United States v. Binta , 16 F. App'x 224 ( 2001 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
             No. 01-4088
    KWAME DEMETT BINTA, a/k/a Karl D.
    Bolling, Jr.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.
    (CR-00-144-R)
    Submitted: July 31, 2001
    Decided: August 15, 2001
    Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part and vacated in part by unpublished per curiam opin-
    ion.
    COUNSEL
    C. David Whaley, Anthony G. Spencer, MORCHOWER, LUXTON
    & WHALEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Kenneth E. Mel-
    son, United States Attorney, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    2                       UNITED STATES v. BINTA
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Kwame Binta was convicted of possession of marijuana, 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 844
     (West 1999), possession with intent to distribute mar-
    ijuana, 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
     (West 1999), possession of a firearm and
    ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(3) (1994), and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug
    trafficking crime, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
     (1994). He received a sentence of
    eighty-one months imprisonment. We affirm in part and vacate in
    part.
    Initially, Binta contends that he cannot be convicted of both pos-
    session with intent to distribute and simple possession as simple pos-
    session is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to
    distribute. The Government concedes error and we agree. Accord-
    ingly, we vacate Binta’s convictions on two counts of possession of
    marijuana pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 844
     and the related twelve
    month sentences. Because the sentences for these counts were to be
    served concurrently with the sentences for possession with intent to
    distribute pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    , Binta’s total sentence of
    eighty-one months is unchanged.
    Binta next contends that his constitutional right to a trial by jury
    was violated when his motion to rescind his waiver of jury trial was
    denied. The motion to withdraw a waiver of trial by jury is committed
    to the discretion of the district judge. Wyatt v. United States, 
    591 F.2d 260
     (4th Cir. 1979). A court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion
    to rescind his waiver of a jury trial is reviewed by this Court for abuse
    of discretion. United States v. Holmen, 
    586 F.2d 322
    , 323-24 (4th Cir.
    1978). The court’s denial of Binta’s motion was not based on the
    inconvenience rescheduling would cause the court and the Govern-
    ment but rather on the court’s perception that Binta was playing
    games with the court, based on the fact that Binta had thrice waived
    UNITED STATES v. BINTA                         3
    his right to a jury trial prior to moving to withdraw it. We find that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Binta’s
    motion made fifteen days before trial to rescind his oft repeated
    waiver of trial by jury.
    Binta’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him
    of possession with intent to distribute the marijuana found in his vehi-
    cle on March 24th or even simple possession of the marijuana recov-
    ered on May 4th from his van is reviewed in the light most favorable
    to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979).
    Our review of the evidence presented at trial demonstrates the Gov-
    ernment presented evidence sufficient to prove possession with intent
    to distribute on both occasions.
    Binta, upon his arrest on March 24, averred that the marijuana was
    his and that he used marijuana for religious purposes. On appeal,
    Binta claims the First Amendment protects him from prosecution for
    possession of marijuana for religious purposes. We find this argument
    unavailing. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon
    v. Smith, 
    494 U.S. 872
    , 878-79 (1990).
    Binta next challenges the constitutionality of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
     after
    the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). We, along with a number of our fellow
    circuits, find this argument unpersuasive. United States v. Cernobyl,
    ___ F.3d ___, 
    2001 WL 733406
     at *2-3 (10th Cir. June 29, 2001);
    United States v. Martinez, 
    253 F.3d 251
    , 256 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001);
    United States v. Fort, 
    248 F.3d 475
    , 482-83 (5th Cir. 2001); United
    States v. Brough, 
    243 F.3d 1078
    , 1080 (7th Cir. 2001).
    Finally, Binta asserts that the district court erred in enhancing his
    sentence for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guide-
    lines § 3C1.1. We review an application of the sentencing guidelines
    by the district court for clear error in factual matters; legal conclu-
    sions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Wilson, 
    198 F.3d 467
    ,
    471 (4th Cir. 1999). The district court in its sentencing memorandum
    found the three prongs of this court’s test for perjury satisfied. United
    States v. Smith, 
    62 F.3d 641
    , 646-67 (4th Cir. 1995). We do not find
    clear error in those factual findings.
    4                      UNITED STATES v. BINTA
    Based on the aforementioned findings, we affirm Binta’s convic-
    tions and sentence pursuant to the two counts of possession with
    intent to distribute marijuana, the two counts of possession of a fire-
    arm/ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance and
    one count of possession of a firearm during/in relation to/in further-
    ance of/a drug trafficking crime. We vacate Binta’s conviction and
    sentence for two counts of possession of marijuana.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART