Sanderson, Charles H v. Culligan Int'l ( 2005 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 04-3253
    CHARLES H. SANDERSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CULLIGAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. IP 00-0459-C H/K—David F. Hamilton, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 1, 2005—DECIDED JULY 11, 2005
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit
    Judges.
    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Magnatech Corporation
    sells “magnetic water conditioners.” Its sole stockholder
    brought this suit in his own name, contending that
    Culligan, a manufacturer of chemical and filtration systems
    of water purification, violated the federal antitrust and
    trademark laws by asserting that magnetic systems don’t
    work. The suit might have been dismissed immediately, for
    Magnatech rather than Sanderson is the appropriate
    plaintiff. See, e.g., In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation,
    2                                               No. 04-3253
    
    681 F.2d 514
    , 519-20 (7th Cir. 1982); Mid-State Fertilizer
    Co. v. Exchange National Bank, 
    877 F.2d 1333
    , 1335-36 (7th
    Cir. 1989). Sanderson does not claim to be injured as a
    consumer; his injury (a reduction in the value of his stock)
    is derivative of Magnatech’s. Cf. Illinois Brick Co. v.
    Illinois, 
    431 U.S. 720
     (1977). But Culligan did not catch
    this, and it is not the sort of jurisdictional problem that a
    court must notice on its own. See Associated General
    Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
    459 U.S. 519
    , 535 & n.31 (1983); Hammes v. AAMCO
    Transmissions, Inc., 
    33 F.3d 774
    , 778 (7th Cir. 1994).
    Instead Culligan defended on the merits, prevailing in a
    series of decisions. First the district court dismissed the
    antitrust allegations for failure to state a claim on which
    relief may be granted. 
    2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8309
     (S.D. Ind.
    May 29, 2001). Then it granted summary judgment on the
    Lanham Act claim to the extent that any of the statements
    preceded the period of limitations. 
    2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19212
     (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2002). Finally it terminated the
    case, again by summary judgment, because none of the
    remaining statements fits the Lanham Act’s definition of
    advertising. 
    2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671
     (S.D. Ind. July 23,
    2004).
    Because the case ended without a trial, we must assume
    that magnetic systems can reduce lime scale deposits in
    pipes, the only benefit that Magnatech and its Superior
    Manufacturing Division claim for their products. (They do
    not contend that magnetic treatment removes minerals or
    biological agents from water.) On a motion to dismiss under
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), even highly unlikely propositions
    must be taken as given. See, e.g., Miles v. Augusta City
    Council, 
    710 F.2d 1542
     (11th Cir. 1983) (assuming, as the
    complaint alleged, that cats can talk). And the party op-
    posing summary judgment receives the benefit of all rea-
    sonable inferences. Some evidence in the record suggests
    that magnetic systems can reduce lime buildup, though
    No. 04-3253                                                3
    whether this evidence, which has not been published in a
    scientific journal, meets the standard of Fed. R. Evid. 702
    is doubtful.
    Lime deposits in plumbing are calcium carbonate
    (CaCO3), which is non-magnetic. Sanderson’s lawyer could
    not explain why magnets affect nonferrous materials, and
    the unpublished study to which his brief refers at length
    does not do so either. This study finds that non-chemical
    devices can reduce the hardness of calcium carbonate build-
    up in industrial air-conditioning systems, but only when the
    water moves faster that 2.3 meters per second— and even
    so the paper offers Sanderson little support, for it lumps
    together a variety of non-chemical approaches and does not
    report separately on the sort of magnetic systems that
    Magnatech sells. See Young I. Cho, Efficiency of physical
    water treatments in controlling calcium scale accumulation
    in recirculating open cooling water system, American Society
    of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers
    Research Project 1155-TRP (May 29, 2002). Positive reports
    about magnetic water treatment are not replicable; this
    plus the lack of a physical explanation for any effects are
    hallmarks of junk science. For a review of the literature see
    John S. Baker & Simon J. Judd, Magnetic amelioration of
    scale formation, 30 Water Research 247 (1996). Nonethe-
    less, we shall indulge the assumption that adverse state-
    ments about Magnatech’s products are calumnies.
    Sanderson’s antitrust claim rests on §1 of the Sherman
    Act, 
    15 U.S.C. §1
    , and fails at the threshold because
    Sanderson does not contend (in the complaint or anywhere
    else) that Culligan has conspired with other producers to
    set price or output, or that it possesses the sort of market
    power that would lead to condemnation under the Rule of
    Reason. See National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
    University of Oklahoma, 
    468 U.S. 85
     (1984). Recast under
    §2 it would fare no better, because Sanderson does not
    contend that Culligan possesses monopoly power or that
    4                                               No. 04-3253
    bad-mouthing Magnatech’s products creates a dangerous
    probability of monopolization. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
    McQuillan, 
    506 U.S. 447
     (1993).
    The problem is not that the pleading is short, as
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 contemplates. Complaints need not allege
    facts or legal theories. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 
    534 U.S. 506
     (2002); Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zürich), 
    953 F.2d 1073
     (7th Cir. 1992). Sanderson’s problem, rather, is
    that his complaint and other papers demonstrate that the
    claim rests on a belief that the antitrust laws forbid all
    “unfair” business tactics, without regard to the likelihood
    that the adversary will achieve and retain a monopoly at
    consumers’ expense. Not at all. The antitrust laws protect
    consumers, not producers. They favor competition of all
    kinds, whether or not some other producer thinks the
    competition “fair.” Much competition is unfair, or at least
    ungentlemanly; it is designed to take sales away from one’s
    rivals. There is no obligation to be kindly or cooperative
    toward other producers. See, e.g., Verizon Communications
    Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
    540 U.S. 398
    (2004). Some laws, including the Lanham Act, condemn
    particular tactics deemed “unfair”; the Sherman Act is not
    among these laws.
    Antitrust law condemns practices that drive up prices by
    curtailing output. See, e.g., NCAA, 
    468 U.S. at 103-07
    ;
    Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 
    441 U.S. 1
    , 1920 (1979).
    False statements about a rival’s goods do not curtail output
    in either the short or the long run. They just set the stage
    for competition in a different venue: the advertising market.
    Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 
    870 F.2d 397
     (7th Cir. 1989), another antitrust case based on a
    supposed commercial falsehood, makes this point forcefully.
    We observed:
    Warfare among suppliers and their different products
    is competition. Antitrust law does not compel your com-
    petitor to praise your product or sponsor your work. To
    No. 04-3253                                                5
    require cooperation or friendliness among rivals is to
    undercut the intellectual foundations of antitrust law.
    Unless one group of suppliers diminishes another’s
    ability to peddle its wares (technically, reduces rivals’
    elasticity of supply), there is not even the beginning of
    an antitrust case, no reason to investigate further to
    determine whether the restraint is “reasonable”.
    
    870 F.2d at 399
     (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
    Magnatech remains free to sell to all who can be persuaded
    that magnets reduce lime buildup; Culligan faces competi-
    tion from dozens of other producers that use different,
    though more conventional, technologies to filter, purify, or
    reduce mineral content in water.
    Sanderson contends that Schachar is incompatible
    with American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v.
    Hydrolevel Corp., 
    456 U.S. 556
     (1982), but Schachar pointed
    out that Hydrolevel depended on something missing there
    (and here): an enforcement mechanism. Some producers
    persuaded an engineering society to write standards in such
    a way that only their products were acceptable. Because
    many governmental bodies made compliance with the
    standards mandatory (they were incorporated into building
    codes and other legal mandates), this curtailed the avail-
    able supply (rivals’ products having been knocked out) and
    could have enabled the conspirators to raise prices.
    Nothing comparable is alleged here. Although magnetic
    devices were at one time banned from some trade shows
    (supposedly at Culligan’s behest), that ban was lifted in the
    mid-1990s and is outside the period of limitations, see 
    15 U.S.C. §15
    (b)—and anyway is some distance from the legal
    restraint that led to Hydrolevel. Sanderson also maintains
    that Culligan persuaded the Water Quality Association, a
    trade group, to withhold its “Gold Seal” from magnetic
    systems. No unit of government incorporates this “Gold
    Seal” into any legal requirement; it is just a marketing
    6                                                No. 04-3253
    device. Anheuser-Busch might as well claim that by selling
    a beer called “Blue Ribbon” Pabst has violated the antitrust
    laws, unless Pabst is willing to bestow the same “Blue
    Ribbon” on Budweiser. What producers say about each
    others’ goods in an effort to sway consumers is competition
    in action. Some other law may require judicial intervention
    in order to increase the portion of truth in advertising; the
    Sherman Act does not. Commercial speech is not actionable
    under the antitrust laws. As we put it in Schachar: “There
    can be no restraint of trade without a restraint.” 
    870 F.2d at 397
    . See also Santana Products, Inc. v. Bobrick Wash-
    room Equipment, Inc., 
    401 F.3d 123
    , 133 (3d Cir. 2005).
    As for Sanderson’s claim under §43(a) of the Lanham Act,
    
    15 U.S.C. §1125
    (a)(1)(B), the district court held that it
    founders on the federal statute’s limited scope. Section 43(a)
    covers only “commercial advertising or promotion”. The
    district court concluded that Sanderson had just three
    examples of supposedly false statements within the period
    of limitations, and that all three were person-to-person
    communications at trade shows. We held in First Health
    Group Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 
    269 F.3d 800
    , 804 (7th
    Cir. 2001), that §43(a) addresses “promotional material dis-
    seminated to anonymous recipients”. This leaves to state
    law the evaluation of oral statements and brochures at
    trade shows. Sanderson does not contend that the state-
    ments of which he complains are “commercial advertising
    or promotion” as First Health Group understood that
    phrase. Indeed, he does not mention that opinion, though it
    was the mainstay of the district court’s decision.
    For that matter, Sanderson does not contend that any
    of the statements within the period of limitations was
    uttered by Culligan. He attributes these oral statements
    and handouts to its franchisees or distributors and says
    that Culligan must be vicariously liable because it insists
    that they live up to high standards of business ethics. That
    Culligan tries to prevent its distributors from committing
    business torts, and reserves the right to stop selling to
    No. 04-3253                                                  7
    anyone who does, hardly makes any of the distributors its
    agent for the purpose of defaming rivals. Unsuccessful ef-
    forts at prevention do not imply agency or an assumption of
    liability. If Culligan told its distributors to avoid reckless
    driving and to obey all state laws, this would not make it
    vicariously liable for their auto accidents or oblige it to pay
    if a distributor shot his neighbor’s dog for barking late at
    night.
    Sanderson pursued some claims under state law, which
    for reasons we have given is the only applicable body of
    legal norms. The district judge granted summary judgment
    to Culligan on all of the state-law claims, and Sanderson
    does not contest this decision on appeal. His arguments
    have been limited to the frivolous claims under federal law.
    He should be thankful that Culligan has not filed a cross-
    appeal from the district court’s order denying its motion for
    sanctions. Neither the Sherman Act nor the Lanham Act is
    designed to throw into federal courts all disputes about the
    efficacy of competing products. Whether magnetic water
    conditioners work is a question about science, not law, and
    scientific disputes must be resolved by scientific means.
    AFFIRMED
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-11-05