-
~\ SS'V-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN TEXAS ORIGINAL MARK ANTHONY GARCIA PRO SE CASE NO: 04-13-0081 8-CR MOTION OF APPEAL... FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW PETITION TO CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS; PURSUANT V. TO RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 66.3 ' fc3)C/?V STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE COURT OF CRffifflNAL APPEALS JUL 15 2015 j Abe! Acosta, Clerk FILED \H COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS JUL 15 2015 ' Abel Acosta, Clerk COURT; OF CRIMINAL APPEALS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS P.O. BOX 1 23Q8,AUSTIN.-TEXAS 78711 LITIGATION PRO SE INDIGENT MOTION IN FORMA PAUPERIS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.1914(a) Comes now pro se litigant Mark Anthony Garcia and request ife&t this Honrable Court of Appeals recognize appellants indigent request that he has no money to pay for filing or copying of his present litigation and brief material to his present case. So prays petitioner.(See attached copy of present account). Respectfully Mnnlr JaJfaH t«*«* ^9/22"/ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On this day of (Juni /~?-1 2015 I sent a copy of this motion and indigent request to the Court of Appeals clerk of the court. Respectfully fji sl^M l^«* iWH AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TITLE 28 INSIDE THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1746 Akx/k. An^/tcM by/Uark This affidavit hy woo* H' Afl$\Qft>A h*8&fi v P^o e se petitioner in the present case being first duly sworn and deposed say and declare under pena lty of perjury that the facts herein are true and correct to the be st of my knowledge and belief. I understand that making false state ments may lead to my being prosecuted for perjury and affirm that all of the statements contained herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge:asd^feelief^are^as^follo^s. STATEMENT OF FACTS FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO,TEXAS MARK ANTHONY GARCIA PRO SE CASE NO:04-13-00818-CR APEALLANTS PRO SE MOTION tmm MOTION TO RECALL^ THE -MANDATE 'ON APPEAL FROM THE 437th JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT„ v. BEXTAR COUNTY,TEXAS,TRIAL COURT NO:2009CR2731A STATE OF TEXAS APELLEE MOTION Comes now pro se petitioner Mark Anthony Garcia and request that this court hold this pro se brief to a less stringent.standard than one pr epared and filed by a seasoned lawyer.See Thomas v. Edy;481 F.3d 434 440(6th Cir.2006);Haines v.Kerner,404 U.S.19,501-21(1972). In support of petitioners motion he asserts the following grounds for relief. Appellant acting pro se moves this court to review and entertain all of his present claims for relief and allegations at law in the .intere; est of justice to prevent further miscarriage of justice to appellant, Appellant also moves this Honorable Court to recall the mandate in a timely fashion to allow"Petition for Panel Rehearing"to be considered by the Court. I.BACKGROUND Apellant was found guilty of one count of murder and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in the Institutional Division of Texas De partment of Criminal Justice. On Appeal Garcia contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial co^ urt erred in assessing attorney fees to an indigent defendant. 1 of 7 Appellant is recalling the mandate and envoking any and all rules of procedure to be reviewed by this court of appeals.Moreover that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective..Appellants trial counsel for exposing him to cruel and unusual punishment and an 8th amendment violation. By and through trial counsels cross examination of appellant that lead the jury to believe he was a drug crazed.rem orseless killer .Because appellant is raa^zn^-thesei"SeasJtiwse assis- f tance of appellate counsel issues at this time he is requesting that this court of appeals toll the time in accordance with^the rule of cr iminal procedure that the record be fully developed to adequately re flect appellants claims> Thompson v. State,
9 S.W.3d 808,813(Tex.Crim. App.1999); Strickland 466 U.S.at 688,690. Furthermore in the interest of justice appellant request that this co urt review these prejudical circumstances of extraordinary exception. ARGUMENT.X Appellant has been severlyprejudiced.by counsels performance that . clearly represents an conflict of interest by and through their non professional actions at trial and during his jpresenfei appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey,469 U.S.387(1985);The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "attaches" with filing of formal criminal charges,and ext ends to all'Vcritical stages"of the proceedings.Moran v. Burbine,475 U.S.412(1986:Michigan v. Jackson,475 U.S.525,629 n.3(1986);Scott v. Illinois,440 U.S.367(1979),-Coleman v. Alabama,399 U.S.1(1970) Dew v. United States,558 A.2d1112,1113^18(D.C.1989)"[TJhe right to counsel is right to effective assistance of counsel."Strickland v. Washington,466 U, S.668,685{1984)(quoting McMann v. Richardson,397 U.S.759,771 n.14(1970). ... When a jurisdiction provides an appeal of right,due process also gu- 2of7 arantees the assistance of counsels on appeal. Evittsv. Lucey,469 U.S.387 (1985).Moreover it is the Courts obligation to ensure that defendants rights are;protected (1)that defendant understands the ch arges (2)assist attorney in making defense Dusky v. U.S.,362 U.S.402 (1960).Counsels cumulative errors throughout his trial proceedings perjudiced defendants opportunity at a fair result attttiallandtldulning his court proceedings. See Taylor v. Kentucky436, U.S.478,n.15,98 S Ct.1930,L.Ed.2d 468(1978);Strickland ,466 U.S.at 688. Counsel is expected to have not only the formal training and is res ponsible, by and through membership in the bar but also enough addit ional knowledge,as well as experience,to permit the exercise [of]th at degree of reasonable care and skill expected of lawyers acting un der similar circumstnces").Thus for defendants_counsel at rial to ex- pose him to such a total disregard E>?m<£tprotecting his client from such exposure with his own defense strategey, prejudiced the defendant and exposed him to an 8th Amendment violation of cruel and unusual punishment.by portrayingdefendant as a crazed drug murderer. Judicial scrutiny of counsels performance must be highly deferential [A]Court must indulge a strong presumption that counsels conduct fa lls xvithin the wide range of reasonable professional assistance "the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonable effe ctive assistance"defined as reasonableness under prevailng professi onal norms."- In appellants case counsel so undermined the adversar ial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Strickland,466 U.S.at 686.Moreover appellate counsel re fused to implicate or recognize the ineffective consequences that wea?e evidenced by trial counsels deficient performance that prejudiced appellant at trial. 3 0f7 Appellant need not show that counsels deficient performance more lik ely than not altered the outcome of the case,"id.at 693,but rather must show that there is a reasonable probabiitiy that,but for cou nsels unprofessional errors,the result in the proceedings would ha ve been different. A reasonable probability is a probability suffic- cient to undermine confidence in the outcome.As in appellants case the numerous cumulative errors that counsel should have exposed and revealed-(1) father of co-defendant prosecuting D.A. and assistant Prosecuting the case forced to resign for tampering with evidence and illicit tactics in court proceedings these and other undermining ev idence should have been utilized by defense counsel and appellate co- ounsel that could have uimdrerMiJO^d the confidence in the outcome of the prosecutions case and changed the entire evidentiary picture in^app- ellants case and trial.Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S.83(1963)this is exc ulpatory information and should have been utilized by defense attor- to mitigate appellants sentence and guilt. These prejudicial errors should have been brought before the appeals cxazxttthat are part of the record and exhibits by prosecution and def ense needed to know or should have Jfernawin through due diligence the ex- tent of thxs exculpatoi'y information. v 'J J ' QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT 1. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to make Brady type obj ections at Appellants Sentencing and krdJngLLng to the courts atten tion that there should be a mistrial for the participation of a pros ecutors assistant that was presently under investigation for tampering with evidence in other cases and possiblv appellants case.Thus cont rary to the Judicial Court Appellants sentence was determined in vio lation of the constituional principles enunciated in Strickland and 4 of 7 ^ and Brady specifically that had the jury been made aware of the D.A* and his assistant being under investigation for illicit acts in the performance of their jobs by and through prosecution of appellant and others ^ 2. Whether appellantCounsel representedran .active conflict of interest by not assisting appellant in filing his requested ineffective assis tance of counsel claims to the Court of Appeals. See Strickland ,466 U,S.at 688; Evitts v. Lucey 463 U.S.387,396-99(1985);Hollines v.Es- telle,-569 F.Supp., 146(W.D.Tex.1 983) ;U.S. v. Johnson. 995 F.Supp.1259(D Kan.1998);Demarest v. Price,905 F.Supp.1432(D.Col,1995);Berryman v. Morton,100 F.3d 1089(3rd.Cir.1996). 3„Whether the Court should recognize the conflict of interest,claim which constituted "cause " for procedural default Bliss v. Lockhart 980 F.2d 470(8th Cir.1992)See also Murray v. Carrier,477 U,S,478,496 106 S.Ct.2639,2649-50,91 L.Ed.2d 397(1985);The Supreme Court although cautioningj£hatt it would not always be true,instructed that "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,a federal habeas corpus may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for pocedural default" The Supreme Court in Smith v. Murray,477 U.S.527,537,106 S.Ct.2661,26 67-68,91 L.Ed.2d 434(1986 did imply that actual innocence exception may apply to non capital sentencing cases;We reject the suggestion th at the principles of Wainwright v Sykes, [cause and eraejjiuHiGe requ irements in cases of procedural default]apply differently depending on the nature of the genaiE^y a State imposes for the violation of its criminal laws.We similarly reject the suggestion that the there is an ything "fundamentally unfair "about enforcing procedural default rules in cases devoid of any substantial claim that the alleged error under mined the accuracy of guilt or sentencing determination.(Emphasis add- 5 of 7 ed). 4. Whether the court erred in not considering appellants actual and fac tual innocence by and through his numerous realistic claims for rel ief .Schlu£_v^_pelo,513U,S,298,130 L.Ed.2d.808,115 3,Ct.851(1995) A credible claim of actual innocence involves the petitionee.,'; support ing his constitutional claim with "new reliable evidence whether it be exculpatory, scientific evidence,trustworthy,eyewitness accounts or critical physical evidence that was not presented at trial.,!Id. The Court "is not bound by the rules o£!admissibility that would gov ern at trial" And should "consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial."id.[a] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persu--c>. ades the ceuqtr.fct that,in light of the new evidence, no jurror fet ing reasonably,would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reason able doubt."Id. Also see McCoy v. Norris,958 F.Supp.420(E.D.Ark.1996) See also Bouseley v. United States.523 U.S.614,140 L.Ed.2d 828,118 S. Ct. 1604(1998); Petitioner in the present case moves this court to issue a writ to re open the cases or all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its ju risdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law to reo pen the criminal case and to grant relief from the execution of the judgement. Because of the matters arising subsequent to the rendition of the judgement based upon legal defenses arising after the judgement showing that constitutional violations resulted in conviction of one who is actually innocent of comitting any crime. 6 of 7 -Or that the conduct that he was accused of no longer be deemed a crime The 11th Circuit found that a"colorable showing of factual innocence" is the test,or the test is whether the alleged error precluded the de velopment of true facts or resulted i^the admission of false ones on a material question of justice will demand consideration of the merits of aclaim,where there is a colorable showing of factual innocence. This a^Lfearit present set of extra ordinary circumstances that he prays this court KIM review and in the interest of justice relieve him from judgement. So Prays Petitioner. Respectfully ML Aa-Wfv 0CV* m^M CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On this day of ,LL Z*l 2015 I sent a copy of this motion-tot: the clerk of the court. Respectfully I Ilij (L, |V*7/22/ 7 of 7 £jlteachtcL-£2^o£j*" ~i- iI^_B^JC2Eito^ ^hiL it'* /j6e.** ^/^;//ec/ f*.A> £z"_^>:<^WV—£h^-J^-£d5*^- rvu;rtU:t» O.QW a EbaMic_5a^okA—iCtf"^i:—S"Mvvca^JLki^aiS^ fbCk&UL-^lJJQ_J^Aa" Can W»395 S.W.3d 152•?<& os> /$*£. , /&Cv Ccscs/^ / /t&f^t £&***•/&•;//&#r -yi^l ivsk/J'*- f^ostA^ C&'fe C**f( S-£*?*e? ••/•'''/ p //^Z £k/fPr-^./':s.^f fl"Ct tffiwu/v* t f&i./ erf"*- "?* V'^Z /&<-/- -&*c*/~ / t,s6? CCif/n Ct*tiS Co&r&pgr J-/&2, iWS_ g/)gf rJ'-'c/ / /^V t^xgrf/ //&.£ " h*YJ fr&s* Sti/nt-fat^f kt ha&A iJisf/• &/&/i£ iu,s,s^f. -^' Wbl/Jl^LT O^_^rojx5^r c>£ "psijc-VioWdW aW flxro Sc\^ct cu_4- -TXUukyiiL OA ^iW^iJlcd XUldJAMA. y\qbViW| (C*\-5.g») r..-s ^W^tccl tUicWiCg. , 4l5fc -sWUs 4-Vta-i- -W.Wvils*. yv\,gji,vior^ of \ra.W\CL\-\c Un.^M> •VtrfwK Vi? Vai V^s fiYvc.MiL. T)wi fb U-jl fti.cV 4rUo.V VUa^ Wppc^t Ci4- h loar i 'Mfl^ji 1)s.c^\e VskJtJ. AHak-trnj C^<\ Wivt. AiiV iy\ /VWi r\c^h.V -s^U. aL__\yvyit£ Cr^ -H^ uhxM Wjl. SoW^r, Th , 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); accordMenefield v. State,
363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). To establish the first prong, deficient performance, Garcia must prove that his attorney's performance '"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' under prevailing professional norms and according to the necessity of the case." Ex parte
Moore, 395 S.W.3d at 157(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). To establish harm, Garcia "must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney's performance or that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 04-13-00818-CR the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"
Id. at 158(footnote omitted) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "An appellate court looks to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case in evaluating the effectiveness of counsel." Thompson v. State,
9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). "There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
Id. (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 689). Therefore, Garcia '"must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Exparte
Moore, 395 S.W.3d at 157(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). B. Arguments of the Parties Garcia contends that by asking the question, trial counsel unintentionally opened the door to otherwise inadmissible extraneous offense evidence. Such testimony could only lead the jury to see Garcia as a "drug-crazed, remorseless killer, instead of a good guy who was just trying to stop a tragedy.'.' The State counters that a single, inarticulate question—asked during an otherwise vigorous representation and well above the objective professional standard of reasonableness—cannot amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel "A substantial risk of failure accompanies an appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal."
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. "In the majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial counsel."
Id. at 813-14."[Tjrial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective." Rylander v. State,
101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); accord
Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593. An "appellate court should not find deficient -4- 04-13-00818-CR performance unless the challenged conduct was 'so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.'"
Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593(quoting Goodspeedv. State,
187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Often on direct appeal, because the record is silent on counsel's reason, the defendant asks the appellate court to "speculate as to the reasons why trial counsel acted as he did," but the court is required to "presume that [counsel's] actions were taken as part of a strategic plan for representing the client." Rodriguez v. State,
336 S.W.3d 294, 302 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref d). Here, however, the record specifically provides defense counsel's reasons for asking the question. D. Analysis 1. Testimony in Question On the tenth day oftestimony, after the State rested its case in chief, Garcia took the witness stand. Garcia articulated his version of the events that evening. Garcia denied firing the weapon l that killed Morales. He further explained that he was actually attempting to stop Lozano "from doing something stupid." Defense: At the time that you were in the office talking with the detective, all right, did you believe that you'd some day end up on the stand being tried for murder? State: Objection, Your Honor, relevance. Defense: State of mind, Your Honor, at the time. Demeanor they placed him. Trial Court: Ask your question again. Defense: At the time that you were placed in custody in — with Detective Angell, all right, did you ever believe that you would be on trial for murder? Trial Court: It's sustained. Defense: Did you have anything to hide that night when you were talking to the detective? -5- 04-13-00818-CR Garcia: I had nothing to hide. Defense: Had you done anything? Garcia: I didn't do nothing. 2. Arguments Before the Trial Court After the defense rested, the State immediately asked to approach the bench. The State asserted that defense counsel "opened the door to his motion in limine" and the State was entitled to ask questions pertaining to the fact that Garcia "had drugs in his possession." The jury was excused and trial counsel explained, I don't believe that the motion in limine has been violated, Your Honor, on the record. I asked him if he ever thought he would be arrested for murder, that night, and did he have any reason. And that's what we're talking about murder. We're not talking about drugs. We're not talking about anything else. The testimony was read back for the parties and the trial court. The trial court determined that, in light of the question asked, defense counsel "opened the door to any criminal act he may have committed that night that could have resulted in an arrest." Over defense counsel's ardent objection, the trial court ruled "that the door [was] opened. And [the State is] going to get to ask the questions." 3. Conclusion We are "especially hesitant to declare counsel ineffective based upon a single alleged miscalculation during what amounts to otherwise satisfactory representation, especially when the record provides no discernible explanation of the motivation behind counsel's actions—whether those actions were of strategic design or the result of negligent conduct."
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; see also Lopez v. State,
343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("While a single error will not typically result in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, an egregious error may satisfy the Strickland prongs on its own."). 04-13-00818-CR Here, trial counsel clearly articulated that he did not anticipate or believe that his questions might open the door to the State's propounding questions pertaining to Garcia's possession of cocaine. But see Garcia v. State,308 S.W.3d 62, 67-68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (concluding trial counsel's multiple blanket questions opened the door to extraneous bad acts and his repeated failure to object to admission of extraneous offenses deprived defendant of a fair trial). Even acknowledging that "a single egregious error of omission or commission" can constitute ineffective assistance, the allegations of ineffectiveness must be "firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness."
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813(citing McFarland v. State,
928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). We, therefore, look to trial counsel's representation throughout the trial. Trial counsel conducted two days of pre-trial motions, two days of voir dire, fourteen days of testimony during the guilt/innocence portion of the trial, and two days of punishment testimony. During the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, trial counsel cross-examined twenty-two State's witnesses and presented ten defense witnesses. There were a plethora of objections lodged by defense counsel preventing damaging testimony from being heard by the jury. Additionally, sixty- one defense exhibits were admitted by the trial court. Defense counsel presented impassioned closing arguments in both the guilt/innocence and the punishment phases of the trial. Garcia contends this trial turned on his credibility; yet, the record demonstrates several witnesses identified Garcia (the individual in the yellowish-colored shirt) as obtaining the weapon from the vehicle, placing the weapon in his waistband, and firing the weapon at Morales. Moreover, although Garcia's "jovial" disposition is mentioned during closing arguments, the State was comparing his appearance shortly after the shooting to his somber appearance in court. Neither party mentioned possession of cocaine or any other narcotics during closing arguments. Importantly, although the trial court ruled that defense counsel's question opened the door to -7- 04-13-00818-CR evidence of extraneous bad acts, there is no indication in the record defense counsel's actions were intentional; to the contrary, he clearly disagreed with the trial court's determination that the door was opened. We remain mindful that simply showing other counsel's hindsight or a different trial strategy does not show ineffective assistance. See Bone v. State,
11 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Upon a review of the entire record, we conclude Garcia failed to demonstrate Strickland's first requirement—the deficient performance of trial counsel. See Ex parte
Moore, 395 S.W.3d at 157(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). Because Garcia failed to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient, he failed to meet Strickland's first prong so we need not address prejudice. See Garcia v. State,
57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We therefore overrule Garcia's first issue on appeal. Attorney's Fees Garcia challenges the assessment of $3,110.00 in court costs plus an undetermined amount for attorney's fees imposed in the judgment. Garcia asserts the trial court twice found him indigent for purposes of trial—during the trial phase and again on appeal. He was, therefore, presumed to remain indigent, and there is no evidence to show he was able to pay the court-appointed trial attorney's fees. A. Argument of the Parties Garcia contends there is no evidence of a material change in his financial circumstances after the trial court determined his indigency. Because there is no such evidence, the record is insufficient to support the assessment of attorney's fees as costs against Garcia. The State counters that Garcia was able to post a $200,000.00 bond and gained employment while on bond awaiting trial. Such evidence, the State argues, is some evidence that Garcia had the financial resources to cover at least a portion of his legal expenses. 04-13-00818-CR B. Court Costs Assessed Against Indigent Defendants '"A defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the defendant's financial circumstances occurs.'" Dieken v. State,
432 S.W.3d 444, 446-47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p) (West Supp. 2014)); accord Wiley v. State,
410 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Mayer v. State,
309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 20.10). On the other hand, "[i]f the court determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided, . . . the court shall order the defendant to pay ... as court costs the amount that it finds the defendant is able to pay." Dieken, 432 S.W.3d at AA6-A1 (alterations in original) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC Ann. art. 26.05(g)); accord
Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 556. '"[T]he defendant's financial resources and ability to pay are explicit critical elements in the trial court's determination of the propriety of ordering reimbursement of costs and fees.'"
Dieken, 432 S.W.3d at 447(quoting
Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 556). Our review determines whether the record supports a finding that Garcia's "financial circumstances experienced a material change" and that he "was able to pay the court-appointed attorney's fees."
Id. (citing TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p)); accordMcFatridge v. State,
309 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In doing so, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment."
Dieken, 432 S.W.3d at 447(citing
Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557). D. Analysis We first turn to the trial court's determination that Garcia was indigent. 04-13-00818-CR 1. Trial Court's Finding ofIndigence The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a criminal defendant "without means to employ counsel of my own choosing," may petition the court to appoint counsel to represent him at the county's expense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(o) (providing oath of indigence language);
id. art. 26.05(f)(requiring counties to pay indigents' costs and attorney's fees). In
Dieken, 432 S.W.3d at 447, this court analyzed the inherent conflict in article 26.04's mandate with that of article 26.05(g). We concluded that "[a]rticle 26.05(g) authorizes a court to determine that a defendant is able to pay a portion of the costs of his legal services but is unable to pay the balance."
Id. (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) ("Ifthe court determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal servicesprovided, including any expenses and costs, the courtshall order the defendant to pay during the pendency of the charges or, if convicted, as court costs the amount that itfinds the defendantis able topay.")). We must, therefore, determine whether the trial court's conclusion that Garcia was able to pay for part, but not all, of the legal services he received was reasonable. 2. Relevant Evidence Although the record does not contain any documents determining Garcia's indigency, Garcia was clearly represented by appointed counsel during his trial. The trial court further approved payment of an investigator for the defense. From these documents, we presume Garcia "'remainfed] indigent . . . unless a material change in [Garcia's] financial circumstances occurred]."'Id. at 448(second, fourth alterations in original) (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p)); see also Wiley, 410 S.W.3d &t3ll;
Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557. As the State points out, on January 13, 2009, the trial court signed a Special Condition of Release on Bond, setting Garcia's bond at $100,000.00 and ordering full-house arrest and -10- 04-13-00818-CR electronic-monitoring as conditions of bond. On October 28, 2011, the bond was apparently increased to $200,000.00. Although it appears Garcia was able to post bond, the clerk's record does not contain any actual documentation of Garcia's bond. On May 31, 2012, defense counsel filed a Motion to Modify Conditions of Bond requesting Garcia's electronic monitoring be modified to accommodate his work schedule at a local restaurant. On November 20, 2013, defense counsel's motion to withdraw indicating that Garcia "remains indigent and cannot afford to hire an attorney to represent him [on] appeal" was granted and, the trial court appointed an assistant public defender to represent Garcia on appeal. 3. Sufficient Evidence To impose the attorney's fees on Garcia, the trial court had to find, either expressly or implicitly, that a material change occurred and Garcia had the ability to pay $3,110.00 in court costs and attorney's fees. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g);
Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 317;
Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 556. The record does not contain either an express written or oral finding supporting the same. Additionally, the record does not contain a bill of costs outlining a portion for which the trial court reasonably determined Garcia could pay. Because the record shows Garcia had court-appointed counsel at trial and on appeal, and does not include either an express or implicit finding of a material change in Garcia's ability to pay the attorney's fees, we modify the judgment to delete the assessment of attorney's fees. See
Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 317;
Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 556. Conclusion Having overruled Garcia's ineffective assistance claim, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified. Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH C^ ~-k ^J :ftf; "*• '
Document Info
Docket Number： PD-0654-15
Filed Date： 7/15/2015
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/29/2016