Lora Liskowitz v. Michael Astrue ( 2009 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-1576
    L ORA L ISKOWITZ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    M ICHAEL J. A STRUE,
    C OMMISSIONER OF S OCIAL S ECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 06 C 1229—Rudolph T. Randa, Chief Judge.
    A RGUED O CTOBER 22, 2008—D ECIDED M ARCH 24, 2009
    Before C UDAHY, M ANION, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    C UDAHY, Circuit Judge. Lora Liskowitz applied for
    disability insurance benefits more than eight years ago.
    An administrative law judge initially denied her claim,
    was reversed by the district court and subsequently
    denied her claim following a second administrative
    hearing. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s second
    decision. Although this second decision is less clear than
    it might have been, the decision was supported by sub-
    stantial evidence. We affirm.
    2                                               No. 08-1576
    I.
    Lora Liskowitz was born with a congenitally deformed
    left hip. As a consequence of her hip condition, she under-
    went multiple surgical procedures as a child, including a
    procedure when she was twelve to equalize the length
    of her legs by removing “growth material” from her
    right tibia and femur plates. She reports that she has
    experienced pain in her knee, hips and back ever since. In
    spite of the pain, she was able to work for fifteen years in
    her parents’ waterbed factory, splitting her time between
    the upholstery shop and the factory office, where she
    performed basic clerical tasks. However, she stopped
    working in 1998 because, by her own account, her pain
    grew progressively worse, and she became incapable
    of performing even sedentary clerical tasks.
    Liskowitz testified that since she stopped working, she
    has been bedridden for all but a few hours each day and
    that she can remain seated without discomfort only for
    ten minutes at a time. Her assessment of her own con-
    dition is at least partly corroborated by her rheumato-
    logist, Doctor Joseph Bretza. Liskowitz began seeing
    Bretza in 2003, after she initially tested positive for rheu-
    matoid arthritis. In 2004, Bretza completed a question-
    naire in which he indicated that Liskowitz can remain
    seated only for an hour at a time, that she can use her
    hands only for twenty percent of an eight-hour work-
    day and that she has suffered from these limitations
    since 1998.
    The record shows, however, that prior to 2003, Liskowitz
    was more functionally capable than she now admits. For
    No. 08-1576                                                 3
    instance, in 2000 her examining physician noted, contrary
    to Bretza’s retrospective assessment, that Liskowitz had
    no significant upper extremity limitations. Between 2001
    and 2003, multiple healthcare providers noted that she
    was fully able to perform household and child care
    duties, and was not otherwise limited in activities of
    daily living. And in 2003, a healthcare provider—appar-
    ently a nurse practitioner—noted that Liskowitz had
    lost weight since giving birth to her third child, and that
    her exercise regime included “some walking.”
    Liskowitz’s own statements also belie her claim that
    she has been incapable of sedentary activity since 1998. In
    2000, she told her doctors at the Milwaukee Medical
    Clinic that she does “a lot of squatting, kneeling and lifting
    off the floor of her young children,” who were five and
    seven months at the time.1 She expanded on this claim
    at her initial administrative hearing in 2001, where she
    admitted that she alone was responsible for the care of
    her children, and testified that she walked or drove her
    eldest daughter to school, changed diapers, made
    lunch and occasionally dinner, did some vacuuming and
    dusting, washed dishes, did laundry and shopped for
    groceries. She also testified that she was able to control
    her pain by taking Celebrex and Vicodin. (As she stated
    at the time, “[t]he Celebrex is awesome.”)
    Two state agency physicians concluded that Liskowitz
    was capable of standing for two hours and sitting for six
    hours in an eight-hour workday. The ALJ concurred,
    1
    In 2002, Liskowitz gave birth to a third child.
    4                                               No. 08-1576
    finding that she was capable of sedentary work and that
    her testimony to the contrary was not credible. Liskowitz
    appealed the ALJ’s decision, and in 2004 the district
    court remanded the case for a new administrative
    hearing based on problems with the testimony of an
    expert witness. However, the district court affirmed the
    ALJ’s findings regarding Liskowitz’s credibility. (Liskowitz
    does not challenge, or indeed even mention, this aspect
    of the district court’s 2004 decision on appeal.)
    Following the remand, Liskowitz appears to have
    changed her theory of the case. In the second hearing,
    Liskowitz emphasized swelling and pain in her hands,
    which she did not even mention in the first hearing, as
    evidence of her disability. Based in part on her previous
    factual findings, the ALJ refused to fully credit either
    Liskowitz’s own testimony or the corroborating testi-
    mony of her rheumatologist. Instead, the ALJ found that
    Liskowitz remained capable of sedentary work through
    December 2002, when her insured status expired. The
    ALJ credited the testimony from an expert witness who
    identified 4,000 unskilled jobs in the Milwaukee area
    that a person with Liskowitz’s background and limita-
    tions would have been capable of performing. The
    Appeals Council denied review.
    II.
    The ALJ denied benefits initially in 2001, and again in
    2005. Only the 2005 decision is at issue here. Because the
    Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s second
    ruling, this ruling constitutes the Agency’s final decision.
    No. 08-1576                                                5
    Getch v. Astrue, 
    539 F.3d 473
    , 480 (7th Cir. 2008). We
    review this decision directly without giving deference to
    the district court’s decision. Elder v. Astrue, 
    529 F.3d 408
    ,
    413 (7th Cir. 2008). We will uphold the ALJ’s decision if
    it is supported by “substantial evidence,” see 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), which means “such relevant evidence as a rea-
    sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971).
    To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must be
    “disabled,” 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (a)(1)(E), which the Social
    Security Act defines as an “inability to engage in any
    substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
    determinable physical or mental impairment which can
    be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
    be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
    than 12 months.” 
    Id.
     at § 423(d)(1)(A). Further, a claimant
    must show that the disability arose while he or she was
    insured for benefits. See 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 423
    (a)(1)(A), (c)(1);
    Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 
    409 F.3d 798
    , 802 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (per curiam).2
    Social Security regulations prescribe a five-step test for
    determining whether a claimant is disabled within the
    meaning of the Act. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
    , 416.920. Only
    the fifth step—which requires the ALJ to determine the
    2
    A claimant who cannot establish that she was disabled
    while she was insured may still receive Supplemental Security
    Income benefits if she can established that she is disabled
    and has limited means. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381a, 1382; Sienkiewicz,
    
    409 F.3d at 802
    .
    6                                             No. 08-1576
    claimant’s residual functional capacity and to ascertain
    whether there are a significant number of jobs that the
    claimant could perform—is at issue here.
    A.
    In considering whether a claimant is capable of work,
    an ALJ must determine the claimant’s “residual func-
    tional capacity,” which is the work he or she can still do
    despite her physical and mental limitations. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
    (a); Hickman v. Apfel, 
    187 F.3d 683
    , 688-89 (7th
    Cir. 1999). In the present case, because the ALJ found
    that Liskowitz was capable of sedentary work in
    April 2001 and Liskowitz has not challenged this finding
    on this appeal, our review is limited. The only question
    that remains is whether there was substantial evidence
    for the ALJ’s determination that Liskowitz’s condition
    did not become dramatically worse in the roughly one
    and one-half years between the ALJ’s first decision and
    expiration of Liskowitz’s insured status.
    Liskowitz argues that it was error for the ALJ to refuse
    to credit her own testimony regarding her functional
    limitations. We are not persuaded. First, and most obvi-
    ously, the ALJ had found Liskowitz to be a non-credible
    witness in the first hearing, and was entitled to rely on
    this finding in the second hearing. See Berger v. Astrue,
    
    516 F.3d 539
    , 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (an ALJ is entitled to
    view the testimony of an applicant who has been decep-
    tive with skepticism). This is not to say that having
    found Liskowitz to have exaggerated her symptoms
    once, the ALJ could automatically disregard her testi-
    No. 08-1576                                                7
    mony in the second hearing. But this is not what happened
    here. Instead, the ALJ found that Liskowitz’s testimony
    at the second hearing was inconsistent both with the
    ALJ’s prior findings and with Liskowitz’s own testi-
    mony during the first hearing. Having already found the
    witness to have exaggerated her symptoms, and having
    reasonably observed that the witness’s account of those
    symptoms materially changed from the first hearing to
    the second, there was nothing improper about the
    ALJ’s adherence to her previous credibility determination.
    But even if it were somehow improper for the ALJ to
    adhere to her previous credibility assessment, this would
    still not justify a second remand. A second problem with
    Liskowitz’s argument is that her testimony at the second
    hearing did not speak to the one narrow point regarding
    her functional limitations that was still at issue in the
    second hearing. Again, the ALJ had previously found that
    Liskowitz was capable of sedentary work prior to 2001.
    Liskowitz appealed this finding to the district court and
    lost. She has not pursued her challenge to the ALJ’s 2001
    findings in this appeal. Thus, to be entitled to disability
    benefits, Liskowitz would have had to show that her
    condition became dramatically worse between 2001, when
    the ALJ rendered her initial decision, and 2002, when
    Liskowitz’s insured status expired. However, Liskowitz
    had practically nothing to say during the second hearing
    about how her condition had changed. On the contrary,
    although she stated that she has “gradually declined” over
    the years, she also testified that her functional limitations
    have remained the same since she initially applied for
    8                                                 No. 08-1576
    benefits.3 Thus, even if the ALJ were somehow required
    to credit Liskowitz’s testimony, this testimony did not
    speak to a rapid deterioration in her condition between
    2001 and 2002.
    Liskowitz’s treatment records, including her
    rheumatologist Dr. Bretza’s opinion, also evidence no
    dramatic deterioration of her condition. Even without
    more, this undermines Liskowitz’s somewhat more
    plausible argument that the ALJ impermissibly “played
    doctor” by refusing to credit the opinion of her treating
    physician. “[A]n ALJ cannot play the role of doctor and
    interpret medical evidence.” Murphy v. Astrue, 
    496 F.3d 630
    , 634 (7th Cir. 2007). Along the same lines, “an ALJ
    cannot disregard medical evidence simply because it is
    at odds with the ALJ’s own unqualified opinion.” 
    Id.
    Here, there is at least a strong argument to be made
    that the ALJ improperly substituted her own, non-profes-
    sional opinion for that of Liskowitz’s treating physician.
    What the ALJ said was:
    There is no basis for relating back [Dr. Bretza’s] find-
    ings from 2003 to the period from the alleged onset
    date in 1998 to December 2002, the date last insured.
    Dr. Bretz’s [sic.] assessment conflicts with the claim-
    ant’s lack of treatment for a condition which could
    3
    Her testimony was as follows: “Question: Now, I had asked
    you a mess of questions about limitations and your condi-
    tion. And I just wanted to see if I’m clear about this. Is this
    basically essentially the way your condition has been since
    June 1 of 1998? Answer: Yes.”
    No. 08-1576                                               9
    be rheumatoid arthritis in the year 2002. It also con-
    flicts with claimant’s infrequent treatment for hip
    dysplasia during the period from 1998 to 2002. It is
    noted that Dr. Bretz [sic] found in March 2003 that
    the claimant had a full range of motion in all joints
    with no synovitis.
    We are troubled by this aspect of the ALJ’s decision. It is
    quintessentially a matter for medical judgment whether
    disabling rheumatoid arthritis is consistent with “a full
    range of motion” or “joint synovitis.” Perhaps the ALJ
    is right that disabling rheumatoid arthritis would result
    in significant joint swelling. See Stedman’s Medical Dic-
    tionary 1773 (27th ed. 2000) (defining “synovitis” as
    inflamation, especially that of a joint). But we do not know
    this; and the ALJ does not know either.
    Standing alone, the ALJ’s remarks give us pause. Were
    this the ALJ’s first decision on the matter, there would
    be a strong case for reversal. However, when we con-
    sider the above-quoted remarks together with the ALJ’s
    findings following the first administrative hearing, we
    conclude that there was substantial evidence for the
    ALJ’s decision. Again, the ALJ made these remarks only
    after she had already found that Liskowitz was capable
    of certain forms of sedentary work. Liskowitz appealed
    this aspect of the ALJ’s first decision, and lost.4 Because
    the factual findings that furnished the basis for the ALJ’s
    first decision to deny benefits were affirmed on appeal, the
    4
    Liskowitz has not pursued any further challenge to the
    ALJ’s first set of factual findings on this appeal.
    10                                              No. 08-1576
    ALJ was entitled to rely on these findings in the second
    hearing.
    Indeed, even if the ALJ had elected to reconsider the
    issue of Liskowitz’s functional limitations prior to 2001,
    Bretza’s retrospective functional assessment does not
    strike us as particularly strong evidence, especially in
    the light of the contrary assessments of Liskowitz’s con-
    temporaneous examining physicians. “A retrospective
    diagnosis may be considered only if it is corroborated
    by evidence contemporaneous with the eligible period.”
    Estok v. Apfel, 
    152 F.3d 636
    , 640 (7th Cir. 1998); see also
    Evangelista v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 
    826 F.2d 136
    ,
    140 (1st Cir. 1987); Adams v. Chater, 
    93 F.3d 712
    , 714 (10th
    Cir. 1996); Perez v. Chater, 
    77 F.3d 41
    , 48 (2d Cir. 1996);
    Jones v. Chater, 
    65 F.3d 102
    , 103-04 (8th Cir. 1995). In the
    present case, Bretza’s retrospective opinion was that
    since 1998, Liskowitz has been able to use her hands for
    one-fifth of an eight-hour workday. This opinion was
    inconsistent, not only with the opinions of the two state
    agency doctors, but also with the opinion of Liskowitz’s
    examining physician, who noted in 2000 that Liskowitz
    suffered from no significant upper extremity limitations.
    Faced with competing opinions, the ALJ had to decide
    which opinion to credit. We cannot say, as a matter of
    law, that the ALJ made the wrong choice here. See Dona-
    hue v. Barnhart, 
    279 F.3d 441
    , 444 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
    resolution of competing arguments based on the record
    is for the ALJ, not the court.”). There may be situations
    where it would be appropriate for an ALJ to repudiate
    previous factual findings in the light of new medical
    No. 08-1576                                            11
    evidence. However, it was not error for the ALJ to refuse
    to credit a treating physician’s opinion four years after
    the fact where this opinion was inconsistent with con-
    temporaneous medical evidence that the ALJ had previ-
    ously and properly credited.
    This leaves Dr. Bretza’s retrospective opinion on rather
    shaky footing. Like Liskowitz herself, Bretza did not say
    that Liskowitz’s functional limitations became more
    pronounced between 2001 and 2002. (Indeed, even this
    claim would not have been supported by the record.
    During this period, Liskowitz reported to her doctors
    that she was experiencing decreased pain through her
    knee and hips, and that she was capable of performing
    all household and child care duties.) Because Bretza had
    nothing to say on the one novel question concerning
    Liskowitz’s functional limitations that was properly
    before the ALJ, the ALJ’s findings concerning Liskowitz’s
    residual functional capacity were supported by sub-
    stantial evidence.
    B.
    We are also unpersuaded by Liskowitz’s claim that the
    Commissioner did not properly show that there were a
    significant number of jobs that she was capable of per-
    forming. An individual is disabled only if he or she
    “cannot, considering his age, education, and work experi-
    ence, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
    which exists in the national economy . . . in significant
    numbers either in the region where such individual
    lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C.
    12                                                   No. 08-1576
    § 423(d)(2)(A).5 The Commissioner bears the burden of
    showing that there are a significant number of jobs that
    the claimant is capable of performing. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1560
    (c)(2); Britton v. Astrue, 
    521 F.3d 799
    , 803 (7th
    Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The Commissioner typically uses
    a vocational expert (“VE”) to assess whether there are a
    significant number of jobs in the national economy that
    the claimant can do. Lee v. Sullivan, 
    988 F.2d 789
    , 793 (7th
    Cir. 1993).6
    5
    Section 423(d)(2)(A) overturned the Kerner doctrine. See
    Kerner v. Flemming, 
    283 F.2d 916
     (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.). See
    Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security
    and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social
    Welfare Estates, 
    89 Harv. L. Rev. 833
    , 853 (1976). Under Kerner,
    once a claimant showed that she was unfit for her former work,
    the burden shifted to the Secretary to prove that the claimant
    had a realistic possibility of obtaining work that was near
    her home. 
    283 F.2d at 921
    . In response to the Federal courts’
    widespread adoption of the Kerner doctrine, Congress
    amended the Social Security Act in 1967 to provide that an
    impairment could not be considered a total disability unless
    it rendered the claimant unable to perform any kind of sub-
    stantial gainful work, “regardless of whether such work exists
    in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
    job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if
    he applied for work.” Social Security Amendments of 1967,
    Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(d)(2)(A).
    6
    In the past, we have expressed confusion over how a person
    becomes a “vocational expert.” See Donahue, 
    279 F.3d at 446
    . We
    note, therefore, that Liskowitz’s counsel stated in oral argu-
    (continued...)
    No. 08-1576                                                    13
    In the present case, the VE testified that there were
    approximately 4,000 jobs in the Milwaukee area that a
    person with Liskowitz’s functional limitations would be
    capable of performing. Liskowitz does not argue that
    4,000 jobs is insignificant; nor would such an argument
    be plausible. As few as 174 jobs has been held to be sig-
    nificant, see Allen v. Bowen, 
    816 F.2d 600
    , 602 (11th Cir.
    1987), and it appears to be well-established that 1,000
    jobs is a significant number. See Lee, 
    988 F.2d at 794
    ; see
    also Hall v. Bowen, 
    837 F.2d 272
    , 275 (6th Cir. 1988) (1,350
    jobs); Barker v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 
    882 F.2d 1474
    ,
    1479 (9th Cir. 1989) (1,266 jobs); Trimiar v. Sullivan, 
    966 F.2d 1326
    , 1330-32 (10th Cir. 1992) (850-1,000 jobs); Jenkins
    v. Bowen, 
    861 F.2d 1083
    , 1087 (8th Cir. 1988) (500 jobs).
    Although the VE indisputably identified a significant
    number of jobs, Liskowitz argues that it was error for the
    ALJ to credit the VE’s testimony for two reasons: first, the
    VE was not able to testify as to the reliability of the
    data she used to reach her conclusions; second, the VE
    was unable to identify the number of part-time jobs that
    were included in her data set.
    As to this first argument, it is not entirely true that the
    VE failed to vindicate the reliability of the data on
    6
    (...continued)
    ment that vocational experts are typically job placement
    specialists. In the present case, the VE for the first hearing had
    worked as a consultant who recruited and evaluated job
    applicants for corporate clients. There is no record of the
    professional background of the VE for the second hearing.
    14                                               No. 08-1576
    which she relied. The VE initially admitted that she
    could not assess the degree of accuracy of the data sources
    on which she was relying. However, on follow-up ques-
    tioning, she added that these sources were “widely recog-
    nized as acceptable sources in the vocational rehabilita-
    tion area.” Perhaps ideally the VE would have been able
    to say a bit more, but this does not go without saying.
    The witness was testifying as a vocational expert, not as
    a census taker or statistician. Indeed, even if the VE had
    happened to know something about the statistical basis
    for her testimony, she arguably still would not be in a
    position to fully vindicate her conclusions. After all,
    statisticians use arithmetic operations, but few probably
    have studied the foundations of arithmetic in set theory.
    Is the statistician’s use of arithmetic therefore unjustified?
    Clearly not. In administrative proceedings, no less than
    in ordinary life, “explanations come to an end some-
    where.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, § 1 PHILOSOPHICAL
    INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1968).
    In addition to testifying that her sources were widely
    recognized as acceptable, the VE actually identified her
    sources. Two of these sources were published by the
    United States Department of Labor and the Wisconsin
    Department of Workforce Development. These are gov-
    ernment sources of which the ALJ was required to take
    administrative notice. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1566
    (d). Although
    the record does not include information concerning the
    nature of the VE’s third source, the Occupational Em-
    ployment Quarterly (OEQ), we note that this does indeed
    seem to be a source on which VEs customarily rely. See,
    e.g., Britton, 
    521 F.3d at 802
    . Liskowitz argues for the first
    No. 08-1576                                                 15
    time in her reply brief that the VE should not have relied
    on the OEQ because it was published by a private com-
    pany.7 But she forfeited this argument by failing to object
    to the VE’s testimony during the hearing. See Barrett v.
    Barnhart, 
    355 F.3d 1065
    , 1067 (7th Cir. 2004); Donahue,
    
    279 F.3d at 447
     (“Raising a discrepancy only after the
    hearing . . . is too late.”). The VE had the OEQ with her
    while she testified. Had Liskowitz actually objected to the
    VE’s testimony, the VE could have said more about the
    kind of information the OEQ contains. At the very least,
    the VE could have identified which of her conclusions
    were based on the OEQ. As it stands, however, the VE’s
    testimony was both unobjected to and uncontradicted.
    Thus, the ALJ was entitled to credit this testimony.
    Finally, we are not persuaded by Liskowitz’s argument
    that the VE was required to identify the number of part-
    time jobs included in the approximately 4,000 jobs she
    claimed Liskowitz was capable of performing. Liskowitz’s
    argument is based on Social Security Ruling 96-8p,
    which provides that
    [o]rdinarily, RFC [residual functional capacity] is an
    assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained
    7
    She cites to the publisher’s website as authority for the
    proposition that the OEQ is not a government source. Informa-
    tion gleaned from a company website, of course, is not part of
    the record on appeal. Further, it is not clear that the website
    helps Liskowitz’s cause, as it states that “[a]ll data provided
    by [the Publisher] is derived from government sources.” See
    http://www.uspublishing.net/references.html (visited 2/6/09).
    16                                                      No. 08-1576
    work-related physical and mental activities in a
    work setting on a regular and continuing basis. A
    “regular and continuing basis” means 8 hours a day,
    for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.
    In the present case, the VE testified that she had “no way
    of knowing” if the jobs she had identified were full-time
    or part-time. According to Liskowitz, this admission
    renders the VE’s testimony unreliable.
    As a threshold matter, it is far from clear, and
    neither party addresses, the level of deference to which
    Ruling 96-8p is entitled. Social Security Rulings “represent
    precedent [sic] final . . . interpretations that we have
    adopted.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 402.35
    (b)(1). We generally defer to
    an agency’s interpretations of the legal regime it is
    charged with administering. See Lauer v. Bowen, 
    818 F.2d 636
    , 639 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United Fire Ins. Co. v.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
    768 F.2d 164
    , 169 (7th
    Cir. 1985). However, we are not invariably bound by an
    agency’s policy statements.8 Since neither party has
    8
    In Prince v. Sullivan, 
    933 F.2d 598
     (7th Cir. 1991), we suggested
    that Social Security Rulings are entitled to Skidmore deference. 
    Id. 602
     (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
    323 U.S. 134
    , 140 (1944)).
    This is partially true, but incomplete. Where a policy statement
    or ruling interprets an Agency’s authorizing statute, this will
    typically be entitled to Skidmore deference. See Christensen v.
    Harris County, 
    529 U.S. 576
    , 587 (2000). On the other hand,
    where, as here, the Agency’s policy statement interprets an
    Agency’s own regulations, the appropriate deference regime
    is established by Seminole Rock. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
    (continued...)
    No. 08-1576                                                  17
    briefed the issue of the appropriate level of deference to
    apply to Social Security Rulings, we assume without
    deciding that violations of Ruling 96-8p constitute
    reversable error. What follows?
    On its face, Ruling 96-8p applies to the ALJ’s functional
    capacity determination, not to the VE’s testimony. Again,
    having determined that a claimant has a severe impair-
    ment, the ALJ must, inter alia, assess her residual func-
    tional capacity and then determine whether there are a
    significant number of jobs in the national economy that
    she can perform. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    . Ruling 96-8p pro-
    vides that “capacity” means sustainable capacity. To take
    an example: the fact that a person can run down the
    block does not mean that she has the functional capacity
    to be a professional runner.
    Ruling 96-8p does not say, nor do we interpret it to
    imply, that a VE may permissibly testify only as to the
    availability of full-time jobs. On the contrary, to say that
    the ALJ may deny benefits only if she finds the claimant
    capable of some form of full-time work is quite different
    from saying that only full-time jobs can constitute sig-
    nificant work in the national economy. To return to our
    previous example, a person who is functionally capable
    of running professionally should not be deemed disabled
    simply because some of the jobs that are available
    for professional runners are part-time jobs.
    8
    (...continued)
    452, 461 (1997) (reaffirming Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
    
    325 U.S. 410
     (1945)).
    18                                             No. 08-1576
    Our conclusion is not at odds with the Eleventh Circuit’s
    decision in Kelley v. Apfel, 
    185 F.3d 1211
     (11th Cir. 1999)
    (per curiam). In Kelley, on the Commissioner’s motion,
    the Eleventh Circuit clarified its basis for affirming the
    Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits, stating in
    dicta that “if the government is correct in its interpreta-
    tion [expressed in Ruling 96-8p], a claimant could pass
    Step Five and be entitled to benefits even though capable
    of working on a part-time basis.” 
    Id. at 1214-15
    . However,
    the Eleventh Circuit did not say that a VE may testify
    only as to the existence of full-time jobs. Indeed, the
    court explicitly observed that at step one of the Com-
    missioner’s sequential analysis, “there is no per se rule
    that part-time work cannot constitute substantial gainful
    activity.” 
    Id.
     at 1214 (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1572
    (a)).
    Liskowitz’s interpretation of Ruling 96-8p also has
    significant practical problems. Once again, the VE testi-
    fied that she had “no way of knowing” how many of the
    jobs that she had identified were part-time jobs. In the
    colloquy that immediately preceded this remark, the VE
    made it clear that the reason she had no way of knowing
    was that this information was not contained in the data
    sources on which she based her testimony. Indeed,
    Liskowitz’s counsel conceded at oral argument that no
    government data source contains this information.
    Surely, this is a sign that Liskowitz expects too much.
    We decline Liskowitz’s invitation to impose impossible
    burdens on the VE. We hold instead that a VE may,
    consistent with Ruling 96-8p, testify as to the numbers
    of jobs that a claimant can perform without specifically
    No. 08-1576                                              19
    identifying the percentage of those jobs that are part-
    time. The claimant, of course, may respond to the VE’s
    testimony by offering evidence of her own that the jobs
    the VE identified do not constitute “substantial gainful
    work” within the meaning of Section 423(d)(2)(A). There
    may even be circumstances in which a claimant can
    accomplish this by showing that a substantial percentage
    of the jobs that the VE has identified are part-time jobs.
    However, Liskowitz made no effort to rebut the VE’s
    testimony in this case. Where, as here, the VE identifies
    a significant number of jobs the claimant is capable of
    performing and this testimony is uncontradicted (and
    is otherwise proper), it is not error for the ALJ to rely on
    the VE’s testimony.
    III.
    It would have been better if the ALJ gave a better-
    reasoned basis for rejecting Liskowitz’s treating
    physician’s opinion. Be that as it may, the ALJ’s decision
    was supported by substantial evidence.
    A FFIRMED.
    3-24-09
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-1576

Judges: Cudahy

Filed Date: 3/24/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (29)

Samuel C. EVANGELISTA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY ... , 826 F.2d 136 ( 1987 )

Robert ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, ... , 93 F.3d 712 ( 1996 )

Philip Kerner v. Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, ... , 283 F.2d 916 ( 1960 )

Stephen A. Kelley, Jr. v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of ... , 185 F.3d 1211 ( 1999 )

Samuel Trimiar v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of ... , 966 F.2d 1326 ( 1992 )

Lewis H. ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, ... , 816 F.2d 600 ( 1987 )

Lynne A. Sienkiewicz v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner ... , 409 F.3d 798 ( 2005 )

Janice S. ESTOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, ... , 152 F.3d 636 ( 1998 )

Linda P. Barrett v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of ... , 355 F.3d 1065 ( 2004 )

Charles PRINCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, ... , 933 F.2d 598 ( 1991 )

Britton v. Astrue , 521 F.3d 799 ( 2008 )

Berger v. Astrue , 516 F.3d 539 ( 2008 )

Johnny W. HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, ... , 837 F.2d 272 ( 1988 )

Ramona PEREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, ... , 77 F.3d 41 ( 1996 )

Steven D. Hickman, Jr. v. Kenneth Apfel, Commissioner of ... , 187 F.3d 683 ( 1999 )

Patrick W. Donahue v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of ... , 279 F.3d 441 ( 2002 )

Albert LAUER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, ... , 818 F.2d 636 ( 1987 )

Murphy Ex Rel. Murphy v. Astrue , 496 F.3d 630 ( 2007 )

Getch v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 473 ( 2008 )

United Fire Insurance Company v. Commissioner of Internal ... , 768 F.2d 164 ( 1985 )

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