Alvarez-Guardia, How v. Mukasey, Michael B. ( 2008 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-2487
    HOWARD H. ALVAREZ GUARDIA and
    ISABEL C. MONTESINOS BALLESTEROS,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General
    of the United States,
    Respondent.
    ____________
    Petitions for Review of an Order of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    Nos. A97 597 128 & No. A97 597 129
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 2, 2008—DECIDED MAY 2, 2008
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EVANS,
    Circuit Judges.
    EVANS, Circuit Judge. Howard Hildemar Alvarez Guardia
    and his wife Isabel Cleotilde Montesinos Ballesteros
    petition for review of a final order of the Board of Immi-
    gration Appeals, which affirmed a final order of removal.
    The petitioners are reasonably well-to-do citizens of
    Venezuela, who lived in Caracas. After previous sepa-
    rate visits to the United States—Ballesteros spent a
    2                                              No. 07-2487
    week here (we don’t know where) in October of 2001, and
    Alvarez, a month later, spent a week vacationing in
    Miami—both returned to their home in Caracas. They
    came here again, this time together, on February 16,
    2002, on a 6-month visa that allowed them to stay until
    August 15, 2002. Although August 15, 2002, came and
    went, the petitioners didn’t do the latter: they overstayed
    their visa and, 14 months later, on October 22, 2003,
    filed an application for asylum. This was followed,
    2 months later, by their receipt of a Notice to Appear
    filed by the Department of Homeland Security (the suc-
    cessor to the old Immigration and Naturalization Service)
    which required their presence before an immigration
    judge to show cause why they should not be ordered
    removed from the country. The “political situation” in
    Venezuela, say the petitioners, motivated their desire not
    to return there, so a brief look back at that “situation,”
    which for our purposes began in the early 1990s, is in
    order.
    After staging an unsuccessful coup d’etat in 1992 and
    spending two years in prison as a result, Hugo Chavez
    was elected President of Venezuela in 1998. In 2001,
    Chavez formed a group called the Bolivarian Circles; by
    2002, its membership was estimated to be 700,000. Mem-
    bers of the organization allegedly verbally and physically
    attack opponents of the President. They also break up anti-
    Chavez marches. The petitioners said they joined three
    such opposition marches during 2001 and 2002. In addi-
    tion, the petitioners were supporters of Accion
    Democratica, the principal party in opposition to President
    Chavez in the Venezuelan Assembly. The petitioners
    themselves are not “card carrying” members of the party,
    though Mr. Alvarez’s grandparents are.
    No. 07-2487                                                 3
    The petitioners tell of a time, on February 2, 2002, when
    they were attacked by members of the Bolivarian Circles,
    who tried to flip over the taxi in which they were riding.
    Mr. Alvarez got out of the taxi to ask the attackers to let
    them pass. Instead, he was beaten so badly that he could
    not work for two weeks. He filed a police report and was
    referred for medical treatment. Soon after the attack the
    petitioners left Venezuela and came to the United States.
    They arrived, as we said, on February 16, 2002.
    The application for asylum, filed on October 22, 2003,
    was untimely. Under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B), an alien
    must establish “by clear and convincing evidence that
    the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of
    the alien’s arrival in the United States.” Petitioners at-
    tempted to fit within possible exceptions to the one-year
    deadline, but they have now acknowledged that our
    decision in Jimenez Viracacha v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 388
     (7th
    Cir. 2008), precludes the claim, and they are no longer
    pursuing it.
    Petitioners also sought withholding of removal, a claim
    respondent argues is waived on appeal. The primary
    focus of petitioners’ main brief, which was filed before
    our decision in Viracacha, was on the asylum application.
    The respondent argues that, by their failure to argue that
    they are also entitled to withholding of removal, peti-
    tioners waived any appeal of the denial of that claim. See
    Huang v. Gonzales, 
    403 F.3d 945
     (7th Cir. 2005). It is a close
    question. But because the petitioners’ main brief makes
    occasional, though very perfunctory mention of with-
    holding of removal, we will consider the claim.
    When the Board of Immigration Appeals adopts the
    immigration judge’s decision while supplementing it
    with its own reasons, we review the decision of the IJ as
    4                                                 No. 07-2487
    supplemented. Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 800
     (7th Cir.
    2006). We review factual determinations under a “highly
    deferential version of the substantial evidence test . . . .”
    Karapetian v. INS, 
    162 F.3d 933
    , 936 (7th Cir. 1998).
    A withholding of removal claim is more difficult to
    sustain than a claim for asylum. To qualify for withholding
    of removal under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3), petitioners must
    establish that a “clear probability” exists that their lives
    or freedom would be threatened in Venezuela because
    of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
    ular social group, or political opinions. Tesfu v. Ashcroft,
    
    322 F.3d 477
    , 481 (7th Cir. 2003). They must prove that it
    is more likely than not that they will be subjected to
    persecution upon removal. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
     (1987).
    There are two ways to establish the claim for with-
    holding of removal. If an applicant can show that he
    suffered past persecution in the country of removal, “it
    shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or freedom
    would be threatened in the future in the country of re-
    moval . . . .” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1); Firmansjah v. Gonzales,
    
    424 F.3d 598
    , 605 (7th Cir. 2005). Failing that, an appli-
    cant may offer evidence of a clear probability of future
    persecution. BinRashed v. Gonzales, 
    502 F.3d 666
     (7th
    Cir. 2007). The IJ and the Board ruled that the peti-
    tioners failed to establish either.
    There is an absence of substantial evidence in the record
    to support a finding that the petitioners suffered past
    persecution in Venezuela because of membership in a
    particular group or because of their political opinions.
    Mr. Alvarez says he was a member of Accion Democratica,
    but he admits that he was not an active member and
    No. 07-2487                                                5
    attended meetings only when his grandparents took him
    when he was a child. He participated in two opposition
    marches, but so did thousands of other people. He admit-
    ted that he was not harmed during the marches. The
    only evidence of his ever being harmed is the taxi cab
    incident. He argues that only the higher classes take taxis
    in Venezuela, and therefore he was attacked because he
    was a member of a group with high social standing. The
    IJ rejected the contention and found that there was no
    evidence that the attack was anything other than a ran-
    dom act of violence. In fact, Mr. Alvarez admitted that
    he made a mistake in getting out of the taxi when it was
    near an ongoing demonstration being held by the
    Bolivarian Circles. The mob which attacked him did not
    seem to know who he was. Mr. Alvarez testified that he
    was attacked simply because people in the mob have
    aggressive natures and “resolve everything with fights.”
    Furthermore, the police assisted him at the scene and
    referred him for medical treatment. The evidence sup-
    ports the IJ’s finding that the incident falls short of show-
    ing past persecution.
    The claim of past persecution is further undermined
    because of petitioners’ previous return to Venezuela
    after other visits to the United States. There is nothing
    in the record which would compel us to come to a con-
    clusion contrary to that reached by the IJ and the Board.
    The Board also found that the petitioners failed to
    establish that it was more likely than not that they
    would face future persecution if they were required to
    return to Venezuela. That Mr. Alvarez voted against
    President Chavez does not show that he will suffer future
    persecution; as the IJ noted, so did three million other
    people. Nor does the simple fact that the petitioners have
    6                                                No. 07-2487
    been living in the United States establish that it is more
    likely than not that they will be persecuted if they return
    to Venezuela. The record is devoid of evidence re-
    garding the likelihood of persecution.
    The petitioners contend that the likelihood that they
    will be persecuted is heightened by the fact that their
    families began to receive telephone threats in 2005. But
    petitioners are unable to identify the source or purpose
    of the threats. A petitioner must be able to identify the
    individual or group responsible for a particular threat
    and the purpose of the threat. Further, the claim must
    rise above the level of harassment to be evidence of perse-
    cution. See Mitev v. INS, 
    67 F.3d 1325
     (7th Cir. 1995).
    Furthermore, petitioners’ parents, who are the ones
    who received the threats, continue to live in Venezuela,
    going about their normal activities with their social demo-
    cratic friends. Evidence that an applicant’s family members
    remain unharmed in their home country may support a
    finding that the applicant is unlikely to suffer future
    persecution. Ambati v. Reno, 
    233 F.3d 1054
     (7th Cir. 2000). In
    fact, some of the threats have been reported to the
    police along with requests for help. One of the families
    has changed their telephone number, which caused the
    threats to stop. The evidence falls short: “Threats can
    constitute past persecution only in the most extreme
    circumstances, such as where they are of a most immedi-
    ate or menacing nature or if the perpetrators attempt to
    follow through on the threat.” Bejko v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 482
    , 486 (7th Cir. 2006).
    In short, there is insufficient evidence in the record to
    show a clear probability that petitioners would suffer
    persecution if they returned to Venezuela.
    No. 07-2487                                              7
    Accordingly, the petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART
    and DENIED IN PART.
    USCA-02-C-0072—5-2-08