United States v. Dennis Oglesby ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 09-1334
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    D ENNIS O GLESBY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of Illinois.
    No. 08-CR-10065—Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
    A RGUED N OVEMBER 9, 2009—D ECIDED M ARCH 10, 2010
    Before E VANS and S YKES, Circuit Judges, and D ER-
    Y EGHIAYAN, District Judge.Œ
    D ER-Y EGHIAYAN, District Judge. During an investiga-
    tory stop, a police officer conducted a pat-down frisk of
    Dennis Oglesby and found a handgun on his person.
    Oglesby was arrested and charged with one count of
    Œ
    Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, District Judge for the Northern
    District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.
    2                                               No. 09-1334
    being a felon in possession of a handgun, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . Oglesby moved to suppress the hand-
    gun, arguing that the police officer did not have suf-
    ficient justification to conclude that Oglesby was
    armed or dangerous and therefore did not lawfully con-
    duct a pat-down search of Oglesby. The district court
    denied Oglesby’s motion to suppress the handgun based
    on the testimonies of several police officers who were
    present at the scene of the arrest. After entry of judgment,
    Oglesby filed a timely appeal challenging the district
    court’s denial of his motion to suppress. For the
    following reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of
    the motion to suppress.
    I. Background
    On June 5, 2008, around 9:00 p.m., Dennis Oglesby was
    standing with a group of four or five men by a bus stop in
    a high-crime area of Peoria, Illinois. Police Officers Rory
    Poynter and Mike Featherstone were on patrol in the
    area and observed that the men were obstructing the
    sidewalk in violation of a city ordinance. After calling
    for back-up so that the police presence would approxi-
    mate the number of men in the group, Officer Poynter
    and Officer Featherstone approached the group to
    discuss the ordinance violation. Almost immediately,
    Police Officer Mike Johnston and his partner also arrived
    on the scene in a squad car. After approaching the
    group, Officer Poynter and Officer Featherstone identi-
    fied themselves to the group as police officers and
    Officer Poynter addressed one of the other men in the
    No. 09-1334                                               3
    group who was drinking alcohol in violation of another
    city ordinance.
    During the investigatory stop, the officers observed that
    Oglesby looked from side to side, dropped his right
    hand down toward his right pocket, and separated
    himself from the group by taking a few steps backward
    while still facing Officer Poynter and Officer Feather-
    stone. The officers also observed that Oglesby had
    angled his body away from Officer Poynter and
    Officer Featherstone so that they were unable to view
    Oglesby’s right side. Oglesby was wearing loose jeans
    and a baggy T-shirt over another T-shirt, and therefore,
    the officers could not have observed any bulge
    beneath Oglesby’s clothing indicating that Oglesby
    carried a weapon.
    Upon seeing Oglesby drop his hand toward his right
    pocket, Officer Featherstone told Oglesby to show his
    hands, and Oglesby immediately complied. When
    Officer Featherstone asked the group to show identifica-
    tion, Oglesby again dropped his hand toward his right
    pocket. Officer Featherstone repeated to Oglesby the
    instruction to show his hands. Oglesby again immedi-
    ately complied, claiming that he had been following
    Officer Featherstone’s prior instruction to show his identi-
    fication.
    From his position behind Oglesby, Officer Johnston was
    not able to hear any of the conversation between Officer
    Featherstone and Oglesby, but Officer Johnston saw
    Oglesby backing away from Officer Featherstone and
    Officer Poynter while looking from side to side. Officer
    4                                              No. 09-1334
    Johnston also observed Oglesby repeatedly lower his
    right hand to his right side, and noted Oglesby’s angled
    stance. In response to Oglesby’s actions, Officer Johnston
    approached Oglesby from behind and grabbed the back
    of Oglesby’s waistband to keep Oglesby from fleeing.
    Officer Johnston asked Oglesby to show his hands and
    Oglesby complied. Officer Johnston then asked Oglesby
    if he had any drugs or weapons on him and Oglesby
    replied that he did not. Despite Oglesby’s denial, Officer
    Johnston put his right hand on the right side of
    Oglesby’s waistband and felt the butt of a handgun
    that Oglesby was carrying. Oglesby was then arrested.
    On August 20, 2008, a grand jury indicted Oglesby
    on one count of possession of a handgun by a felon.
    Oglesby pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress
    the handgun found on him. On October 10, 2008, following
    an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the
    motion. On October 17, 2008, Oglesby entered a condi-
    tional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the
    denial of his motion to suppress. On February 6, 2009,
    the district court sentenced Oglesby to 60 months of
    imprisonment. Oglesby appeals from the district court’s
    denial of his motion to suppress.
    II. Discussion
    The police officers properly approached Oglesby and
    his group. The issue before the court is whether the pat-
    down search of Oglesby was a violation of Ogelsby’s
    constitutional rights. We review the district court’s legal
    determination de novo and its findings of fact for clear
    No. 09-1334                                                   5
    error. United States v. Kenerson, 
    585 F.3d 389
    , 392 (7th Cir.
    2009).
    The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
    tion provides certain protections to the public from
    searches and seizures, but it does not bar all searches. In
    order to conduct an investigatory stop, also known as a
    “Terry stop,” consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
     (1968), “an officer must be ‘aware of specific
    and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspi-
    cion.’ ” Jewett v. Anders, 
    521 F.3d 818
    , 823-25 (7th Cir. 2008)
    (quoting in part United States v. Tilmon, 
    19 F.3d 1221
    , 1224
    (7th Cir. 1994)). A reasonable suspicion requires “more
    than a hunch but less than probable cause and ‘consider-
    ably less than preponderance of the evidence.’ ”
    
    Id.
     (quoting in part Illinois v. Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. 119
    , 123,
    
    120 S.Ct. 673
    , 
    145 L.Ed.2d 570
     (2000)). Police officers
    are permitted to rely on their experience and training
    in forming a reasonable suspicion. United States v.
    Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 273-74, 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 750-51 (2002).
    Determining whether an officer had a reasonable
    suspicion is assessed considering the totality of the cir-
    cumstances and “common-sensical judgments and infer-
    ences about human behavior.” United States v. Baskin, 
    401 F.3d 788
    , 791 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. at 125
    , 
    120 S.Ct. at 676
    ). During a Terry stop, a law enforce-
    ment officer can conduct a protective pat-down search
    only if the officer has “at a minimum some articulable
    suspicion that the subject is concealing a weapon or
    poses a danger to the [officer] or others . . . .” United States
    v. Pedroza, 
    269 F.3d 821
    , 827 (7th Cir. 2001).
    6                                               No. 09-1334
    Oglesby’s arrest occurred at night in a location that
    was known to the officers to be a high-crime area
    plagued by drug trafficking and gun violence. While
    being present in a high-crime area cannot, in and of
    itself, support a particularized suspicion that a subject is
    committing a crime, an officer is permitted to consider a
    location’s characteristics when assessing a situation.
    Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. at 124
    , 
    120 S.Ct. at 676
    ; see also United
    States v. Brewer, 
    561 F.3d 676
    , 679 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting
    that the vehicle observed by officers “was the only
    vehicle on the road at that late hour in [a] high crime
    area”); United States v. Jackson, 
    300 F.3d 740
    , 746 (7th
    Cir. 2002) (permitting officers to consider the prevalence
    of criminal activity in a particular location when
    evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop).
    In addition, as the officers converged on the scene,
    Oglesby slowly retreated from the group while looking
    from side to side. The Supreme Court has recognized
    in numerous cases that nervous or evasive behavior “is a
    pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”
    Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. at 124
    , 
    120 S.Ct. at 676
    . In the instant
    case, the police officers confronted Oglesby and the group
    of men he was standing with to discuss possible violations
    of two city ordinances. Oglesby was the only man in the
    group who seemed to be taking evasive action during
    the confrontation. There is nothing in the record to
    indicate any reason why a law-abiding person in
    Oglesby’s position would have cause to be nervous or
    back away from the officers. In addition, the police
    officers testified at the suppression hearing that, based
    on their experience, Oglesby’s behavior led them to
    No. 09-1334                                              7
    believe that Oglesby might be a flight risk. Such behavior,
    coupled with the other circumstances surrounding the
    Terry stop, would create a reasonable suspicion that
    Oglesby was carrying a gun or was otherwise engaged
    in unlawful activity.
    Oglesby had also angled his body away from Officer
    Poynter and Officer Feathersone so that Oglesby’s right
    side was obscured from their view. Officer Johnston
    testified at the suppression hearing that police officers
    are trained to use the same angled stance to shield their
    weapons when confronting a potentially dangerous
    subject. Thus, Officer Johnston’s training made it rea-
    sonable for him to infer that Oglesby’s stance was poten-
    tially calculated to keep a weapon hidden or out of reach.
    Finally, Oglesby repeatedly lowered his right hand
    toward the right pocket of his pants. At the suppression
    hearing, Officer Poynter indicated that police officers
    are trained to watch for such behavior since experience
    has shown that a subject who pats his waistband may
    be trying to confirm that his gun is concealed and se-
    cured. Officer Featherstone indicated that he was
    worried when Oglesby dropped his right hand out of
    Officer Featherstone’s view, which was why Officer
    Featherstone repeatedly asked Oglesby to show his
    hands. Officer Johnston stated that he perceived Officer
    Featherstone’s alarm when Oglesby repeatedly lowered
    his right hand. Although there is some indication that
    Officer Featherstone had asked the group at one point
    to produce identification, the record also indicates that
    Oglesby placed his hand on his right side prior to the
    8                                               No. 09-1334
    request. Thus, the record clearly reflects that such action
    by Oglesby reasonably indicated to the officers that
    Oglesby might be carrying a weapon.
    Based on the factors above and the totality of the cir-
    cumstances, Officer Johnston clearly had articulable
    facts upon which he could reasonably suspect that
    Oglesby was armed or dangerous. Officer Johnston’s
    timely and efficient observations in this case allowed
    him to discover the handgun Oglesby was carrying and
    remove it quickly and peacefully. Officer Johnston’s
    ability to synthesize his observations and react quickly
    was vital to the safety of the officers and the public. It is
    clear that the circumstances of the encounter, in combina-
    tion with Officer Johnston’s experience and training,
    resulted in the proper pat-down search of Oglesby.
    Furthermore, the pat-down search was extremely
    limited in scope. Oglesby’s behavior led the officers to
    suspect that Oglesby might be carrying a weapon on
    the right side of his waistband area, and Officer
    Johnston’s pat-down frisk of Oglesby was isolated to that
    area. Thus, Officer Johnston’s pat-down frisk only mini-
    mally invaded Oglesby’s personal security. In this case,
    the need of the police officers to protect themselves and
    the public from potential violence clearly outweighed
    the slight invasion to Oglesby’s personal security. See
    United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
    422 U.S. 873
    , 878, 
    95 S.Ct. 2574
    , 2578-79 (1975) (instructing the court to balance the
    public interest served by a search against the invasion of
    personal security when testing the reasonableness of the
    search). Therefore, based on all of the foregoing, we
    No. 09-1334                                           9
    conclude that Officer Johnston’s pat-down frisk of
    Oglesby did not violate Oglesby’s Fourth Amendment
    rights.
    III. Conclusion
    For the above stated reasons, we A FFIRM the district
    court’s denial of Oglesby’s motion to suppress.
    3-10-10