Gudgel, Curtis D. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-1439
    CURTIS D. GUDGEL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.
    No. NA 02-61-C-B/H—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    SUBMITTED JULY 8, 2003—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 26, 2003
    ____________
    Before KANNE, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM. Curtis D. Gudgel applied for Social Securi-
    ty Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) in January 2000,
    claiming that he was disabled because of bone deteriora-
    tion in his knees, arthritis throughout his body, a pinched
    nerve in his left hand, and chronic bronchitis. Gudgel’s
    claim was denied initially, upon reconsideration, and after
    a hearing before an administrative law judge. The Appeals
    Council declined review, making the ALJ’s decision the
    final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The
    district court affirmed, and Gudgel now appeals. Because
    the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,
    we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand.
    2                                              No. 03-1439
    Gudgel, who was 56 years old at the time of the ALJ’s
    decision, has a GED and served in the military. He worked
    as a service manager mechanic from 1977 until 1989. From
    1989 until 1995, he was self-employed and did contract
    work for Pepsi-Cola maintaining their trucks. After 1995
    Gudgel performed intermittent yard work for friends
    and neighbors as his only source of income. Gudgel did not
    work after June 1998.
    Gudgel testified at the administrative hearing that in
    1989 he began experiencing generalized weakness and
    fatigue that progressively worsened until he could no
    longer work on a regular basis. Gudgel’s complaints in-
    cluded pain from aching joints, muscle ache, and overall
    weakness. Throughout the mid- and late-1990s, the doc-
    tors at the Veteran’s Administration hospital ran numer-
    ous diagnostic tests on Gudgel’s knees, hips, back and
    shoulders, but could not determine the cause of his symp-
    toms. Gudgel’s family physician, Dr. Koopman, also at-
    tempted to determine the cause of Gudgel’s pain. While
    examining him from 1999 through 2001, Dr. Koopman
    considered several different conditions including arthritis,
    fibromyalgia, and depression, but rejected each because
    he could not support any diagnosis with medical evidence.
    Ultimately, in mid-2001, Dr. Koopman diagnosed Gudgel
    with post-polio syndrome. The symptoms of this condi-
    tion, which can develop anywhere from 10 to 40 years
    after recovery from polio, include muscle and joint pain,
    muscle weakness and muscle atrophy. Attorneys’ Dictionary
    of Medicine and Word Finder 393 (J.E. Schmidt ed., 2002).
    Dr. Koopman had not considered post-polio syndrome
    previously because Gudgel did not inform him until April
    2001 that he had suffered from polio as a child.
    Dr. Koopman referred Gudgel to a neurologist for fur-
    ther testing. The neurologist, Dr. Baker, performed sev-
    eral tests to determine the strength of Gudgel’s muscles
    No. 03-1439                                               3
    and possible sources of weakness. In a motor exam, Dr.
    Baker found that Gudgel had “diffuse weakness” in his “hip
    and shoulder” area and reported that “[i]t does appear to
    be true weakness.” Dr. Baker found the test results to
    be consistent with post-polio syndrome, but stated that
    “[t]he only way to diagnose this is with an EMG.”
    On May 10, Dr. Baker conducted an EMG to test Gudgel’s
    nerve responses and confirm whether he suffered from post-
    polio syndrome. Based on the test results, Dr. Baker
    concluded that “[t]here are diffuse scattered chronic
    neurogenic changes consistent with the diagnosis of post-
    polio syndrome or other anterior horn cell disease.” Dr.
    Baker listed post-polio syndrome as his diagnosis, to which
    Dr. Koopman—upon receiving Dr. Baker’s report—con-
    curred. Dr. Baker examined Gudgel once more the follow-
    ing month and reaffirmed his assessment: Gudgel’s “EMG
    was consistent with some neurogenic changes consis-
    tent with post-polio syndrome.”
    During the administrative hearing in November 2001, the
    ALJ questioned the state’s medical expert, Dr. Hutson,
    about the post-polio syndrome diagnosis. The ALJ’s line
    of questioning reflected concern that Dr. Baker’s report
    did not support the diagnosis:
    Q: [Dr. Baker] didn’t actually say it was Post Polio, but
    he said that the findings were, you know, I think,
    I think the words that he used were consistent
    with Post Polio.
    A: Yes.
    Q: So, which means it could be, but, but is that, is
    that, does that pass in medical circles as a diagno-
    sis, a formal diagnosis in findings?
    A: Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.
    Q: Okay.
    4                                              No. 03-1439
    Dr. Hutson testified that the records provided by Dr.
    Baker were insufficient to support a diagnosis. Dr. Hutson
    acknowledged that Dr. Baker’s physical examination re-
    port showed “diffuse weakness, especially of the proximal
    muscles of the hip and shoulder girdles,” and that those
    findings supported Gudgel’s claims of weakness. But Dr.
    Hutson also pointed out that the EMG results did not
    show muscle atrophy that, in his view, would typically
    accompany post-polio syndrome: “[Dr. Baker] doesn’t come
    up with any specific findings here as far as atrophy or
    something that polio may have invaded.” Dr. Hutson was
    less conclusive about the ultimate diagnosis: “we may
    be dealing with something secondary to polio here, but
    we may not. This may not have nothing [sic] to do with
    polio at all, since it’s not very well documented except by
    his history.”
    Dr. Hutson testified that he thought that the results
    of Dr. Baker’s physical examination of Gudgel were more
    instructive than the EMG results. Dr. Hutson stated
    that Dr. Baker’s “clinical findings certainly didn’t seem to
    go along with what those findings were in my opinion on
    the EMG.” Dr. Hutson testified that “[u]sually when
    muscles become paralyzed by polio, they become atrophy
    [sic] and they’re almost nonfunctional, the basic polio
    disease. They become very spindly.” When Gudgel’s at-
    torney questioned Dr. Hutson about the relationship
    between the EMG results and Dr. Baker’s clinical find-
    ings, Dr. Hutson replied, “I’m just suggesting that the
    clinical findings of examining the man, I think clinically
    are more important than what you find when you stick
    a needle down inside muscles and look at [sic].”
    In considering Gudgel’s application for DIB, the ALJ
    followed the five-step analysis set forth in 
    20 C.F.R. §404.1520
     and determined that Gudgel met the first
    step—he had been unemployed since 1998—but failed
    to meet the second step—that he suffered from a severe
    No. 03-1439                                               5
    impairment or combination of impairments. The ALJ
    determined that Gudgel had not shown that his com-
    plaints of pain and weakness were supported by evidence
    in the record.
    Relying on Dr. Hutson’s testimony, the ALJ rejected
    the diagnosis of post-polio syndrome because “the evi-
    dence of record simply fails to support the conclusion of
    Dr. Koopman that the claimant’s subjective complaints
    were attributable to post-polio syndrome during the pe-
    riod prior to the expiration of his insured status.” The ALJ
    did not credit Gudgel’s testimony about his pain and
    muscle weakness because “his allegations were not rea-
    sonably consistent with the medical evidence.” The ALJ
    noted, for instance, that Gudgel damaged his credibility
    “when he acknowledged that he normally did not use
    the wheelchair in which he appeared at the hearing.”
    Our review of the Social Security Administration’s
    decision to deny disability benefits is limited to determin-
    ing whether the decision “is supported by substantial
    evidence” in the record. Schmidt v. Apfel, 
    201 F.3d 970
    , 972
    (7th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is such “relevant
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
    to support a conclusion.” Cannon v. Apfel, 
    213 F.3d 970
    ,
    974 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). A treat-
    ing physician’s opinion regarding the nature and severity
    of a medical condition is entitled to controlling weight
    if it is well supported by medical findings and not incon-
    sistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
    See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (d)(2). More weight is given
    to the opinion of treating physicians because of their
    greater familiarity with the claimant’s conditions and
    circumstances. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870; 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (d)(2).
    Gudgel contends that the ALJ improperly credited Dr.
    Hutson’s testimony over the medical opinion of Drs. Baker
    6                                              No. 03-1439
    and Koopman. Gudgel argues generally that the ALJ
    improperly rejected his treating physicians’ opinions
    without finding contradictory evidence in the record. Gudgel
    also argues that the ALJ should not have rejected Dr.
    Baker’s opinion without first allowing him to provide
    additional evidence to support the post-polio diagnosis.
    An ALJ can reject an examining physician’s opinion
    only for reasons supported by substantial evidence in the
    record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining physi-
    cian does not, by itself, suffice. Moore v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 920
    , 924 (9th Cir. 2002). Dr. Baker, a doctor trained
    in treating neurological disorders such as post-polio syn-
    drome, had the opportunity to physically examine Gudgel
    on three occasions and to run a battery of tests on him.
    After conducting these examinations, Dr. Baker concluded
    that both clinical and diagnostic results supported the
    diagnosis. The ALJ did not explain how the evidence in the
    record contradicts Dr. Baker’s diagnosis of post-polio
    syndrome. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870-71 (remanding
    for ALJ to reevaluate whether treating physician’s find-
    ings of disabling symptoms were entitled to controlling
    weight, where ALJ did not adequately explain why those
    findings were necessarily inconsistent with other med-
    ical evidence of record).
    Without examining Gudgel, Dr. Hutson testified that
    he disagreed with Dr. Baker’s assessment of Gudgel’s con-
    dition. Dr. Hutson, however, failed to identify any incon-
    sistency between the post-polio diagnosis and the med-
    ical record, except for his unsupported opinion that Gudgel
    lacked the muscle atrophy that needed to accompany post-
    polio syndrome. Moreover, Dr. Hutson’s assertion about
    the absence of atrophy is questionable: a year before
    Gudgel visited Dr. Baker, he was treated by a Dr. Gal-
    lagher, who reported some muscle atrophy in the web
    spaces of Gudgel’s hand. Neither the ALJ’s ruling nor
    Dr. Hutson’s opinion addressed this finding of muscle
    No. 03-1439                                               7
    atrophy. In addition, Dr. Hutson did not rule out post-polio
    syndrome, acknowledging that “we may be dealing
    with something secondary to polio here, but we may not.”
    Such an inconclusive opinion cannot be a proper basis
    to reject a treating physician’s diagnosis that is sup-
    ported by test results and consistent with the claimant’s
    subjective symptoms.
    The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the
    case is REMANDED to the agency for further proceedings.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—9-26-03
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-1439

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 9/26/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015