United States v. Christopher Spears , 729 F.3d 753 ( 2013 )

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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 11-‐‑1683
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER L. SPEARS,
Defendant-‐‑Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:10cr55 — Rudy Lozano, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 16, 2013 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 6, 2013
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY, POSNER,
FLAUM, KANNE, ROVNER, WOOD, WILLIAMS, SYKES, TINDER,
and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Christopher Spears made a
counterfeit handgun permit for Tirsah Payne, who was
awaiting trial on a drug charge and could not obtain a legit-‐‑
imate permit. Payne used the fake credential—which con-‐‑
tained her own name and birthdate—when trying to buy a
gun. The dealer was not deceived and did not sell Payne the
2 No. 11-‐‑1683
weapon she wanted. An investigation led to Spears’s arrest
and the discovery that he had sold other fake credentials,
such as drivers’ licenses. He was convicted of five felonies,
including aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. §1028A, and
sentenced to 34 months in prison: 10 months on four of the
five counts, to run concurrently, plus two years’ imprison-‐‑
ment under §1028A, which prescribes a mandatory consecu-‐‑
tive term of that length.
Spears appealed three of the five convictions. A panel af-‐‑
firmed two while reversing the third.

697 F.3d 592

   (7th   Cir.
2012).   Spears   then   asked   for   rehearing   en   banc.   Our   order
granting  that  petition  vacated  the  panel’s  opinion  and  judg-‐‑
ment,   which   we   now   reinstate   with   respect   to   the   convic-‐‑
tions  other  than  the  one  under  §1028A.
Section  1028A(a)(1)  provides  that  anyone  who,  in  connec-‐‑
tion   with   a   list   of   other   crimes,   “knowingly   transfers,   pos-‐‑
sesses,  or  uses,  without  lawful  authority,  a  means  of  identifi-‐‑
cation  of  another  person  shall,  in  addition  to  the  punishment
provided   for   such   felony,   be   sentenced   to   a   term   of   impris-‐‑
onment   of   2   years.”   Section   1028A(c)   provides   the   list   of
predicate  offenses;  an  unauthorized  person’s  attempt  to  pur-‐‑
chase  a  weapon,  in  violation  of

18 U.S.C. §922

(a)(6), is on it.
Spears acknowledges that he lacked “lawful authority” to
sell counterfeit permits. But he contends that a permit is not
a “means of identification”; only intangible details such as
names and Social Security numbers are “means of identifica-‐‑
tion”, he maintains. Spears also contends that he did not
“transfer[]” anything “to another person” because Payne
used her own name and birthdate; no information was sto-‐‑
len from, or transferred to, anyone who did not consent. He
believes that the phrase “without lawful authority” helps to
No. 11-‐‑1683 3
show that “transfer” and “another person” refer to a victim
rather than to persons who consent to the transaction.
The panel rejected the first of these arguments, 697 F.3d
at 598, and we agree with its conclusion. Nothing in ordi-‐‑
nary usage or statutory context limits the phrase “means of
identification” to intangible information. People speak of a
passport or driver’s license as a means of identification. Oth-‐‑
er physical objects, including firearm-‐‑owners’ cards, also
come within that phrase because they identify their owners.
The Supreme Court’s only encounter with §1028A, Flores-‐‑
Figueroa v. United States,

556 U.S. 646

  (2009),  treats  both  per-‐‑
sonal  information  and  documents  containing  it  as  “means  of
identification”.  See,  e.g.,

556 U.S. at 653

.  Although  the  Court
did  not  grant  certiorari  in  Flores-‐‑Figueroa  to  define  “means  of
identification”   and   did   not   produce   a   holding   on   that   sub-‐‑
ject,   the   Justices’   understanding   confirms   that   the   common
usage  of  “means  of  identification”  includes  physical  objects.
And  although  §1028A  does  not  define  “means  of  identifi-‐‑
cation”,  a  neighboring  statute—

18 U.S.C. §1028

,  dealing  with
identity  fraud—does.  Section  1028(d)(7)  provides  a  list,  some
members   of   which   (e.g.,   “iris   image”)   are   physical   objects.
Section   1028A(a)(1)   forbids   not   only   transferring   but   also
possessing  a  “means  of  identification”.  Although  it  is  possi-‐‑
ble  to  “possess”  information  without  committing  it  to  paper,
many   forms   of   possession   entail   embodiment   in   an   object
such  as  a  passport,  Social  Security  card,  or  alien  registration
document.  We  therefore  conclude  that  the  document  sold  to
Payne  was  a  “means  of  identification”.  Accord,  United  States
v.   Sash,

396 F.3d 515

, 524 (2d Cir. 2005) (counterfeit police
badge is a “means of identification” under §1028A).
4 No. 11-‐‑1683
Spears insists that he did not “transfer” the means to
Payne, because she knew her own name and birthdate. Be-‐‑
cause the “means of identification” was the counterfeit card,
however, it was indeed “transfer[red]” from Spears to
Payne. But a transfer is not enough. The “means of identifi-‐‑
cation” must be that of “another person”. From Payne’s per-‐‑
spective, the card she received did not pertain to “another”;
it had her own identifying details. The prosecutor says that
this is irrelevant because, from Spears’s perspective, Payne
was the “another”. On this view, Spears could give Payne a
card bearing Spears’s name but not anyone else’s. If the
prosecutor is right, §1028A acquires a surprising scope. It
would, for example, require a mandatory two-‐‑year consecu-‐‑
tive sentence every time a tax-‐‑return preparer claims an im-‐‑
proper deduction, because the return is transferred to the
IRS, concerns a person other than the preparer, includes a
means of identifying that person (a Social Security number),
and facilitates fraud against the United States (which
§1028A(c)(4) lists as a predicate crime).
In trying to understand the meaning of “another person”
we draw on the statute’s caption—“Aggravated identity
theft.” Providing a client with a bogus credential containing
the client’s own information is identity fraud but not identity
theft; no one’s identity has been stolen or misappropriated. A
caption cannot override a statute’s text, but it can be used to
clear up ambiguities. Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadil-‐‑
ly Cafeterias, Inc.,

554 U.S. 33

,   47   (2008);   Porter   v.   Nussle,

534 U.S. 516

,   528   (2002).   Flores-‐‑Figueroa   used   the   caption   of
§1028A  to  help  explicate  its  text.

556 U.S. at 655

.  The  phrase
“another  person”  is  ambiguous:  neither  text  nor  context  tells
us  whether  “another”  means  “person  other  than  the  defend-‐‑
ant”   or   “person   who   did   not   consent   to   the   information’s
No.  11-‐‑1683                                                                      5
use”.  That  §1028A  deals  with  identity  theft  helps  resolve  the
ambiguity   in   favor   of   the   latter   understanding,   while   read-‐‑
ing   “another   person”   to   mean   “person   other   than   the   de-‐‑
fendant”  treats  §1028A  as  forbidding  document  counterfeit-‐‑
ing  and  other  forms  of  fraud,  a  crime  distinct  from  theft.
To   appreciate   the   difference,   one   need   look   no   farther
than  §1028,  the  aggravated-‐‑identity-‐‑theft  statute’s  next-‐‑door
neighbor.  Section  1028,  captioned  “Fraud  and  related  activi-‐‑
ty   in   connection   with   identification   documents”,   makes   it   a
crime  to  do  any  of  the  following  under  circumstances  (speci-‐‑
fied   in   §1028(c))   that   bring   the   activity   within   the   scope   of
national  authority:
(1)   knowingly   and   without   lawful   authority   produces   an
identification   document,   authentication   feature,   or   a   false
identification  document;
(2)   knowingly   transfers   an   identification   document,   au-‐‑
thentication   feature,   or   a   false   identification   document
knowing  that  such  document  or  feature  was  stolen  or  pro-‐‑
duced  without  lawful  authority;
(3)   knowingly   possesses   with   intent   to   use   unlawfully   or
transfer   unlawfully   five   or   more   identification   documents
(other  than  those  issued  lawfully  for  the  use  of  the  posses-‐‑
sor),   authentication   features,   or   false   identification   docu-‐‑
ments;
(4)  knowingly  possesses  an  identification  document  (other
than  one  issued  lawfully  for  the  use  of  the  possessor),  au-‐‑
thentication   feature,   or   a   false   identification   document,
with   the   intent   such   document   or   feature   be   used   to   de-‐‑
fraud  the  United  States;
(5)   knowingly   produces,   transfers,   or   possesses   a   docu-‐‑
ment-‐‑making  implement  or  authentication  feature  with  the
6                                                                        No.  11-‐‑1683
intent   such   document-‐‑making   implement   or   authentica-‐‑
tion  feature  will  be  used  in  the  production  of  a  false  identi-‐‑
fication   document   or   another   document-‐‑making   imple-‐‑
ment  or  authentication  feature  which  will  be  so  used;
(6)  knowingly  possesses  an  identification  document  or  au-‐‑
thentication   feature   that   is   or   appears   to   be   an   identifica-‐‑
tion   document   or   authentication   feature   of   the   United
States   or   a   sponsoring   entity   of   an   event   designated   as   a
special   event   of   national   significance   which   is   stolen   or
produced   without   lawful   authority   knowing   that   such
document  or  feature  was  stolen  or  produced  without  such
authority;
(7)  knowingly  transfers,  possesses,  or  uses,  without  lawful
authority,  a  means  of  identification  of  another  person  with
the   intent   to   commit,   or   to   aid   or   abet,   or   in   connection
with,   any   unlawful   activity   that   constitutes   a   violation   of
Federal   law,   or   that   constitutes   a   felony   under   any   appli-‐‑
cable  State  or  local  law;  or
(8)  knowingly  traffics  in  false  or  actual  authentication  fea-‐‑
tures   for   use   in   false   identification   documents,   document-‐‑
making  implements,  or  means  of  identification;

18 U.S.C. §1028

(a).   The   transaction   between   Spears   and
Payne  fits  comfortably  within  paragraphs  (1)  and  (2).  And  in
a  statute  about  identity  fraud  it  would  make  sense  to  say  that
Spears   violated   paragraph   (7)   as   well,   because   he   made   a
document   that   aided   and   abetted   Payne’s   effort   to   obtain   a
gun   by   fraud.   But   instead   of   using   §1028,   the   prosecutor
charged   Spears   under   §1028A—which,   if   it   means   what   the
prosecutor   says,   would   convert   most   identity   fraud   into
identity   theft   and   add   a   mandatory,   consecutive,   two-‐‑year
term   to   every   conviction,   even   though   §1028   lacks   any
equivalent  sentencing  provision.
No.  11-‐‑1683                                                                    7
Congress   borrowed   and   modified   the   language   of
§1028(a)(7),  which  stems  from  1982,  to  produce  §1028A(a)(1),
which   was   enacted   in   2004.   Section   1028(a)(7)   deals   with
document   fraud   committed   with   intent   to   aid   or   abet   any
federal   crime,   or   any   state   felony.   Section   1028A(a)(1)   deals
with   identity   theft   in   connection   with   a   short   list   of   serious
crimes.   The   abbreviation   of   the   list   of   predicate   offenses   is
one   reason   why   §1028A   carries   a   harsher   sentence;   the   fact
that  identity  theft  has  a  victim  other  than  the  public  at  large
is   another.   The   usual   victim   of   identity   theft   may   be   out   of
pocket  (if  the  thief  uses  information  to  buy  from  merchants)
or  may  be  put  to  the  task  of  rehabilitating  a  damaged  reputa-‐‑
tion   or   credit   history.   Flores-‐‑Figueroa   observed   that   the   ex-‐‑
amples   in   the   legislative   history   of   §1028A   involve   people
injured  when  a  third  party  used  their  names  or  financial  in-‐‑
formation   (credit   card   or   Social   Security   numbers)   without
their   consent.

556 U.S. at 655

. And the Court also observed
that “Congress separated the fraud crime from the theft
crime in the statute itself” (ibid.) by giving §1028 and §1028A
different titles and placing the rules in different sections.
The Solicitor General told the Supreme Court that “[t]he
statutory text makes clear that the sine qua non of a Section
1028A(a)(1) offense is the presence of a real victim.” Brief for
the United States in Flores-‐‑Figueroa v. United States, No. 08-‐‑
108, at 20 (Jan. 2009). Pages 19–22 of that brief give several
reasons why the Solicitor General concluded that identity-‐‑
theft crimes entail a victim whose information has been used
without consent. The United States Attorney has not ex-‐‑
plained why his position in this prosecution differs so dra-‐‑
matically from the Solicitor General’s in Flores-‐‑Figueroa.
8 No. 11-‐‑1683
The most one could say for the United States’ current po-‐‑
sition is that “another” in §1028A(a)(1) is ambiguous. If that
ambiguity is not resolved by the statutory caption and the
contrast between §1028 and §1028A, it must be resolved by
the Rule of Lenity, under which conviction is possible only
when a law declares in understandable words what is for-‐‑
bidden. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States,

130 S. Ct. 2896

,  2932
(2010);  Rewis  v.  United  States,

401 U.S. 808

,  812  (1971).  Crimes
are  supposed  to  be  defined  by  the  legislature,  not  by  clever
prosecutors  riffing  on  equivocal  language.  A  reasonable  per-‐‑
son  reading  §1028A(a)(1)  would  not  conclude  that  Congress
has  definitely  used  the  word  “another”  to  specify  every  per-‐‑
son  other  than  the  defendant,  as  opposed  to  a  person  whose
information  has  been  misappropriated.
We   have   not   located   any   appellate   decision   discussing
the  meaning  of  “another  person”.  Although  one  court  of  ap-‐‑
peals   stated   that   the   phrase   means   “anyone   other   than   the
defendant”   (United   States   v.   Zuniga-‐‑Arteaga,

681 F.3d 1220

,
1224   (11th   Cir.   2012)),   the   parties   had   not   contested   that   is-‐‑
sue,   and   the   court   did   not   explain   why   it   chose   that   defini-‐‑
tion  over  “anyone  other  than  a  person  consenting  to  the  use
of   the  information”  or  something  similar.  The   sole  question
at  issue  in  Zuniga-‐‑Arteaga  was  whether  the  “person”  had  to
be   alive;   the   eleventh   circuit   held,   as   we   also   had   done,   see
United  States  v.  LaFaive,

618 F.3d 613

  (7th  Cir.  2010),  that  un-‐‑
authorized   use   of   a   dead   person’s   identifying   information
can   violate   §1028A.   The   eleventh   circuit’s   decision   does   not
resolve  other  issues  not  contested  by  the  parties.
Section  1028A,  we  hold,  uses  “another  person”  to  refer  to
a   person   who   did   not   consent   to   the   use   of   the   “means   of
identification”.  This  decision,  in  conjunction  with  the  panel’s
No.  11-‐‑1683                                                            9
disposition   of   the   convictions   under   statutes   other   than
§1028A,  mean  that  two  of  Spears’s  convictions  have  been  re-‐‑
versed,   while   three   remain.   The   district   court’s   judgment   is
vacated,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for  resentencing  on  those
three  convictions.