United States v. Clark , 953 F. Supp. 2d 80 ( 2013 )


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  •                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA            )
    )
    v.                            )                 Criminal No. 10-0133 (PLF)
    )
    FLOYD CLARK,                        )
    )
    Defendant.                    )
    ____________________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    This matter is before the Court on the pro se motion of the defendant, Floyd
    Clark, to modify the schedule for his restitution payments. Mr. Clark argues that this Court
    should set the schedule for his monthly restitution payments under the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate
    Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). The government opposes the motion. Upon careful
    consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the entire record in this
    case, the Court will deny Mr. Clark’s motion. 1
    I. BACKGROUND
    After a jury trial, Floyd Clark was found guilty on the following eight counts:
    kidnaping; using, carrying, possessing and brandishing a firearm during a drug trafficking
    offense; carjacking; carjacking while armed; possession of a firearm during the commission of a
    crime of violence or dangerous offense; armed robbery; possession of a firearm during the
    1
    The documents reviewed by the Court in connection with the motion in question
    include: the defendant’s motion for modification of payment schedule (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 100];
    the United States’ opposition to defendant’s pro se motion for modification (“Opp.”) [Dkt. No.
    102]; and the defendant’s reply to United States’ opposition (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 103].
    commission of a crime of violence or dangerous offense; and the unlawful possession of a
    firearm by an individual under felony indictment. He was sentenced to 284 months’
    imprisonment and was ordered to repay $15,440 in restitution. The Court provided that
    “[s]pecial assessments … and the restitution, are immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court
    for the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia.” Judgment Dkt. 84 at 6 (Aug. 17, 2011). The
    Court further provided that “[t]he defendant shall make payments on the restitution and special
    assessments through his participation in the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility
    Program.” Id. Mr. Clark is currently incarcerated in a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) facility in
    Welch, West Virginia.
    Mr. Clark entered into an agreement with the BOP to pay $25 per quarter towards
    his restitution. Mot. at 2. He alleges that subsequent to the initial agreement, the “amount has
    been repeatedly increased arbitrarily and capriciously by the BOP’s staff members… under the
    pretext of the threat that Petitioner would be placed on [I]FRP refusal status (meaning
    unwillingness to make payments towards the [I]FRP) and a number of sanctions would ensue
    against the Petitioner.” Id. He further asserts that, while he continues to pay his restitution
    payments, it is “not without economic hardship on his ability to stabilize his prison life,
    rehabilitate himself, and maintain family ties.” Id. The government counters that, not only does
    the Court lack the authority to interfere with the BOP’s administration of the IFRP, but the
    defendant has also failed to offer specific financial information to justify the requested relief.
    See Opp. at 7-10.
    2
    II. DISCUSSION
    In his motion, Mr. Clark asks this Court to order that his quarterly restitution
    payments under the BOP’s IFRP remain at $25 per quarter, the monthly minimum amount
    allowable. For two reasons, each of which is sufficient to deny the relief sought, the Court will
    deny the motion.
    First, as Mr. Clark concedes, his participation in the IFRP is voluntary. See Mot.
    at 2. The Court has previously noted, however, that “[a]lthough [the] BOP merely encourages an
    inmate’s participation in the program, see 
    28 C.F.R. § 545.10
    , an inmate who refuses to
    participate ordinarily loses certain privileges. See 
    28 C.F.R. § 545.11
    (d).” United States v.
    Honesty, Criminal No. 07-0155, 
    2010 WL 348021
    , at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2010) (Friedman, J.).
    Nevertheless, “[b]ecause the Court’s Judgment does not require [the defendant] to participate in
    the BOP’s IFRP at all, let alone obligate [him] to make specific monthly payments under that
    program, this Court has no occasion to modify its Judgment to ‘reduce’ [the defendant]’s
    monthly payments under the IFRP.” United States v. Rush, 
    853 F. Supp. 2d 159
    , 162 (D.D.C.
    2012) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
    Second, “the IFRP ‘operates under the exclusive control and authority of the
    Executive Branch.’” United States v. Ayers-Zander, Criminal No. 11-280, 
    2013 WL 2468300
    , at
    *1 (D.D.C. Jun. 7, 2013) (Roberts, J.) (quoting United States v. Baldwin, 
    563 F.3d 490
    , 492
    (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Because Mr. Clark seeks relief in connection with his IFRP payment, which is
    administered by the BOP, he must first proceed through the appropriate administrative channels
    before seeking relief in this Court. See 
    28 C.F.R. § 542.10
    (a) (“The purpose of the [BOP’s]
    Administrative Remedy Program is to allow an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating
    to any aspect of his/her own confinement.”). Here, Mr. Clark has not shown that he has
    3
    exhausted the administrative remedies available to him before seeking relief from this Court.
    See United States v. Ayers-Zander, 
    2013 WL 2468300
     at *1.
    Furthermore, even if Mr. Clark had exhausted his administrative remedies, it is
    possible that any request for relief would not lie in this Court. See United States v. Ayers-
    Zander, 
    2013 WL 2468300
     at *1 (“[T]he proper method for challenging how [the] BOP is
    administering the IFRP . . . may not be a motion to the sentencing court, but rather a petition
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     in the district where [he] is serving [his] sentence.”); United States v.
    Rush, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (agreeing that “[the defendant’s] remedy must lie elsewhere”).
    For all of these reasons, it is hereby
    ORDERED that Mr. Clark’s Motion for Modification of Payment Schedule [Dkt.
    No. 100] is DENIED; and it is
    FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall mail a copy of this
    Memorandum Opinion and Order to Mr. Clark at his address of record.
    SO ORDERED.
    /s/
    PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
    DATE: July 11, 2013                                     United States District Judge
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Criminal No. 2010-0133

Citation Numbers: 953 F. Supp. 2d 80

Judges: Judge Paul L. Friedman

Filed Date: 7/11/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023