McDuffy, Delece v. Federal Express Corp , 130 F. App'x 49 ( 2005 )


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  •                            UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted April 26, 2005*
    Decided April 27, 2005
    Before
    Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    No. 04-3893
    DELECE McDUFFY,                                 Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                        District Court for the Northern
    District of Illinois, Eastern Division
    v.
    No. 03 C 3415
    FEDERAL EXPRESS
    CORPORATION,                                    Elaine E. Bucklo,
    Defendant-Appellee.                         Judge.
    ORDER
    Delece McDuffy, an African-American, was employed by Federal Express
    (“FedEx”) from 1996 until she was fired in September 2002. McDuffy claims that
    her termination was the result of racial discrimination, and she sued FedEx under
    Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
     and 1983. The district
    court granted summary judgment for FedEx, and we affirm.
    McDuffy was employed as a part-time handler from 1996 until February 2001,
    when she was promoted to a clerical position. Six months after her promotion,
    McDuffy was warned about her poor attendance. This warning was followed in
    October 2001 with a disciplinary letter from her supervisor citing her for taking an
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
    argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.
    See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 04-3893                                                                   Page 2
    unauthorized absence from work. McDuffy received another disciplinary letter in
    May 2002 for arriving to work late on three days. A third letter followed in August
    2002 after McDuffy left confidential documents in a unsecured location. According
    to the employee handbook, FedEx employees are typically fired after accumulating
    three disciplinary letters within 12 months, but McDuffy’s supervisor concluded
    that she made an honest mistake by not securing the documents and decided not to
    fire her. McDuffy, however, received a fourth disciplinary letter the next month
    after she left work four hours early without properly alerting her supervisor and
    obtaining approval. This letter also informed McDuffy that FedEx was terminating
    her employment. McDuffy filed a timely charge with the EEOC alleging racial
    discrimination. After her charge was denied, she filed this lawsuit. The district
    court granted summary judgment for FedEx, finding that McDuffy had not
    established a prima facie case of discrimination because she failed to meet her
    employer’s legitimate expectations and identified no similarly situated employee
    who was treated more favorably than she was. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
    Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802 (1973).
    McDuffy makes only general assertions that the district court erred by granting
    summary judgment on her Title VII claim, but to the extent her brief contains any
    argument, we agree with the district court’s analysis. McDuffy presented no direct
    evidence of discrimination, so the district court analyzed her claim under the
    McDonnell-Douglas indirect burden-shifting method. See Little v. Ill. Dep’t of
    Revenue, 
    369 F.3d 1007
    , 1011 (7th Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case of
    discrimination, McDuffy must show that she: (1) is a member of a protected class,
    (2) was meeting FedEx’s legitimate employment expectations, (3) suffered an
    adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than other similarly
    situated employees not in the protected class. 
    Id. at 1011
    . FedEx concedes that
    McDuffy, as an African-American, is a member of a protected class, and that her
    termination qualifies as an adverse action.
    But McDuffy was not meeting FedEx’s legitimate employment expectations
    because she was repeatedly written up for poor attendance. See, e.g., Contreas v.
    Suncast Corp., 
    237 F.3d 756
    , 760-61 (7th Cir. 2001) (proper attendance is implicit
    expectation of every employer). As for the fourth prong, McDuffy failed to identify a
    single employee outside her protected class who was similarly situated to her yet
    treated more favorably. In contrast, FedEx provided a list of six other
    employees—three of whom were white and three of whom were African-
    American—who were terminated between January and September 2002 for
    accumulating at least three disciplinary letters. Of these, five were terminated
    upon receiving their third letter; the remaining employee, like McDuffy, was
    terminated upon receiving a fourth.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-3893

Citation Numbers: 130 F. App'x 49

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 4/27/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023