United States v. Brian McGowan ( 2009 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-1384
    U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    B RIAN D. M C G OWAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 03 CR 350—John F. Grady, Judge.
    A RGUED F EBRUARY 24, 2009—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 22, 2009
    Before R OVNER, W OOD and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    R OVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Brian D.
    McGowan of eighteen counts of wire fraud, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    , and one count of investment
    advisor fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(2) and 80b-
    17. He was sentenced to a term of sixty-six months’
    imprisonment and was ordered to pay restitution in
    the amount of $182,470.12. On appeal, he disputes the
    district court’s decision to allow the main witness
    2                                              No. 08-1384
    against him to testify by videotaped deposition. He
    also challenges the charges against him on statute-of-
    limitations grounds. We affirm.
    I.
    In 1986, when working as a warehouse manager in a
    discount department store, Camille LaMie was hit by a
    forklift. Although her injuries prevented her from re-
    turning to that job, she attempted to work at another
    store for a brief time as a customer service representa-
    tive. Because her injuries made walking difficult, she left
    that job as well. Ultimately, she underwent spinal surgery
    and bone grafts, spending a year in a body cast. She was
    unable to collect workers’ compensation because the
    discount store had declared bankruptcy. From the time
    of her injury until her father’s death in 1993, LaMie lived
    on food stamps, Social Security Supplemental Income
    and Medicaid. After her father died, she inherited ap-
    proximately $266,000 and a house in Chicago. All of
    her public assistance ended with her receipt of the inheri-
    tance and LaMie relied entirely on that money for her
    support.
    By 1997, LaMie was fifty-four years old, unemployed,
    medically uninsured, and suffering from a variety of
    chro n ic m ed ica l p ro blem s includ ing diabetes,
    hypothyroidism, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
    cirrhosis of the liver caused by an autoimmune disorder,
    clinical depression, diabetic neuropathy and hepatic
    failure. Her luck was about to get worse. Because she
    lacked health insurance, she became increasingly con-
    No. 08-1384                                               3
    cerned about her declining health and her ability to pay
    her ongoing medical expenses. She had been investing
    her money conservatively in certificates of deposit, but
    now sought to increase her rate of return and obtain a
    steady monthly income while at the same time keeping
    her principal safe. In September 1997, a friend intro-
    duced LaMie to Brian McGowan, a financial advisor.
    LaMie told McGowan that she needed no-risk invest-
    ments and that she also needed health insurance.
    McGowan told her he would keep her principal safe and
    obtain health insurance for her. He told LaMie that his
    clients included Walter Payton, Michael Jordan and
    Michael Jordan’s mother. In fact, he had never
    represented any of these people.
    LaMie researched McGowan’s background to the best
    of her ability and decided to invest the bulk of her inheri-
    tance with him. She paid him an up-front “consulting fee”
    of $2,500 and signed a customer agreement. Between
    September and December of 1997, LaMie invested
    $260,000 with McGowan. Needless to say, McGowan did
    not keep LaMie’s principal safe. He told her he was
    placing $100,000 in Cypress Bioscience, a drug company
    that he characterized as “safe.” He invested $8,200 in a
    commodities account that he intended to trade daily,
    which he told LaMie eliminated any risk. He banked
    $30,000 of her money in a “no risk” real estate deal,
    and told her he was placing $60,000 in Chicago Capital
    Holdings. He claimed to invest another $60,000 in an
    unspecified manner. McGowan did invest some of
    LaMie’s money in real estate: he bought a house for
    himself in New Mexico. He invested $90,000 in Cypress
    4                                           No. 08-1384
    Bioscience and placed $8200 in a commodities account,
    but did not protect LaMie’s principal or make any other
    investments. Nor did he obtain health insurance for her
    as he promised. When LaMie tried to obtain financial
    statements from McGowan to check on the status of
    her investments, he promised to send them but never
    did. The information he did provide was misleading
    and uninformative.
    LaMie became increasingly suspicious as McGowan
    continued to evade her questions and requests for
    reports on the status of her investments. After con-
    sulting several friends regarding her problems with
    McGowan, she contacted the FBI in April 1998. The
    FBI directed her to call McGowan and record her con-
    versations with him. FBI agents scripted questions for
    LaMie to ask and supplied her with blank tapes and
    recording equipment. Between April and July of 1998,
    LaMie recorded nineteen telephone calls with McGowan.
    During those calls, McGowan lied repeatedly about the
    status of LaMie’s investments. He told her that her
    money had been invested in a number of ventures in-
    cluding Cypress Bioscience, Maximum Video, Navarre,
    Chicago Capital Holdings, and a Ramada Inn. He
    also told her a small amount of her money was in a com-
    modities account, and in perhaps his most creative lie,
    he told her some of her money was invested in a new
    production of the musical “Annie.” Although McGowan
    had placed some of LaMie’s money in Cypress Bioscience,
    the investment was not in the amount he promised.
    Everything else, except for the commodities account, was
    a pure fabrication, as he admitted at trial. McGowan
    No. 08-1384                                             5
    also lied when he told LaMie that he was keeping her
    principal safe and that her investments were generating
    interest income. He lied when she asked him to liquidate
    her investments and return her money, and he lied
    about obtaining health insurance for her.
    All of the testimony from LaMie came into the trial
    through Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a) video-
    taped depositions that were recorded because of
    LaMie’s precarious health. LaMie resided in South
    Carolina at the time of the trial, which was held in Chi-
    cago. LaMie’s doctors believed that both travel and testi-
    fying at trial presented great risks to her health. The
    district court found that she was unavailable for trial
    because of her health problems, and her videotaped
    deposition testimony was admitted over McGowan’s
    objections. A jury found McGowan guilty of eighteen
    counts of wire fraud based on the misrepresentations
    he made during phone calls spanning from April 13,
    1998 to June 29, 1998. The jury also found McGowan guilty
    of one count of investment advisor fraud. McGowan
    appeals.
    II.
    On appeal, McGowan contends that the admission of
    LaMie’s videotaped depositions violated Federal Rule
    of Evidence 804(a)(4) and his constitutional rights under
    the Confrontation Clause. He also argues that the
    court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the
    indictment on statute-of-limitations grounds. He main-
    tains that his crimes were complete more than five years
    6                                                No. 08-1384
    prior to the filing of the indictment, and that 
    18 U.S.C. §3282
     requires that prosecutions for wire fraud be
    brought within five years of the offense.
    A.
    The grand jury returned the indictment against
    McGowan on April 3, 2003. In March 2004, because LaMie
    suffered from poor health, the government moved to
    preserve her testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Crimi-
    nal Procedure 15(a). That rule provides:
    A party may move that a prospective witness be
    deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial. The
    court may grant the motion because of exceptional
    circumstances and in the interest of justice. If the court
    orders the deposition to be taken, it may also require
    the deponent to produce at the deposition any desig-
    nated material that is not privileged, including any
    book, paper, document, record, recording, or data.
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a). In support of the motion, the gov-
    ernment submitted a letter from LaMie’s physician, Dr.
    George Sandoz, describing her medical conditions. Dr.
    Sandoz, a neurologist and opthamologist, had been
    treating LaMie since 2001. According to Dr. Sandoz,
    LaMie was “almost bedridden,” required oxygen twenty-
    four hours a day, and suffered from severe diabetes,
    diabetic neuropathy and biliary cirrhosis, among other
    things. LaMie took long-acting narcotics to control
    her pain, according to Dr. Sandoz. He opined that it
    would not be safe for LaMie to travel because of her
    No. 08-1384                                            7
    medical conditions. After a hearing, the court granted
    the government’s motion.
    LaMie was deposed on May 6, 7, 26, and 27, 2004, in
    South Carolina. McGowan and his lawyer were present
    at the videotaped depositions and McGowan’s lawyer
    cross-examined LaMie extensively. At a June 9, 2004
    status call, the parties discussed LaMie’s availability
    for trial. McGowan’s lawyer intended to challenge any
    suggestion that LaMie was unavailable for trial. During
    the depositions, he learned that LaMie owned a car and
    had recently renewed her driver’s license. Based on this
    and other information from the depositions, he believed
    that prior representations about LaMie’s health were
    exaggerated. He told the court he wished to have
    another physician review Dr. Sandoz’s assessment
    of LaMie. The government maintained that LaMie
    could not travel to Chicago to testify because of her
    extensive health-related limitations. The government
    also clarified that LaMie had renewed her driver’s
    license by mail and had driven the car only once in the
    past year, and only a very short distance. The court or-
    dered briefing on the issue.
    Along with its brief, the government submitted two
    affidavits from LaMie’s physicians, one from Dr. Sandoz
    and one from Dr. Charles Busse. Dr. Sandoz again
    asserted that several chronic health conditions made it
    medically unsafe for LaMie to travel or to testify at a
    trial. Dr. Sandoz described LaMie’s severe diabetes and
    opined that stress and changes in schedule could cause
    serious problems with her insulin treatment, and that she
    8                                             No. 08-1384
    could lose consciousness or even lapse into a coma as a
    result. Her diabetic neuropathy caused her constant
    pain that could be exacerbated by stress or physical
    activity. A disease called diffuse lipomatosis affected
    her lungs and required her to use oxygen all day every
    day, a condition that could also be worsened by stress
    or by the physical exertion required in travel. LaMie
    also had chronic liver problems, according to Dr. Sandoz,
    that could progress to the point of a life-threatening
    illness if she experienced increased emotional or physical
    stress. Dr. Sandoz stressed that LaMie’s conditions were
    chronic, and that there was no reasonable likelihood that
    her condition would improve to a degree that would
    render travel safe.
    Dr. Busse, a general practitioner who treated LaMie and
    had examined her two months prior to signing his affida-
    vit, also characterized LaMie’s conditions as chronic.
    According to Dr. Busse, LaMie suffered from diabetes,
    hypothyroidism, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
    cirrhosis of the liver and clinical depression. He stated
    that LaMie had also been diagnosed as suffering from
    multiple sclerosis but conceded that he had not treated
    her for that condition and could not assess whether
    that additional condition would affect her ability to
    travel. Given the conditions for which he did treat LaMie,
    Dr. Busse believed she could travel to Chicago with
    appropriate accommodations. He declined to express
    an opinion on whether those arrangements were prac-
    ticable. However, he also asserted that courtroom testi-
    mony would likely aggravate her chronic medical condi-
    tions. The government also submitted portions of LaMie’s
    No. 08-1384                                                 9
    deposition testimony describing her multiple health
    issues including allergies, asthma, lung failure, heart
    failure, cirrhosis of the liver, multiple sclerosis, a blocked
    heart valve, diabetes and other conditions.
    In response to the government’s submission, McGowan
    conceded that LaMie was “unavailable” as that term is
    used in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). Federal Rule
    of Evidence 804(a) states that a person who “is unable to
    be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
    then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity” is
    unavailable as a witness. Rule 804(b)(1) provides that
    certain out-of-court statements are not excluded by the
    hearsay rule if the declarant is “unavailable as a witness.”
    As applicable here, Rule 804(b) states that “[t]estimony
    given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
    different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compli-
    ance with law in the course of the same or another pro-
    ceeding, if the party against whom the testimony
    is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a prede-
    cessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive
    to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
    examination” is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
    declarant is unavailable as a witness. But having
    conceded LaMie’s unavailability, McGowan argued that
    the use of LaMie’s deposition at his trial would violate
    his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against
    him because he had not had an opportunity to question
    LaMie regarding additional documents produced by the
    government. McGowan also complained that he was still
    waiting for the government to produce further documents
    from the FBI documenting the agency’s directions to LaMie
    10                                            No. 08-1384
    in carrying out the recorded phone calls. McGowan
    acknowledged that the confrontation problems could be
    cured by further depositions. On August 5, 2004, the
    court granted the government’s motion to admit LaMie’s
    deposition at trial and denied McGowan’s motion to
    take a further deposition of LaMie.
    In December 2004, McGowan renewed his objection to
    the court’s unavailability ruling. LaMie had taken a four-
    hour interstate car trip with friends, and McGowan
    argued again that LaMie’s health problems had been
    exaggerated. The court held an evidentiary hearing where
    one of the friends who accompanied LaMie on the trip
    testified. The court found that testimony consistent
    with the declarations of Drs. Sandoz and Busse. The
    court then allowed McGowan to depose Drs. Sandoz and
    Busse, but did not grant McGowan’s request for an inde-
    pendent medical examination of LaMie. Dr. Sandoz
    testified that LaMie’s health had deteriorated in the last
    year, that she was not capable of traveling by plane to
    Chicago, and that minimal changes in her routine could
    have “devastating effects” on her condition. On June 7,
    2005, the court again found LaMie unavailable for trial,
    but invited McGowan to move for an additional deposi-
    tion of LaMie.
    After the government produced additional records, the
    court allowed a December 5, 2005 deposition of LaMie.
    On October 16, 2006, with trial approaching, McGowan
    moved for a current determination of LaMie’s avail-
    ability for trial, and renewed a previously filed
    motion to suppress LaMie’s deposition testimony. On
    No. 08-1384                                                 11
    November 22, 2006, the court ordered a current report on
    LaMie’s health, noting that in order to use LaMie’s deposi-
    tion in lieu of her personal appearance, the court must
    determine that the use of the deposition was still
    medically necessary. In response to McGowan’s motion
    to suppress, the court allowed yet another deposition of
    LaMie. The deposition took place on December 18, 2006,
    and on January 3, 2007, the government submitted a
    report on LaMie’s current health status. That report
    included a December 11, 2006 letter from Dr. Sandoz
    opining that LaMie’s condition had only deteriorated
    since his last report and that any trip would be
    detrimental to her health.
    On January 8, 2007, the first day of trial, the parties again
    discussed LaMie’s unavailability. Noting that Dr. Sandoz
    had originally characterized most of LaMie’s medical
    conditions as chronic with no reasonable likelihood that
    they would improve, the court found that the most recent
    letter from Dr. Sandoz indicated that LaMie had not
    improved since the July 2004 report. The court con-
    cluded again that LaMie was unavailable for trial:
    It is clear from Dr. Sandoz’ recent letter that he
    regards Ms. LaMie as not having improved at all
    from the time of his July 2004 report. His opinion is
    the same. There is no surprise about it. . . . If I was
    right in 2005, I’m still right. I’m satisfied with that.
    And I say that knowing that there will be surgical
    attention paid to my ruling on appeal should an
    appeal be necessary. But I see no alternative. I think
    that the alternative would be cruel to this woman
    12                                              No. 08-1384
    to require her to come here in light of this danger to
    her health. And I’m not talking about discomfort,
    I’m not talking about inconvenience; I’m talking
    about the risk of serious damage to her health that
    is clearly reflected in this doctor’s analysis.
    Tr. at 19, January 8, 2007. The court therefore allowed the
    government to use LaMie’s videotaped deposition at trial.
    McGowan objected to the use of the depositions through-
    out the trial, contesting the finding of unavailability and
    also arguing that the use of the videotaped depositions
    violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The
    court rejected those claims each time. On one occasion,
    the court noted that “the jury is just as able to
    evaluate [LaMie’s] demeanor from this videotape as
    they would be if she were present live in the courtroom
    giving this same testimony.” Tr. at 810. See also Tr. at 811
    (where the court remarked, “I don’t think the
    jury would have any better view of her behavior while
    testifying if she were doing this same thing here in open
    court that she’s doing on the videotape.”). McGowan’s
    attorney requested a mistrial later in the proceedings
    when he believed his client was prejudiced by technical
    difficulties with the videotapes. The court responded to
    his objections thoroughly and thoughtfully:
    This is a very attentive jury. They are taking notes,
    they’re reading these transcripts along with the tapes,
    they’re paying close attention to the videotape. I’ve
    never seen a jury that was more attentive. . . . There
    isn’t a single juror here, and I have been looking at
    all of them, who is anything other than completely
    No. 08-1384                                               13
    absorbed in what is being seen and heard in this
    courtroom. They are taking these glitches with the
    same good humor the rest of us are, and they’re
    intelligent enough to realize that there is a great
    difference between the technical difficulties
    attending the playing of the video and the substance
    and the merits of the testimony that’s being portrayed
    on the video. . . . I am pleased and in fact a little bit
    surprised at how good the video is in terms of giving
    one a real feel for Ms. LaMie. It’s almost—not quite,
    I agree—but it’s almost like having her here in the
    courtroom. I mean, she’s just as life-like as she can
    be. . . . [T]he jury is getting substantially the same
    look and feel for her as they would if she were here
    in person testifying in the courtroom.
    Tr. at 968-69. The court remarked that the technical diffi-
    culties were minimal albeit annoying, but did not under-
    mine the defense’s cross-examination of LaMie. The
    court therefore denied the motion for a mistrial.
    On a third objection during trial, the court found again
    that the videotaped depositions provided an adequate
    substitute for LaMie’s live testimony:
    I’ve watched very carefully, and I’ve listened very
    carefully, and I’ve come to certain conclusions, and I’ve
    given you some of them. I think that her presence
    here in person would have been essentially no
    different than having her present virtually life-size on
    that tape recorder. I don’t know what would have
    been shown that wasn’t shown on the tape. You can
    see every facial expression, you can see her eyes[.] . . .
    14                                              No. 08-1384
    What more would have been gained by having
    her hobble in here and get up on the witness stand
    and do the same thing? I frankly don’t see anything
    that would have been gained. The video deposition
    was as good as her physical presence in the court-
    room, in my opinion[.]
    Tr. at 1590. The court concluded that “the defendant was
    not prejudiced by use of the deposition.” Tr. at 1590.
    On appeal, McGowan argues that the district court
    violated Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4) and the Con-
    frontation Clause in declaring LaMie “unavailable” for
    trial, admitting her deposition testimony into evidence,
    denying his requests for an independent medical exam-
    ination of LaMie, and denying a request for an
    evidentiary hearing on the question of LaMie’s unavail-
    ability at the time of trial. We review a district court’s
    decision to admit deposition testimony based on unavail-
    ability for abuse of discretion. United States v. Donaldson,
    
    978 F.2d 381
    , 392 (7th Cir. 1992). Interpretation of the
    Confrontation Clause is a legal question that we review de
    novo. United States v. Van Sach, 
    458 F.3d 694
    , 701 (7th Cir.
    2006); United States v. Smith, 
    454 F.3d 707
    , 714 (7th Cir.
    2006). When testimonial evidence is at issue, the Confron-
    tation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that the
    government demonstrate that the witness is unavailable
    for trial and that the defendant had a prior opportunity
    for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    ,
    68 (2004).
    We begin with the timeliness and soundness of the
    district court’s determination that LaMie was unavailable
    No. 08-1384                                              15
    to testify due to “then existing physical or mental illness
    or infirmity.” Fed. Evid. 804(a)(4). The government
    bears the burden of demonstrating that its witness is
    unavailable to testify at trial. Donaldson, 
    978 F.2d at 392
    ;
    Burns v. Clusen, 
    798 F.2d 931
    , 936-37 (7th Cir. 1986).
    McGowan first complains that the district court relied
    on a finding of unavailability made in 2005 to hold that
    LaMie was unavailable for trial on January 8, 2007. On
    the morning that the trial was scheduled to begin,
    McGowan requested an evidentiary hearing based on
    what he characterized as new evidence regarding LaMie’s
    medical condition. Citing observations of LaMie at her
    December 18, 2006 deposition, the much earlier letter from
    Dr. Busse, and the out-of-state car trip that LaMie took in
    2004, McGowan claimed that LaMie’s condition had
    improved to such an extent that she was available for
    trial. According to McGowan’s counsel, LaMie was able
    to walk into her attorney’s office for the December 18
    deposition and was even able to scale nine steps to do
    so. Additionally, counsel remarked that LaMie no longer
    required oxygen and was in fact smoking during breaks
    in the deposition. The government confirmed that
    LaMie smoked during breaks, but argued that LaMie
    entered the building with great difficulty and with assis-
    tance. Relying on the Burns case, McGowan argued that
    a new evidentiary hearing was required to demonstrate
    that LaMie remained unavailable to testify. The court, as
    we noted above, had already ordered the government
    to procure another report from Dr. Sandoz regarding
    LaMie’s current condition. Dr. Sandoz’s resultant letter
    was signed on December 11, 2006, approximately four
    16                                            No. 08-1384
    weeks prior to the beginning of the trial and one week
    prior to the deposition. Dr. Sandoz had most recently
    examined LaMie on October 31, 2006, approximately two
    months prior to the start of the trial. As we noted above,
    Dr. Sandoz reaffirmed his earlier diagnoses of LaMie’s
    multiple chronic conditions, and opined that she was
    unable to take any kind of trip, and had only deteriorated
    since the time of his 2005 assessment of her to the court.
    He remarked that her mobility was so impaired that it
    was now almost impossible for her to visit her local
    doctors every few months for the treatment of her condi-
    tions.
    The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
    that LaMie was unavailable to testify at the January 2007
    trial. As the district court repeatedly noted, LaMie’s
    medical problems were severe and chronic. Her doctors
    did not expect her condition to improve and in fact twice
    indicated that, as time passed, LaMie had grown even
    more ill and less able to endure the rigors of interstate
    travel and live testimony. No evidentiary hearing was
    needed on the day of trial because, even assuming that
    all of the assertions made by McGowan’s counsel con-
    cerning LaMie’s abilities at the December 18 deposition
    were true, the government still met its burden of demon-
    strating that LaMie was not able to travel from her home
    in South Carolina to Chicago and endure the rigors of
    testifying at trial without seriously damaging her
    already precarious health. The court did not rely on stale
    information in reaching this conclusion but rather relied
    on the consistency of the reports regarding LaMie’s
    deteriorating health over time, including a report of her
    No. 08-1384                                             17
    condition a few months before trial. See Donaldson, 
    978 F.2d at 393
    . Two months before trial, LaMie was
    morbidly obese, suffering from brittle diabetes, peripheral
    neuropathy, biliary cirrhosis, lipomatosis and other
    severe and chronic conditions. By all accounts, her
    mobility was severely limited. Her many problems were
    not expected to improve in a few months’ time. See United
    States v. Campbell, 
    845 F.2d 1374
    , 1377-78 (6th Cir. 1988)
    (court did not abuse its discretion in finding without a
    hearing that an elderly witness was unavailable to
    testify when the court had found two weeks earlier
    that exceptional circumstances justified taking the wit-
    ness’s deposition; “it was highly unlikely that an elderly
    invalid would undergo a miraculous rejuvenation
    during the two-week interval”). LaMie’s ability to travel
    locally to her lawyer’s office for a deposition did not
    change the analysis of her ability to travel interstate and
    endure courtroom testimony. There was nothing to be
    gained by delaying the trial to hold an additional eviden-
    tiary hearing on an issue over which there was no serious
    dispute. The court had already conducted an evidentiary
    hearing into the 2004 out-of-state car trip and there was
    no new information to examine regarding that trip.
    McGowan’s lawyer had been allowed an opportunity
    earlier to cross-examine Dr. Sandoz, and his opinion had
    not changed. In short, the district court’s January 8, 2007
    assessment of LaMie, based on the 2005 assessment and
    supplemented by Dr. Sandoz’s December 11, 2006 letter,
    was timely and sound given the severe, chronic and
    deteriorating nature of the medical problems from which
    LaMie suffered.
    18                                            No. 08-1384
    McGowan’s reliance on Burns is misplaced. The
    witness in that case was deemed unavailable to testify
    because of mental illness. At a hearing on the issue, the
    witness’s doctor referred to the applicable disorder as
    both acute schizophreniform disorder and schizophrenia,
    conditions with markedly different prognoses. As we
    observed on appeal, the former is an acute condition
    expected to last more than two weeks and less than six
    months while the latter could last considerably longer.
    The witness had been admitted to a hospital psychiatric
    ward in September 1980 in a “catatonic stupor with
    hallucinations and delusions.” Burns, 
    798 F.2d at 938
    . The
    trial court found in January 1981 that the witness
    suffered from acute schizophreniform disorder. By the
    time of the March 1981 trial, a different judge had been
    assigned to hear the case. That judge simply adopted
    the earlier finding and determined that the witness re-
    mained unavailable, even though six months had passed
    since the initial diagnosis and the illness was not
    expected to last more than six months. Moreover, new
    information had become available regarding the
    witness’s mental state but the trial court made no up-to-
    date findings before concluding the witness remained
    unavailable. Burns, 
    798 F.2d at 938-39
    .
    We noted in Burns that in determining unavailability
    of a witness, the court must consider both the severity
    and the duration of the illness. 
    798 F.2d at 937
    . “The
    duration of the illness need only be in probability long
    enough so that, with proper regard to the importance of
    the testimony, the trial cannot be postponed.” 
    Id.
     We also
    indicated in Burns the importance of making a final
    No. 08-1384                                              19
    determination regarding witness availability based on up-
    to-date evidence about the witness’s physical or mental
    condition at or near the time of trial. 
    798 F.2d at 939
    . If
    the witness’s condition is temporary or of a short-term
    nature, we remarked that the court should consider
    whether to grant a continuance to allow the witness to
    testify. 
    Id.
    Unlike the witness in Burns, LaMie’s illnesses are both
    severe and chronic. Her doctors’ opinions never changed:
    she was seriously ill when the case began and her condi-
    tion only deteriorated over time. The doctors advised
    and the court found that the stress of travel and testifying
    could seriously worsen her condition. Unlike the
    diagnosis of a temporary mental illness, LaMie’s illnesses
    were chronic, unlikely to change over time except to
    worsen, and in fact did worsen over the time that passed
    between the indictment and trial. In this context, the
    court’s finding of LaMie’s unavailability was timely,
    sound, and well within the court’s discretion.
    Nor was McGowan’s Sixth Amendment right to
    confront the witnesses against him compromised by
    the procedure employed by the district court. We have
    already concluded that the court did not err in finding
    LaMie unavailable for trial. McGowan could not
    seriously challenge the other part of the analysis, whether
    he had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
    Crawford, 
    541 U.S. at 68
    . McGowan was able to fully cross-
    examine LaMie on several different occasions, during
    depositions to preserve her core testimony and during
    later depositions to address issues raised when addi-
    20                                                    No. 08-1384
    tional documents were produced to the defense.
    Moreover, the district court noted several times that the
    videotapes allowed the jury to fully experience LaMie’s
    testimony, to view her demeanor, to hear her voice and to
    determine her credibility. We have already held that
    there is no Confrontation Clause violation when ad-
    mitting fully cross-examined testimony preserved by a
    properly conducted Rule 15 deposition, and that this
    holding had not changed after Crawford. United States v.
    Cannon, 
    539 F.3d 601
    , 604 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 2013
     (2009); Donaldson, 
    978 F.2d at 392-93
    . We thus
    see no error in the court’s decision to allow the use of
    the videotapes nor in the court’s conclusion that
    McGowan was not prejudiced by the use of the videotapes.
    See United States v. Presbitero, 
    569 F.3d 691
    , 703-04 (7th
    Cir. 2009) (errors arising under the Confrontation Clause
    are subject to harmless error analysis).1
    1
    The government argued that, if we found that the district
    court erred in admitting the tapes, the error was harmless
    considering the evidence against McGowan. In assessing the
    strength of the case against McGowan, the government asked us
    to consider the videotapes themselves. We are hard-pressed to
    understand this circular argument. In determining whether
    evidence admitted in error is harmless, we consider the
    strength of the remaining evidence against the defendant, among
    other things. “An error is harmless when the reviewing court
    is convinced that the jury would have convicted even absent the
    error.” United States v. Conner, 
    583 F.3d 1011
    , 1025 (7th Cir. 2009)
    (emphasis added); United States v. Ozuna, 
    561 F.3d 728
    , (7th Cir.
    2009) (same). The government contends that a videotaped
    (continued...)
    No. 08-1384                                                   21
    B.
    McGowan next argues that the district court erred when
    it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3282
    . McGowan contends that the indictment
    was returned more than five years after the completion
    of the crime, exceeding the five-year limitations period.
    We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion
    to dismiss based on statute-of-limitations grounds, defer-
    ring to the district court’s factual determinations. United
    States v. Useni, 
    516 F.3d 634
    , 655 (7th Cir. 2008); United
    States v. Are, 
    498 F.3d 460
    , 464 (7th Cir. 2007); United
    States v. Barnes, 
    230 F.3d 311
    , 314 (7th Cir. 2000). The
    statute of limitations for wire fraud is five years. United
    States v. Tadros, 
    310 F.3d 999
    , 1006 (7th Cir. 2002).
    The government filed the indictment on April 3, 2003,
    charging McGowan with eighteen counts of wire fraud
    and one count of investment advisor fraud. The indictment
    alleged that McGowan’s scheme to defraud LaMie ran
    from approximately September 1997 through July 1998. In
    1
    (...continued)
    deposition should be exempt from this well-worn rule because
    of its unique value. We see no reason to change this well-
    established rule to create an exception for videotaped deposi-
    tions. If they were admitted in error, they may not be con-
    sidered in assessing the strength of the case against the defen-
    dant. See also Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 18 (1999) (the
    harmless-error inquiry must be essentially: “Is it clear beyond a
    reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the
    defendant guilty absent the error?”).
    22                                              No. 08-1384
    furtherance of that scheme, the indictment alleged that
    McGowan made eighteen telephone calls between
    April 13, 1998 and June 29, 1998 to LaMie, all within
    five years of the filing of the indictment. Those eighteen
    calls serve as the basis for the eighteen counts of wire
    fraud. McGowan argues that the indictment came too
    late because LaMie contacted the FBI in March 1998,
    after she had invested her money with him. All of the
    phone calls took place after the government knew about
    the fraud and after McGowan had obtained LaMie’s
    money. McGowan maintains that the calls could not have
    been made in furtherance of a scheme about which the
    authorities were already aware. According to McGowan,
    because LaMie was already suspicious and had already
    contacted law enforcement, nothing he said in those calls
    could have lulled LaMie into a false sense of security
    regarding her investments, and thus could not have
    furthered a scheme to defraud LaMie.
    In order to prove its wire fraud case against McGowan,
    the government was obliged to prove McGowan’s partici-
    pation in a scheme to defraud, his intent to defraud, and
    his use of the wires in furtherance of the fraudulent
    scheme. United States v. Roberts, 
    534 F.3d 560
    , 569 (7th Cir.
    2008), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 1028
     (2009); Tadros, 
    310 F.3d at 1006
    . Wire communications that lull a victim into a
    false sense of security after the victim’s money had
    already been obtained, or that assist the defendant in
    avoiding detection may be sufficient to further a scheme.
    United States v. O’Connor, 
    874 F.2d 483
    , 486-87 (7th Cir.
    1989). Both the Supreme Court and this circuit have
    recognized “that calls made after the time that goods
    No. 08-1384                                              23
    have been fraudulently obtained can nevertheless
    further the fraudulent scheme by making detection or
    apprehension less likely.” O’Connor, 
    874 F.2d at
    486 (citing
    United States v. Lane, 
    474 U.S. 438
    , 451-52 (1986); United
    States v. Sampson, 
    371 U.S. 75
    , 81 (1962); United States v.
    Eckhardt, 
    843 F.2d 989
    , 994 (7th Cir. 1988)). The Supreme
    Court has also rejected the contention that a mailing that
    actually contributes to uncovering the fraudulent scheme
    cannot supply the mailing element of the mail fraud
    offense. Schmuck v. United States, 
    489 U.S. 705
    , 715 (1989).
    Nor does it matter whether the scheme succeeds. Tadros,
    
    310 F.3d at 1006
    . Rather, the relevant question is whether
    the wire communication “is part of the execution of the
    scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time,
    regardless of whether the [wire communication]
    later, through hindsight, may prove to have been counter-
    productive and return to haunt the perpetrator of the
    fraud.” Schmuck, 
    489 U.S. at 715
    .
    Under those standards, the eighteen calls, which were
    designed by McGowan to lull LaMie into a false sense
    of security, were sufficient to meet the element of fur-
    thering the scheme. The lulling was part of McGowan’s
    investment advisor fraud, and so the eighteen calls bring
    that count well within the period of limitations. Because
    those calls all came within five years of the filing of the
    indictment, the court was correct to reject McGowan’s
    motion to dismiss on statute of limitation grounds.
    A FFIRMED.
    12-22-09