Eugene Hudson, Jr. v. American Federation of Government Employees ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    No. 20-5181                                                  September Term, 2021
    FILED ON: OCTOBER 12, 2021
    EUGENE HUDSON, JR.,
    APPELLANT
    v.
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, ET AL.,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:19-cv-02738)
    Before: KATSAS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
    JUDGMENT
    This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the
    District of Columbia and on the briefs and arguments of the parties. The court has afforded the
    issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See
    D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). For the following reasons, it is
    ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
    This appeal turns on whether the Civil Service Reform Act precludes various labor statutes
    and other causes of action brought by Appellant. Eugene Hudson, Jr. sued the American
    Federation of Government Employees, a national union, and its local branch. Hudson alleged that
    the local branch, with the blessing of the national union, pretextually struck him from its
    membership rolls to prevent him from running as a union official against certain incumbents.
    Hudson brought statutory claims under the Labor Management Relations Disclosure Act, the
    Labor Management Relations Act, Title VII, and 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
     along with various common
    law claims. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Civil
    Service Reform Act, which created an elaborate administrative framework to manage public-sector
    union disputes, precluded all of Hudson’s claims. We affirm.
    Hudson argued before the district court that the Civil Service Reform Act did not apply to
    him because he was a retired federal employee. Before the district court, Hudson cited a letter he
    received from the Federal Labor Relations Authority that stated that Hudson was not covered by
    the Civil Service Reform Act because he was no longer employed by the federal government. Dkt.
    65 at 2-3, 7; Dkt. 66 at 3, 7. Then, Hudson argued that the Civil Service Reform Act did not apply
    to him because he “is not employed by an agency and his employment ceased due to retirement.”
    Dkt. 65 at 7; Dkt. 66 at 7. Responding to those arguments, the district court concluded that the
    Civil Service Reform Act did in fact apply to retired federal employees like Hudson. Hudson v.
    Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., No. CV 19-2738 (JEB), 
    2020 WL 3035039
    , at *6 (D.D.C. June 5,
    2020).
    Now, Hudson seeks to bring an entirely new argument as to why the Civil Service Reform
    Act does not apply to him—that he is “not a retired federal employee” but “a retired private sector
    employee.” App. Br. at 1. We do not entertain “an argument not made in the lower tribunal . . .
    absent ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Flynn v. Comm’r, 
    269 F.3d 1064
    , 1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
    (internal citation omitted). Exceptional circumstances include “cases involving uncertainty in the
    law; novel, important, and recurring questions of federal law; intervening change in the law; and
    extraordinary situations with the potential for miscarriages of justice.” 
    Id.
     Hudson has not claimed
    that there are exceptional circumstances warranting departure from our ordinary forfeiture rule.
    Hudson makes clear that this new argument is his only argument before us. App. Br. at 1. (“This
    appeal is here because of a single, erroneous factual finding by the district court: that Eugene
    Hudson, Jr., is a ‘retired federal employee.’”).
    As Hudson rests his entire appeal on a new argument and this new argument is forfeited,
    we affirm.
    ***
    Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
    directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely
    petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R.
    41.
    Per Curiam
    FOR THE COURT:
    Mark J. Langer, Clerk
    BY:     /s/
    Daniel J. Reidy
    Deputy Clerk
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-5181

Filed Date: 10/12/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/12/2021