de Manez, Sofia v. Bridgestone Fireston ( 2008 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-1126
    SOFIA LOPEZ DE MAÑEZ, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    BRIDGESTONE FIRESTONE
    NORTH AMERICAN TIRE, LLC, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    APPEAL OF:
    LEONEL PEREZNIETO
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. IP 03-5790-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2007—DECIDED JULY 11, 2008
    ____________
    Before RIPPLE, MANION, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of one of
    the many cases that were filed against Ford Motor Com-
    pany and Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (now known as
    Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC), after
    some Firestone tires installed on Ford Explorers ex-
    ploded, often with catastrophic consequences. Although
    2                                                 No. 07-1126
    most of those lawsuits involved U.S. citizens who were
    driving their cars within the United States, a certain
    number involved foreigners. This is one of the latter
    group: it was brought by the family of José Samuel Mañez-
    Reyes, who was killed in Veracruz, Mexico, in one such ac-
    cident. In an earlier opinion, this court reviewed a deci-
    sion by the district court to dismiss the Mañez litigation
    under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, on the ground
    that a forum in Mexico would be available and more
    appropriate. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
    420 F.3d 702
    (7th Cir. 2005) (Mañez I).
    The earlier appeal took an unexpected turn when the
    plaintiffs submitted documents indicating that the
    Fourth Court of First Instance for Civil Cases of the First
    Judicial District in Morelos, Mexico, had concluded
    (contrary to the district court’s expectation) that it did
    not have jurisdiction over the case. In supplemental
    filings before this court, plaintiffs argued that this demon-
    strated conclusively that the courts of Mexico were not
    available to hear the case and thus that a dismissal for
    forum non conveniens was improper. See generally Gulf
    Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 
    330 U.S. 501
    , 506-07 (1947) (“In all cases
    in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into
    play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the
    defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes
    critera for choice between them.”). When we invited
    the defendants to respond to this new information, they
    raised serious questions about the proffered documents.
    We concluded that the best course of action was to remand
    the case to the district court for reconsideration of the
    question whether, in light of all the evidence, Mexico is
    an available forum.
    The district court accordingly held an evidentiary
    hearing on remand to explore the circumstances sur-
    No. 07-1126                                                 3
    rounding the Morelos court’s decision. Ultimately, the
    court had to decide whether the plaintiffs brought that
    case in good faith and whether the Mexican court’s deci-
    sion was entitled to recognition in the U.S. action. The
    district court concluded that the Morelos judgment had
    indeed been procured in bad faith and thus was not sub-
    ject to recognition. The court therefore reaffirmed its
    earlier decision to dismiss the Mañez litigation on the
    ground of forum non conveniens.
    With that judgment in hand, defendants moved for an
    order imposing sanctions against plaintiffs’ U.S. and
    Mexican lawyers. Initially, the district court refrained
    from taking that step, because it believed that any fraud
    that may have been perpetrated was directed to this
    court, not the district court. Upon reconsideration, how-
    ever, the court concluded that the court of appeals no
    longer had jurisdiction over the motion for sanctions,
    because no proceeding was then pending there. In addi-
    tion, the court noted that it, too, was arguably the victim of
    vexatious and unreasonable proceedings, as described in 28
    U.S.C. § 1927. It therefore imposed a fine of $50,000 as a
    sanction against plaintiffs’ U.S. lawyers, to be divided
    among the defendants in any way that defendants
    thought appropriate. In addition, the court singled out
    the appellant before us, Leonel Pereznieto-Castro, for a
    particular sanction:
    Further, Dr. Leonel Pereznieto, the apparent master-
    mind behind these frauds on the U.S. and Mexican
    courts, is ordered to pay over, as a personal sanction,
    the amount of one hundred thousand dollars
    ($100,000.00). Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) of
    that amount is payable to Defendants as an addi-
    tional offset against the expenses they incurred in
    4                                              No. 07-1126
    investigating the Morelos proceedings and litigating
    the remand issues and the second fifty thousand
    dollars is payable to the Clerk of this court as a sanc-
    tion for the fraud perpetrated by him in this forum. So
    long as this monetary sanction remains unpaid in
    the full amount of $100,000, Leonel Pereznieto is and
    shall be barred from providing any testimony against
    any Defendant in this cause in any United States
    court. Further, in terms of resolving the remaining
    cases in this multidistrict litigation, any and all
    sworn assertions reflecting the views or opinions of
    Leonel Pereznieto, whether made by him directly
    or indirectly, shall be stricken and we shall not con-
    sider as authority cases where his testimony wheth-
    er oral or written was relied upon as justification for
    the court’s opinion.
    The court concluded by ordering that its sanctions judg-
    ment should be issued under FED. R. CIV. P. 58(d), and
    that the dismissal of the case as a whole would be with-
    out prejudice. (Here and throughout this opinion we cite
    to the version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    that took effect on December 1, 2007, unless it appears
    that it would not be “just and practicable” to apply the
    new rules to this pending case.)
    The fact that the dismissal was without prejudice
    raises the question whether the judgment before us is
    final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude that
    it was, given the nature of a dismissal based on forum
    non conveniens. First, we note the obvious difference
    between dismissing a case on this ground and refusing
    to dismiss and thereby permitting the litigation to con-
    tinue. The latter kind of order is nonfinal and does not
    fall within the narrow confines of the collateral order
    No. 07-1126                                                 5
    doctrine. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 
    486 U.S. 517
    ,
    527 (1988). A dismissal, in contrast, ends the case before
    the court. The premise of a dismissal under the forum non
    conveniens doctrine, as we noted earlier, is that there is
    an alternative forum that is better suited to hear the
    case. Had the dismissal here been one “with prejudice,”
    there would have been some question about plaintiffs’
    right to resort to that alternative forum; by stipulating
    that it was “without prejudice,” the district court prop-
    erly signaled that it intended no such limitation. See
    In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 
    22 F.3d 755
    , 762
    n.13 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “[t]he grant of a motion to
    dismiss on the common law grounds of forum non
    conveniens is appealable,” despite being without prejudice).
    Compare Peters v. Welsh Dev. Agency, 
    920 F.2d 438
    , 439
    (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court’s order,
    which dismissed a complaint without prejudice for
    failure to prosecute but indicated that the case would be
    reinstated in that same court if plaintiff were to meet cer-
    tain conditions, was not final and therefore not appealable).
    In this context, therefore, the phrase “without prejudice”
    means that although the dismissal is “final” in the sense
    that plaintiffs are finished before the U.S. courts, they
    still are free to refile the case in another, appropriate
    forum, and (at least to the extent that a U.S. court is in a
    position to assure such a thing) such a refiling would not
    be subject to a defense based on former adjudication. See
    Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 
    289 F.3d 1300
    , 1303, 1306
    (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that after a dismissal without
    prejudice on grounds of forum non conveniens, plaintiffs
    are “free to refile” in “any other jurisdiction which
    [would] entertain the case,” and noting that an “appropri-
    ate forum” for refiling in Esfeld could be “the courts of
    6                                                 No. 07-1126
    Italy, Vietnam, or Plaintiffs [sic] respective home states”).
    Because the underlying litigation is finished, nothing
    in Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 
    527 U.S. 198
    (1999),
    which addressed interlocutory appeals from sanctions
    orders, would prevent Pereznieto from appealing (assum-
    ing for the sake of argument that he is best characterized
    as one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs, rather than an
    expert witness).
    This situation is not unlike a dismissal for lack of per-
    sonal or federal subject-matter jurisdiction, which, while
    foreclosing future litigation of the matter in the court
    issuing the order, does not preclude a plaintiff from
    refiling and litigating in a proper forum. See, e.g., Milwaukee
    Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Fjeld Mfg. Co., Inc., 
    8 F.3d 441
    , 448
    (7th Cir. 1993) (taking appellate jurisdiction and affirming
    the district court’s dismissal without prejudice on grounds
    of improper venue because of insufficient contacts to confer
    personal jurisdiction but noting that refiling in a proper
    venue remains an option); Fuhrman v. Livaditis, 
    611 F.2d 203
    , 204 (7th Cir. 1979) (same).
    Returning to the case presently before us, it is Pereznieto
    who has appealed. His complaint is not about the dis-
    missal of the underlying action, but instead is about the
    order imposing sanctions on him. This order, we con-
    clude, is also final for purposes of appeal; the district
    court is finished with him, and the only thing that re-
    mains is for him to pay the fine that it imposed, unless
    he can obtain relief on appeal. See United States v. Dowell,
    
    257 F.3d 694
    , 698 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
    Kirschenbaum, 
    156 F.3d 784
    , 794 (7th Cir. 1998). Beginning
    with fundamental jurisdictional arguments and moving
    on to others, he argues that the court’s order was either
    beyond its competence, unauthorized, or an abuse of
    No. 07-1126                                                 7
    discretion. We consider these points in turn, filling in the
    factual background as necessary.
    I
    A few more details about the conduct for which
    Pereznieto was sanctioned help to explain the district
    court’s action. After the case was remanded to the dis-
    trict court, the parties spent nearly a year in discovery. The
    court then held a two-day evidentiary hearing. The evi-
    dence presented showed that plaintiffs’ U.S. lawyers,
    Roger Reed and Alberto Guerrero, had hired Mexican
    lawyers on a contingent-fee basis after the initial appeal
    had been filed in this court, and that they did so for
    the express purpose of filing a deficient complaint in an
    improper Mexican court. The idea was to file something
    that the Morelos courts would dismiss, so that plaintiffs
    could present “proof” to this court that Mexico was not
    an available alternative forum. The Mexican attorney in
    charge of this strategy was Pereznieto—a Mexican citi-
    zen and attorney whom plaintiffs’ U.S. lawyers knew
    because he previously had filed an expert declaration in
    support of their claims in the U.S. courts. Pereznieto in
    turn hired two other Mexican lawyers to assist him, Juan
    Carlos Guerrero-Valle and Rosa Maria Avila-Fernandez.
    The district court found that the evidence, including a
    “smoking gun” email sent on January 14, 2005, showed
    that the Mexican attorneys improperly had used family
    connections and had ex parte contact with the Morelos
    judge in order to manipulate the system and ensure that
    the judge would “throw out the suit according to what
    we planned.” Pereznieto, the court found, had “played a
    double role in this attempted fraud on the court,” both by
    8                                                 No. 07-1126
    orchestrating the proceedings in Morelos and by sub-
    mitting an “expert affidavit” to the Seventh Circuit in
    support of the plaintiffs’ arguments while the initial
    appeal was pending. At no time did Pereznieto disclose
    the circumstances of the Mexican proceedings to the
    U.S. courts, nor did he mention that he was representing
    the plaintiffs on a contingent-fee basis in Mexico (in
    itself, a lawful arrangement) while at the same time
    giving sworn statements as an expert in the U.S. proceed-
    ings. These findings provided the basis for the sanc-
    tions order we set forth above.
    II
    In his appeal, Pereznieto raises three principal argu-
    ments: that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
    impose sanctions against him; that the district court did
    not observe the requirements of due process; and that
    the court erred in its findings about the Mexican pro-
    ceedings and Mexican law.
    A
    We consider first Pereznieto’s jurisdictional argument.
    To the extent that he is challenging the district court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction to investigate the circumstances
    behind his filings and to impose sanctions for fraud or
    misconduct, we reject his argument. In Chambers v. NASCO,
    Inc., 
    501 U.S. 32
    (1991), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
    the inherent power of the federal courts to address “a
    full range of litigation abuses.” 
    Id. at 46.
    Although the
    exercise of the inherent power may be limited by statute
    or rule, 
    id. at 47,
    it is still possible in appropriate circum-
    No. 07-1126                                                9
    stances for a court “to sanction bad-faith conduct by
    means of the inherent power” even if “that conduct
    could also be sanctioned under the statute or the Rules,” 
    id. at 50.
    No matter who allegedly commits a fraud on the
    court—a party, an attorney, or a nonparty witness—the
    court has the inherent power to conduct proceedings to
    investigate that allegation and, if it is proven, to punish
    that conduct.
    Whether the court had authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
    to punish someone in Pereznieto’s position is another
    question. Section 1927 permits sanctions only against
    “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases
    in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof.”
    Pereznieto is neither, and so the court’s sanction was not
    authorized by § 1927. That is not, however, a point that
    affects the court’s jurisdiction; it simply means that the
    sanction must stand or fall on some other ground. The
    fact that some of the conduct that ultimately gave rise
    to the filings in the U.S. court took place outside the
    United States (here, in Mexico) does not deprive the
    court of its competence to adjudicate this matter. Compare
    F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 
    542 U.S. 155
    ,
    175 (2004) (in an antitrust case, reserving judgment on
    the question whether U.S. law may apply if foreign con-
    duct and domestic conduct are not independent of one
    another).
    This case is not like United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus
    Chemical Co., 
    322 F.3d 942
    (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), in
    which this court found that the restrictions imposed by
    the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA),
    15 U.S.C. § 6a, on the reach of the antitrust laws over
    conduct occurring outside the United States affect the
    subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court. Relying
    10                                                No. 07-1126
    on cases that had construed the FTAIA, the en banc court
    found that Congress, through that particular statute,
    had acted to limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
    federal courts. No such statute exists in our case. Moreover,
    here the district court was exercising its authority to protect
    the integrity of the proceedings occurring before it. The acts
    in question may have begun outside the United States, but
    the scheme decidedly came to fruition within the United
    States.
    Insofar as Pereznieto is objecting to the court’s exercise
    of personal jurisdiction, he runs into a somewhat dif-
    ferent problem. He was not a defendant, “haled” into the
    U.S. federal district court against his will. See, e.g., World-
    Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
    444 U.S. 286
    (1980).
    Instead, he was hired in part as an expert witness and
    in part as co-counsel for the Mexican proceedings. He
    voluntarily submitted opinions to his U.S. counterparts,
    knowing that they would in turn submit them to the
    district court and this court in connection with the
    Ford/Firestone cases. The nature of a person’s relation
    to the court matters, as the Supreme Court held in
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
    472 U.S. 797
    (1985). There
    the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
    teenth Amendment “need not and does not afford [absent
    class plaintiffs] as much protection from state-court
    jurisdiction as it does [absent defendants in non-class
    cases].” 
    Id. at 811.
    At the same time, the Court stressed
    that due process protections appropriate to the person
    in question must be observed: “The Fourteenth Amend-
    ment does protect ‘persons,’ not ‘defendants,’ however,
    so absent plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled
    to some protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State
    which seeks to adjudicate their claims.” 
    Id. What the
    Court
    No. 07-1126                                               11
    said about the Fourteenth Amendment and state-court
    jurisdiction applies with equal force to the Due Process
    Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for purposes of federal-
    court jurisdiction.
    There are two questions here: first, to the extent that the
    district court imposed sanctions against Pereznieto for
    representations he made, directly or indirectly, to the
    district court or this court, is it permissible to conclude
    that Pereznieto submitted himself to the personal juris-
    diction of the court for purposes of anything arising out
    of those filings; second, to the extent that the district
    court imposed sanctions against Pereznieto for actions
    he took before the Morelos courts, in Mexico, what, if
    anything, justifies bringing Pereznieto before the U.S.
    court?
    In the affidavit he submitted in conjunction with the
    proceedings on remand, Pereznieto stated:
    1. My involvement in this case, and others involving
    “roll over” cases against the Defendants here and
    others [sic], initially arose in consulting capacity
    based on experience and training in conflict of law,
    Mexican law, and particularly, issues of “territorial
    competence” of Mexican Courts (much akin to U.S.
    jurisdictional issues).
    2. In this capacity I have consulted and/or provided
    declarations or opinions in 20 U.S. cases.
    * * *
    4. However, in this case, US attorneys Reed, Guerrero
    and Dubose (hereinafter collectively “American
    Lawyers”) approached me regarding initiation of
    litigation in Mexican Courts, first, to establish a Mexi-
    12                                             No. 07-1126
    can “estate”, and, second, to pursue a claim of the
    estate in a Mexican Court.
    * * *
    10. I did send, with the other Mexican lawyers, the
    letter attached as Exhibit “B”, which I understand was
    sent to the Court by the American Lawyers by trans-
    mittal letter Exhibit “C”.
    Although it is not entirely clear to which “Exhibit B”
    Pereznieto was referring in paragraph 10 of his affidavit,
    there is no doubt that Pereznieto allowed at least one
    document to be filed directly with a U.S. court. While
    Mañez I was pending in this court, Pereznieto filed an
    affidavit discussing the Morelos proceedings. It began
    with the caption of the case, showing our docket number
    (No. 04-1827), leaving no doubt that he meant to file the
    affidavit with this court; it concluded with Pereznieto’s
    signature. The affidavit was signed on July 6, 2005, in
    Mexico City, with the statement that it was executed
    “under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
    Illinois, the United States of American, and Mexico.”
    The district court was entitled to exercise personal
    jurisdiction over Pereznieto (putting to one side for the
    moment questions of proper notice and proper service
    of papers) if Pereznieto had the kind of contacts with
    Indiana specified in its Trial Rule 4.4(A) (which serves as
    Indiana’s long-arm provision, see LinkAmerica Corp. v.
    Albert, 
    857 N.E.2d 961
    , 965 (Ind. 2006)) and had minimum
    contacts with Indiana such that the exercise of authority
    would be consistent with fair play and substantial
    justice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(A); World-Wide Volks-
    
    wagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92
    . Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A)(1)
    provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident over actions
    No. 07-1126                                                    13
    arising from his having done any business in the state;
    Rule 4.4(A)(4) covers actions arising from the supply of
    services in the state. Either or both of those subsections
    describe Pereznieto’s situation. From the standpoint of the
    federal constitution, the person’s contacts with the state
    cannot be fortuitous; instead, there must be “some act by
    which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
    privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
    thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”
    Hanson v. Denckla, 
    357 U.S. 235
    , 253 (1958). Because the
    issue before the court is tied directly to Pereznieto’s
    activities with respect to the Mañez litigation, there is no
    need to consider whether his contacts with Indiana were
    so extensive as to justify so-called general jurisdiction.
    See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 
    466 U.S. 408
    , 414-16 (1984). Here, it would be hard to imagine a
    closer link between the activities within a forum and the
    conduct for which a person is being asked to answer. The
    fact that the affidavit mentioned Illinois law, and the
    proceedings in the district court were occurring in Indiana,
    does not mean anything. The affidavit was filed in sup-
    port of an appeal that sought to restore the case to the
    docket of the district court for the Southern District of
    Indiana. Looking strictly at adjudicatory competence,
    we conclude that the district court was entitled to exer-
    cise jurisdiction over Pereznieto in this manner.1
    1
    The discussion in the text follows the well-established
    rule that the district court’s jurisdiction over the parties in a
    diversity case is linked to the state’s long-arm statute. Because
    we find that jurisdiction was proper under Indiana law, we
    save for another day the question whether the district court
    might also have relied on federal law in the proceedings
    (continued...)
    14                                               No. 07-1126
    Although it is conceivable that one might argue that
    Pereznieto also consented to the court’s jurisdiction, by
    the act of furnishing his affidavit to be filed in the
    Seventh Circuit, we prefer not to reach that question. It
    was plaintiffs’ U.S. lawyers who actually submitted
    Pereznieto’s affidavit to the district court. He never ap-
    peared personally, he never had his deposition taken (for
    this case) within the United States, nor in the end did
    he consent to a deposition in Mexico. We thus proceed
    on the basis only of specific adjudicatory jurisdiction,
    which supports the district court’s power to resolve
    issues arising out of Pereznieto’s actions directed to the
    Indiana litigation.
    Finally, we consider the question whether the district
    court had any authority to evaluate Pereznieto’s actions
    before the Mexican courts, apart from anything he reported
    back to the U.S. lawyers or courts. We think not (and,
    indeed, the district court may not have meant to do any
    such thing). Whether the proceedings in Morelos were
    conducted in an honest and upright manner is a matter
    for the Mexican judicial and bar authorities, not for us.
    We are not in a position to draw any conclusion, positive or
    negative, even though we are aware that the problem
    of corruption within the judicial sector is one that
    plagues scores of countries around the globe, as the 2007
    Report of the organization Transparency International
    documents in detail. See http://www.transparency.org/
    publications/gcr/download_gcr (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
    As the famous Operation Greylord investigation in Chicago
    1
    (...continued)
    against Pereznieto, on the theory that his actions were an af-
    front to the federal court’s own processes.
    No. 07-1126                                               15
    during the 1980s illustrated, courts in the United States are
    not exempt from this plague. See http://www.fbi.gov/
    page2/march04/greylord031504.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
    2008). We therefore focus only on Pereznieto’s actions
    that were directed toward the proceedings in the United
    States.
    B
    Pereznieto’s central argument is that the proceedings
    that led to the court’s sanctions order against him did not
    satisfy basic due process standards. He is supported in
    this effort by the Consulate General of Mexico in
    Chicago, appearing amicus curiae on behalf of the Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States. A few
    more background facts are important at this point.
    Pereznieto emphasizes time and again that he was never
    a party to the action before the district court, that he
    did not appear as counsel in the district court, and that he
    is not admitted to practice in the Southern District of
    Indiana. He is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He also
    points out that there was never a court order directing
    him to do anything. Instead, when the case returned to
    the district court after Mañez I, the assigned magistrate
    judge stated, in connection with a possible deposition of
    Pereznieto, that “this court likely has no authority to
    require Mexican counsel to travel to the United States to
    be deposed.” Instead, the judge directed in Decem-
    ber 2005 that he should be deposed in Mexico City.
    Ford and Firestone noticed depositions in accordance
    with that order, but they never attempted to serve any
    subpoenas, court orders, letters of request, or letters
    rogatory on him there. Prior to a court-ordered status
    conference in mid-July 2006, Pereznieto and the other
    16                                              No. 07-1126
    Mexican lawyers notified plaintiffs’ U.S. lawyers that
    they were refusing to be deposed. They cited both rules
    of professional secrecy and the risk of criminal penalties
    under Mexican law if they violated those rules. Later,
    Ford and Firestone listed the Mexican attorneys, in-
    cluding Pereznieto, as witnesses for the upcoming evi-
    dentiary hearing, but once again they did not follow
    up with subpoenas or other compulsory process. Indeed,
    they never served Pereznieto directly with a notice of
    the hearing, which had been scheduled for July 19, 2006.
    One week before the hearing, defense counsel filed a
    motion requesting sanctions against both the U.S. lawyers
    and the Mexican lawyers, including Pereznieto. That
    motion was served on the U.S. lawyers, but not on
    Pereznieto. The court initially declined to address the
    motion, but it promised the U.S. lawyers that if the
    court changed its mind and decided to rule, they would
    be given an opportunity to respond before a decision
    was rendered. As matters unfolded, this did not happen.
    Instead, the court conducted its evidentiary hearing on
    the facts surrounding the Morelos litigation on Septem-
    ber 5 and 6, 2006. Pereznieto was not present and was
    not represented by counsel at the hearing. The details of the
    evidence are not important here, as no one has appealed
    from the district court’s November 14 decision to reaffirm
    its dismissal of the action based on forum non conveniens.
    After the case was again dismissed, Ford and Firestone
    made a formal request for a ruling on their sanctions
    motion on December 6, 2006. Three days before the end
    of the 15-day period normally allowed by S.D. Ind. Local
    Rule 7.1(a) for a response to such a motion, on Decem-
    ber 18, 2006, the court issued its order imposing sanc-
    tions and ordering entry of a final judgment. We have
    No. 07-1126                                               17
    already set forth the critical language from that order. The
    U.S. lawyers did not contest the order, but on January 12,
    2007, Pereznieto appeared by counsel and filed a mo-
    tion for relief from the sanctions; he supported his mo-
    tion with an affidavit and offered to make himself avail-
    able for testimony pursuant to the terms of the Hague
    Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
    or Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention”),
    Oct. 7, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, reproduced at
    28 U.S.C. § 1781 note. On January 16, 2007, Pereznieto
    (through newly-retained counsel) filed a timely notice
    of appeal. The district court later dismissed his motion
    for relief as moot, in light of the fact that it no longer
    had jurisdiction over the matter.
    The defendants do not seriously dispute the fact that
    they never attempted to compel Pereznieto to appear
    before the district court. Instead, they stress the close-
    ness of his relationship with the plaintiffs’ U.S. attor-
    neys—in effect, they say, he was a “joint venturer” with
    counsel for Mañez. As such, they argue, any notices
    that reached U.S. counsel also reached Pereznieto by
    operation of law, and U.S. counsel were de facto represen-
    tatives of Pereznieto’s interests before the district court.
    Through Mañez’s U.S. counsel, Pereznieto received a
    copy of the notice of deposition and initially indicated
    that he would be willing to be deposed in Mexico. His
    later change of heart, defendants urge, permitted the
    district court to draw negative inferences, find facts
    against him, and impose the sanctions that it chose.
    In analyzing the district court’s sanctions against
    Pereznieto, we must draw a distinction between the
    $100,000 fine for which he is personally liable and the
    order barring his testimony (new or already submitted)
    18                                               No. 07-1126
    before any courts in the United States. We look first to
    the fine, and then to the testimonial bar.
    1
    As an initial matter, it is unclear how we should charac-
    terize the $100,000 fine. The court did not specify the
    exact nature of the order, although that in itself is unim-
    portant, as it is the substance that matters. The order
    could have been several different things: (1) an adjudica-
    tion of criminal contempt of court; (2) an adjudication of
    civil contempt; (3) a penalty under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 or
    37 for submitting a misleading or evasive document; or
    (4) a penalty for acts that imposed needless costs on the
    court, imposed under the court’s inherent authority. No
    matter which of these it was, however, the conclusion
    is inescapable that Pereznieto did not have adequate
    notice or a proper opportunity to respond. See generally
    Autotech Tech. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 
    499 F.3d 737
    , 746-47 (7th Cir. 2007) (observing that due process
    requires that one charged with contempt of court be
    advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable
    opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explana-
    tion, have the right to be represented by counsel, and
    have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his
    behalf, either by way of defense or explanation, and noting
    that this principle extends to both criminal and civil cases).
    We start with the first two possibilities, criminal or
    civil contempt. The Supreme Court reviewed the dif-
    ference between these two types of proceedings in Mine
    Workers v. Bagwell, 
    512 U.S. 821
    (1994). Citing Gompers v.
    Bucks Stove & Range Co., 
    221 U.S. 418
    , 441 (1911), the
    Court stated that “a contempt sanction is considered
    No. 07-1126                                                  19
    civil if it is remedial, and for the benefit of the complain-
    ant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is
    punitive, to vindicate the authority of the 
    court.” 512 U.S. at 827-28
    (internal quotation marks omitted). As the
    Ninth Circuit explained it, “[t]he primary purpose of
    criminal contempt is to punish past defiance of a
    court’s judicial authority, thereby vindicating the court,”
    while “[c]ivil contempt is characterized by the court’s
    desire to compel obedience to a court order or to com-
    pensate the contemnor’s adversary for the injuries
    which result from the noncompliance.” Falstaff Brewing
    Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 
    702 F.2d 770
    , 778 (9th Cir. 1983)
    (citation omitted). The line between the two forms of
    contempt is not always clear. As applied to fines, how-
    ever, Bagwell held that “a ‘flat, unconditional fine’
    totaling even as little as $50 announced after a finding
    of contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no subse-
    quent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through
    
    compliance.” 512 U.S. at 829
    (quoting Penfield Co. of Cal. v.
    SEC, 
    330 U.S. 585
    , 588 (1947)). Last, the Bagwell Court
    reviewed the procedures that due process requires
    before any particular contempt penalty may be imposed. 
    Id. at 830-34.
    For that purpose, it distinguished between direct
    contempt, occurring in the court’s presence, and indirect
    contempt, occurring out of court. 
    Id. at 827
    n.2.
    Even for a direct contempt, the Court held, if the trial
    court “delays punishing a direct contempt until the com-
    pletion of trial, . . . due process requires that the
    contemnor’s rights to notice and a hearing be respected.”
    
    Id. at 832
    (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 
    418 U.S. 488
    (1974)). Direct
    contempt “cannot be punished with serious criminal
    penalties absent the full protections of a criminal trial.” 
    Id. at 833;
    see FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Even greater procedural
    20                                                No. 07-1126
    protections must accompany punishment for indirect
    contempt; “[s]ummary adjudication of indirect con-
    tempts is prohibited.” 
    Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833
    .
    A finding of civil contempt also requires adequate
    procedures. One court described the process as follows:
    To establish civil contempt, each of the following
    elements must be shown by clear and convincing
    evidence:
    (1) the existence of a valid decree of which the
    alleged contemnor had actual or constructive
    knowledge; (2) . . . that the decree was in the
    movant’s “favor”; (3) . . . that the alleged
    contemnor by its conduct violated the terms of
    the decree, and had knowledge (at least construc-
    tive knowledge) of such violations; and (4) . . . that
    [the] movant suffered harm as a result.
    Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 
    218 F.3d 288
    , 301 (4th Cir. 2000)
    (alterations in original). This court, too, emphasizes the
    importance of a particular decree or order as a predicate
    for civil contempt:
    To hold [a person] in civil contempt, the district court
    “must be able to point to a decree from the court
    which sets forth in specific detail an unequivocal
    command which the party in contempt violated.”
    Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 
    299 F.3d 635
    ,
    642 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 
    188 F.3d 709
    , 738 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also 11A WRIGHT, MILLER
    & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2960 (2d ed.
    1995).
    We need not pursue the topic of contempt further,
    because we are convinced that it is a poor match for
    No. 07-1126                                                21
    what the district court did in this case. Because Pereznieto’s
    actions were not taken in the presence of the court, any-
    thing he did would have to be viewed as an indirect
    contempt. No one argues that the court invoked the
    procedures spelled out in FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) for a
    prosecution for criminal contempt, and there is no hint
    in this record that Pereznieto received notice that this
    was what he was facing. If the $100,000 fine was in-
    tended instead to reflect a finding of civil contempt, the
    procedural problems are just as serious. The most glaring
    deficiency is the lack of any particular court decree or
    order that Pereznieto allegedly violated. Without any
    certainty about that, it is also impossible to know wheth-
    er Pereznieto had actual or even constructive knowledge
    of the decree or that the decree somehow favored the
    defendants.
    Another possibility is that the court’s order rested on
    either Rule 11 or Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure. It is easy, however, to eliminate Rule 11,
    because it applies only to attorneys or unrepresented
    parties, see Rule 11(a) & (c), and Pereznieto is neither. He
    participated in the U.S. proceeding as an expert witness,
    and so it is possible that his affidavit and other (unspeci-
    fied) filings might be considered as reports for purposes
    of Rule 26(b)(4)(A). That rule does not specifically ad-
    dress misleading or fraudulent expert reports, but
    Rule 37 addresses the topic of discovery sanctions in
    general. Rule 37(a)(1) allows a party to move for a court
    order compelling discovery, and Rule 37(b) provides for
    sanctions against either parties or nonparties who disre-
    gard a court order. To outline this possibility is to show,
    once again, that it does not fit here. The court never
    issued an order to Pereznieto either requiring him to file
    the affidavit in this court or requiring him to explain
    22                                                 No. 07-1126
    himself. It tried instead to arrange for a voluntary deposi-
    tion in Mexico City, and when that fell through, it took no
    additional steps either to compel his appearance or to
    compel his compliance with any other court order. Thus,
    we must reject both Rule 11 and Rule 37 as possible
    sources of authority.
    Last is the possibility of a penalty imposed under the
    court’s inherent authority to punish Pereznieto for an act
    that inflicted needless costs on the court and the defen-
    dants. As we have already noted, courts retain inherent
    power to punish the full range of litigation abuses. Cham-
    
    bers, 501 U.S. at 46
    . This power is distinct from the con-
    tempt power. See Matter of Maurice, 
    73 F.3d 124
    , 127-28
    (7th Cir. 1995). In Maurice, we discussed the difference
    between a sanction under FED. R. APP. P. 38 and contempt.
    Rule 38 authorizes the courts of appeals to “award just
    damages and single or double costs to the appellee” if
    it determines that an appeal is frivolous. (Notably, the
    court may do so only “after a separately filed motion or
    notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to
    respond.”) We also explained that
    a fine for contempt of court . . . entails a violation of a
    judicial order, rather than a waste of time by taking
    frivolous steps, the domain of Rule 38. Ability to
    impose sanctions for acts that impose needless costs
    on other litigants is a longstanding power of federal
    
    courts. 73 F.3d at 128
    . All that means, however, is that the full
    panoply of procedures that attend contempt proceedings,
    either criminal or civil, are not necessary for Rule 38 or
    analogous sanctions. Maurice assuredly did not hold
    that sanctions could be imposed without either notice to
    the offending person or an opportunity to respond.
    No. 07-1126                                               23
    In short, while we have no doubt that the court
    possessed inherent authority to address the kind of
    abuse with which Pereznieto is charged, that does not
    mean that it could dispense with such fundamental
    incidents of due process as adequate notice and an op-
    portunity to be heard. Cf. In re Teknek, LLC, 
    512 F.3d 342
    (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the bankruptcy rules
    and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a non-
    party to be served with process before being held in
    contempt). And the kind of casual notice that one can
    infer from this record that Pereznieto may have received
    is not good enough. In order to be adequate, the Supreme
    Court has held, a person is entitled to “notice reasonably
    calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [him]
    of the pendency of the action and afford [him] an opportu-
    nity to present [his] objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
    Bank & Trust Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 314 (1950). The Court also
    specified how much it expected of the person giving notice:
    But when notice is a person’s due, process which is
    a mere gesture is not due process. The means em-
    ployed must be such as one desirous of actually in-
    forming the absentee might reasonably adopt to
    accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the
    constitutional validity of any chosen method may
    be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably
    certain to inform those affected, or, where conditions
    do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form
    chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home
    notice than other of the feasible and customary sub-
    stitutes.
    
    Id. at 315
    (citation omitted).
    Defendants take the position that their motion for
    sanctions sufficed both to give Pereznieto notice of that
    24                                              No. 07-1126
    possibility and to afford him the opportunity to be heard. It
    is neither their fault nor the court’s, they continue, if
    Pereznieto let this chance slip away. Their motion identi-
    fied him by name, sought sanctions against him personally,
    and detailed the events in Morelos in which he was di-
    rectly involved. What defendants downplay, however,
    is the fact that they never served that motion on him
    directly. Nothing in the court record indicates that coun-
    sel for plaintiffs were also representing Pereznieto in his
    individual capacity, and so we cannot accept that service
    as a substitute. Nor is there anything that indicates an
    effort to serve Pereznieto directly in Mexico. Both the
    United States and Mexico are parties to the Hague Con-
    vention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
    Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague
    Service Convention”), opened for signature Nov. 15,
    1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, reproduced at 28
    U.S.C. App., FED. R. CIV. P. 4 note, as well as the Hague
    Evidence Convention. In the documents he filed seeking
    reconsideration of the district court’s order, Pereznieto
    specifically said that he would make himself available in
    Mexico City for a deposition pursuant to the Evidence
    Convention. Beyond that, FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) offers a
    number of options for service on an individual in a
    foreign country.
    We conclude, therefore, that the part of the district
    court’s order that imposed a personal fine of $100,000 on
    Pereznieto must be set aside for failure of proper
    service. The court is free if it wishes to conduct further
    proceedings on this matter on remand, if it concludes they
    are warranted.
    No. 07-1126                                                25
    2
    The part of the district court’s order that bars Pereznieto
    from providing any testimony in the Ford/Firestone
    cases before any court in the United States and that
    strikes all assertions that are already in the record is also
    problematic, although parts of it stand on stronger
    ground. District courts have broad discretion over the
    admission of evidence into the record, whether at the
    pretrial stage or during a trial. The findings that the
    court made about the contrived nature of the Morelos
    proceedings and the attempted fraud on the court amply
    support the court’s decision to exclude these materials
    for purposes of the multi-district proceeding before it.
    Insofar as it purported to address other lawsuits, before
    other courts, however, the court’s order was impermissibly
    overbroad. As applied to the Ford/Firestone cases, how-
    ever, the order can be implemented easily. Pereznieto has
    a lesser stake in the possibility of acting as an expert for
    these consolidated cases, as compared with his interest in
    not being subject to a large monetary fine. Courts reg-
    ularly reject expert testimony using the framework intro-
    duced by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
    (1993), and later incorporated in FED. R. EVID. 702.
    No one suggests that the rejected expert has a right to
    notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court
    renders such a decision. If this means that Pereznieto has
    breached his contract with the attorneys for the plain-
    tiffs, that is a matter to be resolved between them.
    That said, we think it best to vacate this part of the order
    as well. The testimonial bar is linked directly to the pay-
    ment of the monetary sanction of $100,000 that must be
    set aside for lack of proper notice and opportunity to be
    heard. It is unclear what sanction or sanctions the dis-
    26                                            No. 07-1126
    trict court may decide are appropriate, if and when it
    has the benefit of a full adversary proceeding that in-
    cludes Pereznieto. We note, in this connection, that
    Pereznieto has argued that the district court erred in its
    consideration of Mexican law and that it should have
    considered a wider range of materials. Should the district
    court decide to pursue this proceeding on remand,
    Pereznieto will be free to renew these arguments at an
    appropriate time.
    III
    In summary, we conclude that the district court had
    subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether there had
    been an abuse of process and that Pereznieto’s contacts
    with the Indiana proceeding were sufficient to support
    personal jurisdiction over him. We further conclude
    that although the district court possesses inherent au-
    thority to address the kind of abuse with which Pereznieto
    is charged, Pereznieto did not receive constitutionally
    adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in the
    proceeding that led to the $100,000 fine and other sanc-
    tions against him. We therefore VACATE the order and
    REMAND to the district court for reconsideration in light
    of this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs on
    appeal.
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-11-08
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-1126

Judges: Wood

Filed Date: 7/11/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

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