Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers , 844 F.3d 358 ( 2016 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 16-1267
    BLOCK ISLAND FISHING, INC.,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    JAMIE ROGERS,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Lipez, and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Jonathan E. Gilzean, with whom David F. Anderson and Latti &
    Anderson LLP were on brief, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Muzyka, with whom Kirby L. Aarsheim and Clinton &
    Muzyka, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
    December 23, 2016
    LYNCH, Circuit Judge.     This case involves rulings of
    some significance to seamen and their employers in this circuit,
    as well as for summary judgment practice.    Jamie Rogers, a seaman,
    was injured on October 3, 2013, on the vessel F/V HEDY BRENNA.
    Admiralty law entitles seamen who become injured during the course
    of their service at sea to recover "maintenance and cure" payments
    from their employers.     Block Island Fishing, Inc., is the owner
    and operator of the fishing vessel.     Having made some maintenance
    and cure payments to Rogers and believing it had overpaid, Block
    Island brought this suit against Rogers to dispute the duration
    and amount of maintenance and cure payments that it owed.
    Block Island then moved for summary judgment on the
    ground that its maintenance and cure duties terminated on July 31,
    2014.   It supported its motion with record evidence showing that
    Rogers had returned to work as a commercial fisherman on another
    fishing vessel in July.
    The district court rejected July 31 as the proper date
    of termination. But it went beyond the issue raised by Block
    Island's summary judgment motion and found November 18, 2014 as
    the date on which Block Island's obligations ended.    That was the
    date on which a doctor, but not Rogers' primary care physician,
    found that Rogers no longer needed follow-up care.
    The district court also noted that injured seamen are
    generally entitled to maintenance and cure payments only in the
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    amount of their actual living expenses, but it reserved for a jury
    to determine the exact sum that Block Island owed Rogers, along
    with other issues not resolved at the summary judgment stage.
    Relatedly, the district court held on summary judgment that Block
    Island had overpaid Rogers by calculating its maintenance and cure
    payments using figures that overestimated Rogers' actual living
    expenses.   It further ruled that Block Island could offset the sum
    of overpayment against any damages award that Rogers might win at
    trial.   We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
    As to the exact date on which Block Island's maintenance
    and cure obligations ended, the district court erred by sua sponte
    replacing Block Island's proposed date (July 31) with its own
    (November    18)    without    giving   Rogers     sufficient   notice     or
    opportunity to make his case against the new date.               A summary
    judgment order is premature where the nonmoving party lacked
    "notice and a reasonable time to respond" to the grounds on which
    that motion would be granted.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
    We agree with the district court's implicit recognition
    that   injured     seamen   like   Rogers   can   generally   recover    only
    reasonable expenses through maintenance and cure payments, and
    that it will be the factually exceptional case where the seaman's
    actual expenses are not reasonable.          Whether this case presents
    such exceptional circumstances is an issue for the jury.          Finally,
    as a matter of first impression, we adopt the ruling of the Fifth
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    Circuit in Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 
    721 F.3d 723
    (5th   Cir.    2013),   and   hold   that    Block   Island   may   offset   any
    overpayment against Rogers' potential damages award, but may not
    sue for the sum in an independent action.             See 
    id. at 726–28.
    I.
    "Because our review of a grant of summary judgment is de
    novo, we, like the district court, are obliged to review the record
    in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw
    all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." LeBlanc
    v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 
    6 F.3d 836
    , 841 (1st Cir. 1993).               Although
    there are numerous dates at issue, the core of the dispute involves
    (1)    when    Block    Island's     maintenance     and    cure    obligations
    terminated, and (2) the amount, if any, of the maintenance and
    cure owed. Block Island takes the position that it overpaid Rogers
    based on an inflated rent amount that it believed Rogers to be
    paying when, in fact, Rogers had found less expensive housing.
    Rogers takes the position that special circumstances dictate that
    actual expenses are not the appropriate measure here.
    A.    Rogers' Injury and His Various Residences from 2013 to 2014
    In August 2013, Rogers and his family moved into a
    single-family home in Bristol, Rhode Island.                He paid the first
    month's rent of $1,600, which included utilities, but he cannot
    remember paying rent in subsequent months.                 In September 2013,
    Rogers joined the crew of the F/V HEDY BRENNA, a commercial fishing
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    vessel owned and operated by Block Island.             For a fishing trip in
    which he participated that month, Rogers was paid $2,892 in his
    catch share for the trip.
    On   October   3,   2013,   during   another    fishing   voyage,
    Rogers fell off the top bunk while sleeping and injured himself.
    Three days later, upon returning from the voyage, Rogers was
    diagnosed with a fractured rib and received medical treatment.              In
    October 2013, Block Island paid Rogers $1,752.37 in catch share
    from the October 3 voyage and $475 in maintenance.             On November 1,
    2013, Block Island supplemented that amount with an additional
    $175 in maintenance and $1,857.78 in lost wages.                The total sum
    paid   from    Block   Island     to   Rogers   over   this   period    equaled
    $4,260.15.
    In November 2013, Rogers and his family were evicted
    from the Bristol apartment and moved to a less expensive apartment
    in Fall River, Massachusetts. He paid $625 in monthly rent,
    excluding utilities, for the new Fall River apartment. On November
    4, 2013, Rogers' treating physician, Dr. Christian Campos, gave
    him a "fit for duty" slip and cleared him to return to work as a
    fisherman "without restrictions."
    Rogers' health worsened in December, however, when he
    was diagnosed with pneumonia and was hospitalized for three weeks.
    Rogers attributes the pneumonia to his rib injury.               Block Island
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    learned about Rogers' condition and hospitalization on December
    19, 2013.
    On February 20, 2014, Dr. Campos reported that Rogers'
    condition was improving and that Rogers could "increase his level
    of physical activity as tolerated without restrictions" while
    staying    on    pain   medication.      On   March   17,   2014,   Dr.   Campos
    completed another examination and once again advised Rogers to
    continue to "increase his level of physical activity as tolerated
    without restrictions."
    In March 2014, Rogers moved to Sparta, Tennessee, where
    he lived with his brother.        Rogers paid his brother $800 per month
    as rent.    Finally, in May or June 2014, Rogers purchased a 38-foot
    boat for $2,500 and lived on that boat before returning to Fall
    River in June.
    On June 19, 2014, Rogers' primary care physician, Dr.
    Melanie Cardoza, examined Rogers for pain in his lower back and
    left leg.       During this examination, Rogers told the doctor that he
    had returned from a fishing trip the previous day and that he was
    planning to embark on another fishing trip the next day.                     The
    conversation       demonstrated   that   Rogers   had   been   working     as   a
    fisherman in June.       Dr. Cardoza's examination of Rogers' chest and
    lungs revealed "normal excursion with symmetric chest walls and
    quiet, even and easy respiratory effort with no use of accessory
    muscles."
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    By July 2014, Rogers was working on, and was physically
    fit to captain, another fishing vessel, the KELLY ANN.           But Dr.
    Campos examined Rogers in August 2014 and provided him with a
    letter stating that he was not yet fit to return to work as a
    commercial fisherman.
    On November 18, 2014, Dr. Campos examined Rogers again
    and found that "his condition had improved to the point that no
    'further formal follow-up' was necessary."           At oral argument,
    Rogers' counsel clarified that although Dr. Campos had discharged
    Rogers from his care on November 18, he had "transferr[ed] all
    follow-up care to his primary care physician, Dr. Cardoza, who was
    also treating Rogers for his illness and injury."
    B.   Communications Between Parties Regarding Maintenance and Cure
    In January 2014, after learning about Rogers' pneumonia
    and hospitalization the previous month as recounted above, Block
    Island   hired   Neil   Stoddard   of   Marine   Safety   Consultants   to
    investigate Rogers' demand for maintenance and cure.           From that
    point, almost a year of correspondence ensued between Stoddard and
    Danny Alberto, a paralegal employed by Rogers' counsel, regarding
    the rate of maintenance and cure owed to Rogers.
    In a letter dated January 9, 2014, Stoddard requested
    medical records from Rogers' counsel to support Rogers' claim of
    ongoing medical treatment.    On January 24, 2014, Alberto responded
    to Stoddard's letter and requested that Block Island pay Rogers
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    $72 per day in maintenance and cure.     Alberto cited the following
    as Rogers' monthly expenses: $1,600 for rent, $119.25 for gas,
    $61.28 for electricity, and $362.50 for food, based on the U.S.
    Department of Agriculture's Moderate Cost Plan for a person of
    Rogers' age living in a four-person family home.
    Upon Stoddard's objection that Alberto had provided only
    "cash receipts" with "nothing on them to identify them as a rent
    payment," Alberto mailed Stoddard a copy of the Bristol lease on
    March 27, 2014.     (Rogers had vacated the Bristol home in November
    2013.)   This lease indicated that the monthly $1,600 rent included
    utilities.     When Stoddard discovered that Rogers had moved to the
    Fall River apartment, and he further objected to the $72 daily
    rate demanded by Alberto, Alberto responded that "he had provided
    'all of Mr. Rogers['] living expenses and all of his medical
    records'" and warned that he would pursue punitive damages on
    Rogers' behalf if Block Island did not begin making the requested
    maintenance and cure payments. At some point during this exchange,
    Alberto also provided Stoddard with two utility invoices that
    reflected two different addresses in Fall River.
    In late June, Block Island paid $68,891.41 in cure to
    Rogers' health care providers.       Then, on July 23, 2014, Block
    Island sent Rogers a maintenance check for $10,800.06 -- based on
    a daily rate of $63.26 -- covering the period from October 2013 to
    April 23, 2014, "the date of his last treatment record received."
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    The $63.26 rate was calculated based on Rogers' $1,600 monthly
    rent for his Bristol home and $279.80 per month in food.                      As the
    Bristol lease reflected that utilities were included, Block Island
    did not account for electricity and gas bills in calculating the
    maintenance and cure rate.
    On July 25, 2014, Alberto sent Stoddard a copy of Rogers'
    Fall River lease, which reflected a monthly rent of $625 excluding
    utilities.       (Rogers had vacated this apartment in March 2014.)
    After another threat from Alberto that he would seek punitive
    damages if Block Island did not provide additional maintenance of
    $72    per    day,   Block     Island     sent    Rogers    a    second    check   for
    $11,956.14, based on a daily rate of $63.26.
    II.
    On November 25, 2014, Block Island filed a complaint
    against Rogers in the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Massachusetts.       Block Island sought a declaratory judgment on the
    amount of retroactive maintenance owed to Rogers (Count I), on
    whether it had any continuing obligation to pay maintenance and
    cure,    and    on   whether    it    was    entitled      to    reimbursement      for
    overpayments resulting from Rogers' failure to provide accurate
    and timely information about his living expenses and medical
    treatment       (Count   II).        On   March    6,    2015,    Rogers    filed    a
    counterclaim alleging negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
    §     30104    (Count    I),    unseaworthiness         (Count    II),    continuing
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    maintenance and cure (Count III), negligent or intentional failure
    to provide maintenance and cure (Count IV), and lost wages (Count
    V).
    Block Island moved for summary judgment on its counts
    for declaratory judgment, and on Counts III and IV of Rogers'
    counterclaim.   Block Island also sought $13,027.80, the amount by
    which it had allegedly overpaid Rogers.
    The district court granted in part and denied in part
    Block Island's motion.      First, as to its demand for reimbursement
    for its overpayment, the district court agreed with Block Island's
    premise that it had overpaid Rogers because his actual expenses
    were lower than what Block Island believed them to be: "The
    undisputed evidence is that Rogers vacated the Bristol apartment
    [with $1,600 monthly rent] in November of 2013, and that his
    monthly rent since leaving Bristol has not exceeded $800.             It is
    also undisputed that in calculating the daily maintenance due[,]
    Block Island relied on the $1,600 monthly rent figure and that an
    overpayment resulted."      Nonetheless, the court relied on the Fifth
    Circuit's    opinion   in   Boudreaux   to   rule   that,   despite     the
    overpayment, Block Island could not seek affirmative recovery of
    maintenance and cure payments that it had already made.          
    See 721 F.3d at 726
    –28.    But the court did allow Block Island to offset
    the sum of overpayment, to be determined by a jury, against any
    damages award that Rogers might win at trial.
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    The district court then denied Block Island's summary
    judgment motion as to Count IV of Rogers' counterclaim, which
    alleged that "Block Island negligently or intentionally failed to
    promptly provide maintenance and cure prior to November 3, 2014."
    "[A]s with most issues of negligence," the court explained, "the
    issue of the provision of prompt and proper maintenance and cure
    is a matter for the jury."
    With regard to Block Island's summary judgment request
    for declaratory relief "establishing a specific date upon which
    its maintenance and cure obligations to Rogers came to an end,"
    the district court rejected Block Island's proposed date of July
    31, 2014 but sua sponte supplied its own date of November 18, 2014
    to ultimately grant summary judgment in Block Island's favor.   The
    court noted that "[o]n this issue, the relevant question before
    the court is not whether Rogers returned to work as a fisherman
    (which could be explained by necessity as well as by cure)."
    Accordingly, although Rogers had been working on the KELLY ANN in
    July 2014, that fact was not dispositive of whether Rogers had
    reached the point of maximum medical recovery, as Block Island had
    argued.
    The district court then turned to November 18, 2014 --
    the date on which Dr. Campos had found that Rogers' health had so
    improved that he required no more follow-up visits -- as the date
    on which Rogers had reached maximum medical recovery and thus was
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    no longer entitled to maintenance and cure.                The court observed
    that while Rogers protested that he continued to have trouble
    breathing and to experience pain at the site of his injury, Rogers
    "offer[ed]     no    medical   evidence      that    contradict[ed]   his    own
    doctor's evaluation that he had achieved the maximum feasible
    recovery as of November 18, 2014."                  On that basis, the court
    granted Block Island's summary judgment motion as to Count III
    (continuing maintenance and cure) of Rogers' counterclaims.
    The    court   lastly   denied    Block    Island's   request   for
    attorney's fees.
    Rogers' interlocutory appeal, permissible in admiralty
    cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) and our circuit's case law,
    followed.     See Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 
    419 F.3d 3
    , 6–7 (1st Cir.
    2005); P.R. Ports Auth. v. Barge Katy-B, 
    427 F.3d 93
    , 100–01 (1st
    Cir.   2005);       Martha's   Vineyard      Scuba    Headquarters,   Inc.    v.
    Unidentified Vessel, 
    833 F.2d 1059
    , 1063–64 (1st Cir. 1987).
    III.
    We review de novo the entry of summary judgment.           Hannon
    v. Beard, 
    645 F.3d 45
    , 47 (1st Cir. 2011).
    A.   District Court's Duty to Give Notice Before Entering Summary
    Judgment on Grounds Not Stated in the Motion
    Rogers' primary argument on appeal is that the district
    court erroneously entered summary judgment on a ground that Block
    Island had "never briefed, argued, or raised," thus depriving
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    Rogers of due notice or opportunity to contest that ground.              We
    agree.
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), a district
    court may grant a summary judgment motion on grounds not raised by
    the moving party, but may do so only "[a]fter giving notice and a
    reasonable time to respond" to the opposing party.            Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 56(f). Our circuit has established two criteria that a district
    court must meet before entering summary judgment sua sponte: First,
    "discovery [must be] sufficiently advanced that the parties have
    enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to glean the material facts."
    Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 
    89 F.3d 24
    , 29 (1st Cir. 1996)
    (citations omitted).      Rogers does not claim that he did not have
    a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
    Second,   the    district   court   must   "first    give[]   the
    targeted party appropriate notice and a chance to present its
    evidence on the essential elements of the claim or defense."            
    Id. "Notice, in
    this context, has two aspects: the summary judgment
    target is entitled to know both the grounds that the district court
    will consider and the point at which her obligation to bring forth
    evidence supporting the elements of her claim accrues."           Rogan v.
    Menino, 
    175 F.3d 75
    , 79 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing 
    Berkovitz, 89 F.3d at 31
    ).
    Here, Block Island sought summary judgment explicitly
    and only on the ground that its maintenance and cure obligations
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    terminated on July 31, 2014 because Rogers had resumed his job as
    a commercial fisherman by that point.        According to Block Island,
    Rogers' return to work signaled that it need not make further
    payments because "[m]aintenance and cure is designed to provide a
    seaman with food and lodging when he becomes sick or injured in
    the ship's service; and it extends during the period when he is
    incapacitated to do a seaman's work and continues until he reaches
    maximum medical recovery."     Vaughn v. Atkinson, 
    369 U.S. 527
    , 531
    (1962).
    While the district court rejected the July 31, 2014 date
    and   the   return-to-work   theory,   it   independently,   and   without
    notice to Rogers, determined that November 18, 2014 should be the
    date on which Block Island's maintenance and cure obligations
    ended, based on a theory of maximum medical recovery.        November 18
    is the date on which Dr. Campos advised that Rogers no longer
    required follow-up care from him.
    As a threshold matter, the district court correctly
    noted the well-established law that a fishing vessel must continue
    to make maintenance and cure payments until the point of maximum
    medical recovery -- that is, the point at which an injured seaman's
    "condition has stabilized and further progress ended short of a
    full recovery."    Whitman v. Miles, 
    387 F.3d 68
    , 72 (1st Cir. 2004)
    (quoting In re RJF Int'l Corp. for Exoneration from or Limitation
    of Liab., 
    354 F.3d 104
    , 106 (1st Cir. 2004)).           As a matter of
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    summary judgment law, we hold that the district court nonetheless
    erred when it substituted a new date and ground for summary
    judgment    without   first    notifying      Rogers   and   giving    him    an
    opportunity to dispute this new date and ground.
    The court's decision to grant summary judgment based on
    the November 18 date, notwithstanding the fact that Block Island's
    summary    judgment   motion   had    focused   exclusively    on     July   31,
    deprived Rogers of the opportunity to argue and present evidence
    that he had not yet reached maximum medical recovery as of November
    18.   Indeed, Rogers suffered prejudice as a result of the district
    court's failure to provide notice of the ground on which it would
    enter summary judgment. Had he known that maximum medical recovery
    would be an issue at summary judgment, Rogers says that he would
    have submitted additional evidence (already in his possession) of
    further treatment with Dr. Cardoza, his primary care physician,
    after November 18.      In light of the lack of notice afforded to
    Rogers, the district court acted prematurely when it concluded
    that Rogers had "offer[ed] no medical evidence that contradict[ed]
    [Dr. Campos's] evaluation that he had achieved the maximum feasible
    recovery as of November 18, 2014."
    Although Block Island concedes that it briefed only the
    July 31, 2014 date and return-to-work theory, it argues that the
    district court committed no error in entering summary judgment
    based on the November 18 date because Rogers had been "fully aware"
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    that maximum medical recovery would be a central issue throughout
    this case.     Block Island contends that Rogers had "a reasonable
    opportunity to glean the material facts" on that issue during
    discovery.     But this argument misses the point.     Rogers had no
    reason to know that he would face the issue at summary judgment.
    The district court has a duty to notify the nonmoving party of the
    stage in the litigation at which his "obligation to bring forth
    evidence supporting the elements of [his] claim accrues."     
    Rogan, 175 F.3d at 79
    .    That Rogers knew he would need to dispute that he
    had reached maximum medical recovery at trial, is not the same as
    knowing that the issue would be decided at summary judgment.1
    B.   Calculating the Amount of Maintenance and Cure Payments
    Rogers also complains that the district court erred when
    it allegedly ruled that the amount of Rogers' maintenance and cure
    recovery is capped at the actual living expenses that he incurred.2
    1    In vacating the district court's decision on the end date of
    Block Island's maintenance and cure obligations, we note that we
    need not and do not reach the question of whether a lack of notice
    before a summary judgment ruling could ever be per se sufficient
    for a vacatur absent a further showing of prejudice. Here, there
    is sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that Rogers
    was prejudiced by the district court's premature summary judgment
    ruling on the end-date issue. The end date of the obligation to
    pay maintenance and cure, in turn, affects the issue of the total
    amount of maintenance and cure owed, and that, in turn, affects
    the issue of whether there has been an overpayment.
    2    Rogers' argument that the district court imposed such a cap
    presumably comes from two places in the summary judgment opinion.
    First, while recounting the governing law applicable to the
    dispute, the district court cited Johnson v. United States, 333
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    We understand differently the district court's statements on the
    law governing the calculation of maintenance and cure.
    We do not read the district court's statements on this
    point as a ruling that limited, as a matter of law, Rogers'
    maintenance and cure recovery to his actual living expenses.
    First, the district court stated that an overpayment had resulted
    in the specific context of determining "whether the court can --
    or should -- do anything about the maintenance overpayment in a
    restitutionary sense."   That is, recognition of the overpayment
    immediately preceded the court's ruling that Block Island could
    not affirmatively seek to recover any amount of overpayment but
    rather could only offset it against any damages that Rogers might
    win at trial.
    Second, our reading is bolstered by the fact that, in
    the same summary judgment opinion, the district court refused to
    decide whether Block Island had unduly delayed making maintenance
    and cure payments to Rogers, an issue that is material to establish
    whether Block Island's negligence contributed to Rogers' move from
    U.S. 46, 50 (1948), and noted that a seaman is "entitled to recover
    maintenance only for his actual living expenses."        Then, the
    district court listed the following three propositions as
    "undisputed" for the purposes of the summary judgment motion:
    (1) that Rogers vacated the Bristol apartment with $1,600 monthly
    rent in November 2013; (2) that Rogers' rent since leaving Bristol
    has not exceeded $800 per month; and (3) "that in calculating the
    daily maintenance due[,] Block Island relied on the $1,600 monthly
    rent figure and that an overpayment resulted."
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    the Bristol home to a series of less expensive residences.                 The
    court reserved this issue for the jury, noting that "as with most
    issues of negligence, the issue of the provision of prompt and
    proper maintenance and cure is a matter for the jury."                      By
    assigning the decision to the jury, the court left open the
    possibility   that   the   jury   might    find   that    Block   Island   did
    negligently delay in paying Rogers.         This finding might, in turn,
    impact the amount of maintenance and cure to which Rogers is
    entitled.
    In this circuit, as in numerous sister circuits, the
    norm is to award an injured seaman maintenance and cure payments
    in the amount of his actual living expenses.             See, e.g., 
    Johnson, 333 U.S. at 50
    (affirming circuit court's decision to reject
    injured seaman's claim for maintenance and cure because "there
    [wa]s ample evidence . . . that petitioner had incurred no expense
    or liability for his care and support at the home of his parents");
    Hall v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) Inc., 
    242 F.3d 582
    , 587 (5th Cir.
    2001) ("A seaman is entitled to the reasonable cost of food and
    lodging, provided he has incurred the expense." (emphasis added));
    Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 
    900 F.2d 630
    , 641 (3d Cir. 1990)
    ("Because maintenance is intended to substitute for the food and
    lodging that a seaman enjoyed at sea, it is established that the
    seaman is entitled only to expenses actually incurred.              Thus, if
    a seaman is not charged for hospitalization or lives with his
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    family without incurring any expense or liability for his care, no
    maintenance is due." (citations omitted)).
    But the rule remains that an injured seaman may recover
    reasonable expenses beyond the amount that he actually incurred,
    even if it is the exceptional case where the seaman's reasonable
    expenses will exceed his actual expenses.          See, e.g., McMillan v.
    Tug Jane A. Bouchard, 
    885 F. Supp. 452
    , 463–67 & n.13 (E.D.N.Y.
    1995) (holding that injured seaman was entitled to maintenance and
    cure payments even though he had paid no rent, after factfinding
    at trial that the seaman had involuntarily moved in with friends
    and   family   because   his    employer     had   refused     to   pay   him
    maintenance), abrogated on other grounds by Hicks v. Tug PATRIOT,
    
    783 F.3d 939
    (2d Cir. 2015); cf.       Vaughan v. Atkinson, 
    369 U.S. 527
    , 530–31, 533 (1962) (holding that injured seaman was entitled
    to attorney's fees and to his wages earned as taxi driver without
    offset,   after   factfinding   that   his    employer   had    negligently
    remained "silen[t,] neither admitting nor denying" its duty to pay
    maintenance and cure for two years).       Rogers argues that this case
    presents just this kind of exceptional circumstance because Block
    Island's delayed maintenance and cure payments forced him to vacate
    the Bristol home and seek cheaper housing.               That fact-bound
    determination, however, is one for the jury.          To the extent that
    the district court could be understood as having ruled otherwise,
    any such ruling would be error.
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    C.     Method of Recovery for Any Overpayment
    Finally, both parties seek affirmance of the district
    court's decision that although Block Island cannot affirmatively
    sue to recover any maintenance and cure payments that it has
    already made to Rogers, it can offset any overpayment (the exact
    amount of which should be determined at trial) against any damages
    that Rogers may win.
    The   district   court    properly    relied   on   Boudreaux   v.
    Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 
    721 F.3d 723
    (5th Cir. 2013).              There,
    the Fifth Circuit faced a similar question -- namely, whether a
    Jones Act employer, upon establishing that it overpaid an injured
    seaman, is "automatically entitled to a judgment against the seaman
    for benefits already paid."          
    Id. at 725.
       The court answered this
    question    in     the   negative,    observing    that   allowing   for   such
    affirmative recovery would disturb a central policy of admiralty
    law, which seeks to "achieve[] a fair reconciliation between
    protecting seamen in the wake of debilitating on-the-job injury
    and ensuring that shipowners can protect themselves from liability
    for sums attributable to concealed preexisting injuries."              
    Id. at 728.
        By denying the availability of affirmative recoveries but
    allowing for offset against the injured seaman's damages award,
    the court in Boudreaux strove to strike the proper balance.                  We
    agree with Boudreaux's sound rule, as well as the rationale
    animating it.
    - 20 -
    We   thereby   adopt   the    Fifth   Circuit's   approach    in
    Boudreaux that "once a shipowner pays maintenance and cure to the
    injured seaman, the payments can be recovered only by offset
    against the seaman's damages award -- not by an independent suit
    seeking affirmative recovery."     
    Id. at 728.
    IV.
    We affirm the district court's ruling that Block Island
    may offset any overpayment that occurred against any damages that
    Rogers may win at trial.
    We vacate the ruling that Block Island's maintenance and
    cure obligations terminated on November 18, 2014, and remand for
    further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.                The
    district court did not provide Rogers with sufficient notice and
    opportunity to contend otherwise before entering summary judgment.
    No costs are awarded.
    - 21 -