Annex Books, Incorporated v. City of Indianapolis , 740 F.3d 1136 ( 2014 )

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                                        In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.  13-‐‑1500
ANNEX  BOOKS,  INC.,  et  al.,
Plaintiffs-‐‑Appellants,
v.
CITY  OF  INDIANAPOLIS,  INDIANA,
Defendant-‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the
Southern  District  of  Indiana,  Indianapolis  Division.
No.  1:03-‐‑cv-‐‑00918-‐‑SEB-‐‑TAB  —  Sarah  Evans  Barker,  Judge.
____________________
ARGUED  JANUARY  15,  2014  —  DECIDED  JANUARY  24,  2014
____________________
Before  FLAUM,  EASTERBROOK,  and  ROVNER,  Circuit  Judges.
EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge.  The  Supreme  Court  has  held
that   state   and   local   governments   may   regulate   adult   estab-‐‑
lishments   by   using   time,   place,   and   manner   restrictions   to
reduce   the   secondary   effects   of   those   businesses   on   third
parties,  but  may  not  regulate  them  to  restrict  the  dissemina-‐‑
tion  of  speech  disapproved  by  local  residents.  Los  Angeles  v.
Alameda   Books,   Inc.,

535 U.S. 425

   (2002);   Renton   v.   Playtime
2                                                                   No.  13-‐‑1500
Theatres,   Inc.,

475 U.S. 41

   (1986);   see   also,   e.g.,   Illinois   One
News,  Inc.  v.  Marshall,

477 F.3d 461

,  463  (7th  Cir.  2007).
Indianapolis   requires   adult   bookstores   to   remain   closed
between   the   hours   of   midnight   and   10   a.m.   every   day,   and
all  day  Sunday.  Other  retail  businesses  are  not  subject  to  the-‐‑
se  restrictions.  In  earlier  rounds  of  this  litigation,  Indianapo-‐‑
lis   contended   that   closure   would   curtail   secondary   effects,
but   we   concluded   that   the   evidence   it   offered   was   weak,
contested   in   material   respects,   or   concerned   different   kinds
of   businesses   or   different   kinds   of   laws,   such   as   minimum
distances  between  adult  outlets  rather  than  closure.  See

581 F.3d 460

  (7th  Cir.  2009);

624 F.3d 368

  (7th  Cir.  2010).  The  dis-‐‑
trict  court  then  held  a  trial.  Indianapolis  gave  a  single  justifi-‐‑
cation:   fewer   armed   robberies   at   or   near   adult   bookstores.
The  district  court  found  this  adequate  and  entered  judgment
for  the  City.

926 F. Supp. 2d 1039

(S.D. Ind. 2013).
The current justification is weak as a statistical matter.
The City did not use a multivariate regression to control for
other potentially important variables, such as the presence of
late-‐‑night taverns. The change in the number of armed rob-‐‑
beries is small; the difference is not statistically significant.
The data do not show that robberies are more likely at adult
bookstores than at other late-‐‑night retail outlets, such as liq-‐‑
uor stores, pharmacies, and convenience stores, that are not
subject to the closing hours imposed on bookstores. And
most of the harm of armed robberies falls on the bookstores
(and their patrons) rather than on strangers. The secondary-‐‑
effects approach endorsed by Alameda Books and Playtime
Theatres permits governments to protect persons who want
nothing to do with dirty books from harms created by adult
businesses; the Supreme Court has not endorsed an ap-‐‑
No. 13-‐‑1500 3
proach under which governments can close bookstores in
order to reduce crime directed against businesses that know-‐‑
ingly accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who volun-‐‑
tarily frequent their premises. As we remarked in New Alba-‐‑
ny DVD, LLC v. New Albany,

581 F.3d 556

   (7th   Cir.   2009),
adults   may   decide   for   themselves   what   risks   to   run   by   the
literature   they   choose,   and   cities   must   protect   readers   from
robbers   rather   than   reduce   risks   by   closing   bookstores.   Cf.
Virginia  Board  of  Pharmacy  v.  Virginia  Citizens  Consumer  Coun-‐‑
cil,  Inc.,

425 U.S. 748

  (1976)  (fear  that  readers  will  act  unwise-‐‑
ly  does  not  justify  restricting  otherwise-‐‑lawful  speech).
That  the  City’s  regulation  takes  the  form  of  closure  is  the
nub  of  the  problem.  Justice  Kennedy,  whose  vote  was  essen-‐‑
tial  to  the  disposition  of  Alameda  Books,  remarked  that  “a  city
may   not   regulate   the   secondary   effects   of   speech   by   sup-‐‑
pressing   the   speech   itself.”

535 U.S. at 445

(opinion concur-‐‑
ring in the judgment). Yet that’s what Indianapolis has done.
The benefits come from closure: shuttered shops can’t be
robbed at gunpoint, and they lack customers who could be
mugged. If that sort of benefit were enough to justify clo-‐‑
sure, then a city could forbid adult bookstores altogether.
Indianapolis observes that customers are free to patron-‐‑
ize stores during the hours they are allowed to be open. As
the City depicts things, there is no loss to speech—anyone
who wants any magazine, book, or movie can get it, eventu-‐‑
ally—and some gain in the reduction of armed robberies.
With even a little gain on one side, and no loss on the other,
the City maintains that it must prevail.
To test the proposition that delay in obtaining reading
matter does not cause loss, we put a hypothetical at oral ar-‐‑
gument. Suppose Indianapolis were to prohibit the distribu-‐‑
4 No. 13-‐‑1500
tion of newspapers on Sundays. (Just newspapers: our hypo-‐‑
thetical law differs from a general Sunday-‐‑closing statute.
See McGowan v. Maryland,

366 U.S. 420

   (1961).)   Closure
could  achieve  multiple  benefits,  including  a  reduction  in  the
number  of  traffic  accidents  (newspapers  generate  lots  of  traf-‐‑
fic   because   trucks   deliver   newsprint   to   plants   and   printed
papers   throughout   the   region;   home   delivery   carriers   may
drive   their   own   cars);   a   reduction   in   robberies   of   paper   de-‐‑
liverers,   who   may   be   on   the   street   when   few   others   are
awake   to   protect   them;   and   a   reduction   in   the   newspaper’s
carbon  footprint  and  other  pollutants.  All  the  news  (and  ads)
now  in  the  Sunday  paper  could  appear  in  Monday’s  paper,
so   readers   would   retain   access,   and   anyone   who   wants   up-‐‑
to-‐‑the-‐‑minute  news  could  get  it  on  the  Internet  while  avoid-‐‑
ing   accidents,   robberies,   and   pollution.   The   lawyer   repre-‐‑
senting   Indianapolis   was   shocked   at   the   idea,   however;   he
proclaimed  that  the  City  could  not  do  such  a  thing  consistent
with  the  first  amendment.
What   is   the   difference   between   preventing   a   newspaper
from  selling  paper  copies  on  Sunday  (or  before  10  a.m.)  and
preventing   an   adult  bookstore  from  selling  paper  copies  on
Sunday   (or   before   10)?   Not   secondary   effects:   the   harms   to
third   parties   caused   by   a   newspaper   likely   exceed   those
caused  by  an  adult  bookstore.  The  difference  lies  in  the  con-‐‑
tent   of   the   reading   material.   Indianapolis   likes   G-‐‑rated
newspapers  but  not  sexually  oriented  books,  magazines,  and
movies.  Yet  neither  Alameda  Books  nor  Playtime  Theatres  per-‐‑
mits   units   of   government   to   stop   the   distribution   of   books
because   their   content   is   objectionable,   unless   the   material   is
obscene.   See   also,   e.g.,   United   States   v.   Stevens,

559 U.S. 460

(2010)   (“crush   videos”   cannot   be   suppressed);   American
Booksellers   Association,   Inc.   v.   Hudnut,

771 F.2d 323

   (7th   Cir.
No.  13-‐‑1500                                                                5
1985),   affirmed   summarily,

475 U.S. 1001

   (1986)   (material
that   is   pornographic,   but   not   obscene,   cannot   be   sup-‐‑
pressed).   Indianapolis   does   not   contend   that   any   of   the
plaintiffs   sells   obscene   material;   it   follows   that   objection   to
the  plaintiffs’  stock  in  trade  cannot  justify  closure.
The   judgment   of   the   district   court   is   reversed,   and   the
case   is   remanded   with   instructions   to   enter   an   injunction
against  enforcement  of  the  closure  ordinance.