Harvey Powers v. United States , 348 F. App'x 175 ( 2009 )


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  •                               NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted October 8, 2009∗
    Decided October 21, 2009
    Before
    FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , Chief Judge
    DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL S. KANNE , Circuit Judge
    No. 08-1407
    Appeal from the United
    HARVEY E. POWERS,                                                 States District Court for the
    Petitioner-Appellant,                                        Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    v.                                                No. 04-C-471
    J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Order
    Seven defendants in this RICO prosecution were tried jointly; an eighth pleaded
    guilty; Harvey Powers, the ninth, was tried six months later, after his lawyer withdrew
    shortly before the joint trial.
    Powers’s new lawyer asked the district court to provide him with transcripts of
    the co-defendants’ trial, or alternatively to allow extra time for preparation. The judge
    granted this motion in part; transcripts of some but not all of the proceedings were
    ∗ This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). After
    examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R.
    App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
    No. 08-1407                                                                            Page 2
    completed in time for new counsel to use them in preparation for Powers’s trial. After
    Powers was convicted, his lawyer presented five substantive issues on appeal. He also
    alluded to the transcript question, and our opinion affirming all nine defendants’
    convictions and sentences stated:
    Powers, for example, wanted more time so that his new lawyer could work through the voluminous
    record. Yet counsel had six months for this purpose—and the invaluable benefit of watching the
    other seven defendants’ trial. That preview of the evidence and strategy was worth many additional
    months of preparation time.
    United States v. Warneke, 
    310 F.3d 542
    , 549 (7th Cir. 2002). Powers then filed a collateral
    attack under 
    28 U.S.C. §2255
    , contending that his lawyer furnished ineffective assistance
    by not obtaining the complete transcript of his co-defendants’ trial. The district court
    denied the motion.
    It is difficult to see how trial counsel can be accused of ineffective assistance.
    Counsel made the very requests that Powers says were essential. And Powers’s attack
    on his appellate lawyers fares no better. They did not make the transcript question a
    separate issue on the brief, but they did allude to it clearly enough that this court
    addressed it. Appellate counsel presented five distinct and substantial issues on
    Powers’s behalf. Powers received the benefit of vigorous advocacy. A single lapse in the
    course of vigorous advocacy does not violate the sixth amendment. See Williams v.
    Lemmon, 
    557 F.3d 534
     (7th Cir. 2009). Powers does not now contend that the transcript
    issue was obviously better than the five issues actually raised; the fact that this court
    rejected it on the merits shows that it was not an obvious winner.
    Powers now contends that we should ignore his former lawyers’ vigorous
    advocacy and treat him as if he had no lawyer at all. This line of argument, based on
    United States v. Cronic, 
    466 U.S. 648
     (1984), misunderstands the scope of that decision. As
    the Justices explained in Bell v. Cone, 
    535 U.S. 685
     (2002), and reiterated in Wright v. Van
    Patten, 
    552 U.S. 120
     (2008), Cronic applies only when the defendant did not have the
    benefit of counsel at an important stage of the case, or the lawyer wholly failed to
    perform as an advocate; it does not represent a means to get around the ordinary
    requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984), just because counsel may
    have blundered. Not that Powers’s lawyers did blunder; to repeat, they made the very
    motions (for full transcripts or a continuance) that current counsel says were essential.
    Doubtless a full transcript of the co-defendants’ trial would have been useful. But most
    defendants in criminal prosecutions go to trial without any preview of the prosecution’s
    case. That Powers’s lawyers may have had only an incomplete preview does not
    remotely equate to the absence of any lawyer or a collapse of the adversarial system.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-1407

Citation Numbers: 348 F. App'x 175

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 10/21/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023