United States v. Hiram Graham , 915 F.3d 456 ( 2019 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 18-2156
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    HIRAM OMAR GRAHAM,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 17-CR-220 — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED JANUARY 23, 2019— DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019
    ____________________
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and ST. EVE, Cir-
    cuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM. Hiram Graham pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act
    robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. At
    sentencing, he argued that his financial hardships, his extraor-
    dinary family situation, and his lack of a criminal record
    should mitigate his sentence. He now contends that the dis-
    trict court failed to address these arguments or adequately ex-
    plain his 144-month, below-guidelines prison sentence. But
    2                                                 No. 18-2156
    the district court did not commit these procedural errors, so
    we affirm the judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Over a five-month period, Graham robbed six Aldi gro-
    cery stores at gunpoint. He had worked at an Aldi in Milwau-
    kee for six years, before he was fired four months before the
    first robbery for stealing food. Graham targeted Aldi stores
    because of his insider knowledge, including his knowledge
    that Aldi trains employees to acquiesce to robbers. Graham
    would enter a store a few minutes before closing, hide until it
    closed, then approach employees with his gun drawn and in-
    struct them to empty the safe. Two weeks after the sixth rob-
    bery, Graham was arrested, and he later confessed.
    Graham pleaded guilty to six counts of Hobbs Act rob-
    bery, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    (a), and one count of using a firearm
    during of a crime of violence, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(ii). In
    calculating the applicable imprisonment range under the Sen-
    tencing Guidelines, the district court found that Graham had
    a total offense level of 28 and criminal history category of I,
    giving him a range of 78 to 97 months for each robbery, fol-
    lowed by a mandatory consecutive sentence of 84 months for
    the § 924(c) conviction. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(D)(ii) (man-
    dating that sentence for 924(c) conviction be imposed consec-
    utively). Consistent with Graham’s plea agreement, the gov-
    ernment recommended a within-guidelines sentence.
    At sentencing, Graham argued that he should receive the
    “least restrictive sentence available”—just 84 months’ impris-
    onment for the § 924(c) conviction and no additional time—
    because his case was unique. For thirty years, Graham had
    been a productive member of society, graduating high school
    No. 18-2156                                                     3
    and working two full-time jobs to support his girlfriend and
    six children. Counsel recounted that Graham had lived a
    crime-free life until the financial pressures of six children, one
    with serious medical issues, overwhelmed him and drove
    him to use drugs, steal food, and, finally, rob his former em-
    ployer under the influence of cocaine. Counsel stressed that
    Graham had learned his lesson, was statistically “unlikely to
    reoffend,” and that, because of his family support, there was
    every reason to believe that he would be rehabilitated.
    Before hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court
    stated that it had reviewed Graham’s twelve-page sentencing
    memorandum and other submissions. And after hearing all
    the arguments, the court commented that it understood that
    Graham, “like so many,” had been “confronted with financial
    challenges,” which “may serve as an explanation for” his con-
    duct. But, the court continued, this did “not provide a mean-
    ingful excuse for anyone to take matters into their own hands
    and go about taking from others.” Graham’s criminal con-
    duct, the court emphasized, had not been “spur of the mo-
    ment,” but “well-planned, executed such that it took law en-
    forcement” additional time to discover who the perpetrator
    was, and that there was “too much in the way of criminal con-
    duct” to justify the sentence Graham requested.
    Next, the district court discussed at some length the exor-
    bitant costs of incarceration and the ballooning prison popu-
    lation. It explained that “this branch of the court and others
    are beginning to factor into their analysis of the cost benefit to
    society” this issue in deciding “how much is enough.”
    The court then determined that, considering “uniformity,
    proportionality, certainty, and cost,” concurrent sentences of
    60 months’ imprisonment for each robbery was appropriate,
    4                                                  No. 18-2156
    followed by the mandatory consecutive sentence of 84
    months for the firearm conviction, for a total sentence of 144
    months. The sentence was justified, the court concluded, by
    the “totality of the facts and circumstances” underlying the
    six robberies.
    II. ANALYSIS
    We review claimed procedural errors de novo. See United
    States v. Lockwood, 
    840 F.3d 896
    , 900 (7th Cir. 2016). Graham
    first argues that the district court procedurally erred when it
    failed to address his mitigation arguments and adequately ex-
    plain its consideration of them. At sentencing, a court must
    address the parties’ principal arguments, and “where a de-
    fendant’s principal argument is not so weak as not to merit
    discussion, the court must explain its reason for rejecting that
    argument.” United States v. Reed, 
    859 F.3d 468
    , 472 (7th Cir.
    2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    As to the primary factor concerning the sentence imposed,
    we turn first to Graham’s claim of financial hardship. Alt-
    hough the district court did not say much about how this mit-
    igation argument influenced its sentence, its remarks demon-
    strate that it was unpersuaded that Graham’s severe and es-
    calating financial troubles outweighed the aggravating cir-
    cumstances of his six robberies. The court acknowledged Gra-
    ham’s financial challenges but responded that they did not of-
    fer an excuse for armed robbery. Graham maintains that this
    statement alone was insufficient, but a “short explanation” for
    rejecting a mitigating argument “will suffice where the con-
    text and record make clear the reasoning underlying the dis-
    trict court’s conclusion.” United States v. Schroeder, 
    536 F.3d 746
    , 755 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
    No. 18-2156                                                    5
    338, 358–59 (2007)); see United States v. Castaldi, 
    743 F.3d 589
    ,
    595 (7th Cir. 2014).
    Here, directly after mentioning Graham’s financial hard-
    ship, the court noted that the robberies were “not spur of the
    moment,” but “well-planned,” and involved conduct too
    egregious—“heinous” and “contrary to every moral pre-
    cept”—to allow it to sentence him as leniently as his counsel
    had advocated.
    As to the other mitigating factors Graham raised—his lack
    of a criminal record, strong family ties, and drug use—he is
    correct; the district court did not discuss them. And a court
    that fails to mention a ground of recognized legal merit likely
    errs. United States v. Cunningham, 
    429 F.3d 673
    , 679 (7th Cir.
    2005). But the requirement that a court specifically address the
    defendant’s principal arguments “applies with less force”
    where it receives written and oral sentencing arguments and
    imposes a prison sentence “significantly below the applicable
    guidelines range.” United States v. Poetz, 
    582 F.3d 835
    , 837
    (7th Cir. 2009). And a court’s statement that it has read the
    defendant’s submissions is often “enough to satisfy us that [it
    has] considered the argument and rejected it.” United States
    v. Ramirez-Gutierrez, 
    503 F.3d 643
    , 646 (7th Cir. 2007). That is
    what happened here: the district court stated that it had re-
    viewed Graham’s submissions and heard oral argument be-
    fore explaining its below-guidelines sentence. Besides, the ob-
    ligation to address mitigating arguments decreases when a
    defendant presents “stock arguments … about his family sit-
    uation and lack of criminal history,” as Graham did. United
    States v. Martinez, 
    520 F.3d 749
    , 753 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal
    quotation marks and alterations omitted). These “are pre-
    cisely the types of routine contentions that a sentencing court
    6                                                     No. 18-2156
    is certainly free to reject without discussion.” 
    Id.
     (internal quo-
    tation marks omitted).
    Graham also faults the district court for failing to address
    his extraordinary family circumstances as a father and pro-
    vider for six children, one with medical issues. He points to
    cases in which we remanded because the district court did not
    discuss a defendant’s unusual family situation. True enough,
    a defendant’s family circumstances may be a legitimate basis
    for a below-guidelines sentence if the district court finds “that
    a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities … are so unu-
    sual that they may be characterized as extraordinary.”
    Schroeder, 
    536 F.3d at
    755–56 (alteration in original and cita-
    tions omitted). But Graham did not argue that his incarcera-
    tion would leave his children in imminent danger or com-
    pletely without care—he argued that the financial strain on
    the family would only increase if he was incarcerated. See 
    id.
    at 750–51, 756 (defendant was primary caregiver for daughter
    whose significant medical problems made daycare unsafe
    and defendant’s absence would make arranging care impos-
    sible). Sadly, as we have observed: “Most families suffer emo-
    tional and financial harm when a parent is imprisoned. Any
    experienced district judge has heard about those effects many
    times and must recognize that those effects are consequences
    of the parent’s crime, not the sentence imposed.” United States
    v. Gary, 
    613 F.3d 706
    , 710 (7th Cir. 2010). Graham’s contention
    that his large family would lose its main breadwinner and
    that his children would suffer from their father’s absence, was
    not extraordinary enough to warrant specific discussion.
    See Martinez, 
    520 F.3d at 753
    . Moreover, the focus of Graham’s
    argument about his family was how the financial pressures of
    providing for them led Graham to commit these crimes, and
    the court addressed that mitigating argument.
    No. 18-2156                                                       7
    Next, Graham says that the court improperly focused on
    the costs of incarceration to the exclusion of his substantial
    mitigating arguments, and therefore failed to adequately ex-
    plain the sentence. But even with this incidental policy dis-
    cussion, the district court did address Graham’s strongest
    mitigating argument (financial hardship) and explained that
    it was imposing 60 months for each armed robbery to account
    for the egregiousness of Graham’s criminal conduct. That is
    enough “to allow for meaningful appellate review and to pro-
    mote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall v. United States,
    
    552 U.S. 38
    , 590 (2007); see also United States v. Washington,
    
    739 F.3d 1080
    , 1081 (7th Cir. 2014).
    And the court’s discussion about incarceration costs, alt-
    hough not explicitly mentioned in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), played
    into its “analysis of the cost benefit to society, [and] the benefit
    to the inmate.” See United States v. DuPriest, 
    794 F.3d 881
    , 884
    (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that same district judge’s commentary
    on prison costs was proper in the context of discussing
    § 3553(a) sentencing factors). In any event, the court reduced
    the sentence because of its views on the costs of incarceration,
    so Graham arguably benefited from the court raising a miti-
    gating argument it found more persuasive.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The district court reviewed the § 3553(a) factors, ad-
    dressed Graham’s primary mitigation argument, and stressed
    the aggravating fact that Graham had committed six rob-
    beries. This explanation allows for deferential appellate re-
    view, and thus we affirm the judgment.