Luster v. United States , 50 F. App'x 965 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 13 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JACKIE L. LUSTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 02-3116
v. D.C. No. 01-CV-3242-KHV
(D. Kansas)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Jackie L. Luster, a federal inmate appearing pro se,
appeals the district court's dismissal of the civil action he brought against prison
officials employed at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. In
his complaint, Mr. Luster alleged that the officials, acting pursuant to Bureau of
Prisons policy, wrongfully retained postage stamps worth over $500.00 formerly
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
in his possession.
Mr. Luster originally filed this action erroneously relying upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Recognizing this, the district court liberally construed his claim as
arising instead under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
2671–2690. Accordingly, the district court substituted the United States as the
sole defendant in place of the individual prison officials, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2672.
R. Doc. 4, at 1. We note that the district court did not adhere to the statutory
procedure for such substitution provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (“Upon
certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting
within the scope of his office or employment . . . any civil action or proceeding
commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an
action against the United States . . . and the United States shall be substituted as
the party defendant.”). Mr. Luster did not object on this ground below and has
not raised this issue on appeal.
Construing the claim as arising under the FTCA, the district court
concluded that Mr. Luster failed to show the United States had waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to his claim because the exception contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) for claims arising from the detention of goods or
merchandise by law enforcement officers applied. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed Mr. Luster’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Luster
-2-
then brought this appeal, claiming as error the district court’s failure to allow him
to proceed under § 1983 and its failure to allow him to present evidence in
support of his claim. Aplt. Br. 3. Mr. Luster has not attempted to refute the
reasoning of the district court relating to the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). U.S. West Inc. v. Tristani, 182
F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). We conclude that Mr. Luster’s assertion that
the district court erred by failing to allow him to proceed under § 1983 is without
merit. It is beyond question that § 1983 has no applicability to alleged torts
committed by federal officials acting under federal law. See, e.g., Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963); Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th
Cir. 1997). We also conclude that Mr. Luster’s assertion regarding the district
court’s failure to allow him to present evidence is also without merit, as it fails to
recognize that his claim was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of his argument Mr. Luster cites
cases arising under § 1983 dealing with summary judgment dispositions. These
decisions have no bearing on this case at all.
-3-
Having rejected Mr. Luster’s contentions on appeal, we also agree with the
court’s reasoning regarding the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) to these facts.
R. Doc. 13 at 4-7.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-4-