Edward Weinhaus v. Natalie Cohen ( 2019 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted June 28, 2019*
    Decided July 16, 2019
    Before
    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
    No. 18-3185
    EDWARD A. WEINHAUS,                              Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                         Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.                                         No. 18 C 2471
    NATALIE B. COHEN, et al.,                        Rebecca R. Pallmeyer,
    Defendants-Appellees.                        Chief Judge.
    ORDER
    Edward Weinhaus sued his ex-relatives and the state of Illinois over provisions
    in a state-court custody judgment that required Weinhaus to exercise his parenting time
    outside Illinois. He contends that this requirement violates his constitutional right to
    travel and that the custody proceedings generally violate his right to due process. The
    district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Because it rightly concluded
    * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
    frivolous and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P.
    34(a)(2)(A).
    No. 18-3185                                                                           Page 2
    that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the domestic-relations exception to
    federal jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we affirm.
    Weinhaus and Natalie Cohen filed for divorce in 2012 in the Circuit Court of
    Cook County, Illinois. (We recite the factual allegations and draw all reasonable
    inferences in favor of Weinhaus. See Evers v. Astrue, 
    536 F.3d 651
    , 656 (7th Cir. 2008).)
    Later, they agreed to a joint-custody judgment that addressed the care of their five
    children. Under that judgment, Cohen is the primary residential parent and resides in
    Illinois with the children. Weinhaus, a resident of Missouri, may conduct his parenting
    time outside of Illinois on specified weekends and school breaks. In 2016, Weinhaus and
    Cohen agreed to a modified judgment. One modification provided that Weinhaus’s
    parenting time on certain weekends and school breaks “shall” be exercised outside of
    Illinois. The following year, Weinhaus moved to modify the judgment to remove the
    requirement that he “shall” exercise parenting time outside of Illinois.
    A month before the hearing on his motion to modify, Weinhaus turned to federal
    court, invoking 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) to sue Cohen, her new husband, her
    parents (“the Cohen defendants”), and the state of Illinois. He contends that, because
    the custody judgment requires that he spend his time with his children outside of
    Illinois, and the defendants interpret the judgment that way, they have violated his
    right to travel within Illinois with his children. He argues also that they have violated
    his right to due process because the order was entered without proper procedures,
    without considering the best interests of the children, without recognizing that he was
    under duress, and after interfering with his right to self-representation.
    The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The judge concluded that both the domestic-
    relations exception to federal jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the
    court’s review of the case. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    (1923). (The judge also ruled that the
    custody order did not violate Weinhaus’s right to travel and that the state was immune
    under the Eleventh Amendment.) Because there was “no possibility that [Weinhaus’s]
    allegations can support a good faith claim within this court’s jurisdiction,” the judge
    declined to allow him leave to amend the complaint. We review Weinhaus’s appeal of
    the dismissal de novo. See Kowalski v. Boliker, 
    893 F.3d 987
    , 994 (7th Cir. 2018).
    Weinhaus contends that the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction
    does not block this suit, but the district judge correctly ruled that it does. The exception
    No. 18-3185                                                                            Page 3
    precludes federal review of state-court decisions “’involving the granting of divorce,
    decrees of alimony,’ and child custody orders.” 
    Kowalski, 893 F.3d at 995
    (quoting
    Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 
    504 U.S. 689
    , 701–02 (1992)). Weinhaus argues that the
    domestic-relations exception applies only to diversity-jurisdiction cases, not to
    federal-question cases, like his. But it applies in both types of suits. 
    Kowalski, 893 F.3d at 995
    ; Jones v. Brennan, 
    465 F.3d 304
    , 306–07 (7th Cir. 2006). The reason is that state
    courts, which “have developed a proficiency in core probate and domestic-relations
    matters,” Struck v. Cook Cty. Pub. Guardian, 
    508 F.3d 858
    , 860 (7th Cir. 2007), may also
    decide issues of federal law, so “confining a class of federal-law cases to state courts
    does not deprive litigants of their federal rights,” 
    Jones, 465 F.3d at 307
    .
    To avoid the exception, Weinhaus suggests three possible end-runs, but they are
    all unavailing. First, he relies on Kowalski to contend that the exception does not apply
    because he is merely attacking a third party’s “tortious interference” with a family-law
    case. 
    See 893 F.3d at 995
    –96. In Kowalski, the plaintiff alleged that defendants corruptly
    tried to influence how a judge decided a divorce suit. Because that claim—undue
    influence—was not based on family law, we ruled that the domestic-relations exception
    did not apply (though we decided for other reasons that the plaintiff failed to state a
    claim). 
    Id. Weinhaus’s claim
    is different. He complains that his ex-relatives are using the
    custody judgment itself to restrict access to his children in Illinois, so the claim depends
    entirely on domestic-relations law. Second, Weinhaus contends that the exception does
    not apply because the state court “lacked jurisdiction” after it deprived him of his
    procedural rights and failed to consider the best interests of the children. But these are
    arguments for a direct appeal in state court; they are not grounds for federal courts to
    exercise jurisdiction. See 
    id. Third, Weinhaus
    observes that he and Cohen are now
    divorced and the circuit court has awarded custody, so no domestic-relations case is
    pending there. But this lawsuit is a dispute over child custody, a matter under the
    continuing supervision of state courts, so the domestic-relations exception applies.
    Based on Weinhaus’s last contention—that the domestic-relations case is over—
    the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also precludes our review. The doctrine prevents federal
    district and appellate courts from deciding cases by litigants complaining of injuries
    from state-court judgments rendered before the federal suit commenced and seeking
    federal review and reversal of those judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
    Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005). Weinhaus’s alleged injury comes from the
    provisions in the custody judgment requiring him to exercise his parenting time outside
    of Illinois. The state court entered that judgment and modified it before Weinhaus sued
    in federal court for review and relief from that judgment, so Rooker-Feldman applies.
    No. 18-3185                                                                         Page 4
    Weinhaus raises two arguments that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable,
    but they are as meritless as his contentions about the domestic-relations exception. The
    doctrine does not preclude our review, he first submits, because the modified judgment
    is “void.” It is void, he says, because he agreed to it under duress, the state court failed
    to consider the best interests of the children, and the court lacked authority to require
    him to raise his children outside of Illinois. But the doctrine precludes federal
    jurisdiction “no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may
    be” because the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal court with
    jurisdiction to review a state-court judgment. Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist.,
    
    205 F.3d 990
    , 996 (7th Cir. 2000). Second, he argues that he does not challenge only the
    state-court judgment; he also contests the defendants’ procedural tactics in court (such
    as allegedly preventing him from having a hearing and criticizing his
    self-representation) that led to the adverse custody judgment. But there is no
    “procedural exception” to the doctrine—it applies to “the procedures used by state
    courts to reach decisions” where, as here, “[n]o injury occurred until the state judge
    ruled against” the federal plaintiff. Harold v. Steel, 
    773 F.3d 884
    , 886 (7th Cir. 2014).
    Because the district court lacked jurisdiction, we do not reach Weinhaus’s
    remaining arguments. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal, though the
    judgment is modified to be for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    A final matter remains: the Cohen defendants moved for sanctions under Rule 38
    of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, to which Weinhaus has responded in
    opposition. Sanctions are indeed warranted. The suit is plainly blocked by the
    domestic-relations exception and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To avoid the
    jurisdictional problem, Weinhaus contends that the state-court judgment violates his
    rights to due process and to travel interstate. But his arguments do not circumvent the
    impediments to jurisdiction, and they ignore our case law and the arguments raised by
    the Cohen defendants and the state of Illinois. Thus, the Cohen defendants’ motion is
    GRANTED, and they may file, within 14 days of this order, a statement of the attorneys’
    fees and other expenses reasonably incurred in defending this appeal. Weinhaus shall
    file any response no later than 21 days after the Cohen defendants file their statement.
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, WITH SANCTIONS