DR. MARC BIVINS v. CHARLES W. DOUGLAS, etc. ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed October 20, 2021.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D20-0965
    Lower Tribunal No. 18-5077
    ________________
    Dr. Marc Bivins, et al.,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    Charles W. Douglas, etc., et al.,
    Appellees.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Rosa C.
    Figarola, Judge.
    Law Offices of David Howard Goldberg, P.L. and David Howard
    Goldberg, for appellants Anabelle Bivins and Lorelei Bivins; Adrian Philip
    Thomas, P.A. and Adrian P. Thomas, and Paula Castaneda (Fort
    Lauderdale); Daniel McDermott, P.A., and Daniel L. McDermott (Fort
    Lauderdale), for appellants Dr. Marc Bivins, and Dr. Marc Bivins and Dr.
    Balkys Bivins, as Biological Parents and Natural Guardians of P.B., a Minor
    Child.
    Cartolano & Alvero, P.A., and Joe Cartolano, for appellees Phyllis
    Johns, Sally Knowles, and Emily Moynihan; Dunwody White & Landon, P.A.,
    and Jack A. Falk, Jr., for appellee The Dr. M. Lee Pearce Foundation, Inc.;
    Goldman Felcoski & Stone, P.A., and Brian J. Felcoski and Robert W.
    Goldman, for appellee Charles W. Douglas, as Trustee of the M. Lee Pearce
    Living Trust, as amended.
    Before EMAS, SCALES, and HENDON, JJ.
    HENDON, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    This is an appeal of a final order dismissing Appellants’ second
    amended complaint with prejudice. As the Appellants have failed to establish
    that they have standing to pursue the claims asserted in the second
    amended complaint, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Dr. Marc Bivins (“Bivins”), Anabelle Bivins (“Anabelle”), Lorelei Bivins
    (“Lorelei”), and the natural guardians of P.B. (“P.B.”) (hereinafter
    “Appellants”) filed a declaratory action seeking to invalidate several trust
    instruments executed by the decedent, Dr. Milton Lee Pearce (“Pearce”).
    The appellees, defendants below, are Charles W. Douglas, as Trustee of the
    M. Lee Pearce Living Trust (“Trust”), as amended, and the Dr. M. Lee Pearce
    Foundation, Inc.
    Bivins alleges that he and/or his three biological daughters are the
    lineal descendants and sole intestate heirs of Pearce’s intestate estate. This
    is so, he contends, because Bivens was born out of wedlock and that his
    2
    biological mother and his biological father, Pearce, participated in a marriage
    ceremony after Bivens’ birth and thus Bivens is a descendant of Pearce and
    one of the natural kindred of Pearce’s family. Bivens alleged in his second
    amended complaint that Pearce’s death vested in his intestate heirs the right
    to Pearce’s property, and thus the Appellants, as Pearce’s intestate heirs,
    are affected persons and interested in the Trust. Bivens additionally alleged
    that his paternity is established, and no further determination is necessary.
    The Trust devised Pearce’s fortune to his charitable foundation and
    certain named individuals. 1 Appellants’ initial complaint chronicled several
    estate planning documents executed by Pearce from 2000 until his death on
    October 12, 2017. 2 The trial court dismissed this complaint, outlining the
    pleading deficiencies, including, among others, lack of standing, the
    prematurity of counts I and II, and the failure to join indispensable parties.
    Thereafter, Appellants filed an amended complaint, raising new
    allegations as to Bivins’ paternity, the statute of limitations, and allegations
    1
    It is important to note that, from 2000 until Pearce’s death, Appellants were
    never included as beneficiaries of Pearce’s Trust.
    2
    The first complaint challenged the Trust and sought the following relief:
    Count I – a declaration that a separate writing was invalid; Count II – a
    declaration that the 2017 Trust Restatement was invalid due to a lack of a
    beneficiary; and Count III – a declaration that the 2017 Trust Restatement
    was invalid due to a lack of sufficient mental capacity.
    3
    of equitable estoppel. Also referenced in the amended complaint are
    Pearce’s trusts from 2000 to 2017, and the 2017 Trust Restatement, which
    was attached as an exhibit. The trial court likewise dismissed the amended
    complaint, elaborating even further on the deficiencies in the amended
    complaint, specifically, the failure to adequately plead standing and establish
    Bivins’ paternity. The court further restated that counts I and II were
    premature.
    Appellants then filed the second amended complaint, which is the
    operative pleading. In this amended complaint, the Appellants addressed
    allegations as to standing and the application of the statute of limitations.
    The second amended complaint included an additional count, count IV, in
    which they alleged that the trust sought to achieve a discriminatory
    objective.3
    Appellees again sought a dismissal, but this time with prejudice.
    Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, and entered final
    judgment. In doing so, the court noted that as a threshold matter, the second
    amended complaint “for the third time, [did] not contain sufficient allegations
    3
    Although count IV was first pled in the second amended complaint, factual
    allegations as to Pearce’s racist motives were pled in both the first complaint
    and the amended complaint. Said allegations included the claim that Pearce
    disinherited Bivins on the account of his having married a woman “of African
    American descent.”
    4
    to support [Appellants’] standing to bring the claims alleged.” Specifically,
    count III was dismissed on the grounds that Appellants lacked standing to
    challenge the 2017 Trust instruments. Counts I, II, and IV were dismissed
    for failure to state a cause of action for declaratory relief. In entering final
    judgment, the court reasoned that a dismissal “with prejudice” was
    appropriate because “further amendments to the Complaint would be futile
    given the opportunities already provided to [Appellants] to amend the
    Complaint and the Court’s prior rulings regarding the deficiencies in those
    pleadings.” This appeal followed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “A trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.”
    Edwards v. Landsman, 
    51 So. 3d 1208
    , 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
    ANALYSIS
    Appellants raise three issues, and several sub-issues. As a preliminary
    matter, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in considering exhibits
    attached to the second amended complaint when ruling on the motion to
    dismiss.
    The second amended complaint specifically refers to, and attaches,
    the 2017 Trust Restatement. Since Appellants’ standing is premised on the
    Trust’s contents, the trial court correctly considered the terms of the Trust in
    5
    ruling on the motion to dismiss. See One Call Prop. Servs. Inc. v. Sec. First
    Ins. Co., 
    165 So. 3d 749
    , 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[W]here the terms of a
    legal document are impliedly incorporated by reference into the complaint,
    the trial court may consider the contents of the document in ruling on a
    motion to dismiss. . .”); see also K.R. Exchange Servs., Inc. v. Fuerst,
    Humphrey, Ittleman, PL, 
    48 So. 3d 889
    , 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (stating that
    a “court must consider an exhibit attached to the complaint together with the
    complaint’s allegations, and the exhibit controls when its language is
    inconsistent with the complaint’s allegations”).
    I. Standing
    This Court reviews orders of dismissal based on lack of standing de
    novo. Gordon v. Kleinman, 
    120 So. 3d 120
    , 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
    “Standing is a threshold inquiry that must be addressed before
    considering the merits of a cause of action. To have standing, a would-be
    litigant must show ‘a direct and articulable interest in the controversy, which
    will be affected by the outcome of the litigation.’” Cruz v. Cmty. Bank & Tr. of
    Fla., 
    277 So. 3d 1095
    , 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting Centerstate Bank
    Cent. Fla., N.A. v. Krause, 
    87 So. 3d 25
    , 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)) (internal
    citations omitted).
    6
    Appellants contend that the second amended complaint contained
    sufficient allegations to establish standing to maintain a declaratory action to
    invalidate the Trust. Specifically, Appellants argue they have standing to
    contest the Trust because (1) they are Pearce’s intestate heirs; and (2) they
    are “interested persons” within the meaning of the Florida Trust Code. We
    disagree.
    A. Intestate Heirs
    Both Bivins and Bivins’s children claim they have standing to contest
    Pearce’s Trust because they are Pearce’s intestate heirs.
    Bivins
    Appellants argue that the mere statement that Bivins is Pearce’s
    biological son is sufficient to establish that Bivins is Pearce’s intestate heir.
    Appellants further argue that the statute of limitations as to paternity does
    not bar Bivins’s claims. Appellants also contend that the “delayed discovery
    doctrine” and the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the application of the
    statute of limitations. None of these arguments have merit.
    a.     Statute of limitations
    Bivins claims standing as an intestate heir because he is Pearce’s
    biological son, and points to paragraphs 14 and 16 of the second amended
    complaint. However, the blanket statement that “Pearce was the biological
    7
    father” of Bivins, without more, fails to establish Pearce’s paternity. See
    Robinson v. Robinson, 
    298 So. 3d 1202
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).
    Section 95.11(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes imposes a four-year statute
    of limitations on an “action relating to the determination of paternity, with the
    time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.” Thus, in
    order to qualify as Pearce’s intestate heir, Bivins would have had to establish
    Pearce’s paternity within the time period allowed by the statute of limitations.
    Here, the limitations period ran in 1987, i.e., four years after Bivins reached
    the age of majority when he turned eighteen years old. Because Bivins failed
    to obtain a judicial declaration of paternity within that period. Bivins’s claim
    is barred by the statute of limitations. 4
    In another effort to circumvent the statute of limitations, Appellants
    assert that Bivins was born out of wedlock and that his biological mother and
    Pearce participated in a marriage ceremony after his birth. In Appellants’
    view, Bivins is Pearce’s descendent. In support of this contention, Appellants
    4
    We disagree with Appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in
    considering the statute of limitations in ruling on the motion to dismiss
    because it required the court to consider matters outside the four corners of
    the complaint. The second amended complaint clearly showed the
    applicability of the defense given that it contains allegations as to Bivins’
    paternity without reference to a declaration or other proof. See Gen. Motors
    Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 
    629 So. 2d 292
    , 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
    8
    cite to section 732.108(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which states, in relevant
    part: “For the purpose of intestate succession . . . a person born out of
    wedlock is . . . a descendant of his or her father . . . if: (a) [t]he natural parents
    participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the person
    born out of wedlock, even though the attempted marriage is void.”
    In making this assertion, Bivens has overlooked the fact that section
    732.108(2)(a) requires proof that the marriage was between Bivins’ natural
    parents. This would still require a legal determination of paternity. See
    Thurston v. Thurston, 
    777 So. 2d 1001
    , 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    (“[A]lthough section 732.108(2)(a) permits a person born out of wedlock to
    establish an intestacy relationship between that person and a man married
    to his or her mother, . . . it requires the putative heir to also establish that the
    marriage was between his or her natural parents. Under the authority of In
    re Estate of Smith, [
    685 So. 2d 1206
     (Fla. 1996)] such a probate proceeding
    is a proceeding relating to the determination of paternity to which section
    95.11(3)(b) applies.”) (emphasis added)). Thus, Bivins would have had to
    prove that Pearce was his biological father to establish an intestacy
    relationship to Pearce on the basis of his marriage to Bivins’s mother
    pursuant to section 732.108(2)(a). Given that Bivins never obtained such a
    declaration from Pearce within the statute of limitations, this argument fails.
    9
    b.     Delayed discovery doctrine
    The delayed discovery doctrine “generally provides that a cause of
    action does not accrue until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably should
    have known of the tortious act giving rise to the cause of action.” Hearndon
    v. Graham, 
    767 So. 2d 1179
    , 1184 (Fla. 2000).
    Here, Appellants contend that Pearce made repeated fraudulent
    misrepresentations 5 that he was not Bivins’ biological father, and that said
    misrepresentations were made until nearly the time of Pearce’s death.
    Because of these fraudulent misrepresentations, Appellants claim that the
    facts giving rise to this cause of action were only discovered four years ago.
    In Appellants’ view, the action to establish paternity is timely, given that the
    alleged fraud occurred less than twelve years ago. 6 This argument fails.
    The delayed discovery doctrine applies solely to causes of action that
    are specified in section 95.031, Florida Statutes, which includes claims of
    5
    As Appellees correctly noted, fraud must be pled with specificity, and
    Appellants failed to assert any cause of action for fraud as part of this suit in
    any of their complaints. See Strack v. Fred Rawn Constr., Inc., 
    908 So. 2d 563
    , 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
    6
    Appellants cite to section 95.031(2)(a) for the proposition that “in any event
    an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the
    date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud
    was or should have been discovered.” However, as discussed above,
    Appellants never included a claim for fraud in any of the three versions of the
    complaint filed below.
    10
    fraud, products liability, professional malpractice, medical malpractice, and
    intentional torts based on abuse. See Davis v. Monahan, 
    832 So. 2d 708
    ,
    709–10 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to extend the application of the delayed
    discovery doctrine to claims involving breach of fiduciary duty). Given that
    Appellants failed to specifically plead a claim for fraud on the part of Pearce,
    the delayed discovery doctrine does not serve to bar the application of the
    statute of limitations.
    c.       Equitable estoppel
    Appellants next argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel renders
    the statute of limitations inapplicable as to the issue of paternity.
    The doctrine of equitable estoppel bars the application of the statute of
    limitations defense where an injured party recognized a basis for filing suit,
    but was induced to forbear filing suit during the limitations period by the party
    who caused the injury. W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 
    197 So. 3d 584
    ,
    590 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). The argument here is that Pearce fraudulently
    induced Bivins to forego his right to establish paternity by fraudulently
    concealing the fact that he was Bivins’ biological father, which Bivins did not
    discover until years later.
    This argument fails because “equitable estoppel ‘presupposes that the
    plaintiff knows of the facts underlying the cause of action but delayed filing
    11
    suit because of the defendant’s conduct.’” Black Diamond Props., Inc. v.
    Haines, 
    69 So. 3d 1090
    , 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citations omitted)
    (emphasis in original). In other words, Bivins would have had to: (a) be aware
    of the right to file a claim for paternity, but (b) then failed to do so because of
    Pearce’s fraudulent misrepresentation. First, the second amended complaint
    contains no allegations that anyone actively induced Bivins into foregoing
    filing a paternity suit. Further, Appellants’ argument centers on the fact that
    Bivins did not become aware of the facts underlying this cause of action,
    including Pearce’s status as his biological father, until recently given
    Pearce’s alleged fraud. The above facts render the doctrine of equitable
    estoppel inapplicable.
    2. Bivins’ children
    Appellants argue that even if Bivins has no standing, his children,
    Anabelle, Lorelei, and P.B. still have standing to contest the validity of the
    Trust instruments as Pearce’s sole heirs at law.
    Because Bivins was alive when Pearce died, and would have been in
    a superior class of alleged descendants, Bivens’ children have no standing
    and, thus, cannot claim any interest in the Trust. §§ 732.103, 732.104, Fla.
    Stat.; Estate of Tim, 
    180 So. 2d 161
    , 163 (Fla. 1965) (stating that “to be
    ‘entitled’ to inherit a share of the estate there must be no other persons of a
    12
    class having a prior right, under the established order of succession, to such
    estate”). Given that Bivins’ children do not qualify as intestate heirs, and were
    not included as beneficiaries in any of the Trust instruments attached to the
    second amended complaint, they cannot challenge the Trust. See Cruz, 277
    So. 3d at 1098-99 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
    B. “Interested Persons”
    Appellants alternatively argue that they have standing to invalidate the
    Trust because they qualify as “interested persons” under section
    731.201(23), Florida Statutes.
    Section 731.201(23), Florida Statutes, defines an “interested person”
    as: “any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the
    outcome of the particular proceeding involved. . . .”
    Here, Appellants suggest that they will be affected by the outcome of
    the litigation because they are the intestate recipients of the Trust corpus
    once the assets pass through intestacy upon the invalidation of the Trust. In
    so doing, Appellants erroneously equate this case to Richardson v.
    Richardson, 
    524 So. 2d 1126
     (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), the facts of which are
    easily distinguishable. Here, Appellants do not qualify as “interested
    persons” because they are not contingent beneficiaries under the Trust as
    they were never named beneficiaries in any of the numerous versions of the
    13
    Trust. Additionally, Appellants’ interest in the Trust corpus, if any, has not
    already vested, as they do not qualify as contingent beneficiaries. Finally,
    even if the Trust instruments were deemed void, Appellants could not inherit
    Pearce’s estate through intestacy given Bivins’s failure to establish paternity
    within the applicable statute of limitations.
    Appellants argue that they should be considered interested persons
    because they would inherit Pearce’s estate through intestacy if the Trust
    were invalidated. However, the lack of a declaration of paternity rendered
    their cause of action barred by the statute of limitations. The Appellants
    cannot claim that there is a possibility that they will inherit Pearce’s estate
    under a previous will or the law of intestacy.
    Consistent with the above, the trial court correctly found that Appellants
    lack standing to contest the Trust because they are not “interested persons”
    under the Florida Trust Code.
    Given that that standing is a threshold matter, and that the Appellants
    have failed to establish standing, we need not discuss the remaining
    arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing
    Appellants’ second amended complaint with prejudice.
    Affirmed.
    14