Rodriquez v. Snedeker , 143 F. App'x 974 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 11, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHNNY RODRIQUEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 04-2161
(D.C. No. CIV-03-1347 RB DJS)
PATRICK SNEDEKER, Warden, Lea
(New Mexico)
County Correctional Facility;
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER *
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Johnny Rodriguez applies pro se for a certificate of appealability (COA) of
the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), we see no
basis for an appeal, deny a COA, and dismiss the appeal.
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
*
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument.
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
335-36 (2003). A COA can issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. “The COA determination under
§ 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Id. at 336. “This threshold inquiry does not require
full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.
In fact, the statute forbids it.” Id. While Mr. Rodriguez is not required to prove
the merits of his case in his application for a COA, he must demonstrate
“something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good
faith” on his part. Id. at 338 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Mr. Rodriguez pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled
substance in New Mexico state court and was convicted by a jury of trafficking
the controlled substance of heroin. He also admitted to previously being
convicted of four felony crimes. He was classified as an habitual offender and
sentenced to nineteen years imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal. He then petitioned the federal district court for post-conviction relief,
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raising 1) insufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for trafficking
heroin, 2) improper admission of statements that he trafficked heroin, and 3)
erroneous admission at trial of evidence of three prior felony convictions. The
magistrate judge proposed findings and recommended that the petition be
dismissed. Mr. Rodriguez filed objections, but the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the petition.
Mr. Rodriguez contends the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that
he trafficked heroin. The New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the conviction
because there was testimony from an undercover officer that he sold heroin to Mr.
Rodriguez. Reviewing the record, the court of appeals found that all the
substantive elements of the crime of trafficking were proven at trial beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (relevant
question is whether, viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could find all essential elements proved beyond a reasonable
doubt). The magistrate judge correctly concluded that the state court’s decision
was proper under federal law, and that the conviction was based on sufficient
evidence. In a related contention, Mr. Rodriguez asserts the trial court erred in
permitting into evidence statements that he trafficked heroin when he in fact was
merely a user, and that the state “use[d] statements of so called officials to
fabricate evidence.” Because he provided no further information in support of
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his allegation, the magistrate judge found that his argument was conclusory and
insufficient to support his claim, a conclusion with which we agree.
Mr. Rodriguez also contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
three prior felony convictions, for drug possession, trafficking, and racketeering,
and as a result the jury was tainted against him in violation of due process and
equal protection. Mr. Rodriguez testified at trial. The trial court permitted the
admission of his prior convictions but not the nature of the convictions. It
instructed the jury that the convictions should only be considered for the limited
issue of his credibility. The court of appeals held the trial court had properly
weighed the probity of the evidence versus its prejudicial value as it was required
to do under state law. It agreed that the prior convictions were relevant to Mr.
Rodriguez’s credibility, which was a central issue in the case.
Noting that federal courts have “long permitted the government to impeach
the testimony of a criminal defendant who takes the witness stand in the same
manner as any other witness, including reference to prior convictions,” United
States v. Haslip, 160 F.3d 649, 654 (10th Cir. 1998), the magistrate judge
concluded the state court’s decision was not contrary to established federal law.
Because we are reviewing a state court evidentiary ruling, we may not grant
habeas relief unless the ruling renders “the trial so fundamentally unfair as to
constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.” Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d
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610, 618 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). “[W]e will not disturb a
state court's admission of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts unless the
probative value of such evidence is so greatly outweighed by the prejudice
flowing from its admission that the admission denies defendant due process of
law.” Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled
on other grounds by Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). In light of the
importance of Mr. Rodriguez’s credibility and the state court’s limitations
regarding the nature of the prior convictions and the narrow purpose for which
they could be considered, we are satisfied that the ruling on balance was not
contrary to federal constitutional law.
Mr. Rodriguez also contends his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were
violated because the investigation in his case “starte[d] through another person”
and the officers should have obtained permission to investigate him instead. He
raised these issues in his response to the state’s motion to dismiss this petition
below, and in his objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendation, but they were not addressed by the magistrate judge or the
district court. He also maintains the district court failed to consider his addiction
to heroin. These allegations are conclusory and unsupported, and we are thus
unable to consider them. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113-14 (10th Cir.
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1991). 1
We have carefully reviewed the record of these proceedings, the magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendation, and the order of the district court.
We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s
resolution of the constitutional claims presented. We therefore DENY Mr.
Rodriguez’s request for a certificate of appealability, and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
Mr. Rodriguez also raises the new argument that he was unlawfully
1
searched and arrested. We will not consider on appeal issues not raised or
addressed below. See Walker v. Mather, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, Mr. Rodriguez provides no facts which would support these claims.
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