Mabel Heredia v. Capital Management Services, L ( 2019 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 19-1296
    MABEL L. HEREDIA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CAPITAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 1:17-cv-00284-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 8, 2019
    ____________________
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and ROVNER, Cir-
    cuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Capital Management Services, L.P.
    (CMS) is a debt collector, and therefore regularly sends out
    dunning letters to debtors hoping to collect past-due debts.
    The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) highly regu-
    lates the content of those letters to prevent debt collectors
    from using abusive practices that prey on vulnerable debtors.
    See 
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    (e). Mabel L. Heredia received four
    2                                                   No. 19-1296
    collection letters from CMS—and claims that the language in
    this correspondence violated the FDCPA. CMS disagreed and
    filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which
    the district court granted. Upon our de novo review (see
    Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S., 
    836 F.3d 808
    , 810
    (7th Cir. 2016)), we find that Heredia has plausibly alleged
    that the dunning letter violated the FDCPA. We therefore re-
    verse the order dismissing the matter and remand to the dis-
    trict court for further proceedings.
    I.
    Because this case comes before us on a motion to dismiss,
    we must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
    and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
    Marquez, 836 F.3d at 810. Generally, the question of whether a
    disputed statement is false, deceptive, or misleading is a fact-
    laden one and therefore a district court may not dismiss a
    complaint unless the disputed statement is plainly, on its face,
    not misleading or deceptive. Dunbar v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C.,
    
    896 F.3d 762
    , 765 (7th Cir. 2018). In Marquez, we noted that:
    [I]n determining whether a statement is confus-
    ing or misleading, a district court must tread
    carefully because district judges are not good
    proxies for the ‘unsophisticated consumer’
    whose interest the statute protects. Accord-
    ingly, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on that issue is ap-
    propriate only if there is no set of facts con-
    sistent with the pleadings under which the
    plaintiffs could obtain relief.
    No. 19-1296                                                   3
    Marquez, 836 F.3d at 812 (internal citations omitted). With this
    standard in mind, we turn to the specifics of this case.
    II.
    Like most debt collectors, CMS sends out form letters to
    debtors hoping to convince them to pay what they owe on
    their debt. But, of course, most debt collectors, in reality,
    would be happy to receive any amount of money from a
    debtor. This is so because, by the time a debt collector gets
    involved in the collection process, many of the debts will be
    unrecoverable. Although CMS sends form letters, it personal-
    izes those letters, offering an individualized payment option,
    and often multiple options, to debtors to clear their debt. For
    example, CMS sent a letter to Heredia, dated November 11,
    2016, which stated:
    In an effort to liquidate as many files as possible,
    we are making the following settlement offers:
    A.     29% reduction of your present balance
    to the amount of $1343.63, if paid in full on or
    before 11/30/2016. (A savings of: $548.80)
    B.     24% reduction of your present balance
    to the amount of $1438.25. The first payment of
    $719.13 or more is due on or before 11/30/2016.
    The second and final payment of $719.12 or
    more is due on or before 12/30/2016. (A savings
    of: $454.18)
    C.     19% reduction of your present balance
    to the amount of $1532.87. The first payment of
    $510.96 or more is due on or before 11/30/2016.
    4                                                     No. 19-1296
    The second payment of $510.96 or more is due
    on or before 12/30/2016. The third and final
    payment of $510.95 or more is due on or before
    01/30/2017. (A savings of $359.56)
    ***
    Settling a debt for less than the balance owed
    may have tax consequences and Discover may
    file a 1099C form. We cannot provide you with
    tax advice. If you have any questions, Discover
    encourages you to consult a tax advisor of your
    choosing.
    R. 32 at 25. CMS sent Heredia three other letters dated Octo-
    ber 5, 2016, December 7, 2016, and January 5, 2017, but the
    letter above is the most pivotal to the resolution of this matter,
    as we will explain below.
    The language at the crux of this lawsuit is the part of the
    sentence which contains the following six words: “Discover
    may file a 1099C form.” (We will refer to this as the “1099C
    Clause.”) That statement does not occur in a vacuum, but ra-
    ther, it is the clause that follows on the heels of the one stating
    that “[s]ettling a debt for less than the balance owed may have
    tax consequences.” (We will refer to this as the “Tax Conse-
    quences Clause.”) The question presented by this lawsuit is
    whether the 1099C Clause violated the FDCPA.
    Heredia alleged that CMS violated sections 1692e and
    1692f of the FDCPA. Language in a dunning letter violates
    section 1692e of the FDCPA if the creditor used false, decep-
    tive, or misleading representation or means in connection
    with the collection of debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). And under
    section 1692f, a debt collector may not use unfair or
    No. 19-1296                                                     5
    unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any
    debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The language of a collection letter can
    be literally true and still be misleading in a way that violates
    the Act. O'Boyle v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., 
    910 F.3d 338
    , 344
    (7th Cir. 2018). When evaluating “false, deceptive or mislead-
    ing” or “unfair or unconscionable,” we view the disputed lan-
    guage from the objective point of view of an “unsophisticated
    debtor.” In this circuit we have had much to say about this
    hypothetical unsophisticated debtor. Her knowledge is not as
    great as that of a federal judge but is more than that of the
    least sophisticated consumer. Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Credi-
    tor Bureau, Inc., 
    211 F.3d 1057
    , 1060 (7th Cir. 2000). She is “un-
    informed, naive, or trusting,” but at the same time “possesses
    rudimentary knowledge about the financial world, is wise
    enough to read collection notices with added care, possesses
    ‘reasonable intelligence,’ and is capable of making basic logi-
    cal deductions and inferences.” 
    Id.
     (internal citations omit-
    ted). And although “our unwary debtor may tend to read col-
    lection letters literally, he does not interpret them in a bizarre
    or idiosyncratic fashion.” 
    Id.
     “The Act protects the unsophis-
    ticated debtor, but not the irrational one.” White v. Goodman,
    
    200 F.3d 1016
    , 1020 (7th Cir. 2000).
    As is often the case, a good place to begin our legal analy-
    sis is with that which is settled. Recently, in Dunbar, 896 F.3d
    at 762, we evaluated a very similar tax consequences clause.
    That clause stated, “NOTICE: This settlement may have tax
    consequences.” Id. at 764. We held that this “tax-consequences
    warning is literally true and not misleading under the objec-
    tive ‘unsophisticated consumer’ test,” and thus did not violate
    the FDCPA. Id. at 768. This was so even though the debtors at
    issue in that particular case were insolvent and would not
    have had to pay taxes on any discharged debt. Id. at 764. We
    6                                                  No. 19-1296
    noted that the word “may” does not mean “will,” and that
    therefore the statement is true on its face. Id. at 765. We also
    found that the clause was not misleading because, among
    other reasons, an insolvent debtor can become solvent at any
    moment and “a debt collector has no reason or way to know
    whether an individual debtor is solvent or insolvent at a given
    time.” Id. at 766. In other words, by saying “may” rather than
    “will,” the debt collector described an accurate scenario. Set-
    tlement may or may not have tax consequences depending on
    the financial situation of the debtor, and that information is
    only in the hands of the debtor herself, and not the debt col-
    lector.
    Information about filing a 1099C form, on the other hand,
    is information within the knowledge of the creditor. This
    makes the 1099C Clause materially different than the tax con-
    sequences clause at issue in Dunbar. Only the debtor knows
    whether, given her financial situation as a whole, she will
    have to pay taxes on the forgiven debt. The creditor, however,
    knows whether it will have to file a 1099C form or not. The
    Internal Revenue Service requires a creditor to file a 1099C
    form if it has forgiven at least $600 in principal. 
    26 C.F.R. § 1
    .6050P-1(a) & (d)(2)–(3); 26 U.S.C. § 6050P. The creditor
    knows for certain whether it is offering to forgive more or less
    than $600 in principal. The debtor, on the other hand, may
    have a difficult time determining how much she owes in prin-
    cipal versus interest, as the dunning letter may not identify
    the amount of each. This was certainly the case in CMS’s let-
    ter. Although we know that Heredia owed a balance of
    $1,892.43, even now as the case has wound its way to this
    No. 19-1296                                                             7
    court, we still do not have a clear statement about the amount
    of principal that CMS was willing to forgive.1
    To summarize the law, it is permissible for a creditor to
    make a “may” statement if there is any possibility that an
    event might happen. Dunbar, 896 F.3d at 765 (“An unsophis-
    ticated consumer would not understand the word ‘may’ to
    mean ‘will.’”). And thus Dunbar holds that it is permissible for
    a creditor to say, “Settling a debt for less than the balance
    owed may have tax consequences.” Id. at 768.
    On the other hand, it is impermissible for a creditor to
    make a “may” statement about something that is illegal or im-
    possible. And so, for example, a creditor may not state that “a
    court could allow … attorney fees” where the contract be-
    tween the debtor and creditor did not provide for them. Lox
    v. CDA, Ltd., 
    689 F.3d 818
    , 824, 826 (7th Cir. 2012). Nor may a
    creditor state that late charges might apply when legally, they
    could not. Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 
    880 F.3d 362
    ,
    367 (7th Cir. 2018).
    Although it is not technically illegal or impossible for Dis-
    cover to file a 1099C form with the IRS if the amount is under
    $600, “a collection letter can be literally true” and still mis-
    leading. Dunbar, 896 F.3d at 765. Heredia alleges, and the de-
    fendants do not dispute, that Discover would never file a
    1099C form with the IRS unless required to do so by law—
    1 Because we do not know which portion of the offer was principal, we
    cannot make a determination as to whether the December and January
    letters also contained false, deceptive, or misleading statements. In De-
    cember, CMS made a single offer to save Heredia $738.05 and in January,
    the offer stated that she would save $927.29. We do not know if the amount
    of principal forgiven in either case would have been $600 or more. This is
    a matter for fact-finding on remand, if it becomes relevant.
    8                                                             No. 19-1296
    that is, unless it was forgiving $600 or more of principal. In
    the case of the November 11, 2016 letter, Discover would
    never file a 1099C form regardless of which settlement offer
    Heredia accepted, because in no circumstances would Dis-
    cover be forgiving at least $600 in principal (the amounts it
    would be forgiving would be $548.80, $454.18, or $359.56 in
    combined interest and principal, depending on which option
    Heredia chose).2 In regard to the November 11 letter, there-
    fore, Heredia could plausibly allege that it is, in fact, mislead-
    ing to state that Discover may file a Form 1099C, when it never
    would. And unlike the situation in Dunbar, the debt collector
    has within its own knowledge all of the information it needs
    in order to know whether such a form will or will not be re-
    quired.
    In this case, CMS was sending out individualized form let-
    ters with settlement offers tailored to each recipient’s debt. It
    had both the knowledge (or at least the ability to acquire the
    knowledge) and capability to include the 1099C Clause in sit-
    uations in which it would be forgiving at least $600 in princi-
    pal and to exclude the clause for less than $600. This was not
    true in the Dunbar case, where the debt collector could not
    2 The December 7, 2016 letter offered to settle Heredia’s debt for $1,154.38,
    thus forgiving $738.05, and the January 5, 2017 letter offered to settle the
    debt for $965.14, thus forgiving $927.29. CMS did not demarcate—either
    in the letters themselves or in briefing—how much of this forgiveness was
    principal and how much interest. Both of these letters also contained the
    statement “Discover may file a 1099C form.” The complaint alleges that
    the settlement offers in these third and fourth letters, although offering
    total reductions over $600, did not reduce the amount of principal owed
    by $600 or more. Whether the 1099C Clauses in these later letters were
    misleading is a matter to be determined on remand, if necessary to the
    resolution of the case.
    No. 19-1296                                                      9
    have known whether any particular debtor would have a tax
    liability or not. The district court relied on the reasoning of the
    Dunbar case without recognizing the material distinction be-
    tween the Tax Consequences Clause and the 1099C Clause.
    Heredia v. Capital Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 17-C-284, 
    2019 WL 288122
    , at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2019); R. 43 at 9.
    Moreover, the language is misleading in a material way.
    The reference to a report to the IRS may instill angst in the
    unsophisticated debtor. The district court focused on whether
    the 1099C Clause might cajole a debtor into paying more of
    the debt to avoid the economic consequences of tax liability,
    without considering the psychological coercion that a threat
    to involve the IRS might have on such a consumer. See, e.g.
    Schultz v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 
    905 F.3d 159
    , 162 (3d Cir.
    2018) (agreeing with plaintiffs that by including the language
    about reporting to the IRS, the debt collector presented a false
    or misleading view of the law designed to intimidate the
    plaintiffs into paying the outstanding debts).
    Our decision is in line with this recent decision of the
    Third Circuit in Schultz. The collection letter at issue in that
    case stated, “We will report forgiveness of debt as required by
    IRS regulations. Reporting is not required every time a debt is
    canceled or settled, and might not be required in your case.”
    
    Id. at 161
    . The Schultz court held that such language, even with
    the conditional statement that not all debt would be reported,
    “presented a false or misleading view of the law—one de-
    signed to scare or intimidate the [debtors] into paying the out-
    standing debts listed on the debt collection letters even
    though [the debt collector] knew that any discharge of the
    [debtor’s] debt would not result in a report to the IRS.” 
    Id. at 162
    . See also Foster v. AllianceOne Receivable Mgmt., Inc.,
    10                                                    No. 19-1296
    No. 15-cv-11108, 
    2016 WL 1719824
    , at *1, 2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 28,
    2016) (finding the “mention of the IRS in a situation where
    there is no set of circumstances in which the IRS would be in-
    volved could mislead ‘a person of modest education and lim-
    ited commercial savvy,’” even where the dunning letter listed
    the balance on the account as $718.96 and stated, “[p]lease be
    advised that any settlement which waives $600.00 or more in
    principal of a debt may be reported to the Internal Revenue
    Service by our client.”); Good v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 
    55 F. Supp. 3d 742
    , 744, 748–49 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (drawing all rea-
    sonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs and finding the
    following language deceptive and misleading: “[The Credi-
    tor] is required to file a form 1099C with the Internal Revenue
    Service for any cancelled debt of $600 or more” where the
    creditor offered to allow the plaintiff to settle his $613 debt for
    $183.90). CMS does point to one district court opinion in
    which the court found that a 1099C clause was not mislead-
    ing, but in that case the dunning letter combined two pieces
    of information—first, the amount of debt, which was clearly
    under $600, and second the statement that “any settlement
    write-off of $600 or more may be reported to the Internal Rev-
    enue Service by our client.” Rhone v. AllianceOne Receivables
    Mgmt., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-02034-JMS, 
    2015 WL 4758786
    , at *2
    (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2015). This type of letter arguably places
    the knowledge back in the hands of the debtor by allowing
    the debtor to determine, from the face of the letter, whether
    the conditional reporting will or will not happen in that par-
    ticular instance. Moreover, and importantly, we cannot make
    any predictions about whether this court would find the
    No. 19-1296                                                                  11
    language at issue in any of these district court opinions mis-
    leading in light of our currently evolving precedent.3
    III.
    For the reasons we discussed, applying the requisite pre-
    sumptions in a motion to dismiss, here we cannot say that
    “there is no set of facts consistent with the pleadings under
    which [Heredia] could obtain relief.” Marqeuz, 836 F.3d at 812.
    At least for the November 11 dunning letter, it is certain that
    Discover would never file a 1099C form, as the amount of debt
    CMS was proposing to discharge in each offer was less than
    $600. Heredia has plausibly alleged that a statement that CMS
    might file a 1099C form is misleading.
    Because these questions of whether particular statements
    are deceptive or misleading, however, are almost always
    3 The remainder of the cases that CMS lists as “similar,” in fact, are not
    similar enough to have any bearing on this case, as they address the per-
    missibility of a tax consequences clause (which we held in Dunbar was
    permissible), rather than the permissibility of a 1099C clause. Taylor v. I.C.
    Sys., Inc., No. 17 CV 00541, 
    2018 WL 3637354
    , at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2018);
    Ceban v. Capital Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 17CV4554ARRCLP, 
    2018 WL 451637
    , at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2018); Remington v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc.,
    No. 3:16-CV-865 (JAM), 
    2017 WL 1014994
    , at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2017);
    Taylor v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., 
    252 F. Supp. 3d 344
    , 347 (S.D.N.Y.
    2017), aff'd, 
    886 F.3d 212
     (2d Cir. 2018); but see Moses v. LTD Fin. Servs. I,
    Inc., 
    275 F. Supp. 3d 893
    , 894–95 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding, on summary
    judgment, that the following language was not misleading, “IRS requires
    certain amounts that are discharged as a result of the cancellation of debt
    to be reported on a Form 1099–C. You will receive a copy of the Form
    1099–C if one is required to be filed with the IRS,” where the plaintiff owed
    $951.29 and the debt collector offered him the opportunity to pay $237.82
    to resolve the debt without identifying the amount of principal and inter-
    est).
    12                                                 No. 19-1296
    questions of fact, the ultimate decision on this question is one
    in the province of a district court. We therefore VACATE the
    judgment of the district court and REMAND this case for fur-
    ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1296

Judges: Rovner

Filed Date: 11/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2019