Washington, Chrissie v. IL Dept Revenue ( 2005 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-3818
    CHRISSIE WASHINGTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of Illinois.
    No. 01-CV-3300—Byron G. Cudmore, Magistrate Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2004—DECIDED AUGUST 22, 2005
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit
    Judges.
    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Between 1984 and 2000,
    Chrissie Washington worked from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m.
    instead of the standard 9-to-5 schedule at the Illinois
    Department of Revenue. The earlier hours allowed her
    to care for her son, who has Down syndrome, when he
    arrived home. By 1995 Washington had been promoted
    to Executive Secretary I. Over the next few years some
    of her duties were reassigned to others. Believing that
    this was the result of race discrimination, she filed a formal
    charge with state and federal officials in June 1999. That
    charge, she maintains, led supervisors to rescind the flex-
    time schedule on which her son depended.
    2                                                No. 03-3818
    A senior manager demanded that she work from 9 to 5
    and, when she refused, her position was abolished. She was
    assigned to another Executive Secretary I post with
    a different supervisor and required to apply anew for a flex-
    time schedule. When that accommodation was refused, she
    took vacation or sick leave each day from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m.
    until those benefits were exhausted. In August 2000 she
    took an unpaid leave of absence that lasted until January
    2001, when she returned to work for a different supervisor
    who allowed her to work a 7-to-3 schedule. She contends in
    this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
    the agency moved her to a 9-to-5 schedule in retaliation for
    her earlier charge of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
    3(a). The parties agreed to have a magistrate judge resolve
    their dispute. See 
    28 U.S.C. §636
    (c). He granted summary
    judgment for the agency because, he concluded, Washington
    had not established even a prima facie case of retaliation.
    She could not do so, the judge ruled, because a change of
    work hours, while salary and duties remain the same, is not
    an “adverse employment action.” See Grube v. Lau Indus-
    tries, Inc., 
    257 F.3d 723
    , 729 (7th Cir. 2001); Williams v.
    Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
    85 F.3d 270
    , 274 (7th Cir. 1996).
    And without an “adverse employment action” there can be
    no violation of Title VII, the court concluded.
    Washington wants us to hold that an “adverse employ-
    ment action” is unnecessary in retaliation suits, though it is
    essential (she allows) in litigation asserting discrimination
    with respect to wages, hours, or conditions of employment.
    She relies on decisions saying that proof of an “adverse
    employment action” is unnecessary in litigation under
    §2000e-3(a), which deals with retaliation, because that
    section is “broader” than §2000e-2(a), which deals with
    discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.
    See, e.g., Firestine v. Parkview Health System, Inc., 
    388 F.3d 229
    , 235 (7th Cir. 2004); Herrnreiter v. Chicago
    Housing Authority, 
    315 F.3d 742
    , 745 (7th Cir. 2002). The
    No. 03-3818                                                 3
    employer relies on decisions of other panels saying that an
    “adverse employment action” is essential to both kinds of
    claims. See, e.g., Hudson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
    375 F.3d 553
    , 559-61 (7th Cir. 2004); Little v. Illinois Depart-
    ment of Revenue, 
    369 F.3d 1007
    , 1011 (7th Cir. 2004); Stone
    v. Indianapolis, 
    281 F.3d 640
    , 644 (7th Cir. 2002). Decisions
    of other circuits likewise can be aligned on each side.
    Compare Passer v. American Chemical Society, 
    935 F.2d 322
    , 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (plaintiff need not show an
    adverse change in pay or working conditions), with Nelson
    v. Upsala College, 
    51 F.3d 383
    , 388-89 (3d Cir. 1995), and
    Bass v. Orange County, 
    256 F.3d 1095
    , 1118 (11th Cir.
    2001).
    The supposed conflict among panels of this circuit is
    illusory (though the conflict among other circuits may
    be real). Retaliation may take the form of acts outside
    the workplace. The state’s Department of Revenue might
    have audited Washington’s tax returns in response to
    her complaint to the EEOC, or hired a private detective to
    search for a disreputable tidbit that could be used to
    intimidate her into withdrawing the complaint. When the
    employer’s response does not affect a complainant’s
    terms and conditions of employment, it is vain to look for an
    adverse “employment” decision.
    Section 2000e-3(a) is “broader” than §2000e-2(a) in the
    sense that retaliation may take so many forms, while
    §2000e-2(a) is limited to discrimination “with respect to [the
    worker’s] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
    employment”. This is why we said in Herrnreiter and
    similar decisions that retaliation need not entail an adverse
    employment action. 
    315 F.3d at 745-46
    . Passer, which
    Washington particularly likes, dealt with a claim that
    cancellation of a professional meeting was retaliatory; that’s
    a good example of action that may inflict injury without
    changing pay or working conditions. But it does not follow
    from the fact that retaliation may be found in events away
    4                                                 No. 03-3818
    from the employer’s premises that every unwelcome
    response is forbidden retaliation. To explain why this is so,
    we start with the question why an “adverse employment
    action” ever matters, for that phrase is not in Title VII
    itself. It is a judicial gloss on the word “discrimination,” and
    courts must take care not to confuse the gloss with the
    statute.
    Title VII does not define “discrimination,” the key term
    not only for §2000e-2(a) but also for §2000e-3(a), as the
    latter section treats retaliation as a form of discrimination.
    Lack of a definition leaves unresolved the question how
    important a difference must be to count as “discrimination.”
    Suppose a supervisor regularly smiles or nods when a
    member of his own religious faith walks by, but does
    not change expression when an adherent of another
    faith passes through the office. Does this difference in
    treatment violate Title VII’s prohibition on religious
    discrimination? Courts have resisted the idea that federal
    law regulates matters of attitude or other small affairs of
    daily life—not just because of the maxim de minimis non
    curat lex (the law does not bother with trifles), see Wiscon-
    sin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 
    505 U.S. 214
    , 231 (1992), but because almost every worker feels
    offended or aggrieved by many things that happen in the
    workplace, and sorting out which of these occurred because
    of race, sex, religion, national origin, or a complaint about
    any of these would be an impossible task. Even in an all-
    white, all-male, labor force where all workers share one
    religious faith, everyone feels put upon or slighted occasion-
    ally; if these cannot be attributed to discrimination, neither
    can most of the other disappointments people encounter at
    work.
    Thus the Supreme Court has held that, although any
    “tangible employment action”—lower pay or another “sig-
    nificant change in employment status, such as hiring,
    firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
    No. 03-3818                                                  5
    different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
    change in benefits”, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
    
    524 U.S. 742
    , 761 (1998)—may be treated as “discrimina-
    tion,” only a “severe or pervasive” change in the daily
    “conditions” of employment may be treated as discrimina-
    tory. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
    523 U.S. 75
     (1998); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
    477 U.S. 57
     (1986). Congress could make any identifiable trifle
    actionable, but the undefined word “discrimination” does
    not itself command judges to supervise the minutiae of
    personnel management. Even the definition of “tangible
    employment action” in Ellerth uses “significant” three
    times, reminding us that life’s little reverses are not causes
    of litigation.
    These considerations underlie decisions such as Williams
    and Grube, which hold that a lateral transfer that does
    not affect pay (or significantly affect working
    conditions) cannot be called discriminatory. See also Smart
    v. Ball State University, 
    89 F.3d 437
    , 441 (7th Cir. 1996);
    Brown v. Brody, 
    199 F.3d 446
    , 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Such
    changes may cause upset as workers must adjust their
    schedules but do not hurt the pocketbook. Many of our
    decisions restate this as the principle that transfers nor-
    mally are not “adverse employment actions.” The Supreme
    Court likely would say that a transfer is a “tangible employ-
    ment action” (it is an official decision by the employer) but
    that the change is not “significant.” Grube, Williams, and
    Smart are the principal authorities on which the district
    court relied in ruling against Washington: she was moved
    from one Executive Secretary I position to another, without
    loss of pay or promotion opportunities.
    Although the anti-retaliation rule in §2000e-3(a) is
    broader than the anti-discrimination rule in §2000e-2(a) in
    the sense that it extends beyond pay and other tangible
    employment actions, nothing in §2000e-3(a) says or even
    hints that the significance or materiality requirement has
    6                                              No. 03-3818
    been dispensed with. Retaliation is a kind of “discrimina-
    tion” under Title VII, and the Supreme Court has treated
    materiality or significance as integral to “discrimination”
    rather than to anything that §2000e-2(a) has and §2000e-
    3(a) lacks. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 
    231 F.3d 1080
    ,
    1086 (7th Cir. 2000), and Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 
    203 F.3d 1021
    , 1023 (7th Cir. 2000), say, or at least assume, that
    if the supposedly retaliatory acts occurred at work, the
    court asks whether the employer’s action is severe
    enough to be an “adverse employment action.” Likewise if
    failure to smile at work would not be a form of discrimina-
    tion (because not a severe or pervasive change in working
    conditions), so too a failure to smile after work (say, when
    the supervisor meets an employee at school or church) could
    not be deemed discriminatory, and thus could not be a form
    of forbidden retaliation.
    The materiality requirement is built into the word “dis-
    crimination” and thus must apply to the anti-retaliation
    rule in §2000e-3(a), whether the supposedly retaliatory acts
    occur in or out of the workplace. Now “material” is one of
    those protean words that resists further definition. This
    holds open some potential to say that an act that would be
    immaterial in some situations is material in others. For
    example, suppose that the employee’s charge of discrimina-
    tion is designed to obtain a $10,000 annual raise. Moving
    that employee in response from a 100-square-foot cubicle to
    a 70-square-foot one, or to one with a metal rather than a
    wooden desk, would not be a material change in the condi-
    tions of employment, because petty bureaucratic nastiness
    does not dissuade a reasonable person from seeking a
    substantial increase in income. If instead of seeking money
    for himself the employee supported a colleague’s charge of
    discrimination, however, this sort of response might induce
    the employee to withhold support; it takes less to deter an
    altruistic act than to deter a self-interested one. As we
    remarked in Herrnreiter, 
    315 F.3d at 746
    , the sort of
    No. 03-3818                                                7
    response deemed immaterial to self-interested charges
    could be material to others, and thus could be deemed
    discriminatory. But as in Herrnreiter it is unnecessary to
    pursue this possibility further; Washington’s charge of
    discrimination was self-interested rather than altruistic,
    and though she did not file it to improve her financial lot
    she does not contend that this should matter.
    To recapitulate: “discrimination” entails a requirement
    that the employer’s challenged action would have been
    material to a reasonable employee, which means that
    the same requirement applies to §2000e-3(a), the anti-
    retaliation clause, as well as the other provisions in Title
    VII that use the word “discrimination.” An employer’s
    action is not material under §2000e-3(a) if it would not have
    dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
    a charge of discrimination. By and large a reassignment
    that does not affect pay or promotion opportunities lacks
    this potential to dissuade and thus is not actionable. But
    “by and large” differs from “never.”
    Suppose an employer knows that a particular worker has
    a nervous condition or hearing problem that makes him
    miserable when exposed to music for extended periods.
    Many people find music soothing and welcome its addi-
    tion to the workplace. But if an employer sought to retaliate
    for a charge of discrimination by exploiting this vulnerabil-
    ity, moving him from a quiet office to one where Muzak
    plays constantly, that could be a material change if not,
    indeed, a constructive discharge, even under the high
    standard of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 
    542 U.S. 129
     (2004). Catbert, the Evil Director of Human Resources
    in the comic strip Dilbert, delights in pouncing on employ-
    ees’ idiosyncratic vulnerabilities. Perverse cleverness that
    is funny when limited to newsprint readily could be seen as
    discrimination when used to discomfit real people.
    This record suggests that the Illinois Department of
    Revenue may have a Catbert in its management, seeking
    8                                                No. 03-3818
    out devices that would be harmless to most people but
    do real damage to select targets. What Washington
    alleges—that her job was abolished and that she was then
    placed in a “new” Executive Secretary I position—would for
    most people be no different from a change of supervisors, a
    step that would not be discriminatory under Ellerth and the
    Supreme Court’s other decisions. But because Washington
    was assigned to a “new position” rather than just a new
    supervisor, she had to reapply for a flex-time schedule. The
    approval she had received in 1984 covered only her “old”
    position, and the Department insisted that she work a
    normal 9-to-5 schedule at her “new” job. What the Depart-
    ment effectively did, then, was assign her a new supervisor
    and change her hours. Again this would not be materially
    adverse for a normal employee—but Washington was not a
    normal employee, and Catbert knew it. She has a vulnera-
    bility: her son’s medical condition. Working 9-to-5 was a
    materially adverse change for her, even though it would not
    have been for 99% of the staff. In practical effect the change
    cut her wages by 25%, because it induced her to use leave
    for two hours per day (her salary remained the same,
    but her vacation and sick leave drained away, which is
    an effective reduction in salary). When her leave ran out,
    her pay fell to zero for five months, until she found a
    supervisor willing to let her go at 3.
    At this stage of the litigation a court must indulge all
    reasonable inferences in Washington’s favor. A jury could
    find that the Department set out to exploit a known vulner-
    ability and did so in a way that caused a significant (and
    hence an actionable) loss. To say this is not to say that
    Washington necessarily has a good claim. Perhaps
    she responded unreasonably to the change in hours; if
    she had other options to care for her son without an (effec-
    tive) reduction in pay, then the change in working hours
    would not be material. Or perhaps the Department may be
    able to show that it had a non-retaliatory justification.
    No. 03-3818                                                 9
    Suppose, for example, that little work was available for
    Washington to do during the hours of 7 to 9 a.m., before
    others arrived, and that the time between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.
    (six hours less a lunch break) was not enough to handle the
    office’s business, so that Washington left work for others to
    finish. That would be a nondiscriminatory reason for
    moving Washington to a different post and changing her
    schedule. Perhaps other considerations supported the
    change; or perhaps whoever was responsible did not know
    of Washington’s family situation. (There is no statutory
    obligation to seek out idiosyncratic vulnerabilities and avoid
    taking steps that cause injury; §2000e-3(a) is not an
    accommodation requirement. See Brown, 
    199 F.3d at 457
    .
    An employer that is oblivious to the costs its decisions
    create cannot be using these costs to retaliate.) Assessment
    of these possibilities lies ahead. The district court’s judg-
    ment is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—8-22-05