Lewis, William C. v. Litscher, Jon E. , 279 F.3d 526 ( 2002 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 01-2251 & 01-2252
    William C. Lewis,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Michael Sullivan, Secretary, Wisconsin
    Departmentof Corrections, and his
    successor Jon E. Litscher,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    and
    United States of America,
    Intervening Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 00-C-705-C--Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.
    Argued November 29, 2001--Decided February 1, 2002
    Before Coffey, Easterbrook, and Ripple,
    Circuit Judges.
    Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. One of the
    changes made in 1996 by the Prison
    Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners
    to prepay the filing and docketing fees
    of most future suits, if they have a
    history of frivolous litigation. The
    precise language of what has come to be
    called the three-strikes rule is this:
    In no event shall a prisoner bring a
    civil action or appeal a judgment in a
    civil action or proceeding under this
    section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more
    prior occasions, while incarcerated or
    detained in any facility, brought an
    action or appeal in a court of the United
    States that was dismissed on the grounds
    that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
    to state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted, unless the prisoner is under
    imminent danger of serious physical
    injury.
    28 U.S.C. sec. 1915(g). The reference to
    "this section" is to all of sec. 1915,
    which permits litigation in forma
    pauperiswithout prepayment of fees and
    costs. As a result, a prisoner who has
    "struck out" must pay all required fees
    in future cases, "unless . . . under
    imminent danger of serious physical
    injury." This suit was filed by a
    prisoner who has a history of frivolous
    litigation and thus comes within
    sec. 1915(g), and who does not claim to be
    "under imminent danger of serious
    physical injury." Nonetheless, the
    district court has excused prepayment of
    the required $150 fee. The judge
    concluded that sec. 1915(g) would be
    unconstitutional unless read to allow
    judges to dispense with prepayment
    whenever, in their discretion, they
    viewed the prisoners’ claims to be
    substantial. 
    135 F. Supp. 2d 954
     (W.D.
    Wis. 2001). At the request of the United
    States, which intervened to defend the
    constitutionality of sec. 1915(g) as
    written, the district judge certified
    this ruling for interlocutory appeal
    under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(b).
    Seven courts of appeals have considered
    constitutional objections to sec. 1915(g).
    These arguments have been based on the
    due process right of access to the
    courts, the equal protection clause, the
    ex post facto clause, the first amendment
    right to petition for redress of
    grievances, and several others. None has
    succeeded. All seven decisions have held
    that sec. 1915(g) is constitutional. See
    Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 
    239 F.3d 307
     (3d
    Cir. 2001) (en banc); Carson v. Johnson,
    
    112 F.3d 818
     (5th Cir. 1997); Wilson v.
    Yaklich, 
    148 F.3d 596
     (6th Cir. 1998);
    Higgins v. Carpenter, 
    258 F.3d 797
     (8th
    Cir. 2001); Rodriguez v. Cook, 
    169 F.3d 1176
     (9th Cir. 1999); White v. Colorado,
    
    157 F.3d 1226
     (10th Cir. 1998); Rivera v.
    Allin, 
    144 F.3d 719
     (11th Cir. 1998).
    Lewis, all of whose theories have been
    considered in at least one of these
    opinions, asks us to disagree with all of
    them and to deem sec. 1915(g) not
    "narrowly tailored." (According to Lewis,
    Congress should have written a law
    applicable to frivolous suits by
    prisoners and non-prisoners alike, and
    should have carved out of its scope all
    substantial suits.) We find these
    decisions to be sound, however, and
    accordingly reverse the judgment of the
    district court. Lewis’s suit must be
    dismissed for failure to pay the filing
    fee.
    Our reason is simple: there is no
    constitutional entitlement to subsidy.
    The right to publish a newspaper does not
    imply a right to governmental funding, or
    even to a library where people can read
    the papers for free. A woman’s right to
    choose whether to have an abortion does
    not imply a right to have the government
    cover the medical costs. See Maher v.
    Roe, 
    432 U.S. 464
     (1977). A right to
    education does not imply a right to free
    transportation to school. See Kadrmas v.
    Dickinson Public Schools, 
    487 U.S. 450
    (1988). A right to petition for redress
    of grievances does not imply a right to
    free writing paper and stamps. Federal
    courts are subsidized dispute-resolvers;
    filing fees defray only a small portion
    of the costs. A requirement that
    plaintiffs cover some of these costs
    cannot be called unconstitutional. The
    Supreme Court has never held that access
    to the courts must be free; it has
    concluded, rather, that reasonably
    adequate opportunities for access
    suffice. Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    (1996). The First Congress--almost all of
    whose members attended either the
    Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
    or the state ratifying conventions that
    put the Constitution into force, and
    which proposed the Bill of Rights to the
    states--provided for filing fees by all
    plaintiffs. See the Process Act of 1789,
    
    1 Stat. 93
     (setting fees in federal
    litigation at the same level charged by
    comparable state courts) (replaced by 
    1 Stat. 275
     (1792) setting federal fees
    directly). Not until 1892 was provision
    made for any federal litigant to proceed
    in forma pauperis. This speaks volumes
    about the constitutionality of filing
    fees; otherwise the federal courts
    operated unconstitutionally for their
    first century.
    Filing fees for civil suits have been
    challenged on constitutional grounds
    before, without success. United States v.
    Kras, 
    409 U.S. 434
     (1973), rejects a
    constitutional objection to the filing
    fee in bankruptcy litigation. Although
    Congress must act rationally when
    deciding which litigants must contribute
    toward the costs of the judicial system,
    we have already held, see Zehner v.
    Trigg, 
    133 F.3d 459
     (7th Cir. 1997), that
    it is within the legislative power to
    place special limitations on prisoners’
    litigation. Prisoners have ample time on
    their hands and have demonstrated a
    proclivity for frivolous suits to harass
    their accusers, the guards, and others
    who caused or manage their captivity.
    Section 1915(g) singles out only a subset
    of prisoners--those who have established,
    by their own conduct, that they are among
    the abusers of the judicial system.
    Requiring persons who have abused the
    forma pauperis privilege in the past to
    pay in the future is a sensible and
    modest step. See, e.g., In re Sindram,
    
    498 U.S. 177
     (1991) (requiring abusers to
    prepay in future cases); In re
    Skupniewitz, 
    73 F.3d 702
     (7th Cir. 1996)
    (sustaining against constitutional attack
    a bar on civil litigation by abusers who
    have failed to pay sanctions). Section
    1915(g) would come in for trouble if,
    like the statute in Lindsey v. Normet,
    
    405 U.S. 56
     (1972), it required one class
    of litigants to pay more than the full
    cost of litigation (in Lindsey the
    statute required an appellant to post a
    bond for double the judgment and costs).
    But since even full payment of the $150
    filing fee leaves prisoners the
    recipients of a net subsidy, they have no
    complaint. Anyway, everyone allowed to
    proceed in forma pauperis owes the fees
    and must pay when able; the line drawn by
    sec. 1915(g) concerns only the timing of
    payment. Section 1915(g) does not have a
    substantive effect. That’s why we held it
    applicable to cases in which the
    "strikes" predate the plra. See Abdul-
    Wadood v. Nathan, 
    91 F.3d 1023
     (7th Cir.
    1996).
    Lewis tries to sidestep these principles
    by contending that prisoners who file
    suit about prison conditions should be
    treated like criminal defendants--who if
    poor not only need not pay fees for
    transcripts, see Griffin v. Illinois, 
    351 U.S. 12
     (1956), but also are entitled to
    counsel at public expense, see Gideon v.
    Wainwright, 
    372 U.S. 335
     (1963). The
    analogy doesn’t work very well, for Lewis
    acknowledges that he is not entitled to a
    free lawyer. Being a civil plaintiff (or
    even a civil defendant) and a criminal
    defendant are fundamentally different.
    See United States v. 7108 West Grand
    Avenue, 
    15 F.3d 632
     (7th Cir. 1994) (no
    right to counsel in forfeiture
    proceedings); Stroe v. INS, 
    256 F.3d 498
    (7th Cir. 2001) (no right to counsel at
    public expense in deportation
    proceedings, or to competent privately
    retained counsel). The few proceedings in
    which civil litigants have been held
    entitled to a subsidy (via free counsel
    or waiver of fees) arise from
    prosecution-like proceedings, in which
    the public proposes to take away a
    person’s children or impose other loss so
    great that it amounts to deprivation of a
    fundamental right. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
    
    519 U.S. 102
     (1996); Boddie v.
    Connecticut, 
    401 U.S. 371
     (1971). Lewis
    has not been threatened with such a loss;
    he is the plaintiff, after all. He wants
    the prison system to provide him with
    counseling for post-traumatic stress
    disorder, but psychiatric care has never
    been seen as a fundamental right. Cf.
    Washington v. Glucksberg, 
    521 U.S. 702
    (1997) (defining fundamental rights).
    Even persons who are suicidally depressed
    are entitled, at most, to precautions
    that will stop them from carrying
    through; they do not have a fundamental
    right to psychiatric care at public
    expense.
    It is not hard to imagine situations
    where fundamental rights would be at
    stake. A gravely ill prisoner, or one in
    great pain, who complained that the staff
    was gratuitously withholding medical care
    would have a claim based on the
    fundamental right protected by the eighth
    amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
     (1976). Likewise a prisoner who
    contended that the guards were
    deliberately indifferent to violence
    perpetrated by fellow prisoners--or,
    worse, were themselves the source of
    violence against him. See Farmer v.
    Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
     (1994). Prisons
    curtail rights of self-help (and for that
    matter means of earning income) and have
    on that account some affirmative duties
    of protection. See DeShaney v. Winnebago
    County Department of Social Services, 
    489 U.S. 189
     (1989). This is why the right of
    access to the courts entails some
    opportunity to do legal research in a
    prison library (or something equally
    good); the prison won’t let its charges
    out to use other libraries, so it must
    make substitute provision, though not
    necessarily to the prisoner’s liking. See
    Lewis v. Casey, 
    supra.
     A federal law that
    knocked out prisoners’ ability to obtain
    redress in situations where they are
    victims of official misconduct, yet lack
    any non-judicial means to protect
    themselves, would have to be set aside as
    unconstitutional under Lewis and the
    original meaning of the due process
    clause. Yet sec. 1915(g) does no such
    thing. A prisoner who suffers a threat to
    (or deprivation of) fundamental rights
    has ready access to the courts. Consider
    the list of options:
    1. Pay the filing fee under 28 U.S.C.
    sec. 1914 using assets on hand.
    2. Save up in advance to be able to pay
    the fee in a lump sum. (This would have
    taken Lewis about two months, had he
    deemed the litigation sufficiently
    important to justify using all of his
    income for this purpose.)
    3. Refrain from frivolous litigation and
    thus retain full advantage of
    sec. 1915(a), which authorizes suits
    without prepaying fees and costs.
    4. Borrow the filing fee from friends or
    relatives.
    5. Borrow the filing fee from a lawyer--
    for 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 promises
    reimbursement of prevailing prisoners’
    legal expenses, and this plus a share of
    any recovery may well attract the
    assistance of counsel, who may (and often
    do) advance their clients’ expenses in
    contingent-fee cases. See Rand v.
    Monsanto Co., 
    926 F.2d 596
     (7th Cir.
    1991). This option is useful only for
    prisoners with substantial claims, for
    only then will counsel see the prospect
    of fees; but recall that the district
    court limited its holding to prisoners
    with substantial claims. Borrowing
    against the prospect of one’s recovery is
    the norm in tort litigation by persons
    with substantial claims.
    6. Sue in state rather than federal court-
    -for sec. 1915(g) does not apply in state
    court, and states must entertain sec. 1983
    litigation on a parity with claims under
    state law. See Howlett v. Rose, 
    496 U.S. 356
     (1990). Some states charge less than
    the $150 that it costs to file in
    district court, and this would assist
    prisoners even if a given state should
    enact a statute parallel to sec. 1915(g).
    7. If all else fails, a prisoner may sue
    without prepayment when "the prisoner is
    under imminent danger of serious physical
    injury." And this is just the category of
    cases where fundamental rights are most
    likely to be at stake.
    Congress was entitled to conclude that
    these seven options preserve adequate
    opportunities for prisoners to vindicate
    their fundamental rights. They show that
    sec. 1915(g) effects no real limit on
    access to courts by prisoners who use
    their options carefully and responsibly.
    Not all of the options will be available
    all of the time. Prisoners who insist on
    both filing frivolous suits and spending
    their income as fast as they receive it,
    which Lewis has done, will find when they
    want to sue that options 1, 2, and 3 are
    closed. But Congress may take them into
    account, to encourage both thrift and
    refraining from abusive litigation. Even
    from an ex post perspective, however,
    options 4 through 7 are adequate. The
    worst possible case--a prisoner with no
    friends or relatives, in a state whose
    courts have a high filing fee and a
    provision similar to sec. 1915(g), and who
    waits until the very last minute (or
    experiences an emergency) so that it is
    not possible to secure counsel--still has
    access to option 7. It is not necessary
    to add an eighth, for "substantial"
    claims. When bodily integrity is not at
    stake, additional delay (while the
    prisoner uses options 1 through 6) is
    constitutionally tolerable even when
    fundamental rights are implicated.
    Thedesign of sec. 1915(g) is to leave
    vital choices to the prisoner and the
    bar, not to use case-by-case screening
    for merit. That is a function of 28
    U.S.C. sec. 1915A, for all prisoner suits;
    the district court’s view effectively
    obliterates sec. 1915(g) by requiring
    abusers to be treated identically to
    those filing their first suit.
    Option 7, which allows suit without
    prepayment when "the prisoner is under
    imminent danger of serious physical
    injury", can serve its role as an escape
    hatch for genuine emergencies only if
    understood reasonably. If limited to
    situations in which, say, a beating is
    ongoing, no prisoner will find solace;
    once the beating starts, it is too late
    to avoid the physical injury; and once
    the beating is over the prisoner is no
    longer in "imminent danger" and so could
    not use this proviso to seek damages
    (though with a solid claim for damages
    the prisoner would have an easier time
    persuading a lawyer to advance the filing
    fee). Reading the imminent-danger
    language this way would make it
    chimerical, a cruel joke on prisoners.
    The imminent-danger language must be read
    instead as having a role in those cases
    where time is pressing and the prisoner
    is unable to pursue the other options in
    our list. When a threat or prison
    condition is real and proximate, and when
    the potential consequence is "serious
    physical injury," then the courthouse
    doors are open even to those who have
    filed three frivolous suits and do not
    have a penny to their name. It is not
    possible to elaborate further; concrete
    situations will set the stage for any
    other gloss. Lewis, who wants counseling
    for a mental condition, cannot take
    advantage of this option.
    Suppose that, instead of enacting
    sec. 1915(g), Congress had repealed the
    provision in sec. 1988 that requires
    defendants to pay prevailing plaintiffs’
    legal fees. Such a step could not be
    thought unconstitutional, for it would
    reinstate the norm of the American Rule,
    under which each side bears its own legal
    expenses. The American Rule applies to
    wrongful-death suits and many other
    contract and tort actions in which vital
    rights are at stake. Repeal of sec. 1988
    would strike hardest at the most
    meritorious claims, for it is these that
    are most likely to be worth counsel’s
    while financially. What Congress did
    instead is leave sec. 1988 on the books,
    so that prisoners with substantial claims
    have a good chance to vindicate them,
    while making it harder for persons who
    have demonstrated a proclivity to pursue
    frivolous suits to continue abusing the
    courts and their opponents. Section
    1915(g) imposes a penalty for crying
    "wolf." Making it harder to do so again
    is an eminently reasonable approach, com
    patible with all of the many
    constitutional provisions that Lewis has
    tried to set against it. The judgment of
    the district court is
    reversed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-2251

Citation Numbers: 279 F.3d 526

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/1/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (26)

richard-c-white-hans-g-pressel-jose-crespin-kevin-getchell-richard-smith , 157 F.3d 1226 ( 1998 )

Rivera v. Allin , 144 F.3d 719 ( 1998 )

Arthur X. Carson v. Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas ... , 112 F.3d 818 ( 1997 )

United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, ... , 15 F.3d 632 ( 1994 )

Kenneth Jay Wilson v. Lewis Yaklich, United States of ... , 148 F.3d 596 ( 1998 )

debro-s-abdul-akbar-v-roderick-r-mckelvie-honorable-james-collins-james , 239 F.3d 307 ( 2001 )

Howlett Ex Rel. Howlett v. Rose , 110 S. Ct. 2430 ( 1990 )

Mlb v. Slj , 117 S. Ct. 555 ( 1996 )

Angela Stroe and Marin Stroe v. Immigration and ... , 256 F.3d 498 ( 2001 )

Lokmar Y. Abdul-Wadood v. Sylvester Nathan, Lokmar Y. Abdul-... , 91 F.3d 1023 ( 1996 )

Jerardo Rodriguez v. David Cook, Director, Oregon State ... , 169 F.3d 1176 ( 1999 )

Claire Rand, Custodian for Brett Rand v. Monsanto Company , 926 F.2d 596 ( 1991 )

ray-antwane-higgins-appellantcross-appellee-v-thomas-m-carpenter-city , 258 F.3d 797 ( 2001 )

United States v. Kras , 93 S. Ct. 631 ( 1973 )

Griffin v. Illinois , 76 S. Ct. 585 ( 1956 )

Gideon v. Wainwright , 83 S. Ct. 792 ( 1963 )

Lindsey v. Normet , 92 S. Ct. 862 ( 1972 )

Estelle v. Gamble , 97 S. Ct. 285 ( 1976 )

Lewis v. Casey , 116 S. Ct. 2174 ( 1996 )

Washington v. Glucksberg , 117 S. Ct. 2258 ( 1997 )

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