United States v. Kelvin Marion ( 2009 )


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  •                                 In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 09-2525
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    K ELVIN L. M ARION,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 99-cr-00059—Larry J. McKinney, Judge.
    A RGUED N OVEMBER 6, 2009—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 29, 2009
    Before P OSNER, K ANNE, and R OVNER, Circuit Judges.
    K ANNE, Circuit Judge. The district court denied Kelvin
    Marion’s motion to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2)
    on a form order with a single sentence of explanation:
    “As directed by 
    18 U.S.C. § 3581
    (c)(2)1 the Court has
    1
    This is a simple typo in the district court’s order, as it is
    readily apparent from other parts of its order that the district
    (continued...)
    2                                               No. 09-2525
    considered the relevant factors in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) and
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and determined a sentence reduction
    is not appropriate.” Because we find the district court’s
    written analysis a bit too terse to allow this court to
    meaningfully review its decision, we must remand.
    Marion pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to
    possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine
    base. In 2000, the district court sentenced Marion to
    160 months’ imprisonment after expressly considering
    Marion’s lengthy criminal history, the harm his crimes
    caused to the community, and his cooperation with the
    government. Following the Sentencing Commission’s
    recent amendments regarding cocaine base, Marion
    moved under § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence. The
    government took no position on Marion’s motion. The
    district court denied Marion’s motion using a form
    order, and wrote its one-sentence explanation in the
    “Additional Comments” section of the form. Marion
    timely appealed the district court’s decision.
    The sole issue before us is whether the district court’s
    explanation is sufficient to justify denying Marion’s
    motion and to enable this court to meaningfully review
    the district court’s decision. The decision to reduce a
    defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is squarely
    within the district court’s discretion, and we reverse only
    for an abuse of that discretion. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2)
    1
    (...continued)
    court properly considered Marion’s motion under § 3582(c)(2)
    and not under the non-existent § 3581(c)(2).
    No. 09-2525                                                 3
    (“the court may reduce the term of imprisonment”); United
    States v. Johnson, 
    580 F.3d 567
    , 570 (7th Cir. 2009); United
    States v. Cunningham, 
    554 F.3d 703
    , 707 (7th Cir. 2009).
    “[T]he court must determine the extent of the reduction,
    if any, by considering the factors listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), the movant’s conduct while imprisoned, and
    the risk his early release would pose to public safety.”
    Johnson, 
    580 F.3d at 570
    ; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, Applica-
    tion Note 1(B)(ii), (iii). When imposing a sentence, the
    district court must provide some statement of reasons
    supporting its decision. United States v. Jung, 
    473 F.3d 837
    ,
    844 (7th Cir. 2007).
    Importantly, however, the district court need not
    provide a detailed, written explanation analyzing every
    § 3553(a) factor. United States v. Fitzgerald, 330 F. App’x
    611, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Harris, 
    490 F.3d 589
    , 596-97 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dean, 
    414 F.3d 725
    , 729 (7th Cir. 2005). Although ruling on a motion
    to reduce is not the same as imposing a sentence, we
    think that the reasoning behind requiring a brief state-
    ment of reasons at sentencing compels a similar require-
    ment when deciding a motion to reduce. Some statement
    of the district court’s reasoning is necessary for this
    court to be able to meaningfully review its decision.
    In ruling on the motion to reduce, the district court did
    not supply any reasons for its decision. The district
    court aptly considered and thoroughly explained the
    relevant factors at the time of Marion’s original sen-
    tencing; however, several years have passed since then.
    We think that a district court’s order on a motion for a
    4                                              No. 09-2525
    sentence reduction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2)
    should at least address briefly any significant events that
    may have occurred since the original sentencing. If the
    district court believes that nothing particularly note-
    worthy has changed concerning the basis for the defen-
    dant’s original sentence, some simple explanation to
    that effect will apprise both the defendant and this court
    of that fact.
    Our opinion in this case should not be read to expand
    what is required of a district court when sentencing a
    defendant or considering a motion to reduce a sentence
    under § 3582(c)(2). We have no intention of counting
    words or applying some rigid formulation to statements
    of reasons, particularly on a motion to reduce a sentence.
    The problem with the order here is not that the district
    court used a form order, or even that the order con-
    tained only a one-sentence explanation. The problem
    arises from the fact that it is impossible for us to ensure
    that the district court did not abuse its discretion if the
    order shows only that the district court exercised its
    discretion rather than showing how it exercised that
    discretion. Some minimal explanation is required.
    We R EMAND to the district court to provide a brief
    statement of reasons, consistent with this opinion, for
    denying Marion’s motion for a sentence reduction.
    12-29-09