Yisrael v. Russell , 82 F. App'x 629 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 28 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
YERICHO YISRAEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-3084
(D.C. No. 01-CV-2277-GTV)
JANICE D. RUSSELL, Johnson (D. Kan.)
County, Kansas, District Judge, in her
personal and official capacities;
JAMES FRANKLIN DAVIS, Johnson
County, Kansas, District Judge, in his
personal and official capacities;
PATRICK D. MCANANY, Johnson
County, Kansas, Chief District Judge,
in his personal and official
capacities; STEVE LEBEN, Johnson
County, Kansas, District Judge, in his
personal and official capacities;
ELLEN AISENBREY, attorney, in
her individual, professional and
assumed official capacities;
KATHLEEN L. SLOAN, District
Court Trustee, in her personal and
official capacities; JIM
ROBERTSON, Director, Kansas
Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services, Child
Support Enforcement Agency; DOUG
NOLAN, Kansas Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services,
Child Support Enforcement Agency,
in his personal and official
capacities; KAYE A. LONG, Kansas
Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services, Child
Support Enforcement Agency, in her
personal and official capacities;
HOWARD COATNEY, MSW,
LSCSW, Clinical Social Worker,
Therapist, Consultant, Pastoral Care
and Counseling Intern, Vineyard
Christian Fellowship of Kansas City,
in his personal and assumed official
capacities; CHARLES O.
ROSSOTTI, Commissioner, Internal
Revenue Service, in his official
capacity; PAUL O’NEILL, Secretary
of the United States Department of
the Treasury, in his official capacity;
WADE F. HORN, Assistant Secretary
for Children and Families, United
States Department of Health and
Human Services, in his official
capacity; K. KING BURNETT,
President, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws; JOHN ASHCROFT, United
States Attorney General,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY , HARTZ , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Yericho Yisrael, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order dismissing his amended complaint brought to redress violations of his rights
caused by orders issued by a Kansas state divorce court. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
We provide only a brief summary of the underlying facts essential to our
discussion. Mr. Yisrael’s wife moved to Kansas from the family home in
Tennessee, taking the couple’s children with her. Once in Kansas, she filed for a
divorce and sought orders for child custody and support. Mr. Yisrael declined to
submit to the jurisdiction of the State of Kansas. Accordingly, the Kansas state
court ruled that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over him so it could not enter
orders pertaining to property division and spousal maintenance. The Kansas state
court determined, however, that it did have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage,
to enter an order awarding custody of the children to Mr. Yisrael’s former wife, to
provide for child visitation with Mr. Yisrael, and to require Mr. Yisrael to pay
child support. Mr. Yisrael did not participate in the divorce proceedings except to
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make a limited appearance to challenge jurisdiction. He did not appeal the
divorce court’s decree. Instead, he filed the underlying action in a Kansas federal
district court, alleging that the divorce proceedings and all who participated in
them or facilitated them in some way violated his civil rights. He sought damages
under RICO and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986. He also brought claims
under Kansas state law for conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, libel, and fraud. In addition, he requested declaratory relief. The
federal district court dismissed the case.
Mr. Yisrael appeals. He asserts that the federal court was required to
evaluate whether the Kansas state court had jurisdiction to enter its orders in the
divorce proceedings and that the jurisdictional issue is separate and apart from the
merits of the divorce orders. He further maintains that once the district court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the state-court’s orders, its additional rulings
were void. The defendants-appellees urge this court to affirm all of the district
court’s rulings. Mr. Yisrael fully addressed all of those arguments in his six
voluminous reply briefs, which were filed with court permission.
Standards of Review
We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union , 314 F.3d 468, 473
(10th Cir. 2002). We also review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for
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failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, using the same standard applied by the district court. Ordinance 59
Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Interior Sec’y , 163 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir.
1998). “We accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations, and view those facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc. , 144 F.3d 1302, 1304
(10th Cir. 1998). Because plaintiff is representing himself on appeal, his
pleadings will be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
Analysis
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the
United States Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to entertain claims for review of
state-court judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman ,
460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
The doctrine “applies to all state-court judgments, including those of intermediate
state courts.” Kenmen Eng’g , 314 F.3d at 473, 478. It also applies to claims
“inextricably intertwined” with a state-court judgment. Id. at 475. If a plaintiff
could have raised a constitutional issue in a direct appeal of the state-court order,
he may not bring that claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to modify the
state-court judgment. Facio v. Jones , 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991).
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To determine if Rooker-Feldman applies, we look to the relief Mr. Yisrael
seeks. Kenmen Eng’g , 314 F.3d at 476. He requests a federal-court judgment
setting aside the Kansas divorce orders. See, e.g., Reply Br. to Judicial
Defendants, at 22 (“Yisrael never asked for appellate review to change or modify
the Kansas State Court Orders, but rather to declare it [sic] null and void.”).
Mr. Yisrael argues emphatically that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the
federal court can grant him relief without evaluating the merits of the state-court
orders. But because the relief he seeks from the federal court is an order setting
aside the state-court orders, his federal claims are inextricably intertwined with
those orders. See Kenmen Eng’g , 314 F.3d at 476-77 (holding federal claims
were inextricably intertwined with state-court order because relief sought by
federal-court plaintiff was ruling vacating state-court order). Therefore, we
conclude that the federal district court correctly applied Rooker-Feldman and held
that it was without jurisdiction to review any rulings by the Kansas state court.
We now turn to the remainder of the federal district court’s rulings. We
must reject Mr. Yisrael’s view that once the district court determined it lacked
jurisdiction over the state-court orders, its further holdings were moot. To the
contrary, Mr. Yisrael’s claims against the defendants were independent of his
request to declare the Kansas state court’s orders null and void.
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As noted above, Mr. Yisrael’s claims against all defendants were based on
their actions related to the divorce case. We have carefully reviewed the
numerous and lengthy briefs submitted by the parties, as well as the record on
appeal. Applying the standards set out above, we affirm the order dismissing the
amended complaint and closing the case for the same reasons stated in the district
court’s cogent and succinct order dated February 7, 2003.
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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