United States v. Rashad Anchando ( 2019 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued June 12, 2019
    Decided June 19, 2019
    Before
    DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
    AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge
    AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
    No. 18‐2763
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff‐Appellee,                        Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.                                        No. 1:17‐CR‐00371(2)
    RASHAD ANCHANDO,                                John J. Tharp, Jr.,
    Defendant‐Appellant.                        Judge.
    ORDER
    After crashing a stolen Jeep into the storefront of a firearms retailer, Rashad
    Anchando and his co‐defendants stole 20 guns. Anchando pleaded guilty to stealing
    firearms from a federally licensed gun dealer, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (u), and the district court
    sentenced him to 60 months’ incarceration, consecutive to a sentence that he is serving
    for an unrelated state conviction. On appeal, Anchando argues that his consecutive,
    above‐Guidelines sentence is unreasonable. Because the district court did not abuse its
    discretion, we affirm the sentence.
    No. 18‐2763                                                                         Page 2
    Background
    After Anchando and his co‐defendants stole a Jeep from the parking lot of a gun
    store in Spring Valley, Illinois, they discovered that it contained 700 to 800 rounds of
    ammunition. They then decided to rob South Post Guns, a federally licensed firearms
    business in Streator, Illinois. A co‐conspirator drove the stolen Jeep through the
    storefront, and Anchando and others then entered the store, broke glass casings, and
    stole 20 firearms. Later, the group recorded a video of themselves pointing the stolen
    weapons, with the tags still attached, at the camera; the video was posted on Facebook.
    The group then divided the firearms among themselves. Anchando admits that he
    believed that his accomplices would bring the guns to Chicago and distribute them to
    persons who did not intend to use or dispose of them lawfully.
    Two weeks later, Streator police officers arrested Anchando for the delivery of
    heroin and possession of a stolen firearm. While in detention, he also was charged with
    battery against a fellow inmate. He pleaded guilty to all three charges in Illinois state
    court and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.
    While Anchando was incarcerated, a federal grand jury indicted him on three
    charges in connection with the gun‐store robbery: conspiring to steal from a federally
    licensed gun dealer, 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    , stealing from a federally licensed gun dealer,
    
    id.
     § 922(u), and possessing stolen firearms, id. § 922(j). Anchando entered into a written
    plea agreement and pleaded guilty to the second count.
    At the sentencing hearing, the court calculated a Guidelines range of 41 to 51
    months’ imprisonment. The government requested a sentence of 51 months, beginning
    after his state sentence. Anchando argued that the sentence should not be consecutive
    because he had not committed the federal offense while serving his state sentence.
    See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a). The district court determined, however, that it had discretion to
    impose the sentence wholly concurrent with, partially concurrent with, or consecutive
    to Anchando’s state sentence.
    Ultimately, the court sentenced Anchando to a fully consecutive 60 months in
    prison. In reaching its conclusion, the court discussed each of the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). Among these factors, the court assessed the nature and circumstances
    surrounding the offense, including the fact that Anchando and his co‐defendants posted
    a video bragging about the crime and advertising the guns for distribution, “in effect
    volunteering to throw gas on the fire that is the problem of gun violence in [Chicago].”
    No. 18‐2763                                                                            Page 3
    The court also emphasized the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public
    from similar crimes, and the objective of general deterrence “to make absolutely clear
    that this is conduct [that society] won’t tolerate.”
    Anchando appealed. His attorney, however, filed a motion to withdraw and an
    Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). We twice found the brief
    procedurally deficient. After counsel filed the brief a third time, we struck the brief
    because he had not ordered a transcript of the change‐of‐plea hearing and had not
    discussed in the brief whether he had complied with his obligations under United States
    v. Konczak, 
    683 F.3d 348
    , 349 (7th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Knox, 
    287 F.3d 667
    , 671
    (7th Cir. 2002). These cases require counsel to advise his client about the risks and
    benefits of trying to withdraw the guilty plea and specifically to confirm whether his
    client wishes to do so. See Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349. We directed counsel to order the
    hearing transcript and, after following the procedures in Konczak and Knox, to file either
    a compliant Anders brief or a merits brief. Counsel ultimately filed a brief discussing the
    merits.
    Analysis
    Anchando first questions whether the district court erred in sentencing him
    above the Guidelines range and in relying on the need for general deterrence and the
    fact of increased gun violence in Chicago to do so. We review the substantive
    reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion—regardless whether that
    sentence is inside or outside the Guidelines range—and will uphold an
    above‐Guidelines sentence so long as the district court applied the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and adequately explained why the penalty is appropriate. United States v. Hill,
    
    645 F.3d 900
    , 911 (7th Cir. 2011).
    Here, the transcript of the sentencing hearing precludes any conclusion of error.
    As the government notes, Anchando acknowledges that the court provided a “step by
    step methodical analysis” of its reasoning, pointed to specific reasons why Anchando’s
    crime was particularly egregious, and thoroughly analyzed the factors in § 3553(a).
    Further, the law requires sentencing courts to reckon with deterrence, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(B), so the court did not abuse its discretion in considering deterrence with
    other factors. See United States v. Sunmola, 
    887 F.3d 830
    , 841–42 (7th Cir. 2018). As for the
    mention of gun violence in Chicago, courts may contemplate community‐based factors;
    indeed, “the need … to protect the public” is another required consideration. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(C); accord United States v. Hatch, 
    909 F.3d 872
    , 875 (7th Cir. 2018). The district
    No. 18‐2763                                                                           Page 4
    court did not abuse its discretion in weighing, among all other factors, the specific
    impact of Anchando’s conduct on the community.
    Anchando also questions whether the district court erred in ordering his
    sentence to be served consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. “Multiple terms of
    imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively,” though courts have
    discretion to order otherwise. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a); see also Setser v. United States, 
    566 U.S. 231
    , 236 (2012). In deciding whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence, the
    district court must consider the factors in § 3553(a). 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (b). (The Sentencing
    Guidelines do not provide guidance on this question because Anchando’s federal
    offense did not involve conduct related to his state offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d).)
    Because the district court conducted a reasoned and exhaustive analysis of the § 3553(a)
    factors, its decision to impose a consecutive sentence was not an abuse of its discretion.
    See United States v. Padilla, 
    618 F.3d 643
    , 647 (7th Cir. 2010).
    AFFIRMED