Economy Folding Box v. Anchor Frozen Foods ( 2008 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-1893
    ECONOMY FOLDING BOX CORP.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ANCHOR FROZEN FOODS CORP.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 C 4485—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2007—DECIDED JANUARY 25, 2008
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
    CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Here we have a suit for
    breach of contract by Economy Folding Box Corp. (Econ-
    omy) against Anchor Frozen Foods Corp. (Anchor). Econ-
    omy and Anchor entered into a contract wherein Econ-
    omy agreed to provide Anchor with boxes in which
    Anchor could ship frozen seafood. Economy delivered the
    first shipment of boxes and Anchor filled them with its
    product and shipped them off to its distributors. Anchor
    soon received word from its distributors that the boxes
    were falling apart. After Anchor refused to pay for the
    boxes or accept any further deliveries, Economy sued for
    2                                                   No. 07-1893
    breach of contract. Following a two-day bench trial, the
    district court found that Anchor properly revoked its
    acceptance of the first shipment and that it had a right
    to cancel the contract. The court entered judgment in
    Anchor’s favor. We affirm.
    I. Background
    Prior to the transaction at issue, Anchor regularly
    ordered boxes from Economy.1 Early in 2004, Anchor
    asked Economy to design a new packaging system that
    would consist of six inner boxes of frozen seafood con-
    tained in a single outer box. Anchor planned to sell these
    “six-packs” to distributors for resale to customers. The
    outer box was to be the shipping carton and needed to
    be sturdy enough to withstand being stacked on pallets
    and shipped on freezer trucks to distributors. Ken Green,
    Economy’s sales representative, assured Anchor that the
    outer box Economy designed would be freezer-worthy and
    would withstand being palletized. When samples of the
    inner and outer boxes were ready, Economy sent them to
    Anchor. Anchor’s president, Roy Tucillo, tested the boxes
    by filling them with frozen seafood and freezing them
    for a week. Anchor approved the samples and ordered
    180,000 inner cartons and 30,000 outer cartons from
    Economy. That order could be increased or decreased up
    to 20% based on overrun or underrun of boxes by Economy.
    In the spring of 2004, Economy sent Anchor a shipment
    of 6,300 outer boxes and 36,800 inner boxes. Anchor
    accepted those boxes and Economy issued an invoice for
    204,000 inner boxes and 34,000 outer boxes on or about
    April 14, 2004. Approximately two weeks later, Economy
    issued an invoice for the remainder of the boxes.
    1
    As neither party disputes the trial court’s findings of fact, we
    rely on them in recounting the events giving rise to this appeal.
    No. 07-1893                                             3
    After receiving the first delivery of boxes, Anchor sent
    shipments of frozen food in the new boxes to two of its
    distributors, Colorado Choice Distributors (Colorado
    Choice) and American Gold Label (American Gold).
    Approximately two and a half weeks later, Anchor began
    receiving complaints from Jay Raulerson at Colorado
    Choice that the outer boxes were splitting open and
    collapsing at some of Colorado Choice’s cold storage
    facilities. Raulerson told Anchor not to send any more
    shipments in those boxes. Tucillo asked Raulerson to
    put his complaints in writing. On May 28, 2004, Economy
    asked Anchor to pay the two outstanding invoices for
    the boxes, and that same day, Anchor sent Economy a
    written rejection of the boxes. Tucillo subsequently
    received a written complaint from Raulerson describing
    the problem with the boxes and a facsimile from American
    Gold conveying a similar complaint. Anchor forwarded
    these complaints to Economy. Throughout June, the
    parties had conversations and exchanged letters about the
    allegedly defective boxes. However, they were unable to
    resolve the problem. On July 7, 2004, Economy filed
    suit against Anchor for breach of contract and account
    stated. In its answer, Anchor asserted that the boxes
    were not merchantable or fit for their intended purpose
    and violated these implied warranties.
    The district court analyzed Economy’s claims under the
    Illinois version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
    and found that, although Anchor accepted the boxes, it
    properly revoked its acceptance under 810 ILCS 5/2-608
    after learning of the boxes’ defects. The court also con-
    cluded that Anchor had proven its defense of breach of an
    implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under
    810 ILCS 5/2-315 and entered judgment in Anchor’s favor.
    Economy appeals the district court’s decision, arguing
    that it erred in failing to analyze the contract under
    810 ILCS 5/2-612, which applies to installment contracts.
    4                                               No. 07-1893
    II. Discussion
    We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo
    and its findings of fact and application of law to fact for
    clear error. Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., 
    419 F.3d 626
    , 634 (7th
    Cir. 2005). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when
    the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Gaffney v.
    Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 
    451 F.3d 424
    , 447 (7th Cir.
    2006) (citation omitted).
    Economy argues that the district court erred in analyz-
    ing the contract as a single delivery contract rather than
    as an installment contract under 810 ILCS 5/2-612.
    Unfortunately for Economy, it did not raise this argu-
    ment before the district court and, as we have long held,
    “[i]t is axiomatic that an issue not first presented to the
    district court may not be raised before the appellate
    court as a ground for reversal.” Christmas v. Sanders,
    
    759 F.2d 1284
    , 1291 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). See
    also Robyns v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
    130 F.3d 1231
    , 1238 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The well-established rule
    in this Circuit is that a plaintiff waives the right to
    argue an issue on appeal if she fails to raise the issue
    before a lower court.”) (citing Milwaukee Area Joint
    Apprenticeship Training Comm. v. Howell, 
    67 F.3d 1333
    ,
    1337 (7th Cir. 1995)). Economy did not discuss install-
    ment contracts or cite 810 ILCS 5/2-612 in its Trial
    Memorandum (R. 38), its Proposed Findings of Fact and
    Conclusions of Law (R. 46) or its Reply Memorandum
    (R. 51.) In fact, Economy framed its breach of contract case
    under the UCC sections that apply to single delivery
    contracts. Having asked the court to apply that law,
    Economy cannot now ask us to fault the district court for
    having done so. For “[t]o reverse the district court on
    grounds not presented to it would undermine the essential
    function of the district court.” Boyers v. Texaco Ref. &
    Mktg, Inc., 
    848 F.2d 809
    , 812 (7th Cir. 1988).
    No. 07-1893                                               5
    Economy attempts to circumvent our well-established
    waiver rule by arguing that it relied on the UCC in the
    district court proceedings, and thus it implicitly reserved
    its installment contract argument. This argument is a
    nonstarter. A plaintiff cannot rely on the entire UCC and
    leave it to the court to determine what code sections
    apply to her claim. It is not the court’s responsibility to
    research the law and construct the parties’ arguments
    for them. See APS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time,
    Inc., 
    299 F.3d 624
    , 631 (7th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Casio
    PhoneMate, Inc., 
    105 F. Supp.2d 858
    , 874 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
    (“The court will not construct defendant’s argument
    for it.”). Economy also points out that in its Trial Brief
    and Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-
    clusions of Law, Anchor quoted 810 ILCS 5/2-601, which
    defines a buyer’s right to reject non-conforming goods
    and states that it is “[s]ubject to the provisions of this
    Article on breach in installment contracts (Section 2-612).”
    Economy contends that because Anchor quoted a section
    of the UCC that references 810 ILCS 5/2-612, the install-
    ment contract issue was raised before the district court.
    This argument is unavailing as well. Economy’s analysis
    of its claims was under the single delivery sections of
    the UCC. It is the parties’ responsibility to allege facts
    and “indicate their relevance under the correct legal
    standard.” APS Sports Collectibles, 
    299 F.3d at 631
    .
    Economy alleged facts and indicated their relevance
    under the single delivery contract provisions of the UCC
    and must accept the consequences of that decision.
    Having determined that Economy did not raise its
    installment contract argument before the district court,
    we note that the rule against considering new argu-
    ments on appeal is subject to certain limited exceptions,
    such as “where jurisdictional questions are presented or
    where, in exceptional cases, justice demands more flexibil-
    ity.” Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 
    547 F.2d 1329
    ,
    6                                             No. 07-1893
    1333 (7th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). This case does
    not implicate those limited exceptions, however, and we
    find that Economy has waived its installment contract
    argument.
    Economy also argues that it had a right to cure any
    defects before Anchor could lawfully reject the first
    installment of boxes or cancel the contract. In the deci-
    sion below, the district court did not make a finding
    whether the defect in the outer box was curable or wheth-
    er Economy had an opportunity to cure. The court ap-
    plied 810 ILCS 5/2-608, which provides that a buyer can
    revoke acceptance of a delivery of non-conforming goods
    if he “accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that
    its non-conformity would be cured and it has not been
    seasonably cured; or (b) without discovery of such non-
    conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced
    either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or
    by the seller’s assurances.” A small number of courts
    have found that a seller who accepts goods without
    knowing they are non-conforming and later discovers
    the defect must give the seller a chance to cure before
    revoking acceptance. See 18 Richard A. Lord, Williston on
    Contracts, § 52:25 (4th ed. 2004). However, most courts
    “have concluded that the seller’s right to cure does not
    apply to situations in which the buyer revokes accept-
    ance based on a subsequently discovered defect.” Id.
    (citation omitted). Noting that there is no dispositive
    Illinois case on the issue, the district court found that
    since 810 ILCS 5/2-608 does not expressly provide a
    seller a right to cure prior to a buyer’s revocation of
    acceptance, Economy had no right to cure under that
    section. Economy does not challenge the district court’s
    conclusion. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for Economy
    conceded that the district court’s analysis was correct
    and asserted that the court’s only error was in not ap-
    plying 810 ILCS 5/2-612, which does provide a seller with a
    No. 07-1893                                                7
    right to cure before a buyer can reject an installment.
    Because Economy did not argue before the district court
    that it had a right to cure under 810 ILCS 5/2-612, and
    because it does not challenge the district court’s conclusion
    that there is no right to cure under 810 ILCS 5/2-608,
    Economy has waived its cure argument as well.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    judgment in favor of Anchor.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—1-25-08