Dye v. County Commission of Marion County ( 2021 )


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  •             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    September 2021 Term                        FILED
    October 28, 2021
    _____________________                         released at 3:00 p.m.
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    No. 20-0602
    _____________________
    HOMER DYE,
    Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
    v.
    COUNTY COMMISSION OF MARION COUNTY,
    Defendant Below, Respondent
    ___________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion County
    The Honorable David R. Janes, Judge
    Case No. CC-24-2016-AA-3
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    _________________________________________________________
    Submitted: September 28, 2021
    Filed: October 28, 2021
    Richard R. Marsh, Esq.                         Charles A. Shields, Esq.
    Flaherty Sensabaugh Bonasso PLLC               Assistant Prosecutor
    Clarksburg, West Virginia                      Marion County Prosecuting
    Counsel for Petitioner                          Attorney’s Office
    Fairmont, West Virginia
    Counsel for Respondent
    JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.     “‘This Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and ultimate
    disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact
    under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.’ Syllabus
    Point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 
    196 W.Va. 178
    , 
    469 S.E.2d 114
     (1996).” Syl. Pt. 1, State
    v. Spade, 
    225 W. Va. 649
    , 
    695 S.E.2d 879
     (2010).
    2.     Neither the provisions establishing the ex parte will probate
    procedure, West Virginia Code §§ 41-5-10 to -11 (2019), nor the provisions creating the
    office of fiduciary supervisor, West Virginia Code §§ 44-3A-1 to -44 (2019 & Supp. 2021),
    provide statutory authority for a fiduciary supervisor to undertake an independent
    investigation into the validity of a will that has been admitted into probate.
    3.     There is no mechanism contained in the ex parte probate procedure
    set forth in West Virginia Code § 41-5-10 (2019) and West Virginia Code § 41-5-11 (2019)
    that allows a county commission to rescind its prior order admitting a will to probate.
    i
    WOOTON, Justice:
    The petitioner, Homer Dye, appeals the July 1, 2020, order entered by the
    Circuit Court of Marion County, West Virginia, denying his appeal from an order entered
    by the respondent Marion County Commission (“county commission”), declaring the
    holographic Will of Oras Dye (“the Will”) to be void and rescinding the petitioner’s
    appointment as Executor of the Estate of Oras Dye. On appeal, the petitioner raises a single
    assignment of error, which contains several issues. 1 We find it necessary to only address:
    1) whether the fiduciary supervisor and the county commission lacked statutory authority
    to investigate the validity of a Will, and unilaterally declare it to be void, after said Will
    had been admitted to probate; and 2) whether the county commission failed to provide the
    petitioner with notice and an opportunity to be heard, before taking the action cited above
    in voiding the Will, 2 violated the petitioner’s right to due process of law. After careful
    review of the briefs, the arguments of the parties, the appendix record, and the applicable
    legal authority, we find that the fiduciary supervisor lacked authority to investigate the
    validity of a Will already admitted to probate, and that the county commission lacked
    authority to revoke a Will’s prior admission to probate. We therefore reverse the circuit
    court’s order and remand the case for entry of an order declaring that the Will of Oras Dye
    1
    Because the petitioner lumped several alleged errors into a single assigned error,
    we have rephrased the assigned error by breaking it down into separate issues for ease of
    discussion.
    2
    In light of the Court’s reversal based on the lack of the fiduciary supervisor’s and
    the county commission’s statutory authority, we find there is no need to address the
    petitioner’s argument regarding the untimeliness of the county commission’s actions.
    1
    was admitted to probate as a valid will on February 4, 2016, and reinstating the petitioner
    as the executor of the decedent’s estate.
    I. Facts and Procedural Background
    On December 15, 2013, a holographic Will was signed by Oras Dye, the
    petitioner’s brother. A little over two years later, Oras died on December 25, 2015; on
    January 6, 2016, the petitioner took the Will to the Office of the Clerk of the County
    Commission of Marion County (“county clerk”) to present it for probate. The county clerk
    did not accept the Will for probate at that time but allowed it to be lodged for review. On
    January 21, 2016, Cynthia A. Danley, Deputy Supervisor of the Office of the Fiduciary
    Supervisors, wrote to the petitioner, explaining that in the opinion of the Fiduciary
    Supervisor, David Glance (“the fiduciary supervisor”), the Will could not be proven
    because it was not signed by two disinterested witnesses. 3 Ms. Danley advised the
    petitioner that the decedent’s children (also referred to as the “heirs at law”) had “indicated
    that one of them wishes to be appointed as Administrator of the Estate.” Ms. Danley gave
    the petitioner seven days to consult with an attorney, and advised that if she did not hear
    from him within that time frame, one of the heirs at law would be appointed as
    administrator of the estate.
    3
    See W. Va. Code 41-2-1 (2019) (pertaining to competency of witnesses to a will
    who also are beneficiaries under the will).
    2
    On January 26, 2016, after receiving the letter, the petitioner went to the
    fiduciary supervisor’s office. While it is unclear from the appendix record whether the
    petitioner met with the fiduciary supervisor, the county clerk, or an employee in one of
    these offices, someone explained to him the requirements to probate the hand printed Will
    as a holographic Will under West Virginia law. 4 He was provided with two standard form
    affidavits entitled “Proof of Holographic Will,” for two witnesses to execute concerning
    the verification of the decedent’s handwriting. 5
    4
    West Virginia Code § 41-1-3 (2019) provides:
    No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed
    by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by
    his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the
    name is intended as a signature; and moreover, unless it be
    wholly in the handwriting of the testator, the signature shall be
    made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence of at
    least two competent witnesses, present at the same time; and
    such witnesses shall subscribe the will in the presence of the
    testator, and of each other, but no form of attestation shall be
    necessary.
    Also, this Court held in syllabus point one of In re Teubert’s Estate, 
    171 W. Va. 226
    , 
    298 S.E.2d 456
     (1982), that “W. Va. Code, 41-1-3, provides that holographic wills are valid in
    this State if they are wholly in the handwriting of the testator and signed. The third and
    final requirement for a valid holographic will in our jurisdiction is that the writing must
    evidence a testamentary intent.”
    5
    The circuit court found that the affidavits were “the same Affidavits given to all
    persons tendering a holographic will for probate in Marion County, West Virginia, to
    provide the Marion County Clerk evidence authenticating the handwriting contained in a
    holographic will.”
    3
    The petitioner had the two affidavits signed and notarized for attachment to
    the Will that was lodged in the county clerk’s office. In the two affidavits, Alicia Healey
    and Yvonne Shaw, respectively, each swore that they knew the decedent and had seen him
    write frequently within the time period each affiant knew him and
    had been acquainted with his genuine proper handwriting for a
    number of years, and . . . [was] acquainted with and do know
    his handwriting and would and do know it when . . . [each
    affiant saw] it, and that the handwriting of said will of Oras D.
    Dye is the own genuine proper handwriting of said Oras D.
    Dye.
    The petitioner then provided the completed affidavits to the county clerk. On February 4,
    2016, the Will, with the accompanying affidavits, was admitted to probate and recorded by
    the county clerk’s office, in vacation, as a holographic Will.
    After admitting the Will to probate and recording it, the fiduciary supervisor,
    acting unilaterally and despite the lack of any objection having been lodged by anyone,
    decided to undertake his own investigation of the Will. By letter dated February 23, 2016,
    Ms. Danley informed the petitioner that “Mr. Glance, the Fiduciary Supervisor wishes to
    contact the witnesses who signed the Affidavits for Proving The Holographic Will.” The
    petitioner was asked to provide the fiduciary supervisor with the addresses of the two
    affiants, Alicia Healey and Yvonne Shaw. The fiduciary supervisor, in turn, sent a letter,
    dated March 1, 2016, 6 to Ms. Healey and Ms. Shaw, respectively, stating:
    6
    Interestingly, while the county commission’s order voiding the Will provides that
    this letter was sent to the witnesses “[i]n response to the inquiries of the Fiduciary
    4
    You have recently sworn, under oath, in Affidavits concerning
    the handwritten Will of Oras Dye.
    Before additional litigation takes place over this Will, I want
    to make sure of your position in this matter. The Will is printed
    and then signed by Oras Dye.
    Is it your sworn testimony that the printed Will was ALL done
    by Oras Dye? Or is it your sworn testimony that the signature
    on the Will is that of Oras Dye and you do not know who
    printed the Will. This is an important difference under West
    Virginia law, so I need you to sign the enclosed form and return
    it to our office.
    Both witnesses responded to this inquiry by indicating that they only intended to verify the
    decedent’s signature on the Will.
    By letter dated April 18, 2016, the petitioner’s counsel informed Ms. Danley
    of the petitioner’s position that the validity of the Will had been resolved on February 4,
    2016, when the Will had been admitted to probate and the petitioner had been duly
    appointed as executor. Counsel further advised Ms. Danley that “it is our opinion that Oras
    Delmus Dye’s last will and testament is entirely valid” and that the Will comported with
    the requirements of West Virginia Code § 41-1-3. 7
    Supervisor[,]” the circuit court found in its order that “[i]n response to inquiries in the
    pending Estate of Oras Delmus Dye, the handprinted will and affidavits were reviewed by
    the Fiduciary Supervisor on March 1, 2016.” There is no evidence of any “inquiries” into
    the Will in the appendix record.
    7
    See supra note 4.
    5
    By letter dated April 25, 2016, the fiduciary supervisor responded to the
    petitioner’s counsel, stating that he did not believe the Will was valid. Specifically, the
    fiduciary supervisor stated that he had followed up with the two affiants and “their
    responses did not affirm their Affidavits. They can only say that the signature on the
    Holographic Will is that of Oras Dye, but will not confirm that the Will is ‘wholly in the
    handwriting of Oras Dye.’” He further stated that he
    was in the process of meeting with the Prosecutor’s office to
    have an Order prepared for the County Commission, voiding
    the Will of record.
    Since your client has the burden of proving the Will of record
    “was wholly in the handwriting of Oras Dye,” I will wait
    twenty (20) days before taking any action.
    Finally, the fiduciary supervisor stated that he was also sending a copy of everything “to
    the Heirs at Law of Oras Dye, and by a copy of this letter, asking them to file their written
    position on the Holographic Will within the next twenty (20) days.” Neither the petitioner,
    nor any of the heirs at law responded to the fiduciary supervisor’s letter. 8
    8
    The petitioner’s lack of response was due to his position that he had already proven
    the Will as evidenced by its recording and his appointment as executor. While there is a
    factual finding in the county commission’s “Order Voiding Will of Record,” and a similar
    finding in the circuit court’s “Final Order Denying Appeal from County Commission,” that
    “the children of Oras Dye met with the Fiduciary Supervisor the week of September 20,
    2016, and expressed their concern that Homer Dye [the petitioner] was trying [to] sell the
    real estate of their father, Oras Dye, based upon the hand printed Will that is of record in
    the office of the Marion County Clerk[,]” there is no evidence in the appendix record to
    support this finding.
    6
    By letter dated October 5, 2016, the fiduciary supervisor provided the
    petitioner and the heirs at law a copy of an order entered by the county commission that
    same date, voiding the Will and rescinding the petitioner’s appointment as Executor of the
    Estate of Oras Dye. This order had been entered by the county commission ex parte and
    without any notice to the petitioner, and the county commission’s action was based solely
    upon the investigation conducted by the fiduciary supervisor, as there had never been any
    objection lodged by the “heirs at law” – or anyone else – to the Will. In its order, the
    county commission directed the petitioner to provide the fiduciary supervisor with a “Long
    Form Settlement detailing all actions taken as Executor from the date of his appointment
    to the date of settlement” within thirty days.
    The petitioner appealed the county commission’s order to the circuit court
    on November 2, 2016. 9 By order entered July 1, 2020, the circuit court denied the appeal,
    finding that the fiduciary supervisor’s actions were “open and transparent” and were
    “reasonable and proper under the circumstances.” Further, the court found that despite
    notifications from the fiduciary supervisor, the petitioner failed to respond in a timely
    manner “for more than five (5) months” after the fiduciary supervisor’s April 25, 2016,
    letter. The circuit court then found that “[h]owever, from April 25, 2016, to October 5,
    2016, the Petitioner, Homer Dye, took action to attempt to sell the real estate of his brother
    9
    The docket sheet and the order indicate that a hearing on the petitioner’s appeal
    was held on February 11, 2020; however, there is no transcript of this hearing included in
    the appendix record.
    7
    Oras D. Dye, under the void will, all to the prejudice of the children of Oras D. Dye, the
    statutory heirs of Oras D. Dye.” 10 The circuit court determined that the petitioner had been
    given “reasonable opportunities to respond to the legal issues concerning” probate of the
    Will but had failed to take any action. The circuit court concluded:
    Petitioner and his Counsel had timely and reasonable
    opportunities to avail themselves of remedies before the
    Fiduciary Supervisor and the Marion County Commission,
    which satisfies all procedural due process concerns in this
    particular case. Since the Petitioner and his Counsel declined
    to avail themselves of the legal remedies by their own conduct,
    this Court readily concludes Petitioner has not been deprived
    of Due Process of Law.
    The circuit court further determined that “from a thorough review of this matter, the actions
    of the Fiduciary Supervisor and the Marion County Commission were in accordance with
    all appropriate statutes and standards and were not otherwise arbitrary nor did they
    constitute an abuse of discretion.” It is from this order that the petitioner appeals.
    II. Standard of Review
    “‘This Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and ultimate disposition
    under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a
    clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.’ Syllabus Point 4,
    Burgess v. Porterfield, 
    196 W.Va. 178
    , 
    469 S.E.2d 114
     (1996).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Spade,
    
    225 W. Va. 649
    , 
    695 S.E.2d 879
     (2010); see Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194
    10
    Again, there is no evidence in the appendix record to support this finding.
    
    8 W. Va. 138
    , 
    459 S.E.2d 415
     (1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court
    is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo
    standard of review.”). With this standard in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.
    III. Discussion
    A. Lack of Statutory Authority to Act
    1. Fiduciary Supervisor
    The petitioner contends that the fiduciary supervisor did not have the
    authority to independently investigate the validity of a Will that had been accepted into
    probate and recorded. The petitioner asserts that a fiduciary supervisor’s duties are set
    forth in statute and primarily involve oversight of fiduciaries and the administration of
    estates, not probate of wills. Further, the petitioner argues that the fiduciary supervisor,
    who is an agent of the county commission, should be neutral, not acting on behalf of either
    party to a disputed will. Conversely, the county commission contends that it has “exclusive
    jurisdiction of ‘all matters’ probate.” 11 It also argues, albeit without citation of any legal
    authority, that “[t]he Fiduciary had not only the right, but also the statutory duty and
    obligation to determine the validity of the Will.”
    11
    See 
    W. Va. Code § 7-1-3
     (2019) (providing that county commissions “shall have
    jurisdiction in all matters probate . . . .”).
    9
    It is undisputed that county commissions have subject-matter jurisdiction to
    hear probate matters. See W. Va. Code 7-1-3. However, subject matter jurisdiction to hear
    a case simply does not confer upon either the county commission or its agent the legal right
    to act outside the scope of statutory law enacted by the Legislature governing probate and
    administration of estates and trusts. In this regard, the office of fiduciary supervisor was
    statutorily created as an “optional procedure for proof and allowance of claims against
    estates of decedents.” See 
    W. Va. Code § 44
    -3A-1 to -44 (2019 & Supp. 2021) (creating
    counties with optional procedure for handling proof of claims made against estates).
    Specifically, West Virginia Code § 44-3A-2 provides that
    the office of fiduciary supervisor . . . shall not be construed to
    vest judicial power in the holder . . . thereof. Such office[] [is]
    created to aid and assist the county commission in the proper
    and expeditious performance of the duties of such commissions
    with respect to the administration of estates and trusts and
    every order of finding of any fiduciary supervisor . . . shall be
    subject to confirmation and approval of the county
    commission. . . . Every fiduciary supervisor . . . shall have the
    power to sign and issue process directed to the various parties
    in any proceeding before them and may summon witnesses,
    administer oaths and take testimony with respect thereto as
    may be required to carry out the purposes of this chapter, but
    they shall apply to the county commission or to the circuit
    court, as may be appropriate and lawful for any order to compel
    obedience to any such process or order issued by any such
    fiduciary supervisor . . . or to compel the obedience with any
    of the provisions of this chapter.
    Id. (emphasis added). Further, West Virginia Code § 44-3A-44(a) provides that
    10
    (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section
    and to the provisions of article thirteen [§§ 44-13-1 et seq.] 12
    of this chapter, any power, authority or duty conferred upon the
    clerk of the county commission with respect to the settlement,
    regulation and supervision of estates in any provision of this
    article or in any provision of this Code is hereby transferred to
    the fiduciary supervisor created under the provisions of section
    three, article three-A of this chapter.
    (Footnote and emphasis added).
    In accordance with this statutory scheme, a fiduciary supervisor is an agent
    of the county commission. Id. § 44-3A-2. West Virginia Code § 44-3A-3(a) provides for
    the creation of the office of fiduciary supervisor within the county commission and directs
    that the fiduciary supervisor is to be “appointed by order of the commission and whose
    office, with the consent of the clerk of the county commission, shall be housed within the
    office of such clerk or shall be housed in such other office as the commission may
    designate.” Id. The Legislature also provided that
    [t]he fiduciary supervisor shall have general supervision of all
    fiduciary matters and of the fiduciaries or personal
    representatives thereof and of all fiduciary commissioners and
    of all matters referred to such commissioners and shall make
    all ex parte settlements of the accounts of such fiduciaries
    except as to those matters referred to fiduciary commissioners
    for settlement.
    Id. § 44-3A-3(b).
    12
    See 
    W. Va. Code § 44-13-1
     to -6 (2019) (pertaining to powers of the county court
    clerk where separate tribunal for police and fiscal purposes).
    11
    Throughout chapter 44 of the West Virginia Code pertaining to the
    “Administration of Estates and Trusts,” the Legislature has identified certain express duties
    to be performed by a fiduciary supervisor. 13 Taken together, those statutes establish that a
    fiduciary supervisor’s responsibilities concern only the “settlement, regulation and
    supervision of estates[.]” See 
    id.
     § 44-3A-44(a). None of the statutory provisions give the
    fiduciary supervisor a role with regard to the probate of wills. See generally W. Va. Code
    13
    While not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of all the statutorily delineated
    duties of fiduciary supervisors, the type of duties and responsibilities the Legislature
    intended for fiduciary supervisors to perform include “caus[ing] to be published” at least
    once a month in a newspaper of general circulation within the county wherein “letters of
    administration” have been granted, to provide notice to creditor and beneficiaries of named
    deceased persons to exhibit claims they may have against the estate or to protect their
    respective interests in the estate. 
    W. Va. Code § 44
    -3A-4. As this statute provides, in the
    notice, beneficiaries are to file any claim with the fiduciary at the address provided within
    sixty days of the date of first publication of notice, or to exhibit any claim at the office of
    the fiduciary supervisor within the same time frame. 
    Id.
     The fiduciary supervisor may
    also accept a “short form settlement” of an estate “where more than sixty days has elapsed
    since the filing of any notice required by section four . . . .” and the statutory requirements
    are met, “the fiduciary supervisor may proceed as in the case of any other settlement” 
    Id.
    § 44-3A-4a. Further, West Virginia Code § 44-3A-8 provides for the fiduciary supervisor
    to accept claims against a decedent’s estate before publication of notice. See id. § 44-3A-
    9 (providing for the fiduciary supervisor to accept proof of contingent or unliquidated
    claims against a decedent’s estate). The fiduciary supervisor also may grant continuances
    until all claims against an estate and objections to any claims have been heard and “passed
    on.” Id. § 44-3A-10. The fiduciary supervisor is also given the statutory authority to
    proceed with the summary settlement procedure, see West Virginia Code § 44-3A-19, and
    is charged with preparing a report on claims, which report may include direction to a
    personal representative to withhold from distribution to beneficiaries sufficient assets to
    take care of contingent and unliquidated claims or claims not matured. Id. § 44-3A-20.
    Further, twice a year, the fiduciary supervisor has a statutory duty to report to the county
    commission on delinquent filings. Id. § 44-3A-24. Finally, West Virginia Code § 44-3A-
    44(a), provides that “[w]henever by any provision of this article any paper, document or
    record is required or permitted to be recorded, the fiduciary supervisor shall tender the
    same to the clerk of the county commission and such clerk of the county commission shall
    admit the same to record . . . .” (Emphasis added).
    12
    §§ 44-3a-1 to -44. Further, and critical to our decision herein, the statutory scheme
    establishing the office of fiduciary supervisor is devoid of any language authorizing a
    fiduciary supervisor to sua sponte undertake an independent investigation into the validity
    of a will that has been previously admitted to probate.
    As this Court has long held, “[i]t is fundamental that execution and probate
    of wills are governed by statutory law.” In re Winzenrith’s Will, 
    133 W. Va. 267
    , 275, 
    55 S.E.2d 897
    , 902 (1949). In this regard, West Virginia Code § 41-5-1 (2019) provides that
    [a] person having custody of a will shall, within thirty
    days after the death of the testator is known to him, deliver such
    will to the clerk of the county court [now county commission]
    having jurisdiction of the probate thereof, or to the executor
    named in the will, who shall offer it for probate, or deliver it to
    the clerk, within a reasonable time. Any person who shall,
    without reasonable cause, neglect so to deliver a will shall be
    guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, be punished by a
    fine not exceeding two hundred dollars; and shall in addition
    be liable to any person interested in such will for all damages
    caused by such neglect.
    (Emphasis added). Once a will is delivered to the clerk of the county commission, it is
    incumbent upon the clerk to “notify by mail or otherwise the executor and the beneficiaries
    named in the will, of such delivery, and . . . [to] keep the same safe in his office until
    proceedings may be had for the probate thereof. . . .” Id. § 41-5-2 (2019). According to
    West Virginia Code § 41-5-3 (2019), “[i]f any party desires to contest such will he may
    by application to the court or the clerk thereof in vacation have a rule against the executors
    and all the beneficiaries named in the will, returnable to the court . . . .” (Emphasis added).
    13
    After a will has been delivered to the clerk of the county commission, there
    are two different statutory procedures for probate: probate in solemn form 14 and ex parte
    probate. In this case, the ex parte probate procedure was used as set forth in West Virginia
    Code § 41-5-10 (2019), which is the “usual method followed in this State.” Winzenrith’s
    Will, 
    133 W. Va. at 276
    , 
    55 S.E.2d at 902
    . Specifically, West Virginia Code § 41-5-10
    provides:
    At, or at any time after, the production of a will, any
    person may move the county court [now county commission]
    having jurisdiction, or the clerk thereof in the vacation of the
    court, for the probate of such will, and the court or the clerk
    thereof, as the case may be, may, without notice to any party,
    proceed to hear and determine the motion and admit the will to
    probate, or reject the same. The probate of, or refusal to
    probate, any will, so made by the clerk, shall be reported by
    him to the court at its next regular session, and, if no objection
    be made thereto, and none appear to the court, the court shall
    confirm the same. If any person entitled to contest the probate
    of a will shall appear before the clerk of the court before a
    decision is made by him admitting or refusing to admit the will
    to probate, or before the county court [now county
    commission] at any time before it has made an order
    confirming the action of the clerk in admitting or refusing to
    admit such will to probate, or before such court in any ex parte
    proceeding to probate a will made in the court in the first
    instance before it has made an order admitting or refusing to
    admit the will to probate, and file a notice of contest of the
    probate of the will, stating distinctly the several grounds of
    objection, process on such notice shall be issued and the
    14
    See 
    W. Va. Code § 41-5-5
     (2019) (providing procedure for probate in solemn
    form which requires the filing of “a petition duly verified by affidavit, stating when and
    where the testator died, his last place of residence, the nature of his estate, the relationship
    to decedent and place of residence of each of his heirs at law and distributees, surviving
    wife or husband, and each of the beneficiaries of the will.”); see also 
    W. Va. Code §§ 41
    -
    5-6 to -9 (2019) (concerning hearing, decision and appeal of probate order for probate in
    solemn form).
    14
    proceeding thereafter shall be heard before the county court
    [now county commission] only, and in all respects in the same
    manner as if the will had been offered for probate in solemn
    form; and any judgment entered by the county court [now
    county commission] on such proceeding shall have the same
    effect, and an appeal shall lie therefrom, as if the original
    proceeding to probate the will had been made in solemn form:
    Provided, that the only notice to the parties interested or
    process against them required in such case shall be upon the
    notice of contest. In all ex parte proceedings in which there is
    no contest, the action of the clerk in admitting the will to
    probate, when confirmed by the court, shall have the same
    effect in all respects as if the will had been admitted to probate
    and record by the county court [now county commission]in the
    first instance.
    (Emphasis added). 15
    The Legislature has established a specific statutory process for individuals,
    such as the heirs at law in the instant case, to challenge a will before the county clerk and
    the county commission admit said will to probate, by filing “a notice of contest of the
    probate of the will, stating distinctly the several grounds of objection[.] . . .” 
    Id.
     The filing
    of this notice triggers the issuance of “process on such notice” and “the proceeding
    thereafter shall be heard before the . . . [county commission] only, and in all respects in the
    same manner as if the will had been offered for probate in solemn form[.]” 
    Id.
     This statute
    15
    See W. Va. Code 41-5-17 (2019)(“Every will or authenticated copy of a will,
    when admitted to probate under the provisions of this article, shall be recorded by the clerk
    of the county court [now county commission], and indexed by him in a general index of
    wills, and every such will or copy when recorded shall remain in his office except when
    removed therefrom by the order of a court, or under a subpoena duces tecum, or otherwise
    as provided by law.”).
    15
    does not contain any language authorizing a fiduciary supervisor to challenge the validity
    of a will after it has been admitted to probate.
    A person who was not a party to the ex parte proceeding set forth in West
    Virginia Code § 41-5-10 may challenge a will by following the procedure set forth in West
    Virginia Code § 41-5-11 (2019). This statute provides:
    After a judgment or order entered as aforesaid in a
    proceeding for probate ex parte, any person interested who was
    not a party to the proceeding, or any person who was not a party
    to a proceeding for probate in solemn form, may proceed by
    complaint to impeach or establish the will, on which complaint,
    if required by any party, a trial by jury shall be ordered, to
    ascertain whether any, and if any, how much, of what was so
    offered for probate, be the will of the decedent. The court may
    require all other testamentary papers of the decedent to be
    produced, and the inquiry shall then be which one of all, or how
    much of any, of the testamentary papers is the will of the
    decedent. If the judgment or order was entered by the circuit
    court on appeal from the county commission, such complaint
    shall be filed within six months from the date thereof, and if
    the judgment or order was entered by the county commission
    and there was no appeal therefrom, such complaint shall be
    filed within six months from the date of such order of the
    county commission. If no such complaint be filed within the
    time prescribed, the judgment or order shall be forever binding.
    Any complaint filed under this section shall be in the circuit
    court of the county wherein probate of the will was allowed or
    denied.
    Id.
    As was the case with the statutes examined supra, the statutory language
    establishing the ex parte will probate procedure is devoid of any authorization for a
    fiduciary supervisor to undertake a unilateral, independent investigation into the validity
    16
    of a will already admitted to probate. See Hose v. Estate of Hose, 
    230 W. Va. 61
    , 66-67,
    
    736 S.E.2d 61
    , 66-67 (2012) (determining that statute did not give fiduciary supervisor the
    authority to reject a claim against an estate, but the statute required a claim be objected to
    by specific persons, which did not include the fiduciary supervisor, and that once a proper
    objection was made, the claimant had to be given an opportunity to provide additional
    information to prove a claim at a hearing). Therefore, we now hold that neither the
    provisions establishing the ex parte will probate procedure, West Virginia Code §§ 41-5-
    10 to -11 (2019), nor the provisions creating the office of fiduciary supervisor, West
    Virginia Code §§ 44-3A-1 to -44 (2019 & Supp. 2021), provide statutory authority for a
    fiduciary supervisor to undertake an independent investigation into the validity of a will
    that has been admitted into probate.
    In this case no one – neither the heirs at law nor any other person – filed any
    objection or challenge to the Will, either before it was accepted into probate and confirmed
    by the county commission or afterward under the ex parte will probate procedures. See id.
    As set forth supra, after the Will was admitted to probate and duly recorded, the fiduciary
    supervisor had no legal authority to begin his own independent investigation into the
    validity of the Will. More specifically, in the absence of a proper challenge, and where the
    Will had already been entered to probate and duly recorded, he had no legal authority to
    contact the witnesses in order to have them explain or clarify the substance of their
    respective affidavits; no legal authority to instruct the petitioner that he had the burden of
    proving that the Will was wholly in the decedent’s handwriting; no legal authority to direct
    17
    that the petitioner respond to him within twenty days; and no legal authority to draft an
    order declaring the Will void and submit said order for entry by the county commission. In
    each of these actions the fiduciary supervisor was acting wholly outside the scope of his
    statutory authority.
    2. County Commission
    The petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to reverse the
    county commission’s decision declaring the Will to be void. The petitioner contends that
    the Legislature has not provided a mechanism for a county commission to void a will
    unilaterally and without a challenge by the decedent’s children or heirs-at-law. We agree
    and easily resolve this issue.
    As previously discussed supra, West Virginia Code § 41-5-10 provides for a
    county commission to confirm the probate of a will accepted by the clerk unless an
    objection is made or an objection “appears to the county commission.” Id. In this case,
    because there was no objection made, and none appeared to the county commission, it
    confirmed the county clerk’s decision to admit the Will to probate as follows: “on February
    4, 2016, the Marion County Commission admitted a Holographic Will of Oras D. Dye to
    probate, based upon the affidavits of Yvonne Shaw and Alicia Healey. The Will was
    recorded in Will Book No. 147, at page 228.” Once the county commission admitted the
    Will to probate, its work was complete. Thereafter, although a complaint could have been
    filed pursuant to West Virginia Code § 41-5-11 to “impeach or establish the will,” the
    18
    action lies in circuit court, not with the county commission. Id. Accordingly, we now hold
    that there is no mechanism contained in the ex parte probate procedure set forth in West
    Virginia Code § 41-5-10 (2019) and West Virginia Code § 41-5-11 (2019) that allows a
    county commission to rescind its prior order admitting a will to probate.
    Simply stated, in the instant case, the county commission lacked the legal
    authority to void the Will – a lack of legal authority which was also fatal to its recission of
    the petitioner’s appointment as the executor of the Estate of Oras D. Dye. The county
    commission’s order invalidating the Will was void and unenforceable in its entirety, and
    therefore the circuit court committed reversible error, as a matter of law, in denying the
    petitioner’s appeal.
    B. Lack of Due Process
    The petitioner argues that he did not receive due process in the procedures
    utilized by both the fiduciary supervisor and the county commission. Specifically, he
    asserts that the fiduciary supervisor submitted the proposed order voiding the Will to the
    county commission ex parte, affording him no notice of its submission and no opportunity
    to be heard. Further, he argues that both the fiduciary supervisory and the county
    commission lacked the authority to invalidate the Will.             Conversely, the county
    commission argues that the circuit court correctly found that the April 25, 2016, letter from
    the fiduciary supervisor to the petitioner was adequate notice and the petitioner simply
    failed to respond.
    19
    The unilateral, independent, and wholly unauthorized investigation
    undertaken by the fiduciary supervisor in this case not only trampled the due process rights
    that would have been afforded the petitioner in a valid challenge by any interested party to
    the Will, but also destroyed any semblance of the neutrality required by a fiduciary
    supervisor, who is an agent of the county commission, not of any interested parties to the
    Will. First, it is undisputed that petitioner did not receive notice from either the fiduciary
    supervisor or the county commission that a proposed order invalidating the Will had been
    prepared by the former and submitted for entry by the latter. In this regard, we are
    unpersuaded that the April 25, 2016, letter from the fiduciary supervisor constituted notice,
    as it failed to provide a specific date for a hearing in which the petitioner would be given
    an opportunity to be heard prior to a decision being made on the validity of the Will. See
    
    W. Va. Code § 41-5-10
    . Indeed, despite the fiduciary supervisor giving the petitioner
    twenty days in which to respond to the letter, there was no action taken in regard to the
    Will for over five months – and that action was taken in the absence of any challenge to
    the Will ever having been filed. Succinctly stated, the April 25, 2016, letter, which clearly
    was sent to the petitioner as part of the fiduciary supervisor’s independent investigation,
    was not proper notice, did not provide an appropriate opportunity to be heard, and therefore
    failed to afford the petitioner due process. See generally Estate of Hose, 
    230 W. Va. 61
     at
    67, 736 S.E.2d at 67 (“The general scheme of the probate statutes reflect[s] a legislative
    intent that a claimant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before a claim is
    rejected on its merits.”); see also 
    W. Va. Code § 41-5-11
     (providing for a trial by jury).
    20
    Second, the April 25, 2016, letter is indicative of a much larger problem in
    this case: by ignoring the statutory ex parte will probate procedures, the fiduciary
    supervisor took on the role of advocate for the heirs at law and abandoned the neutrality
    and fairness intended by the Legislature in the administration of probate matters. This
    affected the entire probate process in this case. By becoming an independent investigator
    and advocate for the decedent’s children, the fiduciary supervisor denied the petitioner
    notice and an opportunity to be heard, which are his statutory and constitutional rights.
    Further, the fiduciary supervisor devised, pursued, and ultimately resolved a nonexistent
    will contest, submitting an order to the county commission that handed the heirs at law a
    victory in a challenge they never brought. Moreover, the county commission also denied
    the petitioner his right to due process when it entered an ex parte order prepared and
    submitted by its agent, the fiduciary supervisor, without affording the petitioner notice and
    an opportunity to be heard.
    Both the fiduciary supervisor and the county commission’s actions were
    wholly unauthorized by statute and done in a manner that deprived the petitioner due
    process of law. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in upholding the county commission’s
    order in this regard.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s July 1, 2020, order
    denying the petitioner’s appeal from the order entered October 5, 2016, by the respondent
    21
    Marion County Commission, declaring the Will of Oras Dye, the decedent herein, to be
    void and rescinding the petitioner’s appointment as Executor of the Estate of Oras Dye.
    The case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order declaring that the Will of
    Oras Dye was admitted to probate as a valid will on February 4, 2016, reinstating the
    petitioner as the Executor of the Estate of Oras D. Dye, and for any additional proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    22