Loggers, L.L.C. v. 1 Up Technologies, L.L.C. ( 2009 )


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  •                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2009-CA-01471-SCT
    LOGGERS, L.L.C., A MISSISSIPPI LIMITED
    LIABILITY COMPANY AND GARY
    TROESCHER, INDIVIDUALLY
    v.
    1 UP TECHNOLOGIES, L.L.C., A LOUISIANA
    LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                           07/31/2009
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                HON. R. I. PRICHARD, III
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                  PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:                    NATHAN S. FARMER
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                      MICHAEL CHAD MOORE
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                         CIVIL - CONTRACT
    DISPOSITION:                                AFFIRMED - 01/06/2011
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE GRAVES, P.J., DICKINSON AND CHANDLER, JJ.
    GRAVES, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Pearl River County involving whether the
    appellants waived an affirmative defense by not specifically asserting it in their answer.
    Because the appellants are barred from raising the affirmative defense for the first time at
    trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    FACTS
    ¶2.    In April 2007, Loggers, LLC, and Gary Troescher (“Loggers”) entered into an oral
    contract with 1 Up regarding equipment and services for Loggers’ computer gaming business
    in Pearl River County. A dispute arose, and 1 Up ultimately filed suit on October 10, 2007,
    against Loggers for $8,783.33 owed on the contract and $2,195.83 in attorney’s fees. 1 Up
    obtained a default judgment against Loggers, but the default judgment later was set aside by
    the trial court. On May 7, 2008, Loggers filed its Amended Combined Answer, Affirmative
    Defenses and Counter-Claim(s) of the Defendants, which contained various affirmative
    defenses.
    ¶3.    The trial was held before a special master on February 10, 2009. At the close of 1
    Up’s case-in-chief, Loggers moved for dismissal under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6) and 41(b) on the ground that 1 Up was barred from bringing suit under Mississippi
    Code Section 79-29-1007(1). The special master took the motion under advisement, and
    Loggers proceeded with its case. On July 9, 2009, the special master issued her report,
    wherein she found that Loggers had waived its right to assert the affirmative defense under
    Mississippi Code Section 79-29-1007(1) by failing to raise it in its answer and by raising it
    for the first time at trial. Loggers objected to the special master’s report. However, the
    special master’s report was adopted by the Circuit Court of Pearl River County, which
    entered final judgment on August 5, 2009, in favor of 1 Up in the amount of $10,979.19 plus
    court costs. Thereafter, Loggers appealed.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶4.    This Court reviews issues of law, including those involving a motion to dismiss or a
    motion for directed verdict, under a de novo standard. Howard v. Estate of Harper ex rel.
    Harper, 
    947 So. 2d 854
    , 856 (Miss. 2006). See also Forbes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    935 So. 2d
     869, 873 (Miss. 2006).
    2
    ¶5.     Loggers asserts that it preserved its right to the affirmative defense that 1 Up is barred
    from filing or maintaining this action pursuant to Section 79-29-1007(1) by the inclusion of
    general language from Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in its response. Loggers’
    response, filed May 07, 2008, asserted various affirmative defenses, and included the
    following language:
    Defendants would assert the Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim
    for which the Plaintiff may be granted relief as against the Defendants.
    Defendant, Gary Troescher, also asserts the Complaint of Plaintiff fails to state
    any claim for relief against the Defendant, Troescher, individually, due to the
    fact that at all times that any contractual relationship existed solely between
    Defendant, Loggers, L.L.C., A Mississippi Limited Liability Company and the
    Plaintiff.
    ¶6.     At the close of 1 Up’s case-in-chief during the trial of this matter on February 10,
    2009, Loggers moved for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b)1 pursuant to Mississippi
    Code Section 79-29-1007(1), which states: “A foreign limited liability company transacting
    business in this state may not maintain any action, suit, or proceeding in any court of this
    state until it has registered in this state.” Miss. Code Ann. § 79-29-1007(1) (Rev. 2009).
    ¶7.     The special master found that 1 Up was not registered to do business in Mississippi
    and was unable to bring a lawsuit pursuant to Section 79-29-1007(1). But the special master
    also found that this assertion was an affirmative defense that should have been raised by
    Loggers prior to trial. The special master further found as follows: “After reviewing all
    pleadings in this matter, the first mention of this defense was asserted at trial. This lawsuit
    1
    Rule 41(b) states, in relevant part: “After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without
    a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to
    offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that
    upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
    3
    was filed on October 10, 2007 and the Defendants have actively participated in the litigation
    since its inception and have thereby waived this defense.” The special master quoted East
    Mississippi State Hospital v. Adams, 
    947 So. 2d 887
    , 891 (Miss. 2007) (quoting MS Credit
    Center, Inc. v. Horton, 
    926 So. 2d 167
    , 181 (Miss. 2006)), for the following: “A defendant’s
    failure to timely and reasonably raise and pursue the enforcement of any affirmative defense
    or other affirmative matter or right which would serve to terminate or stay the litigation,
    coupled with active participation in the litigation process, will ordinarily serve as a waiver.”
    ¶8.    The circuit court adopted the special master’s findings and further said: “However,
    this Court is of the opinion that a specific affirmative defense, such as this, cannot be raised
    in a general 12(b)(6) defense provision.         Furthermore, any Rule 12(b)(6) motions or
    assertions must be addressed prior to trial, not at a Motion for Directed Verdict.”
    ¶9.    Loggers asserts that the trial court erred and that the boilerplate language from Rule
    12(b)(6) included in its response was sufficient to preserve the right later to assert Section
    79-29-1007(1) at trial. Rule 12 states, in relevant part:
    Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
    whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
    asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
    following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
    ...
    (6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . .
    Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Further, the comment to Rule 12 provides, in relevant part:
    Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) serve the same function, practically, as the
    general demurrer. [Citations omitted]. They are the proper motions for testing
    the legal sufficiency of the complaint; to grant the motions there must appear
    to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that
    could be proved in support of the claim.
    4
    Miss. R. Civ. P. 12 cmt.
    ¶10.   Loggers relies on Howard v. Estate of Harper ex rel. Harper, 
    947 So. 2d 854
     (Miss.
    2006) and Transocean Enterprise, Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 
    33 So. 3d 459
     (Miss.
    2010), as authority for the proposition that a general Rule 12(b)(6) assertion is sufficient to
    preserve a later issue. In Howard, this Court, without explanation, found that a general Rule
    12(b)(6) assertion in a motion to dismiss was sufficient to preserve for appeal an issue of
    medical malpractice liability. Howard, 947 So. 2d at 860. In Transocean, the majority of
    this Court did not address the waiver issue, but found that the “trial court justifiably did not
    address the implications” of the relevant statute. Transocean, 33 So. 3d at 463.
    ¶11.   However, in reaching our decision today, we rely on Burleson v. Lathem, 
    968 So. 2d 930
     (Miss. 2007), and East Mississippi State Hospital v. Adams, 
    947 So. 2d 887
     (Miss.
    2007). As stated previously herein, the complaint in this matter was filed on October 10,
    2007. The trial occurred more than a year later on February 10, 2009. The record in this
    matter indicates that Loggers actively participated in the litigation. Loggers cannot merely
    assert a general defense in its initial response to preserve any other defenses that might be
    asserted months or years later. See Burleson, 968 So. 2d at 934-37, and East Mississippi
    State Hospital, 947 So. 2d at 890-91. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
    Circuit Court of Pearl River County.
    ¶12.   AFFIRMED.
    WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ.,
    CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE
    WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN
    RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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