Rice, C. Etta v. Barnhart, Joanne B. ( 2004 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-3830
    C. ETTA RICE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of Illinois.
    No. 02 C 2188—Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JUNE 1, 2004—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 2004
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit
    Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge.
    I. Background
    To be eligible for disability insurance benefits under Title
    II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423,
    and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the
    Act, §§ 1382, 1382c, a claimant must prove she is unable to
    2                                                   No. 03-3830
    engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a
    medically determinable physical or mental impairment
    which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
    or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
    than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 432(d)(1)(A),
    1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner of the Social Security
    Administration uses a five-step sequential analysis to ascer-
    tain whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
    §§ 404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)-(f); Zurawski v. Halter, 
    245 F.3d 881
    , 885-86 (7th Cir. 2001). Steps one and two are threshold
    determinations and assess first, whether a claimant is not
    presently working, and second, whether the complained- of
    impairment(s) are of the required duration and significantly
    limit the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R.
    §§ 404.1520(a)-(c), 416.920(a)-(c). In step three, evidence
    demonstrating the claimant’s impairments is compared to
    a list of impairments presumed severe enough to preclude
    any gainful work. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1
    (“listing of impairments”). Where an impairment meets or
    equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant qualifies
    for benefits and no further inquiry is necessary. 20 C.F.R. §§
    404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant is not able to qualify
    for benefits under step three, the analysis proceeds to steps
    four and five. The fourth step requires an assessment of
    whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity1 will
    allow the claimant to pursue her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§
    404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Where the impairment precludes the
    performance of past work, the claimant’s RFC, age, educa-
    tion, and work experience are considered to determine if
    other work exists that would accommodate the claimant. 20
    C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
    Rice was born on August 13, 1945. She graduated from
    high school and is a certified nursing assistant. She has
    worked in the past as a nursing assistant and babysitter.
    1
    The residual functional capacity denotes what a claimant can
    still do, despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
    No. 03-3830                                                  3
    After injuring her back while lifting a patient in an elderly
    nursing facility in 1985, she received disability insurance
    benefits between 1988 and 1994, when she returned to
    substantial gainful employment at a homeless shelter.
    On October 29, 1998, Rice applied for disability insurance
    benefits and supplemental security income, claiming she
    became disabled on October 25, 1998 due to back and re-
    lated leg pain, the result of her 1985 injury and a subse-
    quent fall. Rice’s applications were denied initially and
    upon reconsideration. On November 18, 1999, a hearing
    was held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).
    A. Testimony before the ALJ
    At the hearing, Rice testified generally about her age,
    educational level, job history, and medical history. Specifi-
    cally, she described two previous back surgeries in 1985 and
    1988. She indicated that after being on disability benefits,
    she returned to work as a day care provider, only to suffer
    a fall in 1994. One month after the fall, due to a pronounced
    limp and an inability to lift heavy objects, Rice testified it
    became impossible for her to continue working as a
    babysitter. She was unemployed from 1994 until 1997,
    when she began working part-time at a homeless shelter.
    Her employment there, which included meal preparation,
    cleaning, and supervision of the clients, ended in October of
    1998 when her “legs gave out,” causing her to fall on the
    stairs. As a result, she testified, she resigned.
    Rice also spoke specifically about her back and leg pain.
    Rice testified that the primary source of a constant, tooth-
    ache-type pain, occasionally aggravated by cold weather,
    was her lower back. However, she described how certain
    activities cause pain to radiate to other parts of her body.
    After sitting for a certain amount of time, Rice testified that
    her leg will go numb. And after standing for a period of
    time, Rice indicated that she experiences pain between her
    4                                               No. 03-3830
    shoulder blades and neck, as well as pain down her legs,
    particularly her right leg, sometimes causing numbness in
    her toes. Moreover, she complained that she must sleep in
    an upright position.
    In terms of medication and other treatment for the pain,
    Rice indicated that for approximately one month she had
    been taking Tylenol-3 every six hours and that previously,
    she took Darvoset. To counter inflammation, she had been
    taking Lodine since 1997. She also indicated that she does
    not use a cane, brace, or other support device aside from a
    home-fashioned walking stick, used only occasionally in cold
    weather. Rice used no assistive device on the day of the
    hearing.
    Rice also testified that she had been living by herself for
    the past three years. She stated that while her children
    assist her from time to time, she occasionally cooks for
    herself and does a daily load of laundry, necessitating one
    difficult trip up and down a flight of stairs. She also goes
    grocery shopping with assistance, washes dishes, and takes
    out the garbage. In addition, she testified that she reads
    and attends church services three to four Sundays a month,
    sings in the choir, and attends choir practices. She also
    stated that she enjoys watching television, although it is
    difficult for her to sit through an entire program. Rice
    testified that she is able to bathe herself, but that she has
    problems getting out of the bathtub and therefore takes
    showers. She also stated that she can dress herself and put
    on shoes and socks without a problem. Finally, she indi-
    cated that although she has a driver’s license, she had not
    driven since October based upon a recommendation by her
    neurologist, Dr. Wayne D. Kelly.
    B. Evidence submitted to the ALJ
    The medical evidence submitted on behalf of Rice was
    No. 03-3830                                                     5
    extensive. However, it revealed marked differences of
    opinion among health care professionals. We summarize the
    evidence, for simplicity purposes, according to the treating
    physician.2
    1. Dr. David L. Pohl
    Dr. Pohl reported that an October 20, 1995 magnetic
    resonance imaging (“MRI”) of Rice’s lumbar spine showed
    postoperative changes at the L5 level. At the L5-S1 level,
    Dr. Pohl noted degenerative changes and scar tissue, but he
    also indicated that the abnormalities may be the result of
    a recurrent herniated nucleus pulposus (slipped disk).
    2. Dr. Donald G. Rumer
    Dr. Rumer examined Rice on February 4, 1997. He
    noted that a 1985 accident resulted in a herniated disk,
    which was treated with chemonucleolysis, and that, in 1998,
    Rice underwent a bilateral laminectomy with a total lami-
    nectomy at L5 and exploration and neurolysis of the first
    and second sacral nerve roots. He also made the following
    findings:
    2
    Because the Appeals Council eventually refused Rice’s request
    to review the ALJ’s unfavorable decision, we note that it is not
    appropriate for us to consider evidence which was not before the
    ALJ, but which Rice later submitted to the Appeals Council (or
    any argument based upon such evidence). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
    Eads v. Sec. of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    983 F.2d 815
    , 817
    (7th Cir. 1993), cited in Wolfe v. Shalala, 
    997 F.2d 321
    , 322 n.3
    (7th Cir. 1993). Although technically a part of the administrative
    record, the additional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council,
    (R. 10 at 366-438), cannot now be used as a basis for a finding of
    reversible error.
    6                                                     No. 03-3830
    • positive Lesegue’s sign3
    • possible atrophy of the right calf, measuring sixteen
    inches compared to sixteen and a half inches on the
    left
    • absent patellar reflexes
    • trace Achilles reflex on left
    • absent Achilles reflex on right
    • tender posterior spine
    He diagnosed Rice with traumatic lumbodorsal fascitis (the
    chronic phase of an acute lower back strain) and aggrava-
    tion of postlaminectomy syndrome.
    3. Dr. D. Patel
    Dr. Patel, Rice’s family doctor, completed a “Spinal
    Disorders” questionnaire upon request on November 20,
    1998. In it, he noted that Rice had degenerative joint
    disease, but had no atrophy and could walk without as-
    sistance. He also indicated that no nerve root compression
    was present and that Rice did not have any limitations in
    her range of motion in her cervical spine or her lumbosacral
    spine. Dr. Patel also reported that sitting or walking for
    more than one-half hour worsened Rice’s pain and that Rice
    was “unable to lift.” Dr. Patel’s office notes also refer to
    Rice’s complaints of constant toothache back pain and
    burning pain and numbness in her right leg, for which Dr.
    Patel referred Rice to Dr. Wayne D. Kelly, a neurologist.
    3
    This refers to the results of a test which, when positive, elim-
    inates a disease of the hip joint as the cause of painful hip flexion
    when the knee is extended, indicating instead lumbar root or
    nerve irritation as the cause.
    No. 03-3830                                                 7
    4. Dr. Wayne D. Kelly
    Dr. Kelly, neurologist, treated Rice beginning in April of
    1999. His records reveal the following results and diagno-
    ses:
    • April 23, 1999 exam revealed bilateral 2+ symmetri-
    cal patellar reflexes, decreased pin prick sensation in
    the right entire leg, positive mild weakness in the
    tibial anterior muscle and peroneous longus, positive
    lumbosacral paraspinal muscle spasm with stiffness
    and difficulties getting straight up out of couch, and
    slightly antalgic gait.
    • April 30, 1999 electromyogram (“EMG”) was consistent
    with chronic bilateral L5-S1 polyradiculopathy, with
    evidence of axonal involvement, as well as a (right)
    superimposed mild right compression/entrapment
    peroneal neuropathy at the fibular head, and evidence
    of mildly slowed nerve conduction velocity across the
    fibular head. No electro-physiological evidence of an
    underlying sensory/motor polyneuropathy.
    • July 7, 1998 MRI showed left paracentric L3-4 disc
    herniation with compression of left L4 nerve root, a
    central L5-S1 disc herniation, left herniated disk at
    L3-4, small central herniated disk at C2-3, C3-4, and
    C4-5 with cervical radiculopathy, and a bone spur at
    C5-6.
    • June 15, 1999 and August 4, 1999 Rice reported that
    epidural steroid injections helped reduce her back
    pain “a lot,” but only lasted for about 2 months. She
    also reported difficulty sleeping, walking, and sitting
    because of pain, including leg and neck pain. She
    declined a trial treatment of steroid injections for her
    neck. Dr. Kelly noted that Rice had C2-3 and C3-4
    small herniated disks, with a bone spur at C5-6;
    secondary radioculopathy with cervicalgia; L5 lumbar
    radiculopathy, with chronic pain not responsive to
    long-run treatment so far; and a sleeping disorder.
    8                                                No. 03-3830
    • September 3, 1999 Dr. Kelly reported that Rice’s
    chronic cervical and lumbosacral radiculopathies had
    been “recalcitrant to treatment so far” and also
    indicated that Rice had a sleeping disorder, likely
    secondary to sleep apnea.
    5. St. Mary’s Hospital Physical Therapy
    Dr. Kelly recommended physical therapy for Rice. Be-
    tween August 9, 1999 and September 1, 1999, Rice un-
    derwent six therapy sessions. The physical therapist noted
    significantly reduced range of motion and muscle weakness.
    (R. 10 at 329-41.)
    6. Dr. Sandra A. Bilinsky
    On December 17, 1998, Dr. Bilinsky reviewed Rice’s claim
    file and completed a “Physical Residual Functional Capacity
    Assessment” form. Dr. Bilinsky concluded that Rice could
    lift 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally. She
    indicated that Rice could stand or sit for a total of six hours
    per eight-hour workday, but also noted that Rice’s attending
    physician suggested that Rice needed to alternate between
    sitting and standing to relieve the pain. Dr. Bilinsky further
    indicated that Rice could climb, balance, stoop, kneel,
    crouch, or crawl occasionally, but that Rice should avoid
    concentrated exposure to heights. She further noted that
    Rice could walk unassisted and had a normal range of
    motion. Moreover, the doctor twice indicated that there was
    no evidence of panvertible muscle spasm. Dr. Bilinsky,
    pointing out that “pain has been considered in this evalua-
    tion,” then concluded that Rice could perform medium work
    activity. Dr. James Graham affirmed Dr. Bilinsky’s assess-
    ment on December 17, 1998.
    No. 03-3830                                                 9
    C. Outcome of the proceedings
    On February 9, 2000 the ALJ issued an opinion denying
    Rice’s applications. Specifically, the ALJ found that step one
    was satisfied as Rice had not been employed since the onset
    of the alleged disability. Second, the ALJ implicitly found
    that her impairment was sufficiently severe and proceeded
    to step three, where he determined that her impairments
    did not meet or equal those in the listing of impairments.
    Reaching step four, the ALJ noted that Rice’s subjective
    allegations regarding her pain and limitations were not
    fully credible. Although the ALJ concluded that she could
    not return to her former work, he ultimately determined at
    step five that she could perform medium work and was not,
    therefore, entitled to benefits.
    The Appeals Council denied Rice’s subsequent request for
    review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
    Commissioner of Social Security. The district court affirmed
    on August 13, 2003, and Rice now appeals.
    II. Analysis
    A. Standard of review
    We review the Commissioner of Social Security
    Administration’s decision to deny benefits to determine
    whether it was supported by substantial evidence or is the
    result of an error of law. Lopez v. Barnhart, 
    336 F.3d 535
    ,
    539 (7th Cir. 2003); Schmidt v. Apfel, 
    201 F.3d 970
    , 972 (7th
    Cir. 2000). Evidence is substantial when it is sufficient for
    a reasonable person to conclude that the evidence supports
    the decision. Clifford v. Apfel, 
    227 F.3d 863
    , 869 (7th Cir.
    2000). In our review of the ALJ’s decision, we will not
    “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of
    credibility, or substitute [our] own judgment for that of the
    Commissioner.” 
    Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539
    ; see also 
    Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869
    . And while the ALJ must have built a “logical
    10                                                   No. 03-3830
    bridge from the evidence to his conclusion[,]” Steele v.
    Barnhart, 
    290 F.3d 936
    , 941 (7th Cir. 2002), we will
    nonetheless “give the opinion a commonsensical reading
    rather than nitpicking at it,” Shramek v. Apfel, 
    226 F.3d 809
    , 811 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. Apfel, 
    189 F.3d 561
    , 564 (7th Cir. 1999)).
    The main thrust of Rice’s argument on appeal is that the
    decision by the ALJ is not supported by substantial evi-
    dence because the ALJ ignored or misstated significant
    medical findings in the record. We disagree.
    B. ALJ’s determination at step 3
    Rice first complains that because the ALJ did not ex-
    pressly mention Listing 1.05(C)4 of the listing of impair-
    ments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.05(C) (1999),
    which Rice admits was the only listing relevant to her
    applications, we must reverse and remand. Listing 1.05(C)
    provides:
    other vertebrogenic disorders (e.g., herniated nucleus
    puplosus, spinal stenosis) with the following persisting
    for at least 3 months despite prescribed therapy and
    expected to last 12 months. With both 1 and 2:
    1. Pain, muscle spasm, and significant limitations of
    motion in the spine; and
    2. Appropriate radicular distribution of significant
    motor loss with muscle weakness and sensory and re-
    flex loss.
    4
    Listing 1.05(C) was rescinded effective February 19, 2002. Revised
    Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal
    System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,010 (Nov. 19, 2001).
    Because Listing 1.05(C) was the listing in effect at the time of the
    ALJ’s decision, it is the only listing we need now consider.
    No. 03-3830                                                 11
    The applicant must satisfy all of the criteria in the Listing
    in order to receive an award of disability insurance benefits
    and supplemental security income under step three. Pope v.
    Shalala, 
    998 F.2d 473
    , 480 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled on
    other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 
    189 F.3d 561
    , 564 (7th
    Cir. 1999).
    A plethora of subjective and objective evidence demon-
    strates that Rice suffers from pain and sensory and reflex
    loss. However, record evidence also reveals that Rice did not
    meet all of the criteria of Listing 1.05(C), as required. It is
    sufficient to note that the entire medical record contains
    only reference to muscle spasms, a cursory mention in Dr.
    Kelly’s otherwise thorough and voluminous medical records.
    And Dr. Bilinsky affirmatively indicated that Rice did not
    suffer from any muscle spasm. Furthermore, the record
    contains no evidence of significant motor loss. In 1998, Dr.
    Patel reported that she could ambulate without assistance
    and in 1999, Dr. Kelly reported that her gait was only
    “slightly antalgic.” This is insufficient to demonstrate that
    Rice met all of the criteria of Listing 1.05(C).
    As to Rice’s argument that the ALJ’s failure to explicitly
    refer to the relevant listing alone necessitates reversal and
    remand, we have not yet so held and decline to do so here.
    See 
    Steele, 290 F.3d at 940
    . Moreover, given that Rice’s
    attorney and the vocational expert who testified at the
    November hearing both referred only to Listing 1.05(C) (and
    because Rice concedes that Listing 1.05(C) is the sole listing
    applicable to her), we can safely conclude the ALJ consid-
    ered and applied the appropriate listing, although he
    nowhere expressly referred to it in his February decision.
    Mirroring her arguments as to the ALJ’s step five analy-
    sis, Rice also attempts to bolster her argument that the
    ALJ’s step three analysis was fatally flawed by characteriz-
    ing it as “perfunctory.” We have recently held that where an
    ALJ omits reference to the applicable listing and provides
    nothing more than a superficial analysis, reversal and
    remand is required. See Brindisi v. Barnhart, 
    315 F.3d 783
    ,
    12                                                   No. 03-3830
    786-87 (7th Cir. 2002); Scott v. Barhart, 
    297 F.3d 589
    , 595-
    96 (7th Cir. 2002); 
    Steele, 290 F.3d at 940
    -41. But we do not
    find the ALJ’s reasoning in Rice’s case to be perfunctory.
    The ALJ discussed Rice’s “severe physical impairments”
    in detail and referred to numerous specific exhibits. He
    discussed her 1985 and 1988 surgeries, her 1994 fall, and
    the objective evidence of disc degeneration and disc
    herniation from 1995 and 1998. The ALJ also summarized
    the opinions of Drs. Patel and Kelly. He noted the use of
    epidural steroid injections, Darvoset, and Tylenol-3 to treat
    Rice’s pain. He recounted Rice’s course of physical therapy
    treatment. In addition, the ALJ summarized Rice’s subjec-
    tive statements regarding her pain and assessed her
    credibility. We have long held that an ALJ is not required
    to provide a “complete written evaluation of every piece of
    testimony and evidence,” Diaz v. Chater, 
    55 F.3d 300
    , 308
    (7th Cir. 1995), and we find that the ALJ’s determination
    with respect to step three was supported by substantial
    evidence.5
    C. ALJ’s determinations at step 5
    The ALJ concluded at step five that Rice was able to
    perform medium work and was therefore not disabled.
    Rice’s complains that the ALJ impermissibly relied upon
    the opinions of Drs. Bilinsky and Graham, the Social
    Security Administration state agency doctors who deter-
    5
    Because it is proper to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole, and
    because it would be a needless formality to have the ALJ repeat
    substantially similar factual analyses at both steps three and five,
    cf. Orlando v. Heckler, 
    776 F.2d 209
    , 213 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusing
    to require an ALJ to lay out his determinations and supporting
    reasoning in a “conclusion” section, as opposed to a “discussion”
    section, and calling any such requirement a “needless formality”),
    we consider the ALJ’s treatment of the record evidence in support
    of both his conclusions at steps three and five.
    No. 03-3830                                                13
    mined Rice’s RFC, failed to treat her testimony properly,
    and omitted discussion of crucial pieces of evidence. We
    address each of these arguments in turn.
    The ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination was
    consistent with the opinions of Drs. Bilinsky and Graham.
    The ALJ was entitled to rely upon their opinions. 20 C.F.R.
    § 404.1527(f)(2)(i); Scheck v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 697
    , 700
    (7th Cir. 2004). More importantly, there is no doctor’s
    opinion contained in the record which indicated greater
    limitations than those found by the ALJ. Dr. Patel’s oblique
    note that Rice could not “lift” and that sitting and walking
    for more than one-half hour worsened her pain is the only
    opinion arguably more restrictive than the ALJ’s residual
    functional capacity conclusion. But Dr. Patel’s clinical
    findings were negative, (R. 10 at 298-99), and hence, the
    limitations on lifting, sitting, and walking were presumably
    based upon Rice’s subjective complaints. And medical
    opinions upon which an ALJ should rely need to be based
    on objective observations and not amount merely to a
    recitation of a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Farrell
    v. Sullivan, 
    878 F.2d 985
    , 989 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing 20
    C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.00(B)).
    We next address Rice’s protestation that the ALJ mis-
    characterized her testimony in unfavorably concluding that
    she was not credible. There is no basis in the record for this
    assertion. In his assessment of Rice’s credibility, the ALJ
    properly considered the degree to which the objective
    medical evidence supported the degree of severity of Rice’s
    subjective complaints; Rice’s daily activities; the duration,
    frequency, and intensity of the pain; the precipitating and
    aggravating factors; medications taken; and treatment.
    
    Scheck, 357 F.3d at 703
    (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 
    739 F.2d 1320
    , 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)). All of the ALJ’s analysis is am-
    ply supported by the hearing record, and Rice’s argument
    amounts to nothing more than a dislike of the ALJ’s phrase-
    14                                                No. 03-3830
    ology. As such, we see no reason to overturn the ALJ’s
    eminently reasonable credibility determination, particularly
    given that as a factual finding, credibility determinations
    are due special deference. 
    Id. Rice also
    lists items of evidence that the ALJ did not
    specifically mention in his decision. However, an ALJ need
    only “minimally articulate his or her justification for re-
    jecting or accepting specific evidence of a disability.” Steward
    v. Bowen, 
    858 F.2d 1295
    , 1299 (7th Cir. 1988), cited in
    
    Scheck, 357 F.3d at 700
    . As we pointed out previously, the
    ALJ need not provide a written evaluation of every piece of
    evidence. 
    Diaz, 55 F.3d at 308
    . And just as we held above
    with respect to step three, we find that the ALJ satisfied his
    minimal duty to articulate his reasons and make a bridge
    between the evidence and the outcome as to his step five
    determination. To summarize, we conclude that the ALJ’s
    step five determination was supported by substantial
    evidence.
    D. Circuit Rule 30 violation
    One final matter deserves our attention. Despite Circuit
    Rule 30(b)(3), which requires every appellant to include
    with the brief a copy of “all the opinions, orders, findings of
    fact and conclusions of law rendered in the case by ad-
    ministrative agencies . . . whether the original review of the
    administrative decision is in this court or was conducted by
    the district court[,]” Rice’s brief included only the district
    court’s opinion and judgment, omitting the ALJ’s decision.
    Counsel also filed a statement under Circuit Rule 30(d)
    incorrectly certifying that all materials required by Rule
    30(a) had been included. When this omission was drawn to
    the attention of Rice’s lawyer at oral argument, he was
    unable to offer any excuse other than sheer oversight. This
    violation is, by itself, enough to yield summary affirmance.
    No. 03-3830                                                15
    In re Dorner, 
    343 F.3d 910
    , 915 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
    Mortell v. Mortell Co., 
    887 F.2d 1322
    , 1326-27 (7th Cir.
    1989)); Urso v. United States, 
    72 F.3d 59
    , 61-62 (7th Cir.
    1995). See also Snipes v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 
    291 F.3d 460
    ,
    463-64 (7th Cir. 2002).
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, although we sympathize with
    Ms. Rice due to her indubitably trying condition, the district
    court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I
    agree that the case may be summarily affirmed on the basis
    of the inadequately explained Circuit Rule 30 violation and
    I therefore concur in the judgment. As for the merits of the
    case, I cannot agree that the ALJ’s decision was supported
    by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s “reasoning” was thin at
    best, and contained a substantial error that even the SSA
    acknowledged on appeal. In footnote 12 of the response
    brief, the Commissioner explains that the ALJ’s finding
    that Rice was capable of medium work is not consistent with
    the medical opinion advanced by the State's own doctors. The
    agency doctors opined that Rice could only occasionally climb,
    balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. For medium work,
    a person must be capable of frequent stooping and crouch-
    ing. Nonetheless, the agency doctors concluded, contrary to
    the agency’s own regulations, that Rice was capable of
    medium work, and the ALJ adopted this unsupported
    conclusion. The Commissioner urged us to find this error
    harmless because the agency doctors’ opinions would
    16                                            No. 03-3830
    support a finding that Rice could perform light work, and
    thus was not disabled. Given the medical record document-
    ing Rice’s severe spinal disorder and accompanying pain, as
    well as the analytical error overlooked by both the agency
    doctors and the ALJ, I have no confidence that the agency
    doctors or the ALJ properly analyzed Rice’s residual
    functional capacity. Because I would find that the ALJ’s
    decision was not supported by substantial evidence, I
    respectfully concur in the judgment.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—9-14-04
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-3830

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 9/14/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (20)

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Donald E. Mortell v. Mortell Company , 887 F.2d 1322 ( 1989 )

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George W. Schmidt v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of ... , 201 F.3d 970 ( 2000 )

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Terry Steele v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social ... , 290 F.3d 936 ( 2002 )

James M. FARRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN,... , 878 F.2d 985 ( 1989 )

Thomas Eads, Jr. v. Secretary of the Department of Health ... , 983 F.2d 815 ( 1993 )

Bonnie Shramek v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social ... , 226 F.3d 809 ( 2000 )

William E. WOLFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, ... , 997 F.2d 321 ( 1993 )

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Elnora G. POPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, ... , 998 F.2d 473 ( 1993 )

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Darius Scott v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social ... , 297 F.3d 589 ( 2002 )

Lorenzo Lopez, on Behalf of Roberta Lopez, Deceased v. Jo ... , 336 F.3d 535 ( 2003 )

In the Matter Of: Charles T. Dorner, Debtor-Appellant , 343 F.3d 910 ( 2003 )

23-socsecrepser-315-unemplinsrep-cch-14204a-florence-steward-v , 858 F.2d 1295 ( 1988 )

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