set forth in his SA."
    The letter in pertinent part provided:
    The majority of the reserves which were
    established in the fourth quarter of 1987
    related to the provision for losses on
    Real Estate Owned of $1.5 million which
    were deemed necessary by management of
    the Bank due to some adverse developments
    on portions of its Real Estate Owned and
    a substantial increase in Real Estate
    Owned during the fourth quarter of 1987
    as well as recording Provision for Losses
    on Industrial Revenue Bond
    Collateralization Agreements of $3.4
    million in connection with the default by
    borrowers under three of these
    agreements.
    New Letter at 6. Morris had testified
    that events in the fourth quarter
    necessitated the additional reserves in
    February 1988, including the stock market
    crash, and four properties, Westchester,
    Oak Brook, Silver Springs, and the Ramada
    Inn at Fairview Heights, that became
    scheduled items. According to Morris, the
    Industrial Revenue Bond Collateralization
    Agreements described in New’s letter
    referred precisely to those properties.
    Morris contends that the reserves taken
    in February 1988, although roughly
    equivalent in amount with the
    recommendations of the SA, were based on
    the substantially different asset
    problems which arose in the fourth
    quarter. He asserts that the New letter
    recognizes that, and thus contradicts
    New’s trial testimony to the contrary.
    Because New’s testimony was critical to
    the conviction, Morris argues that his
    attorney was ineffective in failing to
    realize the significance of the New
    letter and use it in cross-examination.
    We need not consider whether there is
    deficient performance in the failure to
    use the New letter in this case, because
    there is no prejudice. See United States
    v. Depoister, 
    116 F.3d 292
    , 295 (7th Cir.
    1997) ("[b]ecause the defendant must
    establish both of these prongs, we can
    initially address, in reviewing such an
    ineffectiveness claim, either prong of
    this test."). Our review of the trial
    transcript reveals that the New letter
    was indeed cumulative of testimony
    elicited on cross-examination by counsel
    for Morris’ co-defendant Gardner. New was
    questioned regarding those same assets,
    and acknowledged the developments that
    occurred in the fourth quarter. For
    instance, New acknowledged that West
    Chester was moved from Deed Foreclosure
    status into Real Estate Owned status in
    the fourth quarter, but he further stated
    that although it happened in the fourth
    quarter, they were aware of it in the
    second and third quarter. Under
    questioning, New admitted that the stock
    market crash of October 1987 was a very
    significant event in the fourth quarter.
    New also agreed that he did not
    anticipate the way that Peat, Marwick
    would treat the industrial revenue bond
    properties, but asserted that the
    difference was not $3.3 million, but was
    approximately a million or a million and
    a half because the SA recommended some of
    that amount as basket reserves. When
    confronted with his prior testimony in
    which he stated that the industrial
    revenue bond properties of West Chester,
    Silver Springs, and Oak Brook, resulted
    in three and a half million of reserves
    that he had not planned on in August or
    September, he said that was a true
    statement. That extensive questioning
    regarding the developments of the fourth
    quarter renders the New letter
    cumulative. New effectively acknowledged
    the same facts presented in the New
    letter, and provided an explanation that
    the jury could choose to credit or not.
    Because New testified consistently with
    the statements in the New letter and it
    was merely cumulative of other testimony
    elicited on cross-examination, New was
    not prejudiced by his attorney’s failure
    to discover or utilize the letter at
    trial. See Drake v. Clark, 
    14 F.3d 351
    ,
    356 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no prejudice
    where omitted testimony was cumulative).
    The second document identified as
    critical by Morris is an October 1987
    internal FHLBB memorandum considering and
    approving Germania’s application to issue
    subordinated debt to Laclede Gas around
    the time of the sale of Schnotes. Morris
    specifically points to a portion of that
    memorandum entitled "Consolidated Cash
    Flow Forecast Utilizing the $17.5 Million
    Subordinated Debenture." That forecast
    indicates that Germania had budgeted an
    additional eleven million dollars in loan
    loss reserves for the five-year period
    from 1987 through 1991. Morris argues
    that notwithstanding that predicted need
    for reserves, the FHLBB approved the sale
    of subordinated debt to Laclede Gas.
    That memorandum does not help Morris,
    and in fact might have worsened his case.
    The memorandum effectively corroborates
    New’s contention that Morris was aware at
    the time the offering circular was issued
    of the need for a substantial increase in
    the loan loss reserves. It is
    furtherevidence that the statement in the
    offering circular characterizing the
    current reserves as "adequate" was
    deceptive at best. Morris appears to
    argue that the memorandum establishes
    that they did not attempt to hide the SA
    from others, and that they supplied the
    relevant information to the regulators.
    It does nothing, however, to counter the
    testimony at trial that the information
    was not provided in the offering circular
    or in other material presented to
    potential Schnote investors, or in the
    information provided to Laclede Gas.
    Therefore, the failure of Morris’ counsel
    to discover and use the memorandum did
    not prejudice Morris.
    Accordingly, the decision of the
    district court is AFFIRMED.