Jerry Harden v. Bruce Schroeder ( 2019 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted June 28, 2019 *
    Decided July 1, 2019
    Before
    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
    No. 18-3144
    JERRY HARDEN,                                        Appeal from the
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                            United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    v.
    No. 18-C-1109
    BRUCE SCHROEDER and
    REBECCA MATOSKA-MENTINK,                             Lynn Adelman,
    Defendants-Appellees.                           Judge.
    ORDER
    Jerry Harden, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals the dismissal at screening of his
    complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. He alleges that a state-court judge and clerk violated
    his First and Fourteenth Amendment right to access the courts by docketing his
    collateral attack in his criminal case. But he has not alleged that the docketing harmed
    *  The defendants were not served in the district court and are not participating in
    this appeal. We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
    record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
    significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 18-3144                                                                           Page 2
    him, and he attached to his complaint a state-court ruling showing that he received a
    merits decision on his collateral attack. Thus, we affirm.
    We review a dismissal at screening de novo and accept Harden’s allegations as
    true. Gomez v. Randle, 
    680 F.3d 859
    , 864 (7th Cir. 2012). Harden filed a “Petition for Writ
    for Habeas Corpus” in the Circuit Court of Kenosha County. He used the case number
    from his original criminal case, and the court clerk docketed the petition in that case’s
    file instead of opening a new one. Circuit Judge Bruce Schroeder reviewed Harden’s
    petition and, as the ruling that Harden attached to his complaint shows, denied it on the
    merits. Referring to Harden (mistakenly) as “Mr. Moore,” the state judge also wrote:
    “Because Mr. Moore has incorrectly filed this petition in the criminal court file, … this
    order and his application will be kept in the criminal court file for reference purposes.”
    Harden moved for reconsideration. The judge reviewed that motion too but denied it.
    Rather than appeal the denial of his petition, Harden turned to federal court. He
    sued the judge and clerk for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they
    conspired to deny him access to the courts. Harden asserted that the clerk intentionally
    refused to docket his petition under a new case number and that the judge’s denial of
    Harden’s petition was “illegal” and “fictitious.” In dismissing the case, the district judge
    explained that Harden had no constitutional right to insist that the clerk adhere to state
    filing rules. And, the judge added, Harden could not allege an injury from the
    defendants’ actions because nothing “prevents [Harden] from appealing Judge
    Schroeder’s denial should he choose to do so.”
    On appeal Harden contends that he stated a valid claim that the defendants
    deprived him of access to the courts. We begin with two threshold matters. First, the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine permitted the judge to decide the merits of this § 1983 suit. See
    Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983). Because Harden complains about acts that preceded the initiation of process (the
    alleged refusal to docket a case), Rooker-Feldman did not block the district court from
    acquiring jurisdiction. See Gen. Auto Serv. Station LLC v. City of Chicago, 
    319 F.3d 902
    , 905
    (7th Cir. 2003). Second, because Harden seeks damages from the defendants under
    § 1983 for allegedly preventing him from accessing the state court to invalidate his state
    conviction, the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    (1994), could be a defense to
    this suit. But the judge did not discuss Heck and the defense is not jurisdictional, so we
    do not address it. See Polzin v. Gage, 
    636 F.3d 834
    , 838 (7th Cir. 2011).
    No. 18-3144                                                                              Page 3
    The district judge was correct to dismiss the suit on the merits. Although many
    defects render it baseless, we discuss only one: Harper failed to allege an injury. To state
    an access-to-courts claim, a prisoner must allege that an injury resulted from the
    defendants’ conduct. See Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 350–51 (1996); Ortloff v. United
    States, 
    335 F.3d 652
    , 656 (7th Cir. 2003). An inmate may allege, for example, “that he
    missed court deadlines, failed to make timely filings, or that legitimate claims were
    dismissed because of the denial of reasonable access to legal resources.” 
    Ortloff, 335 F.3d at 656
    . Harden pleaded none of this. Moreover, the ruling attached to his complaint
    shows that despite how the case was docketed, the state judge decided the merits of the
    petition. Therefore, Harden received access to the courts. See Antonelli v. Sheahan,
    
    81 F.3d 1422
    , 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Shango v. Jurich, 
    965 F.2d 289
    , 293 (7th Cir. 1992).
    Finally, nothing prevented Harden from appealing this adverse decision on the
    merits. In Wisconsin a litigant may appeal by filing a notice “with the clerk of the circuit
    court in which the judgment or order appealed from was entered.” WIS. STAT.
    § 809.10(1). The judge told Harden what case number to use, so he could have used his
    case name and number, specified the order that he planned to appeal, and followed the
    other procedural rules set forth in section 809.10(1)(b).
    Harden’s replies are unpersuasive. First, he observes that in denying his petition,
    Judge Schroeder made a scrivener’s error by calling Harden “Mr. Moore.” That may
    have been a reason to appeal in state court, but it also shows that Harden received
    access to the state court because the judge made that error when deciding the petition’s
    merits. Second, Harden argues that Judge Schroeder entered an “illegal” and
    “fictitious” order. If Harden is challenging the validity of a state-court order,
    Rooker-Feldman blocks that challenge. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
    
    544 U.S. 280
    , 283–84 (2005); Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 
    591 F.3d 896
    , 900 (7th Cir.
    2010). And in any event, Judge Schroeder is absolutely immune for his judicial actions.
    See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 
    502 U.S. 9
    , 11 (1991); Myrick v. Greenwood, 
    856 F.3d 487
    , 488 (7th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 389
    (2017). Finally, Harden complains that the district judge
    failed to address his allegation that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his
    constitutional rights. But without an underlying violation, his conspiracy allegations
    also fail to state a claim. See Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 
    636 F.3d 293
    , 305 (7th Cir. 2011).
    AFFIRMED