United States v. Hampton ( 2021 )

Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 18, 2021
No. 21-60056 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Willie Hampton,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 2:00-CR-94-1
Before Stewart, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Willie Hampton appeals the district court’s denial of his motions for
a reduced sentence and for compassionate release. For the following reasons,
we AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND in part.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
I. Facts & Procedural Background
Hampton, federal prisoner # 79948-011, was convicted by a jury of
three counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine
base and powder cocaine. He was sentenced under the enhanced penalties in
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) to a total of life imprisonment. 1 In 2019, Hampton filed a
pro se motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step
Act of 2018 (“FSA”). 2 Then in 2020, he moved for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied both motions.
This appeal ensued.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a sentence
reduction under the FSA for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Batiste, 980 F.3d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 2020). A district court’s denial of a
motion for compassionate release is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). A district court
abuses its discretion when it “makes an error of law or bases its decision on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Batiste, 980 F.3d at 469
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. Discussion
A. First Step Act
On appeal, Hampton contends that the district court failed to
calculate his post-FSA statutory penalties and guidelines range as it was
1
Specifically, Hampton was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison for
counts four and six and to a concurrent 30-year term of imprisonment for count five. He
was also ordered to serve concurrent periods of supervised release of eight years on count
four, six years on count five, and ten years on count six.
2
Section 404(b) of the FSA gives a sentencing court discretion to apply the lower
statutory penalties introduced by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124
Stat. 2372, to reduce a prisoner’s sentence for certain covered offenses.
2
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
required to do under section 404 of the FSA. His arguments on this issue are
framed in the context of the bifurcated review process detailed in Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that the bifurcated review
process involves evaluating the district court’s imposition of a sentence for
both procedural soundness and substantive reasonableness). He also argues
that the district court failed to adequately consider the § 3553(a) factors.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He contends that mitigating facts related to his
military service were omitted from the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) and that it is unclear whether the district court considered his
service record in denying his motion for a sentence reduction. He also
complains that the district court gave too much weight to his prior criminal
conduct and failed to consider that he is unlikely to recidivate. We disagree.
Section 404(b) of the FSA gives a sentencing court discretion to apply
the lower statutory penalties introduced by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
to reduce a prisoner’s sentence for certain covered offenses. United States v.
Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 416–18 (5th Cir. 2019); see also United States v.
Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2699 (2020).
Here, the district court declined to exercise its discretion to modify
Hampton’s sentence. It explained that, “[p]rior to being taken into custody
for the charges in this case, Hampton engaged in extremely troublesome
behavior, including but not limited to the distribution of substantial amounts
of cocaine, various types of fraud, and possession of marijuana for sale.” It
reasoned that Hampton’s conduct clearly illustrated that “he poses a danger
to society.” It further determined that “a reduction in Hampton’s sentence
would not be in accordance with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including
the nature and circumstances of his offenses, his history and characteristics,
and the need for the sentence imposed.”
3
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
As a preliminary matter, we have held that the bifurcated procedural
soundness and substantive reasonableness review of sentencing decisions
that is derived from Booker 3 and its progeny is inapplicable in the context of
FSA sentence reduction motions because, like § 3582(c)(2) proceedings,
they “do not constitute full resentencings.” Batiste, 980 F.3d at 479–80
(“Although we have noted some distinctions between [FSA] sentence
reduction motions and § 3582 motions, we also have found them similar in
other respects. Pertinent here, in adopting an abuse of discretion standard of
review for the discretionary component of a district court’s [FSA], section
404 determination, we analogized to the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard of
review applicable to ‘decisions whether to reduce sentences’ pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(2) . . . Given the foregoing, we similarly conclude the substantive
reasonableness standard does not apply here.” (quoting United States v.
Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 2009)). As a result, Hampton’s argument
that the district court failed to calculate his post-FSA statutory penalties and
guidelines range under section 404 of the FSA is without merit.
Moreover, contrary to Hampton’s arguments on appeal, the record
reveals that the district court referenced Hampton’s military service several
times but concluded that his brief time in the military4 was outweighed by his
subsequent 29-year criminal history. 5 The district court explicitly concluded
that a reduction in Hampton’s sentence would be inconsistent with the
§ 3553(a) factors. 6 Because Hampton’s arguments on this issue amount to a
3
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4
Hampton served in the military for less than two years.
5
The PSR indicates that Hampton’s criminal history spanned from 1971 to 2000.
6
Because we have concluded that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors
in evaluating the merits of Hampton’s sentence reduction motion under the FSA, we need
not address his Rule 28(j) letter arguments on the issue.
4
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
mere disagreement with the district court’s balancing of the statutory
sentencing factors, he has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a sentence reduction under the FSA. See
Batiste, 980 F.3d at 469.
B. Compassionate Release
Hampton further contends that the district court erred in denying his
compassionate release motion by limiting itself to the considerations set forth
in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, p.s., and its commentary in determining that
extraordinary and compelling circumstances were not present. Because the
district court’s findings were inadequate, Hampton argues, it cannot be
discerned whether the district court considered his mitigating evidence in
light of the reduced statutory penalties and guidelines range under the FSA.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court:
upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [(BOP)],
or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully
exhausted all administrative [remedies] . . . , may reduce [a de-
fendant’s] term of imprisonment . . . , after considering the fac-
tors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are ap-
plicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction; . . .
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
Congress has not defined the phrase “extraordinary and compelling
reasons.” See United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2021). Nor
has the Sentencing Commission amended the definition of the phrase
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” set forth in § 1B1.13 and its
commentary. See id.
5
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
We have recently held that § 1B1.13 and its commentary apply only to
§ 3582 motions filed by the Director of the BOP. United States v. Shkambi,
993 F.3d 388, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2021). Consequently, a district court
considering a prisoner-filed motion is bound only by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Id. at 393. In ruling on Hampton’s motion
for compassionate release, the district court couched its analysis in terms of
§ 1B1.13 and did not refer expressly to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 7
Because the district court did not have the benefit of intervening Fifth Circuit
authority in ruling on Hampton’s motion, we conclude that its decision
should be reconsidered in light of Shkambi.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
denying Hampton’s motion for a sentence reduction. We VACATE the
district court’s order denying Hampton’s motion for compassionate release
and REMAND in light of United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.
2021).
7
The dissent relies on a footnote to support the contention that the district court
did not believe it was bound by § 1B1.13. In that footnote, the district court “note[d]
Bowens’ reliance” on United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2020), which
stands “for the proposition that district courts have broad discretion in the compassionate
release context—not limited solely to the considerations set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.”
But reliance on this footnote is misplaced for two reasons. First, this footnote only
acknowledges this argument was made and gives no insight into whether the district court
agreed with the proposition or considered it as its own position in considering Hampton’s
compassionate release motion. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the footnote is
unreliable because it acknowledges “Bowens’ reliance” on Brooker, not Hampton’s.
Bowens is Hampton’s co-defendant. The record shows Hampton did not rely on Brooker
in his compassionate release motion, even though Bowens did in his own motion. This
mistake in the district court’s order makes it even less clear what the district court
considered in deciding Hampton’s compassionate release motion.
6
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
Haynes, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Sections I, II, and III.A., and the corresponding portion of
the judgment. However, I would affirm the entirety of the district court’s
judgment and, therefore, disagree with the reasoning of Section III.B.
I agree that our decision in United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388,
392–93 (5th Cir. 2021), makes it clear that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, p.s., is not
binding on the trial court (though it can be utilized). A district court
considering a prisoner-filed motion is bound only by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Shkambi, 993 F.3d
at 393. The district court never stated expressly, however, that it believed it
was bound by § 1B1.13; to the contrary, in footnote 6 of its order, it cited a
Second Circuit opinion noting a district court’s broad discretion in the
compassionate release context that is not limited to § 1B1.13. See United
States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 2020). 1
I also agree that the district court did not expressly reference § 3553(a)
in the compassionate release section. Most importantly, however, in the
exact same order as the compassionate release decision and in the paragraph
immediately preceding the court’s discussion on compassionate release, the
1
Footnote 7 of the majority opinion takes issue with the district court’s footnote
6 because the district court relied upon a case cited by a co-defendant and not by Hampton
in the district court (though it relied upon that case in this court). Of course, courts are not
limited to considering only cases cited by the parties (as opposed to limitations based upon
arguments made by parties), so however the district court learned of Brooker, it clearly found
it persuasive or it would not have cited it the way it did. Indeed, the second paragraph of
the majority opinion’s Footnote 7 actually demonstrates something different that does not
support Hampton: Hampton never argued in the district court that the district court was
not bound by 1B1.13. Instead, he argued in his motion that the district court “should
review” U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 in making the compassionate release determination, which is
exactly what it did do. Hampton’s failure to make the Brooker argument would actually
support finding waiver or forfeiture, not remanding the case.
7
Case: 21-60056 Document: 00516099906 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
No. 21-60056
district court balanced the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and denied
Hampton’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. There,
the court determined that he was not entitled to relief given his lengthy
criminal history and other troublesome conduct. Thus, the district court had
already considered the relevant sentencing factors so the notion that there is
something new for the court to consider on remand is inconsistent with the
reality of the district court’s order. Simply put, the record does not reflect
that Hampton would have received relief on his compassionate release
motion but for the district court’s application of § 1B1.13. Cf. United States
v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 286–89 (5th Cir. 2021). No abuse of discretion has
been shown. See United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir.
2020).
I conclude, therefore, that there is no point in remanding on this issue.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the judgment.
8