Saleem Jan v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2009 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-1093
    S ALEEM M UHAMMAD JAN,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
    of the United States,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review
    from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A95 925 138
    A RGUED JULY 7, 2009—D ECIDED A UGUST 6, 2009
    Before P OSNER, K ANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    P ER C URIAM. Saleem Muhammed Jan, a native of Paki-
    stan, entered the United States in 1999 and overstayed
    his visa. When immigration officials initiated removal
    proceedings, Jan requested asylum and withholding of
    removal based on his membership in a particular social
    group, which he describes as Pakistanis who are threat-
    ened by government officials bribed to settle private
    2                                              No. 08-1093
    disputes. He also sought relief under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied
    his application and ordered him removed. The Board of
    Immigration Appeals concurred in the IJ’s conclusion
    and dismissed Jan’s appeal. Because the Board’s decision
    was supported by substantial evidence, we deny Jan’s
    petition.
    All of Jan’s troubles began after a major customer of
    his fabric exporting business, Musaib Fabrics, refused
    to pay for a large shipment of fabric, citing poor quality.
    Musaib, located in Karachi, had contracted in 1998 to
    sell $1 million U.S. dollars worth of fabric to Prestige
    Apparels, located in Qatar. The initial shipments of
    fabric passed inspection, and Prestige’s bank in Qatar
    released payment to Musaib’s banks in Pakistan after
    each shipment. But around October 1998, after receipt
    of the final shipment, Prestige rejected the fabric as sub-
    standard and refused to make further payment.
    The following month Jan met with the management of
    Habib Bank, one of Musaib’s banks in Pakistan, to discuss
    his outstanding debts to the bank in connection with the
    Prestige transaction. According to Jan, Habib’s manage-
    ment threatened to use their connections to corrupt
    Pakistani officials to have him arrested for the debts he
    owed the bank. But after further discussion, Habib’s
    management backed off of their earlier threats and
    decided to join a lawsuit that Jan brought in Qatar
    against Prestige to collect payment. Jan and Habib Bank
    in fact won their case in 1999, but two years later the
    decision was reversed by Qatar’s highest court, which
    No. 08-1093                                               3
    ordered Musaib to refund $365,855 to Prestige for the
    substandard fabric it sold. Shortly thereafter, Habib sued
    Jan in Pakistan, seeking more than $200,000 for Musaib’s
    outstanding debt from the Prestige deal.
    After Prestige stopped payment to Musaib, Jan became
    unable to pay his business debts, leading to indirect
    threats instigated by his creditors against him. For in-
    stance, sometime in fall 1998, one of Musaib’s contractors,
    Latif Textile, filed a complaint over an unpaid bill with
    Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (“FIA”), the
    country’s national law enforcement agency. Jan in turn
    was summoned to FIA’s Karachi office. At the FIA office,
    Jan testified, he heard screams for help and saw bruised
    and beaten people being led out of offices. According to
    Jan, he met with an FIA agent named Baloch for half an
    hour, during which time Baloch placed his revolver on
    the table and told him to pay Latif Textile the $50,000
    he owed. Jan testified that he interpreted Baloch’s
    gesture as a threat. Two days after his meeting, Jan
    visited Latif Textiles’s director, who agreed to stop com-
    plaining to the FIA as long as Jan demonstrated that he
    would pay off his debt. But the Latif director parted
    with the words “I will see you”—an ominous phrase,
    according to Jan, that reflects a serious threat or warning.
    The nature and scope of the FIA’s activities were ad-
    dressed at Jan’s removal hearing by Kamran Rizvi, a
    former Pakistani political activist now living in the
    United States. Rizvi had served as a human-rights con-
    sultant to the Pakistani government for four years and
    later founded a non-profit organization in Pakistan pro-
    4                                               No. 08-1093
    moting tolerance and nonviolence. Rizvi testified that the
    FIA runs detention centers and has been implicated in
    the torture of prisoners at those centers. He stated that,
    because police corruption is rampant, individuals with
    FIA connections pull strings by having agents use in-
    timidation or threats of detention to coerce their adver-
    saries to settle private disputes. When asked what
    would happen if a person called into the FIA office did not
    comply, Rizvi responded that the agent could place
    that person in a detention center and order beatings or
    torture. Without explanation, Rizvi went on to say that
    90 percent of the people called into FIA offices are
    detained and that Jan was lucky to avoid trouble after
    his meeting with Baloch.
    Jan’s business debts led to another unsettling incident in
    late 1998, when his family members were allegedly am-
    bushed by armed men while driving in Karachi. According
    to Jan, the men demanded $12,000 in payment for
    Jan’s business debts and threatened to kill him if they
    were not paid. Jan’s family submitted and turned over
    money and jewelry. The men’s identities were unknown,
    though Jan suspects that they worked for Latif Textiles
    or perhaps another of Musaib’s creditors. And the harass-
    ment continued. Jan claims that in the first half of 1999
    he received threatening phone calls from people working
    for Latif Textiles and other creditors. He said that
    Musaib’s creditors also dispatched thugs to his house
    and office to threaten him and his family with harm
    unless he settled his debts.
    In May 1999 Jan fled to the United States. He says
    he overstayed his visa to avoid further confrontations
    No. 08-1093                                            5
    with his creditors in Pakistan. The following month his
    wife and children moved to the United Arab Emirates to
    live with her parents. Sometime later, after Jan had de-
    parted Pakistan for the United States, the manager of
    Habib Bank went to Jan’s house in Karachi and told his
    father that if Jan did not pay the money he owed to the
    bank, “we will send the army people to your house
    and take you away.” In 2000 Jan’s cousin visited him in
    the United States and told him that the FIA was still
    looking for him. Jan also points to country reports and
    news articles as evidence that his creditors would
    bribe officials to detain, torture, or even kill him upon
    his return.
    After a hearing, the IJ found that Jan did not qualify
    for asylum because his fear of persecution arose from
    a purely personal dispute and not on account of
    any ground protected by the INA. The IJ also found
    Jan ineligible for CAT relief because he failed to
    establish that it was more likely than not that the FIA
    would torture him if he returned to Pakistan, especially
    in the absence of any harm after his meeting with
    Baloch. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) sub-
    sequently dismissed Jan’s appeal. The BIA found Jan
    ineligible for asylum because he failed to adequately
    describe a particular social group. And because Jan
    failed to satisfy the statutory burden required for
    asylum, the BIA concluded that he could not meet the
    higher standard for withholding of removal—a clear
    probability of persecution. Finally, the BIA upheld the
    IJ’s conclusion that Jan was not eligible for CAT relief
    because he had not shown that he would be tortured if
    he returned to Pakistan.
    6                                                 No. 08-1093
    In his petition for review, Jan first argues that the
    BIA and IJ erred in concluding that he would not be
    tortured by Pakistani government officials upon his
    return. In support, he points to the 1998 ambush on his
    family, the documentary evidence of police corruption
    in Pakistan, and portions of Rizvi’s testimony. As further
    evidence that he would be tortured if returned to
    Pakistan, Jan notes his encounter with Baloch, as well as
    Pakistan’s “systematic problem” of police torture.
    To receive protection under CAT, an individual must
    prove it more likely than not that he would be tortured
    if he returns to the country of removal. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c); LaGuerre v. Mukasey, 
    526 F.3d 1037
    , 1040
    (7th Cir. 2008); Prela v. Ashcroft, 
    394 F.3d 515
    , 519 (7th
    Cir. 2005). Torture must be inflicted by or with the
    consent of a public official. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(1);
    Boci v. Gonzales, 
    473 F.3d 762
    , 768 (7th Cir. 2007).
    Here Jan did not prove a likelihood that he would be
    tortured upon return by Pakistani government officials.
    There is no evidence that the government was behind
    either the 1998 ambush of Jan’s family or the other
    threats made against Jan at his home and office. Further,
    the country reports and news articles on police corrup-
    tion in Pakistan are too general and vague to suggest
    that Jan in particular would face torture. See Ayele v. Holder,
    
    564 F.3d 862
    , 871 (7th Cir. 2009). The only concrete
    example of government intimidation was Baloch’s bran-
    dishing the gun in his meeting with Jan, but even in
    that case Baloch had no further contact with Jan. Nor is
    there any evidence that Pakistani government officials
    No. 08-1093                                                 7
    contacted Jan or his family during the past ten years.
    Thus, the evidence does not compel a finding that Jan
    would be tortured if he returns to Pakistan.
    Jan next challenges the BIA’s conclusion that he did not
    identify an appropriate social group. He characterizes his
    social group as “persons threatened by corrupt officials of
    the [FIA] in Pakistan.” This court has explained that “a
    characteristic that defines a ‘social group’ within the
    meaning of the immigration laws ‘must be one that
    the members of the group either cannot change, or
    should not be required to change because it is fundamental
    to their individual identities or consciences.’ ” Orejuela v.
    Gonzales, 
    423 F.3d 666
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citation
    omitted); Lwin v. I.N.S., 
    144 F.3d 505
    , 512 (7th Cir. 1998).
    Jan’s indebtedness, however, is not an immutable charac-
    teristic because it is not innate or fundamental to his
    identity. See Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 
    406 F.3d 1187
    , 1191-92
    (10th Cir. 2005) (“Being indebted to the same creditor
    (unscrupulous or not) is not the kind of group characteris-
    tic that a person either cannot change or should not
    be required to change.”).
    The petition for review is D ENIED.
    8-6-09