United States v. Albert Guzman , 614 F. App'x 745 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-10709      Document: 00513081158         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/16/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-10709                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                   June 16, 2015
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Plaintiff - Appellee                                              Clerk
    v.
    ALBERT GUZMAN,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 11-CR-13-1
    Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    After a stipulated bench trial, the district court found Albert Guzman
    guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court adopted
    the Presentence Investigation Report, which gave Guzman a two-level
    reduction for his acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to United States
    Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3E1.1(a), and sentenced him to 200
    months in prison.        At sentencing, the government did not move for an
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-10709    Document: 00513081158     Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/16/2015
    No. 14-10709
    additional one-level reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) (providing that, upon
    motion of the government, the court can decrease the offense level by an
    additional point, if the defendant assisted authorities by timely notifying them
    of his intention to plead guilty). There is no evidence in the record indicating
    why the government withheld the § 3E1.1(b) motion at the original sentencing.
    Guzman subsequently appealed the district court’s ruling on his motion
    to suppress, and this court vacated his conviction and sentence and remanded
    to the district court for additional factual findings related to the motion to
    suppress. See United States v. Guzman (“Guzman I”), 
    739 F.3d 241
    , 249 (5th
    Cir. 2014). The panel instructed: “If after [making additional findings], the
    court again denies Guzman’s motion to suppress, it shall reinstate the
    conviction and sentence, and Guzman could then appeal.” 
    Id.
     at 248-49 (citing
    United States v. Chavis, 
    48 F.3d 871
    , 873 (5th Cir. 1995)). On remand, the
    district court dutifully followed the Guzman I mandate. The district court held
    a hearing, received briefing, made findings, and again denied Guzman’s motion
    to suppress.   Over Guzman’s objection, the district court then reinstated
    Guzman’s conviction and sentence. Guzman’s only issue on appeal is that the
    district court erred when it adhered to the mandate rule and, following this
    court’s explicit mandate, reinstated his conviction and sentence without
    holding a new trial or sentencing hearing. We disagree.
    The “mandate rule” provides that “a lower court on remand must
    implement both the letter and the spirit of the appellate court’s mandate and
    may not disregard the explicit directives of that court.”      United States v.
    Matthews, 
    312 F.3d 652
    , 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). While there are several exceptions to the mandate rule, none was
    present here. See 
    id.
     (“The doctrine has three exceptions: (1) The evidence at
    a subsequent trial is substantially different; (2) there has been an intervening
    change of law by a controlling authority; and (3) the earlier decision is clearly
    2
    Case: 14-10709       Document: 00513081158          Page: 3     Date Filed: 06/16/2015
    No. 14-10709
    erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”). The Guzman I mandate was
    not clearly erroneous and did not result in manifest injustice but, instead,
    simply reopened the case for a limited purpose consistent with longstanding
    practice. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 
    399 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1970); United States
    v. Wade, 
    388 U.S. 218
    , 242 (1967); United States v. Chavis, 
    48 F.3d 871
    , 873
    (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson, 
    625 F.2d 1211
    , 1221 (5th Cir. 1980);
    United States v. Bowie, 
    892 F.2d 1494
    , 1502 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
    Mitchell, 
    602 F.2d 636
    , 637 (4th Cir. 1979). Further, even if Guzman is correct
    in asserting that United States v. Palacios, 
    756 F.3d 325
     (5th Cir. 2014),
    constituted an intervening change of law, that change had no effect on the
    present case. On this factual record, where there is no record evidence showing
    that the government originally withheld the § 3E1.1(b) motion for an
    impermissible reason, and, more significantly, there is determinative support
    in the record justifying the continued withholding of the additional reduction, 1
    consideration of Palacios would have made no difference. Accordingly, even if
    the district court erred by adhering to our mandate and declining to consider
    1  Guzman contends that the government withheld the § 3E1.1(b) motion because
    Guzman would not waive his right to appeal, a reason that has since been disallowed. See
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6 (2013) (“The government should not withhold such a motion based
    on interests not identified in § 3E1.1, such as whether the defendant agrees to waive his or
    her right to appeal.”); Palacios, 756 F.3d at 326. There is no evidence in the record
    establishing the motivational reason for the government’s decision. See United States v.
    Henneberger, 592 F. App’x 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2014) (reviewing for plain error and explaining
    that “we cannot conclude that the government withheld its motion for reasons not identified
    in Section 3E1.1” where “[t]he record [was] silent as to the reason” for the government’s
    decision). Significantly, Guzman was indicted on January 26, 2011, but he did not announce
    his intention to enter a guilty plea until around September 4, 2012. This announcement came
    almost one year after the parties litigated, and the district court first denied, the motion to
    suppress and several months after the government filed numerous documents in preparation
    for a full jury trial. See § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6 (“In general, the conduct qualifying for a decrease
    in offense level under subsection (b) will occur particularly early in the case. For example, to
    qualify under subsection (b), the defendant must have notified authorities of his intention to
    enter a plea of guilty at a sufficiently early point in the process so that the government may
    avoid preparing for trial and the court may schedule its calendar efficiently.”)
    3
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    Palacios, any error was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; see also United
    States v. Paz, No. 14-10243, 
    2015 WL 993391
    , at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015)
    (unpublished) (emphasizing that “because the government has a valid basis to
    refuse to move for the additional point and we have no basis to force the
    government to so move, vacating the sentence and remanding would be futile”).
    The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    4