Murphy, Vicki v. Astrue, Michael J. ( 2007 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-2422
    VICKI MURPHY, on behalf of
    NATHAN MURPHY, a minor,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,1
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 05-C-3044—Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2007—DECIDED JULY 13, 2007
    ____________
    Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Nathan Murphy, a minor,
    applied for Supplemental Security Income after being
    diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
    (ADHD). Although the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
    found that Nathan exhibited marked difficulty in one
    domain of functioning, the ALJ denied benefits because
    impairment in two domains is required to qualify for
    1
    Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Michael J. Astrue is substi-
    tuted for his predecessor, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, as Commissioner
    of Social Security.
    2                                             No. 06-2422
    coverage. In reaching his decision, the ALJ relied in part
    on documents he obtained from Nathan’s school after the
    administrative hearing. A psychologist selected by the
    ALJ testified at the hearing and specifically said he
    would need the school documents to come to a conclusion
    regarding Nathan’s disability, yet the ALJ did not contact
    the psychologist after receiving those documents. The ALJ
    also discounted, without explanation, information in the
    school documents that supports a conclusion that Nathan
    is disabled. As a result, the ALJ’s decision was not sup-
    ported by substantial evidence, and so we remand for
    further proceedings.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Nathan was eleven years old and in the fifth grade at
    the time of his March 2004 hearing before the ALJ.
    Doctors had diagnosed him with ADHD in 2000 and with
    bipolar disorder in 2002. Before the hearing the ALJ
    reviewed Nathan’s medical record, which included assess-
    ments of his condition and behavior from doctors and
    social workers. Nathan testified at the hearing, as did his
    mother and stepfather. Dr. Kenneth Kessler, a clinical
    psychologist who had reviewed Nathan’s medical record,
    also appeared at the request of the ALJ and provided
    expert testimony.
    Nathan, his mother, and his stepfather testified about
    Nathan’s day-to-day moods and behavior, focusing primar-
    ily on his inattentiveness and violent outbursts. Dr. Kes-
    sler confirmed that Nathan exhibited a marked limitation
    in the domain of “interacting and relating to others,” and
    the psychologist also said Nathan did not have similar
    limitations in another four of the six relevant domains.
    The ALJ accepted these conclusions. Dr. Kessler, however,
    was unable to reach a conclusion concerning the final
    domain of “attending and completing tasks.” He testified
    No. 06-2422                                              3
    that the evidence suggested that Nathan did have a
    marked limitation in this domain before he started
    receiving treatment in 2000, but the available information
    was inadequate to determine whether Nathan still suf-
    fered from that limitation. He indicated that recent
    behavioral evaluations from Nathan’s school would likely
    clarify the question. The hearing concluded with
    Mrs. Murphy agreeing that the ALJ would ask the school
    to complete and forward a behavioral assessment. The ALJ
    also told Mrs. Murphy and Nathan’s counsel that he
    hoped that after receiving this assessment he “[could]
    make a decision based on that.”
    Later the ALJ supplemented the administrative record
    with what appears to be the behavioral assessment (the
    document is dated just a few days after the hearing) as
    well as additional documents from Nathan’s school: a
    Vanderbilt Teacher Behavior Evaluation Scale completed
    just before the hearing, Individualized Education Program
    progress reports from 2003 to 2004, and scores from
    academic achievement tests taken by Nathan between
    2000 and 2003. Except for the test scores, these records
    mainly included surveys by Nathan’s teachers document-
    ing his behavioral tendencies and classroom performance.
    After reviewing these documents, without the benefit of
    Dr. Kessler’s expert opinion on the additional information,
    the ALJ ruled that Nathan did not have a marked impair-
    ment in the domain of “attending and completing tasks.”
    That finding alone made Nathan ineligible for benefits,
    but the ALJ went further and concluded that Nathan’s
    mother and stepfather were not fully credible because
    “their complaints were not entirely consistent with the
    other substantial evidence of record.” The ALJ also noted
    evidence that Mrs. Murphy chose to pursue Supplemental
    Security Income only after she failed to secure child
    support from Nathan’s biological father.
    4                                              No. 06-2422
    The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s
    decision, making that ruling the final decision of the
    Commissioner. Mrs. Murphy sought judicial review on
    Nathan’s behalf, and when the district court upheld the
    denial of benefits, she appealed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. The Legal Framework
    Where, as here, the Appeals Council denies a claimant’s
    request for review, the ALJ’s ruling becomes the final
    decision of the Commissioner. Skarbek v. Barnhart, 
    390 F.3d 500
    , 503 (7th Cir. 2004). We will uphold that decision
    if it is supported by substantial evidence, meaning evi-
    dence a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
    support the decision. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 
    454 F.3d 731
    ,
    734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Skarbek, 
    390 F.3d at 503
    .
    A child is disabled within the meaning of the Social
    Security Act if he has a “physical or mental impairment,
    which results in marked and severe functional limitations,
    and . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
    continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). Whether a child meets this definition
    is determined via a multi-step inquiry. 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.924
    (a); Giles ex rel. Giles v. Astrue, 
    483 F.3d 483
    ,
    486-87 (7th Cir. 2007). First, if the child is engaged in
    substantial gainful activity, his claim will be denied. Giles
    ex rel. Giles, 
    483 F.3d at 486
    . Second, if he does not have
    a medically severe impairment or combination of impair-
    ments, his claim will be denied. 
    Id.
     Third, the child’s claim
    will be denied unless his impairment meets, or is medically
    or functionally equivalent to, one of the listings of impair-
    ments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 
    Id. at 486-87
    ;
    
    20 C.F.R. § 416.902
    .
    No. 06-2422                                                 5
    To determine whether an impairment is the functional
    equivalent of a listing, an ALJ evaluates its severity in six
    domains: 1) acquiring and using information, 2) attending
    and completing tasks, 3) interacting and relating with
    others, 4) moving about and manipulating objects, 5)
    caring for oneself, and 6) health and physical well-being.
    
    20 C.F.R. § 416
    .926a(a), (b)(1). Functional equivalence
    exists, and a child qualifies for benefits, if the ALJ finds a
    marked difficulty in two domains of functioning or an
    extreme limitation in one. 
    Id.
     § 416.926a(a). The ALJ here
    concluded that Nathan had marked difficulty in a single
    domain, and therefore did not qualify for Supplemental
    Security Income.
    B. The ALJ Was Qualified to Interpret the School Records
    Without Expert Assistance
    Mrs. Murphy first argues that the ALJ erred in evaluat-
    ing medical evidence without consulting an expert. Specifi-
    cally, she contends that documents obtained from Nathan’s
    school after the administrative hearing contained medical
    information that the ALJ should not have interpreted
    without Dr. Kessler’s assistance. She insists that those
    documents, if subject to expert analysis, could prove a
    marked difficulty in the “attending and completing tasks”
    domain, and that by interpreting the documents without
    expert assistance, the ALJ failed to adequately develop
    the record and support his ruling.
    We have recognized that an ALJ cannot play the role of
    doctor and interpret medical evidence when he or she is
    not qualified to do so. See Rohan v. Chater, 
    98 F.3d 966
    ,
    970 (7th Cir. 1996); Schmidt v. Sullivan, 
    914 F.2d 117
    , 118
    (7th Cir. 1990). And we have explained that an ALJ cannot
    disregard medical evidence simply because it is at odds
    with the ALJ’s own unqualified opinion. See Barnett v.
    Barnhart, 
    381 F.3d 664
    , 669 (7th Cir. 2004); Golembiewski
    6                                               No. 06-2422
    v. Barnhart, 
    322 F.3d 912
    , 917 (7th Cir. 2003); Rohan, 
    98 F.3d at 970-71
    ; Wilder v. Chater, 
    64 F.3d 335
    , 337 (7th Cir.
    1995). However, here we reject Mrs. Murphy’s argument
    that the school documents received by the ALJ are “medi-
    cal” records that triggered an obligation of the ALJ to
    contact Dr. Kessler. The Social Security Administration
    distinguishes medical evidence (that derived from clinical
    and laboratory diagnostic techniques used to indicate
    physiological, psychological, or anatomical abnormalities)
    from general observations of daily behavior and restric-
    tions that might result from a medical condition. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912
    (b), 416.928(b)-(c). Sources of medical
    evidence include psychologists or, in some limited in-
    stances, “licensed or certified individuals with other
    titles who perform the same function as a school psycho-
    logist in a school setting . . . .” 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.913
    (a).
    Given these limitations on the scope and source of
    medical evidence as defined by the agency, we do not agree
    that a teacher’s description of a child’s daily behavior
    qualifies as medical evidence. In fact, § 416.913 specifically
    distinguishes educational personnel from medical sources.
    See Branum v. Barnhart, 
    385 F.3d 1268
    , 1272 (10th Cir.
    2004) (holding that records from behavioral health center
    were not compiled by physician and thus were not
    medical evidence). The documents received from Nathan’s
    school after the administrative hearing were lay descrip-
    tions of readily observable, everyday behaviors. Under the
    regulations, such descriptions are not medical evidence,
    and Mrs. Murphy has provided no basis for finding other-
    wise. So, we conclude that the ALJ was qualified to re-
    view those documents without assistance.
    C. The ALJ Failed to Explain His Disregard of Pertinent
    Evidence
    We find Mrs. Murphy’s argument that the ALJ ignored
    substantial evidence in support of a finding of disability
    No. 06-2422                                               7
    more persuasive. An ALJ has a duty to fully develop
    the record before drawing any conclusions, 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.912
    (d); Flener v. Barnhart, 
    361 F.3d 442
    , 448 (7th
    Cir. 2004); Branum, 
    385 F.3d at 1271
    , and must ade-
    quately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his
    reasoning, Giles ex rel. Giles, 
    483 F.3d at 487
    ; Prochaska,
    
    454 F.3d at 735
    ; Skarbek, 
    390 F.3d at 503
    . In this case the
    ALJ did not explain why he gave no weight to the portions
    of the school documents which support a finding that
    Nathan is disabled. The records indicate that Nathan
    was having difficulty completing his work because of
    deficits in attention span, concentration, and on-task
    behavior. He was losing things, working very slowly,
    struggling to finish assignments, and turning in incom-
    plete work. Often he failed to pay attention to details
    and avoided or struggled with tasks requiring sustained
    mental effort. The ALJ did little to counter this evidence.
    He noted only that the school documents reflected that
    Nathan did not talk excessively, did not interrupt or
    intrude, did not move about unexpectedly, knew the
    answers to questions when called upon, was cooperative,
    had a good sense of humor, tried to follow rules, and
    wanted to do well in his studies. These traits may well
    be accolades for Nathan, but the ALJ did not explain
    how or why they trump the evidence of his inability to
    attend and complete tasks. See Giles ex rel. Giles, 
    483 F.3d at 488
    ; Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 
    458 F.3d 580
    , 583-84 (7th
    Cir. 2006).
    Dr. Kessler testified that at one time Nathan had a
    marked difficulty attending and completing tasks. The ALJ
    should have supplied Dr. Kessler with the school records
    and allowed him to give a medical opinion as to whether
    this deficit persists. Instead, Dr. Kessler was not able to
    address the inconsistencies in the record and to form an
    opinion on the dispositive question in the case. Contacting
    Dr. Kessler a second time would have been the best
    8                                               No. 06-2422
    way for the ALJ to complete the administrative record and
    adequately support his decision, even if agency regula-
    tions did not compel him to do so. However, the ALJ
    skipped this last significant step and failed to sufficiently
    explain his disregard of evidence suggesting disability. As
    a result, a reasonable person could not accept his reason-
    ing as adequate to support the decision. Giles ex rel. Giles,
    
    483 F.3d at 487-88
    ; Prochaska, 
    454 F.3d at 734-35
    .
    This conclusion is distinguishable from our decision in
    Flener, in which the claimant argued that the ALJ failed
    to develop the record and did not adequately support his
    conclusion because he did not contact an expert to statisti-
    cally compare the results of the claimant’s behavioral
    studies to the general population. 
    361 F.3d at 448-49
    .
    There, we determined that the ALJ did not need to conduct
    additional investigation into the results of the studies
    because he relied on the medical conclusions of experts
    who reviewed the behavioral studies and determined that
    the claimant was not disabled. Here, in contrast, the
    medical expert had insufficient evidence to reach a conclu-
    sion regarding disability, and the ALJ disregarded evi-
    dence of Nathan’s disability without identifying any
    support for his conclusion.
    D. The ALJ’s Credibility Determinations Were Not Sup-
    ported by the Record
    Mrs. Murphy also argues that the ALJ erred in not
    fully crediting her testimony and the testimony of Na-
    than’s stepfather. Generally, the ALJ is in the best posi-
    tion to determine credibility, Barnett, 
    381 F.3d at 670
    ;
    Prochaska, 
    454 F.3d at 738
    , and if an ALJ gives specific
    reasons that are supported by the record, his or her
    determination will stand, Barnett, 
    381 F.3d at 668
    ;
    Golembiewski, 
    322 F.3d at 915
    . In this case, however, the
    ALJ’s credibility finding is intertwined with the same gaps
    No. 06-2422                                              9
    in the record and reasoning that require us to vacate his
    determination of Nathan’s disability. The ALJ noted,
    without elaboration, that the family’s observations of
    Nathan’s aggression and inattentiveness did not align
    with more positive observations by school officials. But it
    was these school observations, sometimes supporting a
    finding of disability, that the ALJ disregarded without
    explanation and that must be further examined upon
    remand. The testimony of Nathan’s mother and stepfather
    must also be reexamined in light of a proper treatment of
    the school’s observations, to see if there truly are any
    contradictions. Without an adequate examination of the
    school documents, a finding that the parents’ testimony
    contradicts those documents is not supported by the
    record.
    E. We Need Not Resolve Whether HALLEX Required an
    Expert Opinion on Nathan’s School Records
    Finally, Mrs. Murphy contends that § I-2-7-30 of the
    Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX),
    promulgated by the Social Security Administration Office
    of Disability Adjudication and Review, required the ALJ to
    re-contact Dr. Kessler in this circumstance. The Commis-
    sioner argues that Mrs. Murphy waived this argument,
    but our disposition in this case makes it unnecessary to
    resolve this issue.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The decision of the district court is VACATED, and the
    case is REMANDED to the Social Security Administration
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    10                                       No. 06-2422
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-13-07