Patel, Shehzad Q. v. Kiesler, Peter D. ( 2007 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-3077
    SHEHZAD QAMARUDDIN PATEL,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
    Respondent.
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A95 925 155
    ____________
    ARGUED JULY 10, 2007—DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2007
    ____________
    Before BAUER, CUDAHY, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
    CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. When Shehzad Patel failed
    to appear at a hearing scheduled in his removal proceed-
    ings, the immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered him removed
    in absentia. Patel faults his original attorney, who, he
    asserts, assured him that his absence would be excused.
    Patel retained new counsel to file a motion to reopen on
    his behalf; the motion was denied. On the eve of his
    removal, he retained yet another attorney and filed a
    second motion to reopen, asserting for the first time that
    his previous attorneys were ineffective. The Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that Patel had not
    complied with its procedural prerequisites for claiming
    ineffective assistance of counsel, see In re Lozada, 19 I. &
    2                                             No. 06-3077
    N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and denied the motion. Because
    the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the second
    motion to reopen, we deny the petition for review.
    I. Background
    Patel is a citizen of Pakistan who overstayed his visa
    in 1996. The Department of Homeland Security initiated
    removal proceedings against him in 2003, and over the
    next twelve months, Patel attended a series of hearings
    with his attorney, Marshall Hong, at which he conceded
    removeability but sought to adjust his status based on an
    approved application for labor certification. Before each
    hearing Patel was sent a notice to appear warning him
    that he could be removed from the United States if he
    failed to attend. The notices stated that his attendance
    would be excused only in “exceptional circumstances,” such
    as the “death of an immediate relative.”
    When Patel failed to attend his master calendar hear-
    ing on October 28, 2004, the IJ ordered him removed in
    absentia. Patel then received notice in December 2004
    that he was scheduled to be removed in March 2005. Patel
    retained two new attorneys, Susan Fortino-Brown and
    Alexandra Baranyk, who in February 2005 filed with the
    IJ a motion to reopen and rescind the in absentia removal
    order. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). They asserted that
    Patel skipped the hearing in Chicago to visit a dying
    friend in Dallas, Texas, and noted that the BIA has held
    that a close family member’s illness may justify an alien’s
    failure to attend a hearing. They argued that Patel
    considered his friend to be a “second mother” and so his
    absence should be excused. The IJ denied the motion, and
    in September 2005 the BIA affirmed. On March 17, 2006,
    Patel received notice that he was scheduled for removal
    on April 11, 2006.
    No. 06-3077                                              3
    On April 10—the day before his scheduled removal—
    Patel’s current attorney, Raymond Sanders, filed the
    current motion to reopen with the BIA, arguing that all
    three of Patel’s prior attorneys were ineffective. He
    attached to the motion two complaints that he had filed on
    April 6 with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disci-
    plinary Committee (“ARDC”) (technically, the ARDC calls
    these “requests for investigation”); the first was directed
    against Hong and the second against Fortino-Brown and
    Baranyk. In the first complaint Patel accused Hong of
    assuring him that the IJ would grant a continuance if he
    skipped the hearing, and of failing to file a motion to
    reopen as promised after the IJ ordered Patel’s removal. In
    the second complaint Patel claimed that Fortino-Brown
    and Baranyk were ineffective for failing to alert the BIA
    to “Hong’s malfeasance.”
    The BIA denied the second motion to reopen because it
    found that Patel had not complied with the Lozada
    procedural requirements for basing a motion to reopen on
    allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under
    Lozada the motion must include (1) an affidavit from the
    alien attesting to the relevant facts and setting forth a
    detailed account of the actions counsel agreed to take on
    his behalf, (2) evidence that former counsel was informed
    of the allegations and given the opportunity to respond,
    and (3) an explanation of whether the alien filed a com-
    plaint with appropriate disciplinary authorities and if
    not, why not. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. The BIA found that
    Patel had met neither the first requirement—his affidavit
    did not allow the BIA to “ascertain the scope of the work”
    that his prior attorneys had agreed to do—nor the
    second—there was no evidence that he notified the attor-
    neys of his allegations.
    Patel attached to his opening brief to this court Hong’s
    response to his ARDC complaint. At no time did Patel give
    that response to the BIA, so it is not part of the adminis-
    4                                              No. 06-3077
    trative record, and Patel’s inclusion of the response in his
    brief is improper. Regardless, Hong’s response undercuts
    Patel’s contention that he was the victim of deficient
    performance by Hong. According to Hong, Patel said he
    wanted to skip the October 2004 hearing to visit a
    sick uncle, not a dying friend. By his account, Hong
    repeatedly told Patel to attend the October 2004 hearing.
    After the IJ entered the removal order, Hong told Patel
    that he would file a motion to reopen only if Patel provided
    a physician’s letter or death certificate showing that
    his uncle had died and documents establishing a family
    relationship. Patel failed to produce these documents, so
    Hong told him in December 2004 that he would not file
    a motion to reopen. Hong did not hear from Patel again
    until March 20, 2006, three days after Patel received
    notice of his imminent removal. On that day, Patel came
    to Hong’s office and said that attorney Royal Berg had
    informed him that he would be deported unless Hong
    filed an affidavit with the BIA accepting responsibility
    for Patel’s failure to attend the hearing. According to
    Hong, Patel even admitted telling Berg that Hong had
    advised him against skipping the hearing, and he offered
    Hong money to sign the affidavit Patel already had
    prepared. When Hong refused, Patel threatened to file
    an ARDC complaint.
    Patel also attached to his opening brief Fortino-Brown’s
    response to his ARDC complaint. Once again, this docu-
    ment was never given to the BIA, is not part of the admin-
    istrative record, and is not properly included in Patel’s
    brief. In her response, Fortino-Brown asserts that she
    did not argue in her motion to reopen that Hong was
    ineffective because after investigating she determined
    that his conduct had been “entirely proper.”
    No. 06-3077                                               5
    II. Discussion
    Patel argues that the BIA should have been more flexible
    in applying Lozada, and asserts that his affidavits in
    support of his ARDC complaints, which he attached to the
    motion to reopen, fulfill the Lozada prerequisites. We
    review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse
    of discretion. Gomes v. Gonzales, 
    473 F.3d 746
    , 752 (7th
    Cir. 2007).
    Although aliens do not have a constitutional right to
    effective counsel, we have endorsed the BIA’s decision to
    grant relief where, in its discretion, the BIA finds that an
    alien’s claim has been undercut by bad lawyering. See
    Magala v. Gonzales, 
    434 F.3d 523
    , 525-26 (7th Cir. 2005);
    Stroe v. INS, 
    256 F.3d 498
    , 501 (7th Cir. 2001). The
    BIA established the Lozada requirements to filter out
    strategic claims of ineffective assistance, which often are
    filed for the purposes of delay. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec.
    at 639; Stroe, 
    256 F.3d at 501
    . The Lozada requirements
    reduce the potential for abuse by providing information
    from which the BIA can assess whether an ineffective
    assistance claim has enough substance to warrant the
    time and resources necessary to resolve the claim on its
    merits. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639.
    The BIA is free to deny motions to reopen for failure to
    comply with Lozada as long as it does not act arbitrarily.
    See Zeng v. Gonzales, 
    436 F.3d 26
    , 31 (1st Cir. 2006). We
    have not expressly decided whether the BIA abuses its
    discretion by requiring strict compliance with Lozada, but
    several circuits have held that aliens only need to show
    substantial compliance. See, e.g., Yang v. Gonzales, 
    478 F.3d 133
    , 142-43 (2d Cir. 2007); Habachy v. Gonzales, 
    471 F.3d 858
    , 864 (8th Cir. 2006); Lu v. Ashcroft, 
    259 F.3d 127
    ,
    133 (3d Cir. 2001). But because Patel did not fulfill two
    of the three Lozada requirements, he has not shown
    even substantial compliance. See Barry v. Gonzales, 445
    6                                              No. 06-
    3077 F.3d 741
    , 746 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n alien who fails to
    satisfy any of the three Lozada requirements will rarely,
    if ever, be in substantial compliance.”).
    Lozada requires that an alien first notify former counsel
    of the allegations and give counsel an opportunity to
    respond, and then file a complaint with the appropriate
    disciplinary authorities. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. This two-
    step notification requirement is a particularly important
    screening tool because in many cases it removes the
    need for an evidentiary hearing and enables the BIA to
    resolve ineffective-assistance claims on the basis of
    documentary submissions. See In re Rivera-Claros, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 599
    , 604 (BIA 1996). By requiring the alien to
    give counsel an opportunity to respond before the motion
    to reopen is filed, Lozada discourages baseless allega-
    tions and ensures that a “ ‘mechanism exists for allowing
    former counsel, whose integrity or competence is being
    impugned, to present his version of events if he so
    chooses.’ ” Reyes v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 592
    , 599 (9th Cir.
    2004) (quoting Lozada, 19 I.& N. Dec. at 639). If former
    counsel admits to the alleged error, the inquiry ends and
    the BIA may resolve the claim on the merits. See Fadiga
    v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 05-4910, 
    2007 WL 1720048
    , at *11
    (3d Cir. June 15, 2007). But if former counsel denies the
    allegations, the alien must take the next step of either
    filing a formal complaint with the appropriate dis-
    ciplinary authority or explaining why such a complaint is
    unwarranted. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. This
    second step increases the BIA’s confidence in the claim’s
    validity, reduces the need for an evidentiary hearing,
    and helps the BIA to police the quality of the immigra-
    tion bar. See Rivera-Claros, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 605.
    Here, Patel skipped over the first notification step and
    went straight to the second, filing ARDC complaints
    against former counsel just days before he filed his second
    No. 06-3077                                               7
    motion to reopen. To explain this approach, Patel argues
    at length that his imminent removal prevented him from
    providing former counsel an opportunity to respond to
    his claims. But this explanation is at best disingenuous.
    Patel knew as early as January 2005 (when he retained
    Fortino-Brown and Baranyk) that Hong had not filed a
    motion to reopen, and he knew at least by September 2005
    (when the BIA denied the second motion to reopen) that
    Fortino-Brown and Baranyk did not raise an ineffective-
    assistance claim. Yet he did nothing to pursue the matter
    until March 2006, when he received another notice of his
    imminent removal, and only then did he retain present
    counsel to file an 11th-hour motion to reopen asserting
    that all three of his former counsel failed him. Patel never
    supplemented this motion with Hong’s and Fortino-
    Brown’s responses during the intervening three months
    before the BIA ruled. Had he done so, the BIA would
    have learned that Fortino-Brown did not believe there
    was any basis to claim that Hong was ineffective, and
    that Patel allegedly attempted to bribe Hong to sign a
    false affidavit saying he had erred and then threatened
    him when he refused.
    Having deprived the BIA of the opportunity to review the
    substance of former counsel’s responses, Patel submits
    them here to demonstrate that he fulfilled Lozada’s
    notification requirements. But because he did not submit
    them to the BIA, we cannot consider them as evidence
    of notification. See Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 
    297 F.3d 596
    ,
    599 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002). And Patel points to no evidence
    properly before the BIA that contradicts its finding that
    he did not fulfill Lozada’s notification requirements. Patel
    asserts that the affidavits he attached to his ARDC
    complaints and filed with his motion show “sufficient oral
    notification,” but the affidavits do not state that he
    expressed even dissatisfaction to his attorneys, let alone
    that he informed them of his plan to file a motion to
    8                                              No. 06-3077
    reopen based on their allegedly inept performance. He
    also relies on his present attorney’s representations to
    the BIA that he informed former counsel of the allegations,
    but as the BIA explained, such representations do not
    constitute evidence. See Singh v. INS, 
    213 F.3d 1050
    , 1054
    n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Ramirez-Sanchez, 
    17 I. & N. Dec. 503
    , 506 (BIA 1980)). Given this lack of evidence,
    the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
    Patel failed to comply with Lozada’s notification require-
    ment.
    We could deny the petition based solely on Patel’s fail-
    ure to meet one Lozada requirement, see Barry, 445 F.3d
    at 746, but here the BIA correctly found that Patel also
    failed to describe the scope of his representation agree-
    ment with his former counsel. Patel argues that the
    affidavits he submitted to the ARDC along with his
    complaints are sufficient to meet this requirement, but as
    the BIA noted, the affidavits do not reveal whether
    Fortino-Brown or Baranyk (or both) was responsible for
    his case, nor do they clarify whether Patel retained Hong
    to file a motion to reopen. The BIA’s assertion that Patel
    should have submitted the “representation agreements” is
    puzzling, because Lozada and its progeny do not sug-
    gest that an alien need submit anything more than a
    detailed affidavit. Nevertheless, the crux of the BIA’s
    finding is that Patel did not explain what actions his
    prior counsel were hired to undertake—and the record
    supports that finding. Indeed, it is unclear whether
    Patel himself knows whether all three attorneys were
    obligated to assist him—he states in his brief to this court
    that “he suffered at the hands of two (possibly three)
    attorneys.” Given this ambiguity, the BIA did not abuse its
    discretion in finding that Patel did not meet the first
    Lozada requirement.
    No. 06-3077                                             9
    III. Conclusion
    Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in conclud-
    ing that Patel did not fulfill two of the Lozada require-
    ments, we deny the petition for review.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—8-8-07