Gustafson, Susan v. Zumbrunnen, Kathryn ( 2008 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 07-3019
    S USAN G USTAFSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    K ATHRYN ZUMB RUNNEN, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 07-C-94—John C. Shabaz, Judge.
    S UBMITTED M AY 16, 2008—D ECIDED O CTOBER 1, 2008
    Before B AUER, P OSNER, and W OOD , Circuit Judges.
    P OSNER, Circuit Judge. This diversity suit governed by
    Wisconsin law presents an issue of federal diversity
    jurisdiction.
    The original complaint named as plaintiff Georgia
    Gustafson, suing as the personal representative of the
    estate of her grandfather, George Skille, who had ap-
    pointed her in his will, which left most of his estate to his
    eight grandchildren by his first wife. The suit named as
    defendants Skille’s lawyer, the lawyer’s law firm, and a
    2                                                 No. 07-3019
    bank in which Skille and his second wife, Betty Skille, had
    a joint account with some $150,000 in it, constituting,
    according to the complaint, the bulk of George Skille’s
    wealth. All the defendants, but none of the grandchildren,
    are citizens of Wisconsin, as George Skille had been.
    Shortly after George Skille’s death, his widow had
    withdrawn the money from the joint account. Georgia
    Gustafson, who as personal representative of Skille’s estate
    was legally entitled to control all the property of the estate,
    Wis. Stat. § 857.01; In re Estate of Peterson, 
    225 N.W.2d 644
    ,
    646 (Wis. 1975); Peters v. Kell, 
    106 N.W.2d 407
    , 413 (Wis.
    1960), sued the defendants in a Wisconsin state court to
    recover the money in the joint account for the decedent’s
    estate. The suit was settled by the entry of a judgment
    that required Betty Skille to transfer $100,000 from the
    joint checking account to her lawyer’s trust account and
    specified that “any money that may remain at the time of
    Betty Skille’s death which came from the now-closed [joint
    checking account] . . . will go to certain beneficiaries named
    in the last will of George Skille.” The agreement further
    provided that “neither party may raise any further claim
    or cause of action against the other party except to
    enforce this Stipulation and Judgment.”
    Still in her capacity as personal representative of the
    decedent’s estate, Georgia Gustafson brought the present
    suit in a federal district court in Wisconsin. It seeks the
    other $50,000 that was in the joint checking account, plus
    the attorneys’ fees incurred in the previous suit, plus
    punitive damages based on such allegations as that the
    lawyer defendant had “intentionally and tortiously
    No. 07-3019                                                  3
    interfered with the beneficiaries’ expectancy of inheritance
    by concealing or destroying the list [of beneficiaries under
    Skille’s will] and suppressing evidence of [Skille’s] testa-
    mentary intention.”
    The suit, though based ultimately on the will, is not
    within the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. The
    judgment sought would just add assets to the decedent’s
    estate; it would not reallocate the estate’s assets among
    contending claimants or otherwise interfere with the
    probate court’s control over and administration of the
    estate. Marshall v. Marshall, 
    547 U.S. 293
    , 310-12 (2006);
    Struck v. Cook County Public Guardian, 
    508 F.3d 858
    , 859-60
    (7th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Brennan, 
    465 F.3d 304
    , 306-07 (2006).
    The defendants, however, moved to dismiss the suit for
    want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction on a different
    ground—lack of complete diversity of citizenship. All the
    defendants, as we mentioned, are citizens of Wisconsin,
    and while Georgia Gustafson is a citizen of Minnesota the
    federal diversity statute treats “the legal representative” of
    a decedent’s estate (or the estate of an infant or an incom-
    petent) as a citizen of the same state as the decedent, and
    that is Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). So Georgia
    Gustafson was a Wisconsinite for purposes of her federal
    suit and that placed citizens of that state on both sides of
    the suit.
    She responded to the motion to dismiss by asking the
    court for leave to amend her complaint to change the
    plaintiff from herself in her representative capacity to
    herself plus the other grandchildren. (The grandchildren
    are the “beneficiaries” referred to in the settlement of the
    4                                               No. 07-3019
    first suit and the complaints in this one.) But then she
    noticed that this wouldn’t work either, because the eight
    grandchildren are to share equally in the decedent’s estate
    and when $370,000 (the total amount of damages sought in
    the amended complaint) is divided by eight, the quotient
    ($46,250) is below the minimum amount in controversy
    ($75,000) required for a diversity suit. So Georgia then
    filed (though improperly, because without seeking leave
    of the court) a second amended complaint, in which the
    only plaintiff is another one of the grandchildren, Susan
    Gustafson, suing on behalf of the estate. The district judge
    dismissed the suit for want of federal jurisdiction, and
    Susan Gustafson appeals.
    She argues that Georgia Gustafson, as the personal
    representative under Skille’s will, is the sole “legal repre-
    sentative” of the decedent’s estate within the meaning of 28
    U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). Wisconsin law, however, permits any
    person having an interest in a decedent’s estate, such as
    Susan Gustafson, to sue “on behalf of the estate . . . in the
    court in which the estate is being administered” to recover
    any property “which should be included in the estate.”
    Wis. Stat. § 879.63. (We need not consider whether, in
    the teeth of the statutory language, such a suit can be
    brought in a different court, namely a federal district
    court, from the court in which the estate is being adminis-
    tered.) The second amended complaint charges one of
    the defendants, the lawyer, with having tortiously inter-
    fered with the legacies to which the will entitled the
    grandchildren by advising the widow to withdraw the
    money in the joint checking account rather than turn it
    over to the estate, from which it would have passed to
    No. 07-3019                                                   5
    the grandchildren. The bank is charged with negligence,
    among other things in allowing the money to be with-
    drawn from the account, but we can limit our consider-
    ation to the tortious-interference claim.
    However, the Wisconsin statute permits someone other
    than the estate’s personal representative to sue to bring
    property into the estate only if “the personal representative
    has failed to secure the property or to bring an action to
    secure the property.” Georgia Gustafson, the personal
    representative, did bring such a suit, as we know. It is true
    that suits for tortious interference with an anticipated
    bequest, brought by the intended recipient of the bequest,
    are permitted under Wisconsin law, as under the law of
    other states. Wickert v. Burggraf, 
    570 N.W.2d 889
    , 890 (Wis.
    App. 1997); Harris v. Kritzik, 
    480 N.W.2d 514
    , 516-17 (Wis.
    App. 1992); Anderson v. McBurney, 
    467 N.W.2d 158
    , 161-62
    (Wis. App. 1991); Marshall v. 
    Marshall, supra
    , 547 U.S. at
    312; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979) (“one who
    by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally
    prevents another from receiving from a third person an
    inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received
    is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance
    or gift”); Irene D. Johnson, “Tortious Interference with
    Expectancy of Inheritance or Gift—Suggestions for Resort
    to the Tort,” 39 U. Toledo L. Rev. 769, 772 (2008). And it is
    also true that the tortious-interference claim is not, as one
    might at first glance suppose, identical to the claim in
    the original Wisconsin suit. It starts out the same, by
    asking for the $50,000 balance that remained, after the
    settlement, in the widow’s hands, but then it adds claims
    for attorneys’ fees and punitive damages. However, it
    6                                                No. 07-3019
    alleges that Susan is acting not on behalf of herself or the
    other legatees but “on behalf of the estate.” All the dam-
    ages sought against lawyer, law firm, and bank are to be
    awarded to the estate rather than to Susan or to any of the
    other individual legatees.
    If there were antagonism between Georgia and the other
    grandchildren and she were accused of failing to protect
    their interests in the decedent’s estate, they could sue
    the defendants in their own names, as in McDonald v.
    McDonald, 
    228 N.W.2d 727
    , 732 (Wis. 1975), and Schaefer v.
    Schaefer, 
    278 N.W.2d 276
    , 279 (Wis. App. 1979); see also
    Tallmadge v. Boyle, 
    730 N.W.2d 173
    , 182 (Wis. App. 2007).
    And then there would be no problem with 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(c)(2); it would not be a suit by the legal representa-
    tive of the estate. Susan says that Georgia has refused to
    continue as the plaintiff in this suit and therefore is refus-
    ing to protect the other legatees’ interests; and that is
    literally true. But her action is not motivated by any
    antagonism or disloyalty toward the other legatees. It is a
    ploy for keeping this case alive in federal court. Her refusal
    to litigate is the consequence of collusion, not antagonism.
    And anyway Susan is not suing on her own behalf or that
    of other disappointed legatees, but, as we said, on behalf of
    the estate.
    The plaintiff argues that there can be only one “legal
    representative” of a decedent’s estate within the meaning
    of the diversity statute, and that is Georgia, and so Susan’s
    suit, though on behalf of the estate, is not governed by
    section 1332(c)(2). But nothing in the statute limits the
    number of legal representatives that a decedent’s estate can
    have. Co-trustees and co-administrators are common in
    No. 07-3019                                                 7
    Wisconsin, as elsewhere. In re Disciplinary Proceedings
    Against Forester, 
    530 N.W.2d 375
    , 378 (Wis. 1995); In re
    Guardianship of Bose, 
    158 N.W.2d 337
    , 339 (Wis. 1968);
    Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Quad Drilling Corp., 
    273 So. 2d 717
    , 718 (La. App. 1973); In re Stahl’s Estate, 
    44 N.E.2d 529
    ,
    532 (Ind. App. 1942).
    The purpose of section 1332(c)(2) is to prevent the
    manufacture of diversity jurisdiction by the appointment
    of an out-of-state representative for an in-state decedent’s
    estate, or the destruction of diversity jurisdiction by
    appointing an in-state representative of an out-of-state
    decedent’s estate. Steinlage ex rel. Smith v. Mayo Clinic
    Rochester, 
    435 F.3d 913
    , 917-18 (8th Cir. 2006); Tank v.
    Chronister, 
    160 F.3d 597
    , 599-600 (10th Cir. 1998). This
    purpose would be thwarted by a rule that an estate can
    have only one legal representative, so that a second person
    who sues on behalf of the estate cannot be a representative
    within the meaning of the federal statute even though that
    is what he or she really is—as in this case. Susan is suing
    expressly on behalf of the estate, and any damages recov-
    ered in the suit are to be added to the estate, just as if
    Georgia were the plaintiff, which she would be were it not
    for the legatees’ desire to sue in federal court. To say
    that Susan is not a legal representative of the estate
    within the meaning of section 1332(c)(2) would be to say
    that an estate that wants to litigate state-law claims in
    federal court despite the absence of diversity can appoint
    a second representative to do everything the first one
    would have done and can simply refuse to acknowledge
    that the second representative is the estate’s legal represen-
    tative for purposes of that suit. A facile evasion indeed.
    8                                                   No. 07-3019
    Before subsection (c)(2) was added to the diversity
    statute in 1988, the jurisdictional issue in this case would
    have been governed solely by 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which
    requires dismissal of a case “in which any party, by
    assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collu-
    sively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
    court.” The vague word “improperly” is given meaning
    by the specific prohibition in section 1332(c)(2) against
    basing diversity jurisdiction on the state of the legal
    representative of a decedent’s estate rather than on the
    state of the decedent.
    As there is no doubt that Susan Gustafson is suing on
    behalf of a decedent’s estate, we needn’t consider the
    bearing of that section on other suits arising out of death,
    such as wrongful death suits brought by wrongful death
    trustees, as in Steinlage ex rel. Smith v. Mayo Clinic 
    Rochester, supra
    .
    The dismissal of the suit for want of federal jurisdiction
    is
    A FFIRMED.
    10-1-08