Com. v. Brown, B. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S31029-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    BOBBY BROWN                                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2130 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 17, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000043-2017
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2022
    Appellant Bobby Brown appeals pro se from the order dismissing his
    timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition.       Appellant raises
    numerous claims of ineffective assistance against trial, appellate, and PCRA
    counsel. We affirm.
    The facts of this matter are well known to the parties.             See
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 3469 EDA 2018, 
    2019 WL 6359023
    , at *1-3 (Pa.
    Super. filed Nov. 27, 2019) (unpublished mem.). Briefly, on November 1,
    2016, Appellant went to a garage in Pottstown where Robert Pfanders (the
    victim) and Terry Presgrave were working.              After an argument about
    Appellant’s motorcycle, Appellant shot the victim three times. Immediately
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S31029-22
    after the shooting, the victim told Presgrave that the shooter’s name was
    “Bobby Brown.” The victim was transported to a hospital and survived his
    injuries.   After both Presgrave and the victim identified Appellant as the
    shooter in photo arrays, an arrest warrant was issued for Appellant.
    A prior panel of this Court explained that:
    On November 25, 2016, Officer Kevin Gorman of the Philadelphia
    Police Department pulled Appellant over to make a routine traffic
    stop. Appellant initially provided a false name, identifying himself
    as Maurice Brown. When Officer Gorman eventually determined
    that the driver’s actual name was Bobby Brown, he took him into
    custody under an active warrant out of Pottstown for attempted
    homicide.
    Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed an information charging
    Appellant with offenses related to the shooting. On August 3,
    2017, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the identification
    evidence. Appellant argued that the photo array lineup was
    prejudicial and unduly suggestive because none of the other
    photographs resembled Appellant.          Following a suppression
    hearing on April 2, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion.
    Id. at *3 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    We add that Scott McIntosh, Esq. (trial counsel), represented Appellant
    at trial. At trial, Presgrave testified that he saw Appellant holding a gun during
    Appellant’s argument with the victim, heard gunshots, and saw the victim fall
    to the ground. Immediately after the shooting, the victim told Presgrave that
    Bobby Brown had shot him. Presgrave also admitted that he frequently used
    methamphetamine, including on the date of the shooting.           During closing
    arguments, the attorney for the Commonwealth remarked that Appellant
    could not account for his whereabouts at the time of the shooting.
    -2-
    J-S31029-22
    On May 21, 2018, the jury convicted Appellant of attempted murder and
    related offenses.   The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to an
    aggregate term of twenty-two-and-a-half to forty-five years’ incarceration.
    Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court
    denied. Appellant timely appealed. Erin C. Lentz McMahon, Esq. (appellate
    counsel) represented Appellant on direct appeal. On appeal, Appellant argued
    that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the identification
    evidence. Brown, 
    2019 WL 6359023
    , at *4. In reviewing Appellant’s claim,
    a panel of this Court noted that it could find the issue waived because
    Appellant did not include the photo array in the certified record. Id. at *6.
    However, the Court ultimately agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that
    there was independent evidence to support the identification of Appellant and
    affirmed the judgment of sentence. Id. at *6, *10.
    The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as
    follows:
    Appellant filed a timely pro se [PCRA petition] on September 23,
    2020. Sean Cullen, Esq. was appointed to represent Appellant on
    October 1, 2020. Attorney Cullen filed a petition to incorporate
    and supplement Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition and request for
    a hearing on December 30, 2020. . . .
    A video conference evidentiary hearing was held on February 2,
    2021. Attorney Cullen represented Appellant. At the hearing, the
    court heard testimony from trial counsel . . . and Appellant. . . .
    *    *    *
    Appellant filed pro se correspondence on March 12, 2021, alleging
    collusion between Attorney Cullen and the [Montgomery County]
    District Attorney’s Office. On March 26, 2021, Attorney Cullen
    -3-
    J-S31029-22
    filed a petition for leave to withdraw appearance, citing Appellant’s
    allegations of collusion between appointed counsel and the district
    attorney’s office.
    *    *    *
    On May 4, 2021, a hearing was held regarding Attorney Cullen’s
    petition for leave to withdraw. At the hearing, Appellant testified
    he lacked confidence in his court-appointed attorney and was in
    the process of hiring private counsel. On the same date, Attorney
    Cullen’s petition for leave to withdraw appearance was granted. .
    ..
    On June 10, 2021, Thomas D. Kenn[y], Esq. entered his
    appearance on behalf of Appellant. Attorney Kenn[y] was
    privately retained by Appellant.
    *    *    *
    On August 13, 2021, [Attorney Kenny] filed a [brief captioned
    “]Statement of Precise Issues Pursued[”] which identified . . . five
    issues to be pursued at the continuation of the PCRA hearing on
    August 23, 2021[.]
    *    *    *
    Argument was held on August 23, 2021. [Attorney Kenny]
    acknowledged that the evidentiary record was closed and that the
    five issues identified in his [brief] were the only relevant issues
    being pursued in the PCRA petition.
    *    *    *
    The court took the matter under advisement. On September 17,
    2021, after consideration of the filings, arguments of counsel and
    evidence presented in the instant matter, this court issued an
    order denying the PCRA petition pared down to the five issues
    PCRA counsel identified at the August 23, 2021 hearing.
    PCRA Ct. Op., 12/20/21, at 2-5 (citations and footnote omitted, formatting
    altered).
    -4-
    J-S31029-22
    Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal2 and a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.3 Appellant subsequently filed correspondence
    with the PCRA court indicating that he wished to proceed pro se on appeal.
    Attorney Kenny filed an application with this Court to withdraw as counsel.
    On December 2, 2021, the PCRA court conducted a hearing pursuant to
    Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
     (Pa. 1998), and granted Appellant’s
    request to proceed pro se.4,5
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we restate
    and reorder as follows:
    ____________________________________________
    2 Although Appellant was represented by Attorney Kenny when he filed his pro
    se notice of appeal, the rule against hybrid representation does not render the
    timely pro se notice of appeal a legal nullity. See Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    151 A.3d 621
     (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that because a notice
    of appeal protects constitutional rights, it is distinguishable from other filings
    that require counsel, and this Court is required to docket pro se notice of
    appeal despite the appellant being represented by counsel).
    3 The PCRA court noted that Appellant served his Rule 1925(b) statement on
    the PCRA court judge and the Commonwealth, but that he failed to file a copy
    with Clerk of Courts. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 5 n.3. Nevertheless, the PCRA
    court treated Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement as properly filed and the
    PCRA court submitted a copy of the statement to the Clerk of Courts for filing.
    See 
    id.
    4 Although the PCRA court quotes from the transcript of the December 2, 2021
    Grazier hearing in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, see PCRA Ct. Op. at 6-8, that
    transcript is not included in certified record. However, because Appellant is
    not challenging the PCRA court’s ruling in the Grazier hearing, the absence
    of the transcript does not impede our review.
    5This Court granted Attorney Kenny’s application to withdraw as counsel on
    December 6, 2021.
    -5-
    J-S31029-22
    1. Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting relief on the
    PCRA petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to file a motion to preclude Appellant’s prior bad acts?
    2. Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting relief on the
    PCRA petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to file a motion to exclude the victim’s hearsay
    statement identifying Appellant as his assailant?
    3. Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting relief on the
    PCRA petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to impeach Terry Presgrave?
    4. Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting relief on the
    PCRA petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to contest the identification evidence?
    5. Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting relief on the
    PCRA petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to object to prejudicial remarks in the Commonwealth’s
    closing regarding Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.6
    ____________________________________________
    6 In his brief, Appellant argues approximately ten additional issues that he did
    not include in his statement of questions presented. See Appellant’s Brief at
    5, 14-17, 24-43. “[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally
    materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special
    benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the
    procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.”
    Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (citations omitted). Because Appellant failed to include these issues in his
    statement of questions presented, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)
    (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the
    statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”); see also
    Commonwealth v. Hodge, 
    144 A.3d 170
    , 172 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2016).
    Additionally, an appellant may not raise new issues in his reply brief.
    Therefore, the issues that Appellant raised for the first time in his reply brief
    are also waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 
    737 A.2d 214
    , 219
    n.8 (Pa. 1999).
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -6-
    J-S31029-22
    Trial Counsel’s Failure to File Motions in Limine
    In his first two issues, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective
    for failing to file motions in limine to exclude: (1) Appellant’s prior bad acts
    and (2) the victim’s statement that Appellant shot him. Appellant’s Brief at
    12-13, 49-50.
    Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the
    exclusion of Appellant’s prior bad acts under Pa.R.E. 404(b). Appellant’s Brief
    at 12-13. Specifically, Appellant contends that Officer Gorman’s testimony
    was inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 404(b) because it tended to prove Appellant
    acted in conformance with prior bad acts. Id. at 13.7
    ____________________________________________
    We also note that Appellant presented eight additional issues in his Rule
    1925(b) statement. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/2/21, at 1-2. However,
    in his brief on appeal, Appellant has not raised or presented any argument
    relative to these other claims of error. Accordingly, Appellant has abandoned
    those issues on appeal.        See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see also
    Commonwealth v. McGill, 
    832 A.2d 1014
    , 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding
    waiver where the appellant abandoned claim on appeal).
    7 Appellant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
    the police property receipt from the night of Appellant’s arrest to rebut Officer
    Gorman’s testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant asserts that trial
    counsel and PCRA counsel suborned perjury and procedural misconduct. 
    Id.
    Appellant additionally argues that Officer Gorman’s trial testimony was not
    reliable because Officer Gorman was named in a Philadelphia Inquirer article
    of Philadelphia Police Department officers who the Philadelphia District
    Attorney’s Office considered to be untrustworthy. Id. at 13. Therefore,
    Appellant contends that the Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights
    by knowingly using false evidence to convict him. Id. Appellant did not raise
    any of these claims in either his Rule 1925(b) statement or in the statement
    of questions involved in his appellate brief. Therefore, they are waived. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not included in the Statement
    and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4)
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -7-
    J-S31029-22
    Appellant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file
    a motion in limine to exclude the victim’s statement that Appellant shot him
    because its potential for unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value. Id.
    at 49-50. Further, Appellant contends that the victim’s statement was of an
    emotional nature and was likely to confuse and mislead the jury. Id. at 50.8
    In reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review
    is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
    supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
    error.     The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
    supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
    apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
    conclusions.
    Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
    circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
    determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
    innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant
    to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim
    is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
    basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
    and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
    the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
    ____________________________________________
    are waived”), 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it
    is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested
    thereby”).
    8 Appellant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1)
    present evidence regarding the discrepancies between the victim’s statement
    and the condition of the crime scene; (2) request a limiting instruction; (3)
    retain a medical expert to testify about how the victim’s substance use
    affected his perceive the attack. Appellant’s Brief at 49-50. Appellant did not
    raise any of these claims in either his Rule 1925(b) statement or in the
    statement of questions involved in his appellate brief. Therefore, they are
    waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), 2116(a).
    -8-
    J-S31029-22
    We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the
    factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.
    Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
    determination.
    The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
    his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
    chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
    offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
    Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they
    effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight
    analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he
    may have taken.
    Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
    but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
    been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
    to undermine confidence in the outcome.
    Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis
    and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to
    prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy
    any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the
    claim of ineffectiveness.
    Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 
    203 A.3d 1033
    , 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (citations omitted and formatting altered). It is well settled that “[c]ounsel
    will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.”
    Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    927 A.2d 586
    , 608 (Pa. 2007) (citation
    omitted).   Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
    perform an act that counsel actually performed. See, e.g., Commonwealth
    v. Gwynn, 
    943 A.2d 940
    , 946 (Pa. 2008) (concluding that the defendant’s
    “claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s
    ineffectiveness on direct appeal is meritless since it was, in fact, raised”).
    -9-
    J-S31029-22
    Here, Appellant has raised only bald assertions of prejudice regarding
    the admission of this evidence. A PCRA petitioner has the burden to plead
    and prove prejudice, i.e., “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
    Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. Therefore, Appellant has failed to establish
    that he is entitled to relief on these claims. See id.
    Trial Counsel’s Failure to Impeach Presgrave
    In his third issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to impeach Presgrave regarding his prior inconsistent statements.
    Appellant’s Brief at 8-11.         Specifically, Appellant noted that during trial,
    Presgrave testified that his memory of the shooting was foggy because he had
    taken drugs that day.        Id.   Appellant contends that trial counsel failed to
    introduce the statement in which Presgrave denied that he was under the
    influence of alcohol or drugs on the day of the shooting.9 Id. Appellant also
    argues that trial counsel failed to impeach Presgrave regarding his inconsistent
    statements about whether he saw the shooting and the description of the
    shooter he gave to the police. Id.
    The PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
    ____________________________________________
    9  Appellant also asserts that Presgrave committed perjury and the
    Commonwealth violated Appellant’s constitutional rights by knowingly
    presenting or failing to correct Presgrave’s false testimony. Appellant’s Brief
    at 8-11. Appellant did not raise any of these claims in either his Rule 1925(b)
    statement or in the statement of questions involved in his appellate brief.
    Therefore, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), 2116(a).
    - 10 -
    J-S31029-22
    This issue is also without merit. Trial counsel cross-examined Mr.
    Presgrave regarding his drug use on the day of the incident, his
    drug habit in general, and open drug charges related to
    methamphetamine. See [N.T. Trial, 5/17/18, at 71-77]. Mr.
    Presgrave admitted that his ability to perceive events that day was
    impaired and his memory was “foggy.” Id. at 78. [Trial counsel]
    also cross-examined Mr. Presgrave regarding the victim’s
    enemies. Id. at 81-82. At the February 2, 2021 PCRA hearing,
    [trial counsel] recalled that the bulk of his cross-examination of
    the witnesses and the victim “was about them using meth that
    day. And [he] asked both of them about, ‘When you use meth,
    you stay up for days, right? And how does staying up for days
    doing drugs affect your ability to perceive events or to recall what
    happened?’” [N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 2/2/21, at 33].
    [Trial counsel’s] cross-examination at trial was reasonable and
    Appellant has failed to prove a different alternative “offered a
    potential for success substantially greater than the course actually
    pursued.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 
    30 A.3d 1111
    , 1127 [(Pa.
    2011)] (citing [Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    899 A.2d 1060
    ,
    1064 (Pa. 2006)] (citation omitted)). Therefore, Appellant is
    unable to demonstrate this allegation merits PCRA relief.
    PCRA Ct. Op. at 21.
    Based on our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s
    conclusion.   Trial counsel cross-examined Presgrave regarding his use of
    methamphetamine and the effects it had on his perception and memory. Trial
    counsel also questioned Presgrave about the inconsistencies between
    Presgrave’s trial testimony and the statement he gave to the police. See N.T.
    Trial, 5/17/18, at 71-78, 80-81. A petitioner cannot establish counsel was
    ineffective for failing to perform an act that counsel actually performed. See
    - 11 -
    J-S31029-22
    Gwynn, 943 A.2d at 946. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this
    claim.10
    Trial Counsel’s Failure to Contest Identification Evidence
    In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective
    for failing to adequately contest the identification evidence. Appellant’s Brief
    at 18-23.      Specifically, Appellant contends that trial counsel failed to
    adequately cross-examine the officers regarding their compliance with police
    procedures regarding the use of photo arrays. Id. at 22-23. He also claims
    that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert regarding
    eyewitness identification. Id. at 21-23. Lastly, he argues that counsel11 was
    ineffective for failing to preserve the photo array for appeal. Id. at 21.
    Our Supreme Court has held that when this Court finds an issue waived
    on direct appeal but then alternatively concludes that the issue is meritless,
    the ruling on the merits is a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case
    ____________________________________________
    10 As noted previously, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant was not
    entitled to relief because he failed to prove that trial counsel’s chosen strategy
    lacked a reasonable basis by showing the alternative not chosen offered
    greater potential for success. PCRA Ct. Op. at 21. Although we affirm the
    PCRA court’s ruling on a different basis, we note that it “is well settled that
    where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s
    decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by the lower
    court itself.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 
    275 A.3d 513
    , 520 n.5 (Pa. Super.
    2022) (citations omitted), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 153 WAL 2022, 
    2022 WL 6915277
     (Pa. filed Oct. 12, 2022).
    11 Appellant does not specify if he is referring to trial counsel, appellate
    counsel, or both with respect to this claim.
    - 12 -
    J-S31029-22
    with respect to that issue. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 
    971 A.2d 1216
    ,
    1220 (Pa. 2009). Further, because the ruling on the merits of the issue is the
    law of the case, it constrains this Court’s review of the same issue in
    subsequent collateral proceedings, even if it is nested in an ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim. See id. at 1220, 1227.
    Here, the PCRA court concluded that this claim was meritless because
    even though the photo array was not included in the certified record, a panel
    of this Court affirmed the order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress on
    direct appeal. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 22 (citing Brown, 
    2019 WL 6359023
     at
    *6).
    Based on our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s
    conclusion. As noted by the PCRA court, a prior panel of this Court affirmed
    the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress on the merits
    instead of finding the claim waived. See Brown, 
    2019 WL 6359023
     at *6.
    Because this Court’s prior ruling on the merits of Appellant’s claim constitutes
    the law of the case, Appellant cannot establish that either trial or appellate
    counsel was ineffective regarding the suppression of the identification
    evidence. See Reed, 971 A.2d at 1227 (affirming denial of PCRA claim that
    trial counsel was ineffective because this Court previously held that the
    underlying issue was meritless on direct appeal). Accordingly, Appellant is
    not entitled to relief on this claim.
    - 13 -
    J-S31029-22
    Trial Counsel’s Failure to Object to Commonwealth’s Closing
    In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to object to prejudicial remarks in the Commonwealth’s closing
    arguments.      Appellant’s Brief at 45-48.        Specifically, Appellant notes that
    during her closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Appellant could not
    account for his whereabouts at the time of the shooting. Id. at 45-47 (citing,
    inter alia, N.T. Trial, 5/21/18, at 30). Appellant contends that this remark
    inappropriately referred to Appellant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right
    against self-incrimination. Id. at 45. Appellant claims that he was prejudiced
    by trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s remarks because those
    remarks “injected a highly prejudicial personal opinion regarding [Appellant’s]
    guilt[.]”12 Id. at 47.
    Our Supreme Court has explained that
    a claim of ineffective assistance grounded in trial counsel’s failure
    to object to a prosecutor’s conduct may succeed when the
    petitioner demonstrates that the prosecutor’s actions violated a
    constitutionally or statutorily protected right, such as the Fifth
    Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination or the
    Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, or a constitutional interest
    ____________________________________________
    12 Appellant additionally argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing (1)
    object to the prosecutor’s “material misrepresentation of the facts that was in
    contradiction to [the] physical evidence[,]” (2) present exculpatory evidence
    he had received in discovery, (3) argue inconsistencies in the
    Commonwealth’s evidence during his closing, and (4) object to the trial court’s
    denial of the jury’s request to review witness statements during deliberations.
    Appellant’s Brief at 45-47. Appellant did not raise any of these claims in either
    his Rule 1925(b) statement or in the statement of questions involved in his
    appellate brief. Therefore, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii),
    2116(a).
    - 14 -
    J-S31029-22
    such as due process. To constitute a due process violation, the
    prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to
    result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The
    touchstone is fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the
    prosecutor. Finally, not every intemperate or improper remark
    mandates the granting of a new trial; reversible error occurs only
    when the unavoidable effect of the challenged comments would
    prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a fixed bias and
    hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors could not weigh
    the evidence and render a true verdict.
    *     *      *
    This Court has recognized that counsel are not constitutionally
    required to forward any and all possible objections at trial, and
    the decision of when to interrupt oftentimes is a function of overall
    defense strategy being brought to bear upon issues which arise
    unexpectedly at trial and require split-second decision-making by
    counsel. Under some circumstances, trial counsel may forego
    objecting to an objectionable remark or seeking a cautionary
    instruction on a particular point because objections sometimes
    highlight the issue for the jury, and curative instructions always
    do.
    Commonwealth v. Koehler, 
    36 A.3d 121
    , 144, 146 (Pa. 2012) (citations
    omitted and formatting altered); see also Commonwealth v. Campbell,
    
    260 A.3d 272
    , 280-81 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[a] prosecutor’s
    comments must be examined within the context of defense counsel’s conduct,
    and the prosecutor may fairly respond to points made by the defense.
    Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct will not be found where comments were
    based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were only oratorical
    flair” (citations omitted and formatting altered)), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---,
    27 EAL 2022, 
    2022 WL 3053299
     (Pa. filed Aug. 3, 2022).
    - 15 -
    J-S31029-22
    Further our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he jury is presumed
    to have followed the court’s instructions.” Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1147 (citation
    omitted).
    Here the PCRA court explained:
    During its final jury instruction, the court specifically advised the
    jury that they were not to draw any adverse inference from the
    fact that Appellant did not testify . . . . [N.T. Trial, 5/21/18, at
    59.]
    *     *      *
    The court further advised that it was not Appellant’s burden to
    prove his innocence, and that the statements made by counsel
    during opening and closing statements were not evidence and
    should not be considered as such. Id. at 59, 62-63, 66-67.
    *     *      *
    The court has determined that the statement made during closing
    arguments by the prosecutor did not assault Appellant’s
    constitutional protections pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s
    privilege against compulsory self-incrimination or the Sixth
    Amendment’s right to a fair trial. Nor did the remark result in the
    denial of Appellant’s right to a fair trial. Further, the court’s final
    jury charge was curative of any impropriety.
    Because the prosecutor’s remark was not of sufficient significance
    to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, trial
    counsel’s failure to object during the closing argument is
    meritless. As such, Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness in this
    regard fails to satisfy the “arguable merit” prong of the [ineffective
    assistance of counsel] test. Further, any effect of the prosecutor’s
    remark was cured by the jury instruction given by the court prior
    to jury deliberation.
    PCRA Ct. Op. at 25-27 (some citations omitted).
    Based on our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s
    conclusions. The prosecutor’s comment did not have the unavoidable effect
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    J-S31029-22
    of forming a fixed bias in the minds of the jurors such that it denied Appellant
    a fair trial. See Koehler, 36 A.3d at 144. Further, the trial court instructed
    the jurors that they could not make any adverse inferences from the fact that
    Appellant did not testify, that the Commonwealth had the burden of proof,
    and that counsel’s arguments were not evidence. See N.T. Trial, 5/21/18, at
    59, 66-67. Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. See
    Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1147. For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s
    claim that the prosecutor inappropriately referred to Appellant’s silence lacks
    arguable merit, and counsel “will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise
    a meritless claim.” Washington, 927 A.2d at 608. Therefore, Appellant is
    not entitled to relief on this issue. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1044.
    Ineffectiveness of PCRA Counsel
    Lastly, Appellant has raised several claims of ineffective assistance of
    PCRA counsel,13 alleging that PCRA counsel failed to raise and/or develop
    various claims in their filings and failed to present evidence at the evidentiary
    hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 8, 12, 14, 23-25, 45-46, 52; Appellant’s Reply
    Brief at 1-2 (unpaginated).
    Although Appellant has raised these claims for the first time on appeal,
    our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 
    261 A.3d 381
     (Pa.
    2021), that a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief and after
    ____________________________________________
    13 Appellant refers to “PCRA counsel” in his brief without specifying if he is
    referring to Attorney Cullen or Attorney Kenny. Therefore, we refer to
    Attorney Cullen and Attorney Kenny collectively as “PCRA counsel.”
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    J-S31029-22
    obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s
    ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even on appeal.         See
    Bradley, 261 A.3d at 405. Because Appellant’s appeal was pending when our
    Supreme Court decided Bradley, it is applicable to this appeal.            See
    Commonwealth v. Chesney, 
    196 A.3d 253
    , 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating
    that “Pennsylvania appellate courts apply the law in effect at the time of the
    appellate decision” (citations omitted)).
    At the outset, we note that Appellant has not raised any of his claims of
    ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel in his statement of the questions
    involved. Therefore, we conclude that these claims are waived. See Pa.R.A.P.
    2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in
    the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”); see also
    Hodge, 144 A.3d at 172 n.4 (noting that a claim that the appellant argued in
    his brief but failed to include in his statement of questions presented was
    waived).
    In any event, were we to reach these claims of error, we would be
    constrained to find them waived due to Appellant’s failure to develop them
    beyond bald assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Sandusky,
    203 A.3d at 1044. Therefore, we conclude that it is not necessary to remand
    this matter to the PCRA court for further consideration.14 Cf. Bradley, 261
    ____________________________________________
    14 In his reply brief, Appellant argues that PCRA counsel was ineffective for
    failing to challenge the legality of his sentence under Apprendi v. New
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 18 -
    J-S31029-22
    A.3d at 402 (explaining that “to advance a request for remand [for further
    development of the record, an appellant] would be required to provide more
    than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness” (citation
    and quotation marks omitted)).           Accordingly, Appellant is due no relief on
    these issues.
    For these reasons, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the
    PCRA court in denying Appellant’s petition. Therefore, we affirm the PCRA
    court’s order.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000) and United States v. Alleyne, 
    570 U.S. 99
    (2013). Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2 (unpaginated). Although under Bradley,
    Appellant may raise this ineffectiveness claim on appeal for the first time, we
    conclude that it is waived for the reasons stated above.
    We also note that the underlying legality of the sentence claims are meritless.
    “‘[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and
    jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
    conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
    in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.’” Commonwealth v. King, 
    234 A.3d 549
    , 560 (Pa. 2020) (quoting
    Apprendi, 
    530 U.S. at 476
     (additional citation omitted)). Here, the jury found
    that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
    inflicted serious bodily injury. See N.T. Trial, 5/21/18, at 103. Therefore,
    Appellant’s sentence of twenty to forty years’ incarceration under 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 1102(c) is a legal sentence. See Apprendi, 
    530 U.S. at 476
    ; King 234
    A.3d at 560. Alleyne is not applicable to Appellant’s sentence because 18
    Pa.C.S. § 1102(c) does not provide for a mandatory minimum sentence. Cf.
    Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111-16 (requiring that the jury must find that the
    prosecution proved any facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence
    beyond a reasonable doubt).
    - 19 -
    J-S31029-22
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/22/2022
    - 20 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2130 EDA 2021

Judges: Nichols, J.

Filed Date: 11/22/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/22/2022